Neri: 0:03

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Our good friend Michael Milstein is back with us this week to discuss where the Gaza war is heading after the Israeli government approved plans for a major new offensive in the Strip that it says will finally defeat Hamas in the Strip that it says will finally defeat Hamas. Mikhail is, of course, a colonel in the IDF reserves and the former head of the Palestinian arena in Israeli military intelligence, an advisor to the IDF general responsible for the Palestinian territories and the head of the Palestinian Studies Center at the Delayan Center at Tel Aviv University. This was a really important and timely episode After 19 months of difficult war.

Neri: 0:48

Many people here and in many other places are concerned that the situation may only get worse in the coming weeks and months and, dare I say, years, as Michal and I get into in our conversation. The only hope perhaps is some diplomatic intervention at the last minute by the Trump administration, but barring that, we're likely looking at escalation. Let's get to Mikhail Nishnet. Hi Mikhail, welcome back to the podcast.

Michael: 1:20

Hi Nery, Thank you for having me again.

Neri: 1:24

It's my pleasure, mikhail. If you remember, last time you were on was way back in September, yeah, so it was both a very different time and also a lot of the same issues still at play, but it was definitely an inflection point in the war, and I think we're now at another inflection point in the war, so I very much wanted to have you on For the record for our listeners. We're recording this Thursday morning, tel Aviv time. President Donald Trump last night said there may be some big announcements about Gaza coming in the next 24 hours. No one quite knows what he meant and what it could be and, believe me, I've checked, but I personally don't think it's going to be a big ceasefire of a hostage deal. It might be something smaller, hopefully, but as always, our listeners may be smarter than we are by the time this episode comes out. So just bear that in mind.

Neri: 2:14

But leaving aside the US President Mikhail, the Israeli cabinet earlier this week took a big decision. It approved plans for a new massive and expanded offensive into Gaza, which would potentially see the IDF reoccupy, reconquer the entirety of the Strip and, according to the government, finally finally destroy Hamas once and for all and force it into submission after 19 months of war, no less. We'll get into the details of the plan in just a bit, trust me. But first question to you, mishael what was your initial reaction to the cabinet's decision and this looming new offensive?

Michael: 2:57

Well, you know, I cannot say nearly that I was surprised, but me as a lot of Israelis, maybe the majority of Israelis we elaborated two points. First of all, and we will speak about it, I'm not sure at all that I, you know, in a very clear manner, I do understand the whole concept of this operation. And second, and this is more important for most of the Israelis, we do not understand what will be with the hostages. You know, it seems that this term in Israel, very popular conceptia, the misconception that was actually, you know, the background or the roots of the failure of October the 7th, actually repeat itself. And the new concept is that we can defeat Hamas, occupy all Gaza, but on the same time, also release all the hostages. And you know, it's really it's.

Michael: 4:00

I don't think that there is anyone in Israel who really believes that you can implement that, and we want the leadership to speak with us in a very clear manner. If you decided to prefer the war in Gaza or the goal of defeating Hamas, say that in a very clear manner and also admit that actually, actually, you sacrifice the, the, the hostages. But you know, right now, we, we, we do not really know what, what is the purpose, or the exact purpose, and we'll speak immediately about the meaning of occupying, or gaza and uh. That's why, you know, even a week after, after the almost a week after the announcement, it seems that there are much more question marks than answers.

Neri: 4:53

Definitely question marks, including, well, all the things you talked about the fate of the hostages, what happens after you reconquer Gaza, the cost and the price not only for Gazans but also Israeli soldiers who are going to be tasked with doing this. But I may disagree slightly with you, mithail. I think this government has told us what they prefer, right, bibi Netanyahu? Two weeks ago, he said, I think maybe for the first time, getting the hostages back is important. But what do you say?

Neri: 5:25

Ultimate victory over Hamas, over our enemies is more important, yeah, and uh, betel Smotrich has been uh, our finance minister has been saying this, uh, for for weeks, if not months. Uh, there are even reports that the IDF, under the new chief of staff, theael Zamir, has made the return of the hostages a lower priority. Again, I disagree with that prioritization. I think you disagree with that prioritization. Like you said, 60, 70% of the Israeli public disagrees. But they may be doing what you've been talking about.

