Neri: 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum Chag. Sameach everyone and happy almost Passover and Easter. With the holidays nearly upon us, I thought it would be a good time to touch base with our dear friend Tal Shalev, the chief political correspondent for Walla News. She and I broke down the recent Netanyahu-Trump summit meeting in Washington this week, the whole deep state conspiracy issue here in Israel, just to be clear, the Qatar Gate investigation, and we ended with a political check-in on both the state of the Netanyahu coalition and the opposition. This was, as always, a wide-ranging and free-flowing conversation, so let's get Tal Shalev Hi Tal, welcome back to the podcast.

Tal: 0:56

Hi Neri, how are you?

Neri: 0:58

I'm doing okay, tal, but you know as well as I do that Passover is just a few days away. Just for the record, we're recording this on Wednesday afternoon, tel Aviv time. So really just a few more days and then the holidays, as they're called here, will be upon us. How are you feeling? How are you doing before the Chagim? Any big plans for next week?

Tal: 1:17

Well, you know, never a dull moment. So let's wait and see if the holidays are real holidays or as part of the whole chaos surrounding us or swifting us, what is supposed to be peaceful and calm, khol Am know, a holiday like Passover, which is all about freedom, right? So a constant tension between you know, the need to lead a normal life and to you know, breathe and do things that are outside of day-to-day politics, and between the fact that you know we're in a very abnormal situation. So that's a constant tension which I think we'll be dealing with next week as well.

Neri: 2:16

Definitely a constant tension every day for the past 18 months, and some would say even before the past 18 months, even before the war. But that's another story. But you're right, I was thinking back to last Pesach last year and there were barely any flights. The war was really still in full swing, unlike now, which is a very different war, and it seemed like the whole country kind of came together. There's a much stronger sense of unity. Last year, you know, there was an empty chair next to the table for the hostages, a lot of yellow, at least in my family's Passover Seder politicized. Even the hostage issue shouldn't be political at all. That was what I was thinking of in terms of the contrast between this year and last year, that the politics have actually come back in a really bad way. But I was going to ask Tal, what do you know that I don't about Holamued? It's supposed to be a time of no politics. I think a lot of the politicians are going to be flying away on vacation. What kind of news are you expecting next week?

Tal: 3:28

I wish, I wish. I mean, I'm just saying this is such a crazy. We live in such crazy times. I don't know about anything specific, I'm just saying, as I know the tempo of my work, I'll be grateful if all of the politicians take a month away, a month. They can take a month vacation.

Neri: 3:48

Right.

Tal: 3:50

Unfortunately, we live under, you know, the Bibi regime, and the Bibi regime is very hectic and finds it very hard to lay down. It's true that this is an extremely religious government and the Knesset is on vacation, on its spring recess, and even this week you can start feeling how like the country is slowly, slowly, you know, slowing down ahead of the holidays. But you know I'm just preparing myself for the worst.

Neri: 4:17

Yeah, that's a. That's a good way to to approach our, our line of work, although I will be telling my bosses not here that everything will be completely, completely quiet. Everyone's off. There won't be any news, let's hope for the best.

Tal: 4:29

Fingers crossed, I'm rooting for you.

Neri: 4:31

Yeah, I'm rooting for me too. I'm looking forward to the hug. But let's get down to business and Netanyahu. He was in the White House a few days ago for another summit meeting with Donald Trump, their second in two months. This one, I dare say, was a surprise summit. It wasn't planned. And then I was, of course, in Hungary late last week and this past weekend, and then he was called to Washington to talk mostly about tariffs and Iran, but also a little bit about Gaza and Turkey. So first question to you, tal you're a veteran of these diplomatic trips. What did you make of this quickie one? It wasn't the best White House visit for Bibi, was it?

Tal: 5:13

To say the least. I would probably rate it amongst you know his top five bad visits to the White House, at least the way you know, at least from what we know now and you know from what was televised that not very short encounter in the Oval Office. Netanyahu did not evolve from this meeting strengthened or bolstered, as he has used his meetings with President Trump in the past. So you know the way it was televised here. Netanyahu did not emerge as King Bibi or King America. On the contrary, I think he was quite ambushed there by the president with his comment about the direct talks with Iran, even if it was coordinated in advance and Netanyahu wasn't caught in the dart. This was Netanyahu's thing, you know this is to talk about. I mean, just like the irony of thinking how Netanyahu would react if President Obama or President Biden would be sitting next to him in the Oval Office and announcing he's opening direct talks with Iran. And you know Netanyahu's baby, and one that he has been very much nourishing in the past few months, is an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear program, but also the comments about Turkey and Erdogan, which you know are contrary to statements that Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials have been making about the Turkish influence in the post-Assad Syria In that question. In that response, president Trump basically told Netanyahu well, you got to be reasonable.

Tal: 6:57

So I think that, at large, you know, one of the reasons that Netanyahu, you know, cherishes his White House visits is because of the image it impacts in Israel, the way it televised in Israel. So this is one of the you know, I can't remember a visit which was so humiliating for him, at least on the outside. Of course there might be understandings on the inside that we do not know about, but at least you know there's one good thing about President Trump being so eccentric that you know the rifts are just out in the open. There's no daylight that Netanyahu will not necessarily like. And even the excuse that Netanyahu gave, the main excuse, which was the tariffs even there, and even though Netanyahu offered to succumb, basically succumb to President Trump and remove all tariffs here in Israel and pay back I don't know what he said there $4 billion. Even on that issue, which was presented as the primary goal of the trip, netanyahu didn't come home with any achievement at all.