Neri: 6:00

Mikhail and you and I have had conversations since the beginning of the war and even before the war, as listeners of this podcast know, this T-junction, that Israel was faced with throughout much of the war Not all the war, but throughout much of the war where, on the one hand, you were talking about taking a left turn, shall we say, and cutting a deal, ending the war and getting all the hostages back, and the right-hand turn in this T-junction is going for full reoccupation of the Strip. Are they not taking your advice? Are they not choosing to make a decision at this T-junction? Or have I missed something?

Michael: 6:42

Yeah, I think that we both missed a lot of things. You know, you said in several announcements there is what was the definition? Oh, okay, that we are not going to occupy all Gaza. There will be an area that will be controlled I don't know if by the Palestinians, but it will be an area that IDF will not control, mainly the area that all the population of Gaza will be concentrated in, and we will occupy or control other areas. So you know, once again, I agree with you, nery, that the messages of last week were clearer than ever, but still there are a lot of question marks. By the way, many people in Israel still or let's say that like that they are not sure that Netanyahu is serious enough about occupying all Gaza and they say that maybe it's a threat, you know, to Hamas to feel more pressure, to Hamas to feel more pressure. And they also are trying to analyze why there are clear messages that the occupation or the operation will start only after Trump's visit. Maybe there is an attempt or a willingness that this operation will not take place.

Michael: 8:21

And you, nery, you spoke about the T-junction and we both we are spoke about the T-junction and we both, we are speaking about this T-junction for, I think, more than a year since the first steps of the war, and you know, I think, that for most of the Israelis it's very clear there are only two options. All the fantasies of clans, of, you know, UAE that will control Gaza, total illusions. There is the option for occupation of Gaza, if you really want to defeat Hamas. My main argument is that this is not a bad idea and maybe Israel, by the way, in the future will have to implement it. But the timing right now, I'm not sure that it won't lead Israel to disaster, to catastrophe. I mean a war with no plans, no clear purpose, no legitimacy, no consensus inside. You know, we have a very crisis among the reserve army soldiers. We're not sure that all of them agree right now to take part in the current operation and you know we didn't speak, and maybe we will speak, about the consequences. I mean the effect of this war on the relations between Israel and the Arab world, maybe on the West Bank.

Michael: 9:48

So I say that in this T-junction, we must also look at the other alternative. I mean the other bad option, but the least worst alternative, which is to promote the deal right now. I mean to release the hostages, by the way, I think that you cannot release hostages. If you will decide to defeat Hamas or to occupy all Gaza, you will have to put an end to the war right now and you will have to commit withdrawal, full withdrawal, from Gaza. Otherwise there is no chance that you will be able really to make Hamas present more flexible opinions. And, as I told you before, mary, I do think and I'm not naive at this point I know that if Hamas will stay in Gaza, of course, even if they won't control formally Gaza, they will be the dominant player in Gaza and you will have in the future to promote a broad operation against Hamas, but it will be with serious plans and with legitimacy, and right now we have no way I mean the government doesn't have any legitimacy to this war.

Neri: 11:09

All very good points. And yes, this may be a threat and a leverage play trying to get Hamas to finally cave. I'm skeptical and we'll maybe get your opinion in just a second. And yes, even according to the Israeli government, the offensive won't start until after Donald Trump finishes his trip to the region to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar next week. So there is still at least another week for something else to happen More than a week, something like that.

Neri: 11:41

Okay, interesting, but yes, it'll take time for the IDF to prepare, to call up enough reservists, et cetera, et cetera. So maybe it's a leverage play, although on this issue I take the government at its word. I don't believe them on many other issues, but on this issue I do believe that they're serious about this offensive and in terms of how shall we put this, the cost and the price, I'll say so. You don't have to, but you gave an interview on Channel 12 two nights ago and you said that this coming offensive could be the most disastrous war possibly in Israeli history and that it will change the lives of Israelis and the character of the country for a long time to come economically, security, diplomatically and socially. Could you get into maybe some of the more concerning parts of this? That's a serious statement, it's a strong statement. So what did you mean by it when you gave that interview to Channel 12?