Neri: 8:10

That's right. It was quite a scene, that hour-long Oval Office, essentially a press conference. So they were sitting there taking questions from a very rowdy, well Israeli diplomatic press and then also the White House press.

Tal: 8:24

Yeah, well, I just want to mention that. You know there was supposed there was a real press conference scheduled that was supposed to take place after the meeting, in which I think questions would have been distributed in a more even way and Netanyahu would probably get questions, more questions about what happens, what's happening in Israel while he's abroad. These are the, you know, the attempt to sack the head of the Shimbad Security Service and other issues that are burning here today, and I think I don't know, but I think Netanyahu was the one who wanted to ditch that kind of traditional press conference and, by you know, having the press conference in the Oval Office, it's totally, it was totally President Trump's show and Netanyahu, at least the way I perceived it, was basically just a status.

Neri: 9:17

Yeah, in English, basically an extra, an extra in Trump's, trump's movie or play. That's a really interesting theory. I hadn't actually thought about that. So he wanted it more to be focused on Trump's issues and less the Israeli press asking him.

Tal: 9:33

Well, yes, you know, netanyahu hasn't given a press conference in Israel in I don't know over at least over half a year. So it just continues the trend right.

Neri: 9:44

He doesn't want answers journalists, but also for the public to actually hold their leader to account. But I was going to say it was interesting. I don't think I've ever seen Netanyahu sit quietly without saying anything for so long in a room.

Speaker 3: 10:14

I mean really, and like you said, even on the Iran issue.

Neri: 10:20

if President Obama or President Biden or anyone else other than Trump had sat there and said, oh yeah, we're going to negotiate a deal with Iran, I bet we would have gotten a little bit more from Bibi Netanyahu pushing back against that idea. But obviously Trump, like you said, is eccentric that's a nice word for it. And also the Turkey issue. I was looking at Netanyahu's body language and face when Trump answered that question. He's like you know they're both, they're both my friends, and you know he's looking at Bibi. He's like yeah, you need to be reasonable. It's like OK, that's not. The messaging, like you said, coming out of the Netanyahu government about Turkey in Syria remains to be seen if Trump can can mediate that issue, and I mean correct me if I'm wrong. The hostage issue in Gaza in general, almost both leaders basically just kind of skipped over it. It was very general responses, nothing really concrete, right?

Tal: 11:17

Yes, so I did notice President Trump's statement that he hopes that the war will be over in a short matter of time. I don't remember the exact, exact verb, but he did, let's say at least he did not embrace with full power the Israeli campaign and preparations for a full scale attack on Gaza. He was more about we're still trying to end it Now. I think the most evident thing for me between the first press conference, or the first Netanyahu-Trump summit, and the second Netanyahu-Trump summit is where the president's attention is. So in the first summit it was all about the hostages and the Gaza Riviera. In the second summit he was all about mainly about Iran and the tariffs. And that's just to show, a the president's attention span. B how much you know credibility we should give to all of these statements. But C it all and you know.

Tal: 12:21

It just shows that you know the enthusiasm that the administration had when it first entered office in June, which was in January, which was a big source of hope for the Israeli hostages families. Well, you don't see that anymore. Steve Witkoff has now been appointed to, you know, lead the negotiations with Iran, with Iran. So you're not doing the same thing at the same time, unless I don't know about some secret plan by Witkoff to enable the release of the hostages through negotiations about the Iranian nuclear program, but I think it was quite striking how that was on the top of the president's agenda when he entered office. And here we are I don't know what is it three months or four months later and he's already moved on and he passed through Russia and Ukraine in the middle right. So I think that was very striking for me. It's just not on the top of his agenda.

Neri: 13:18

Right, steve Witkoff, trump's special envoy, originally to the Middle East and primarily Gaza. Then Witkoff was Well, apparently to the Middle East and primarily.

Tal: 13:26

Gaza, then Witkoff was Well apparently to everywhere right.

Neri: 13:29

Well, that's exactly it. Then he was tasked with bringing peace to Ukraine and the Ukraine-Russia war, and now Witkoff is going to Oman, likely on Saturday, to negotiate with the Iranians. Each one of these global crises would be a massive lift for any diplomat. To try to do all three at the same time, that's a lot. So, like you said, it's an issue of attention and bandwidth.

Tal: 13:53

You know, good luck, right, I'm not, I'm all for negotiations instead of war. But I just think that you know, also in Israel, right, netanyahu kind of dissolved the negotiation team as part of his efforts to undermine the Stimbet security service. He kind of pushed out the head of the Mossad and he pushed out the head of the Stimbet and he assigned, you know, the file of the hostage negotiations to Ron Dermer and Dermer, just like Witkoff, is involved in I don't know 10 other big burning issues. And in that respect I think the hostages are being neglected and their families are being neglected. And I feel, you know, on the personal level, to connect where we started our conversation, it's like I feel very much guilty of normalizing. You know, not me personally, but I think that this is a process of normalizing an abnormal situation.

Neri: 14:54

Very abnormal situation and I think the lack of attention and pressure by the Trump administration on the hostage issue, but really the Gaza issue. My conclusion is that they're backing the Netanyahu government's position, which is we're going to resume the war and try to quote, unquote, apply pressure on Hamas to get Hamas to release hostages, without any commitment by Israel to end the war.

Tal: 15:23

Unless there's something that we don't know right. It was very interesting to see that a few, you know, just a short while before the Netanyahu Trump summit, there was a phone call between French President Macron, who was in Egypt with President Sisi and King Abdullah. There is an effort to try and find a way out of the war and of course, we have to wait. I mean, you know, President Trump does have a dream of breaking some kind of deal with Saudi Arabia, so I just think we have. Apparently we have to wait for the White House attention span to go back there.

Neri: 16:00

Yeah, I mean you know, like you said, it changes day by day. Yeah, I mean you know, like you said, it changes day by day. So tomorrow it might be front and center and then by Friday it'll be gone.

Tal: 16:10

Exactly. But remember, the first time Netanyahu was in the White House, the president said he would be going to Saudi Arabia within weeks and we've been hearing about his trip to Saudi Arabia within weeks. But here the visit is not completed, you know, is not happening yet. So my, you know it might be wishful thinking, but my hope is that ahead of his visit to Saudi Arabia, the president will want to have some achievement in the Middle East and that could be part of a big deal of ending the war.

Neri: 16:41

Very interesting theory. I think he's supposed to be in Saudi Arabia next month, in May at some point. Maybe I'll believe it when I see it frankly, I think there's less going on than people imagine.

Neri: 16:55

Obviously there's still things going on behind the scenes. I don't want to make it seem like there's no diplomacy happening, but all these various reports and leaks I take with a grain of salt. But I've been wrong before, so I'm willing to be wrong again, especially on this issue and especially to get the hostages back. And just a final point on the Trump baby summit the reason he was there, the tariffs I think that was useful for both parties. Tariffs I think that was useful for both parties. Right?

Neri: 17:23

Trump got the first foreign leader to DC, to the White House, to quote unquote negotiate over removing the tariffs. Bibi was very happy to be the first foreign leader to be there and talk about all the other issues on the agenda. But in terms of brass, tacks and Tachlis, I think that Neahu said afterwards yeah, we're going to work to close or eliminate the trade deficit between the US and Israel. Now I work for a quasi-financial newspaper called the Financial Times. We looked into this. It's nearly impossible. Israel doesn't really import all that much from America and it exports to America certain things and that's the reason why there's a deficit. And even before this government in Israel took away all the tariffs on American imports. It was already, I think, 95 or 99% gone for years, so I'm not quite sure what Netanyahu can do to appease Trump on the tariff issue.

Tal: 18:22

Another thing that striked me watching that meeting that probably didn't get enough attention here in Israel was that statement by Trump when he told Netanyahu we're already giving Israel $4 billion a year and, of course, the focus needs to be on the next MOU, which, you know. Under any other administration I would say it shouldn't be a problem, but since this administration is in the midst of, you know, a trade war with other countries and is unconventional, then I think Israel should be looking much more seriously to start and open the next MOU negotiations because, given, you know, some of Trump's statements, it doesn't seem like he necessarily will give us everything that we got from the Obama administration and, if so, he will probably ask for things in exchange, because he is a dealmaker.

Neri: 19:16

That's a great point, tal, and I think, out of anything that should worry the Israeli I mean public, but definitely the Israeli government more than anything, the fact that Trump is, a definitely transactional and B is definitely aware of the fact that the US provides what $3.8 billion a year in defense aid to Israel as part of this memorandum of understanding. Basically, you know the US-Israel defense deal, defense pact, whatever you want to call it, understanding. Basically, you know the US-Israel defense deal, defense pact, whatever you want to call it, and it expires in 2028. And it takes a long time to negotiate these things and it's not all clear to me, and it shouldn't be a given to anyone here in Israel, that Trump will re-up and provide the same level of military support to Israel.

Neri: 20:03

Like you said what do we get out of it? We already give you $4 billion, so you need to give us something. Yeah, that could be a very rude awakening for Israelis and for this Israeli prime minister. But moving right along, tal one thing Netanyahu and Trump likely agreed on was this whole idea, concept, conspiracy of deep states. You probably were watching, as I was.

Neri: 20:28

Yesterday, tuesday, at the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, a hearing took place over whether the government can or cannot fire Rodenbar, as you said, the head of the Shin Bet, the domestic intelligence agency.

Neri: 20:41

The judges in the case basically punted and gave both sides a few more weeks to find a compromise on this very important issue of you know who's going to be running this internal security agency. Will Netanyahu be able to appoint someone, maybe more to his liking? And it's not clear, and remains to be seen, whether the government will actually adhere to the ruling, meaning that they can't replace Barr before April 20th. So a few more weeks to find this compromise. But I think the larger point is that Netanyahu is now very clearly in open warfare with the Shin Bet, after he's already gone after the courts, the attorney general, the police, the army, the media I'm sure I'm missing something or someone, but basically all the institutions of state here, and calling it a deep state conspiracy against him and his government. We've seen this movie before in other places, but knowing what you know about Netanyahu, how far do you think he will take all of this in terms of his battle against what he calls a deep state here?

Tal: 21:40

Well, first of all, I think he's taken it quite far. So up until now, right, he's the first prime minister to be convicted in a criminal court Not convicted, indicted, indicted, of course, in a criminal court. And since 2017, when the investigation started, 2016, 2017, he has been basically waging a war against the state, and you can include anything, everything that has happened to us inside that, if it's the attacks against the police, and then the justice ministry and the five election campaigns and the judicial overhaul which his government is promoting. So I think the deep state is basically, you know, a good slogan for something that Netanyahu has been doing for many, many years, even before he knew it was called the deep state, and he's just moved from. You know, after the judicial overhaul, he's basically now in the midst of a security overhaul and, of course, he is inspired by President Trump and Elon Musk, whom he meets regularly during his Washington visits, and when he came back from his first Washington visit last in February, he did fuel his attempts to sack both Ronen Baal, the Shindad Security Service head, and Ghaliba Ravmiyar, the attorney general.

Tal: 23:05

So far, it seems that the Supreme Court or at least on the case of Wonen Bar, the Supreme Court is protecting, or at least trying to protect, wonen Bar.

Tal: 23:18

This is quite a, you know, peculiar situation, I have to admit. You know there are dozens of thousands of Israelis who have protested in the streets in the name of democracy and the name of the head of the secret service, onenbal, which is quite a peculiar situation in which only Netanyahu could have created, as I said, an abnormal situation. But Netanyahu has been wanting to fire Wonenbao basically since the summer as part of a big plan to replace all of the top security at Cologne and have a much more loyal and agreeable top security brass. Should, or you might, or you could, or you should, write a book about Netanyahu's relationships with the head of the security services, whether it's the army or the Shin Bet or the Mossad, specifically the Shin Bet. Netanyahu has a very bad history with Shin Bet heads. Almost all of them who have served under Netanyahu have came out against him in the past few years in one way or another and warned that he is a danger to democracy.

Neri: 24:26

On that point I have to interject. It's not just the Shin Bet chiefs, it's, I think, literally every IDF chief of staff going back to the 90s has come out against him.

Tal: 24:35

True, it's also the defense ministers. There's no defense minister.

Neri: 24:39

And most of the Mossad chiefs it's literally every security chief going back probably 30 years have come out and said, yeah, this guy is a danger to well Israeli democracy in the country. Even the ones like Bogia Alon, who was IDF chief of staff, and Yoav Galant, who wasn't chief of staff but a senior general and then defense minister obviously Both of them are now his biggest critics and they were in the Likud. So I don't think there's one exception.

Tal: 25:10

There are some exceptions in the Mossad, I think Yossi Cohen.

Neri: 25:13

Give it time.

Tal: 25:15

It's part of an exception, perhaps the current Mossad chief, but yes, there's basically almost no exception. And some of these former Shin Bet chiefs are now coming out and explaining exactly why they say he's giving the explanations, why they think he's a danger to democracy, and that is because Netanyahu has no limits and has no borders and has asked them over the years to do things that are for his political and personal benefit and not and have nothing to do with security. Even just you know the most simple example right, netanyahu's constant it's not Netanyahu himself, it's Netanyahu's family constant demands, growing demands from the Shin Bet security service, just to you know, to secure them and their households. And you know, you have Yair Netanyahu, his eldest son, in Miami with three Shin Bet bodyguards and at the same time, he is spreading conspiracy theories against the Shin Bet who didn't wake up his father on the 7th of October. So, basically, this is a culmination.

Tal: 26:29

If this, you know, this event or this fiasco with Ronenba is a culmination of so many inner battles that Netanyahu has been waging against the Shin Bet in the past few years. And again, he just has no borders, he has no limits anymore. So, as part of his current battle against Ronenbal. He has been, you know, leaking confidential letters written by Ronenbal something that has never happened. You know, I don't remember anything like it the prime minister leaking personal correspondence with the head of the Shinbara security service, and he has been spreading conspiracy theories, trying to, you know, brush off the Qatar Gate scandal and with whataboutism and kind of staying Ronen Bar.

Tal: 27:22

And of course, the main thing that he's trying to do is that he's trying to portray Ronen Bar and not only Ronen Bar, also Herzliya Levy and the army, as you know, responsible for the 7th of October, and to shed all responsibility himself. So all of this is like a perfect storm uh happening right now, uh, in igreo, and of course, you have the supreme court involved and embroiled now, and that brings in the other storm, which is, you know, netanyahu's government's relentless attempt to weaken the Supreme Court and threaten, you know, undermine its authority and undermine its decisions. So we really are in the midst of, I think, one of the biggest internal storms that we've seen in Israel, probably, you know, just like before the 7th of October, during the judicial overhaul. And this is all happening, of course, when Netanyahu plans to send the army, or at least has plans to send the army for another war, while you know, israel is once again shattered down or being challenged internally by these internal fights and divisions.

Neri: 28:36

This is why I said, in a weird way, last Passover was as difficult as it was and it was difficult, I don't want to sugarcoat. It was more uplifting and unifying, just in terms of the overall vibe here in Israel, than this Passover to the overall vibe here in Israel, than this Passover, which so you know my test, my sad test, is actually the Yom Ha'atzmaut, which will be next month, in a month by now.

Tal: 29:03

Independence. Day Less than a month from here, the Independence Day and, of course, the day before which is the Memorial Day for the bereaved soldiers, which was extremely difficult in 2023, before the war, in the midst of the judicial overhaul. It was extremely difficult in 2024, with hundreds of know. The scenes yesterday in the Supreme Court, which were quite unbelievable, of shouting in the Supreme Court, are going to probably repeat, might repeat themselves and, you know, in some of the same cemeteries, and these are very, you know, heartbreaking days for Israeli society and consciousness.

Neri: 29:57

It is, it is, but, like you said, I think this year will be even more difficult, not only because another year of war has passed, but because the consensus that we had last year has been broken deliberately. So and Tal, you may not remember this, but I do Back in 2023, I was writing an article I forget for who about the judicial overhaul and the tech protests and the economic protests and the reservists refusing to report for duty, and basically everything was looking like it was heading off a cliff here and you told me you posed it as a question. It's like you know that Yahoo, essentially, is destroying everything he's built over three decades, more or less, you know, at the top of this country running this country, and there was no clear answer as to why.

Speaker 3: 31:07

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Tal: 31:52

So I actually have the answer now.

Neri: 31:54

Okay.

Tal: 31:55

Why he's doing it for his own political and personal survival, just as I mean, I think, in many ways, you know, the post-7th of October. Netanyahu is a ruthless and reckless leader who will and we've seen it in so many examples if it's, you know, the budget, the very fat budget, which mainly is fat for his sectorial partners to keep his coalition together, and the way that he has, you know, turned the hostages issue into a political issue, and the way he is prolonging the war in order to keep his coalition together. So I think I understand why nathaniel is willing to um today. I understand why nathaniel is willing to take, you know, tear down everything that is good in this country's fabric, because it's what keeps him in power.

Neri: 32:55

Yeah, I mean, I guess that's the most direct and obvious answer. It just I don't know. It seems insane to want to burn this place down so you can rule over the ashes, to borrow a quote from Game of Thrones. By the way, we saw yesterday I kind of alluded to this the scenes at the Supreme Court for the Ronan Barr hearing. I'm pretty sure Netanyahu sent in supporters and, in some cases, yes, bereaved families, families of the fallen, to go in and yell at the judges, to yell at the former Shin Bet chief and the former Mossad chief and the former police commissioner who showed up to the hearing and they were yelling at them.

Neri: 33:37

And, by the way, the judges, you know you're responsible for October 7th. You're responsible as if there was no prime minister here on October 7th 2023. You know, it all seemed very, very orchestrated. And yet another brick in the wall here, you know, going after institutions of the state Tal we have to get into Qatargate, because I get asked about his main political advisor and Elie Feldstein, bibi's former military spokesperson, by the way, after October 7th 2023, and allegations that they received money from Qatar to allegedly lobby on their behalf or improve their image in Israel as they were working in the prime minister's office. This is very important. They were working in the prime minister's office.

Tal: 34:38

And again one of them. One of them we know we we only know at this point about Elie Selstein getting money while he was working in the prime minister's office.

Neri: 34:50

Correct Right. They're investigating whether Uri actually received money, and that's that needs. That needs to be shown. But I guess, to start off with this, when your family or friends come to you, talyn, and ask okay, what is this Qatargate scandal? How do you explain it to them so that they understand?

Tal: 35:07

it. I have to say that I think that Qatargate, the prime minister's office, is handled and managed today how it does not keep confidentiality rules at all and it does not succumb to security considerations at all. And it's more, like we say in Hebrew, which is a neighborhood. It's more like a hood than the place where the most important decisions in the country are supposed to be made. Netanyahu has been with him for many years and perhaps other advisors who are not direct employees of the prime minister's office, but still they are part of the prime minister's entourage and walk daily into the office. So the issue is Eddie Feldstein, who was Netanyahu's spokesperson, even though he didn't pass a security clearance, and why was he still there and how was he paid and how was this approved? And the issue is if Yonatan Uli is a private contractor of Netanyahu, then how is it possible that he can also get, perhaps, or at least allegedly be, involved with other countries? And the issue of Qatar itself I think it's a bit more complicated. A because Qatar is complicated. It's not just an enemy country, it's not even defined by law as an enemy country, but it's also a country who has an extremely complex relationship with Israel and with the whole world and Israel as a country has been playing a double game with Qatar under Netanyahu for many, many years and I'm not sure that they have necessarily has a connection right.

Tal: 37:27

But there are many, many questions in the air about the whole policy that Netanyahu decided to move with the Qatari payments to Gaza. Now we know, you and I know, neri, that the reason there were Qatari payments to Gaza, or the reason they were enhanced, was because Netanyahu was keen on weakening the Palestinian Authority and he had to find a way to keep Gaza from, you know, falling apart or bursting when the Palestinian authorities stopped paying its officials inside Gaza. So in my opinion, there are a lot of things embroiled in Qatargate. But the big question if we put aside the question of the concept and then about the policy regarding Qatar, which is not a criminal question, it is a question. It might be a question for a national inquiry committee which Netanyahu refuses to establish, but I'm not sure it has any connection with the criminal documents that some of them allegedly show that Netanyahu himself was paid dozens of billions of dollars by the Qatari. We don't know if these documents are real. They haven't been authenticated.

Neri: 38:48

I don't believe it personally.

Tal: 38:51

Again, I don't know if you're there, but definitely there are many, many points that are unconnected and I'm not sure that they will be connected, but at least in the Israeli public conscience they are currently being connected all the time. You know it's not clear where this investigation is leading. And B because Netanyahu will not have a national inquiry or he won't even answer questions about Qatar. He'll only say on camera that Qatar is a complicated country, even though he himself had anti-Qatari messages during the war. So you know I've been going.

Tal: 39:30

Sometimes Netanyahu also had the interest. I've been going. Sometimes Netanyahu also had the interest. Netanyahu had the interest of strengthening Qatar sometimes, and sometimes he had an interest in weakening Qatar. But at large, I think it's part of the same thing that we talked about earlier. It's the fact that Netanyahu has no moral limits. Netanyahu and his surroundings have no more moral limits and the most important decision-making security. Decision-making is not necessarily made on security reasons, but rather on small political interests, and I think that's the essence of the party aides were kind of double dipping and benefiting on the side from clients like Qatar as they were advising the prime minister.

Neri: 40:19

And what was it? Last week Netanyahu said well, jonathan Urych you know he's a political advisor in the Likud party trying to make it seem like Urych wasn't an advisor in the prime minister's office. I think it's very clear legally that he is a government employee. Feldstein was working in the prime minister's office. How Feldstein was getting paid, I think is of critical importance in this case. Whether Ulrich or someone else in the prime minister's office set up the payment from Qatar via an American lobbyist so that it would reach Feldstein. All of that still remains to be seen. And, yes, look, if it's shown, if there's proof that Ulrich or again someone else arranged this payment to circumvent whatever government ethics rules were in place and got qatar to pay feldstein, I mean that's, that's unbelievable I think, letting us leaving aside the question of whether uli and maybe someone else, uh, were getting paid by qatar for for pr purposes, as they were working for the prime minister.

Tal: 41:29

It's unbelievable, even without you know, even just just from what we know, it's unbelievable, even without you know, even just just from what we know, it's unbelievable that Eddie Feldstein, while he was working in the prime minister's office whether he was getting money or not, or who was paying him he was physically working there. It's unbelievable that, at the same time, he would help Qatar spread its messages. And I dare to you know, we don't know what will come out of this Pandora box because this, all you know, the Qatar gate and this is also worth reminding is, you know, came out of the Pandora box of a different of the previous Feldstein affair.

Speaker 3: 42:10

Scandal yeah.

Tal: 42:11

Yeah, scandal in which Feldstein has already been indicted in court and Ullrich is also very strongly involved, which has to do with that attempt, the leak to the build about the alleged Hamas strategy memo.

Neri: 42:26

That's exactly right. So this I dare say again I think it's kind of common sense that the Qatargate scandal came out of this prior scandal from last fall where Feldstein, along with someone inside the military, stole classified documents, leaked it to the prime minister's advisors, who then gave it to the German newspaper the Bild to get it out in the kind of the bloodstream of the international media in order to undermine the movement here, to get the hostages back, to kind of solidify the arguments by Netanyahu and his camp that Hamas was essentially Hamas was not willing to release hostages, that it may even be trying to smuggle hostages across the Philadelphia corridor into Egypt, and in that sense it defended and upheld Netanyahu's argument that Israel couldn't leave the Philadelphia corridor. Again we're getting into the weeds. But there was a previous scandal involving classified materials leaks and basically influence operations by allegedly the prime minister's office against the Israeli public.

Tal: 43:40

Yeah.

Neri: 43:42

Yeah, like we said, it's complicated, but I think we did, hopefully a reasonable job trying to explain the broad strokes of it, and remains to be seen what can be proven and what can't be proven. Before we finish up Tal, let's do a little bit of a political check-in ahead of Passover, spring break. Let's start with the government, with the Netanyahu coalition. A few weeks ago, they very easily passed a budget that was big for them and likely gives them another year in power. Itamar Ben-Gur even came back from exile from Borges into the coalition after he left the government over the Gaza ceasefire deal back in late January. So the coalition is now back to full strength. What do you expect their priorities to be for the summer session? Is it the whole issue of the ultra-Orthodox military conscription issue? Is it the judicial overhaul? I mean, what do you expect from the coalition in the next couple of months?

Tal: 44:38

So the first and foremost issue on the coalition's table is, of course, the conscription crisis. Netanyahu basically has been promising the ultra-Orthodox parties over two and a half almost two years and a half that he's going to pass a conscription bill. This was one of their conditions, their prime conditions, of joining the government. They were supposed, according to their coalition agreements, this bill was supposed to be passed and approved before the first budget and since then Netanyahu has passed five budgets and each time the ultra-Orthodox parties, or at least part of them, come out with some kind of ultimatum and eventually they drop the ultimatum. That happened just last month, again the budget, and now supposedly there's another ultimatum. There won't be a bill or any progress with the bill within the next two weeks or until the Knesset comes back from recess next month. Then they will vote against the coalition. So that's one issue on the table. There have been tireless.

Neri: 45:47

Do you believe the alt-orthodox?

Tal: 45:49

I don't believe the alt-orthodox, I mean. A I don't think there'll be a bill because I think that the minimum that the ultra-Orthodox are willing to consider doesn't reach the minimum that the you know General Israeli public and most rich people will be willing to accept. So, a I don't think there will be a bill and B I mean I might believe the ultra-Orthodox parties. I just think that it's not their call. They just got the budget and they just got all of the money that they need to compensate for some of the money that has been taken away because of the conscription bill crisis. And I think that, essentially, the decision whether there will be an early election or not, well is traditionally has been Netanyahu's and it'll still stay Netanyahu's decision, and I don't see Netanyahu willingly giving up a year in power. That being said, there's a common assumption that we are entering an election year because the next budget, the 2026 budget, has to be approved by March 2026. It'll probably be a very difficult budget, just like this one, which will have much tax raises and other bad news for the general public, and Netanyahu will not want to pass that kind of budget in an election year. So the assumption is that you take the end of March 2026, and somewhere between now and then, netanyahu will decide to go to early election, but he will be the one who will want to choose. You know the agenda for the election Now. It could very well be you know, that he will decide that it's good for him to go to election with a fight with the ultra-Orthodox party and to present himself as someone who was not willing to give in to their demands vis-a-vis the conscription bill. I don't feel that he has enough or gained enough traction from the 7th of October for him to go to an early election yet. That being said, we could be surprised.

Tal: 48:00

Another thing that's going to be on the agenda for the coalition in the upcoming weeks or after the Senate recess will be the attempt to pass bills that have to do with the media. You have the communications minister, shlomo Kali, who has been waiting very patiently or rather impatiently, unpatiently to pass the bills to A close down or limit the independence of the Public Broadcast Association. He also has some plans to close the army radio. So that is going to be on the legislative agenda for and Netanyahu has embraced his plans, so that's probably going to be on the legislative agenda for the next few months, and the government is also trying to fire the attorney general. That has nothing necessarily to do with the Knesset, because it's a complicated legal and bureaucratic process, but the government is very keen on moving forward and firing Ghalibar and Rav Miara, so that will probably be at the top of the agenda for the next few weeks as well.

Neri: 49:11

Very interesting. And, by the way, I'd be remiss if I didn't remind you and our listeners, the last time you were on, you called it exactly right that Smotrich would not leave the government, would not leave the coalition, even if there was a ceasefire in Hosserziel in Gaza, thereby keeping Netanyahu's government intact. And even Benville, you know he left, but it was kind of understood that he was coming back at some point. So you're right. You're right back then, tal.

Tal: 49:39

I'm always right. Nene, I'm always right.

Neri: 49:42

This is why we like to have you on for the real tea, for the real dirt. Before we finish up, let's check in with the opposition such as it is, and I wanted to start with Yerri Golan. The opposition such as it is, and I wanted to start with Yair Golan. He's obviously the former deputy IDF chief of staff. He's a very outspoken critic of the government and a hero on October 7th when he went down south by himself to fight and rescue people. He also became a hero in another way last year when he finally finally merged the two left-wing parties, Labour and Meretz. When he finally finally merged the two left-wing parties, Labour and Meretz, they're now called the Democrats. Yair Golan is their leader and they're rising in the polls. So what do you think? Is it for real in terms of the Democrats and Golan?

Tal: 50:24

Yeah, Well, it's definitely. You know you can't say anything for real because we have no elections in sight and things can change during campaign, but he is the trend, is definitely the moment. He definitely has gained momentum and he's the trendiest one, the trendiest leader today in the center left. A because he's the newest leader in the center-left. I mean he's competing against Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, who are both considered, I would say, if I say mildly, failures, each in their own way, and Yair Golan is the only one who hasn't failed yet. B because he has a much more blunt and authentic style. He's not, as you know, polite and lovable as Benny Gantz and he is considered much more, I think, outspoken than Yair Lapid, who always suffers from, you know, this TV anchor image, while Yair Golan has his military history which kind of praises him always everywhere he goes, and the 7th of October heroism. So he is definitely very much representative of the trend and he's also, I think, representative of the support he's gaining. You know the support he's gaining. It just goes to show how fed up at least the liberal camp is with attempts to make peace with the other side.

Tal: 51:59

Yadon Golan is the most combative and, you know, militant leader among all of the opposition leaders, he's closest to the protest leaders. So I think it's real. But again, we're so far away from elections and I think his popularity, if we stay in the same way we are now we see Yael Golan, yael Lapid and Benny Gant in the center left that'll probably continue to gain popularity. But if there are changes, by any chance, one of them, you know, one of the changes that are being being floated in the air is the, the option that the Aydin coat might, you know, head a party, a joint party that could change the dynamics. So I think it's too early to call, but definitely if they send, you know, yair Lapid and Benny Gantz stay the way they are, then I do think that he will continue to gain traction.

Neri: 52:54

And I mean I have to ask do you think Gadi Aizenkot is built or, put another way, has the political talent to be the figurehead of a center-left merged party list between Gantz and Lapid and whoever else? Do you think Eisenkot can carry that?

Tal: 53:17

I know there are people who are skeptical about Daddy Eisenkot, but I think that he has the ability to appeal to a very broad audience. He comes from a different background and he has a different authenticity.

Speaker 3: 53:33

He's also very authentic is really.

Tal: 53:34

Yeah, israelis believe him and he's also. He's not as blunt as y'all and goland, but he also has a way of saying things that are much more clear-cut than y'all and, uh, benny guns and about you know his political and y' his political and his political capital.

Tal: 53:52

You know it's about advisors and it's about putting the right people around you and it's about wanting. So does he want to do it? I'm not sure that you know he will say that he wants to be prime minister, but if he is convinced him leading a party could make a change. I think that he is keen on change and I definitely can see that something as emergent.

Neri: 54:17

Yeah, there's only the small matter of convincing Benny Gantz to let his number two and running mate be the top leader, anything's possible in. Israeli politics, but that would be a big surprise.

Tal: 54:30

Again, I think it's too early to see how the Israeli political I mean Israelis love polls, but they really don't have any meaning right now.

Neri: 54:40

Yeah, I mean, on the issue of polls and this will be my final question Tal Naftali Bennett, the former prime minister. He took a break from politics back in 2022 after his coalition fell apart. Now he's plotting his comeback and, yes, in every poll this new unnamed party for now it's just called Naftali Bennett 2026, is doing very well and leading everyone, including Netanyahu and the Likud party. So I mean same question to you as before Is Naftali Bennett for real in terms of his public support, his candidacy to be prime minister? You know he does, or at least has the ability potentially to kind of straddle both, definitely the right and maybe even the center left.

Tal: 55:27

Yeah, so of course Naftali Bennett is the, you know, the hottest product on the shelves right now. You can see it in the polls.

Neri: 55:35

But yeah, but the shelf, the shelf of Israeli politics, it's, like you know, a supermarket in 1987, Soviet Union. There's, there's like four, there's four products.

Tal: 55:45

I just old enough to have seen Naftali Bennett spike in the polls and end with six seats or not even past the electoral threshold. So, a Naftali Bennett is always very good in the polls. B we are not campaigning yet and Bennett has been extremely selective about what he says things about and what he doesn't say anything about. For instance, for over a year of the judicial overhaul, naftali Bennett had nothing to say about that. And even in the hostage deal he has been, you know, vying away from issues that could cause him damage on each side or, you know, cause him to diminish support on each of the political spectrum. But in a campaign he won't be able to do so. By the way, he also hasn't given an interview to Israeli media, basically since he left, so he hasn't been asked difficult questions.

Tal: 56:43

I think his popularity A mainly represents the need or the will or the wishful thinking in Israel for a different leader, someone from the outside.

Tal: 56:55

But I'm not sure how it will, you know if it's sustainable in a campaign. The minute you start a campaign, you'll have to answer questions and give clear answers on them, answers on them, and it'll be very easy for right wingers or other right wing parties or from the coalition, for instance, to try and eat from his support from the right, and for the center left parties to try and eat from his support from the left. And the minute he loses traction, then you know. There's something also psychological in Israel, amongst the anti-Netanyahu camp, is that whenever someone seems to be the alternative, then just the fact that he's leading in the polls brings more people, or more voters or more supporters, because they see him as an alternative. But the minute if Naftali Bennett will not be over 20 seats, then he will not necessarily be perceived as an alternative to Netanyahu and then some of those votes might go back to other places. Again, we are far away or at least we might be far away from elections.

Tal: 58:00

It also depends on you know, who is Naftali Bennett going to put on his list. How is it going to look? There's also an option, not much discussed, but because supposedly they put it off the table. But you know, the most logical thing would be for Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman to join forces and to create a big right wing party. That would be an alternative for Alikur in two different parties. Then they once again are actually helping Netanyahu preserve himself as the biggest party instead of trying to challenge him in his own home court.

Neri: 58:38

Correct and that's also been in the ether Lieberman and Bennett, but the same issue as Gantz and the other side of the political ledger. Is Lieberman going to allow Naftali Ben to essentially be number one? He's going to have to.

Tal: 58:55

So at the moment it seems like no, but again, there's no reason for them to announce anything right now, when there are any elect right.

Tal: 59:05

So there should be both on the center-left, as you mentioned, between Yann Lapid and Benny Gantz, and on the right, the anti-Netanyahu right. There should be some strategic thinking and some strategic pressure from the anti-Netanyahu camp to reorganize themselves in a way that they can defeat Netanyahu. Because if you look, if the camp remains organized the way it has been in the past few years and that's the way it is right now then it'll be very easy for Netanyahu to keep in power. And there's you know this, the way the anti-Netanyahu camp is arranged right now did form a government in 2021, but it fell apart in 2022. They couldn't keep it together, they couldn't win the election and they couldn't bring down Netanyahu's government. So, in my opinion, the main challenge for the anti-Netanyahu camp is to think how to reorganize itself in a strategic way that leads to bringing down Netanyahu, and one of the ways to do that is to stop these stupid divisions, which are only based on personality and not an ideology, and to reorganize the political map.

Neri: 1:00:15

Yeah, egos, as always in Israeli politics, do a lot of the work, as opposed to say ideology or policy positions. Remains to be seen and, like you said, tal, elections are not on the horizon anytime soon most likely so we'll have to check back in with you when they really are, hopefully sooner rather than later. Let me just wish you and yours, Chag Sameach Hopefully it will be a quiet week next week, tal, so we can take a break and enjoy it. Enjoy the spring, chag Sameach, bye, bye, okay, thanks again to Tal Shalev, as always for her generous time and insights.

Tal: 1:00:47

Enjoy the spring. Chag Sameach.

Neri: 1:00:50

Bye, bye, okay. Thanks again to Tasha Lev, as always, for her generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so you can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And, most importantly, thank you for listening and Chag Sameach to all those celebrating. Thank you.