Michael: 12:46

You know, first of all, nery, not only in Channel 12, but in other interviews. I consider these interviews important, not because I'm a part of them, but because it's a part of public discourse, which is very important because the public must demand from the government a very clear picture about the purpose, about the targets of the war. And first of all, I oppose the you know the term operation Gideon chariots operation. You cannot call this move operation. This is a broad war, historic one, and occupying all Gaza, or the majority of Gaza, it's something that will change the life of the Israelis for decades. And I'm not afraid. I'm concerned and I demand the government to explain to the people what is the meaning of occupying all Gaza, for example. First of all, the government must explain the people that actually all the toughest, bitter fighting between us and Hamas, they are in front of us right now. Hamas is waiting in the populated urban areas of Gaza and they prefer not to expose themselves right now but to wait for IDF. And it means that when IDF will start the ground maneuver into Gaza, derenbala, hamunis, other places, then you will see a very tough fighting, clashes between us and Hamas and, of course, no doubt it will be followed by a lot of casualties.

Michael: 14:29

The other point, which is more important you know Smotrich, the Minister of Finance. He announced that he's not afraid from civil administration, military regime occupying all Gaza. That's okay, you know this is his opinion and that's okay. But you need to explain to people what is the price, what is the meaning of occupying all Gaza, for example, you are the minister of finance. How much will it cost us? You know we're speaking about the control over 2 million people in destroyed areas, by the way, 2 million people who really hate you. They hate you before the war and now even the hostility got in. And you know there are many terms in Israel, many people in Israel. Now we will go until the end.

Michael: 15:23

Okay, let's say that you will occupy all Gaza. You will kill dozens of thousands of Hamas members and no doubt at all, it will be severe damage to Hamas. But do you understand that in the day after, israel will face terror and guerrilla. And you know the same things that the Americans knew in Iraq after 2003, after the collapse of Saddam's regime. And you know one more important thing what will be the impact on the relations between Israel and the Arab world? First of all, the idea of normalization between us and Saudi Arabia we can forget about. You know, I really cannot imagine the Saudis promoting normalization if there will be a full occupation of Gaza, of course, if Israel will decide to reestablish settlements in Gaza. And second, I'm afraid that even the relations between us and Jordan, and mainly Egypt, will be damaged because of this step, and that's why, you know, we are waiting for explanation from the government.

Neri: 16:35

Yes, a major price, as I mentioned, and that's a lot of the fears that I share with you, Mifal that it's very easy to say, ok, this time we're going, like you said, for the final victory over Hamas. We're going to reoccupy. Very easy to say, but what would that look like in practice, on the ground, and what would it look like around the world If the past 19 months have been difficult? I think, if and when this offensive starts, it could even be worse. It's hard to believe, but it could be worse. It could even be worse. It's hard to believe, but it could be worse. And again, we'll maybe get into the more granular details in just a moment.

Neri: 17:18

Mithail, in terms of what you call the least worst option, a full deal to get all the hostages back, even at the cost of quote unquote, ending the war and then preparing, planning, strategizing for likely the next round, the real final victory over Hamas, as we mentioned. And, to be clear, netanyahu and his government have rejected that option. The Prime Minister isn't willing to end the war for various reasons, both political and strategic, at least in his own mind, but in terms of the US president, that may be the only how should you put it get out of jail free card that we have to avoid this offensive, and obviously Trump is going to be meeting with many Arab leaders next week. So do you think there is a possibility that the Arab leaders pressure Trump, to pressure Israel to hopefully not begin this offensive?

Michael: 18:20

Yeah, you know, we both know, nery that when we speak about Trump so it is very, very hard to predict something. Sometimes it's easier to guess things about it. But you know, this is my impression, my assessment. I, of course, I read, I follow the Arab media, I speak with people from my colleagues from the Arab world, speak with people from the my colleagues from the arab world and I am I have very, uh, general impression that there are serious talks between arab players, arab states and the american administration in washington. I speak mainly about the egyptians, qatar and saudi arabia and the uae.

Michael: 19:06

I think that they all understand, you know, they knew, they learned how to speak in Trump's language I think that better than most of the Israelis and they do understand that he wants the Arab world to present the initiative, something creative, something new, something new, and they are trying to. I think that they plan to present him actually the Egyptian or the Arab initiative, which says that, okay, you asked us to present you a plan that Hamas will not control Gaza. So we have a plan about a local committee or a kind of Palestinian council that will manage Gaza, and you know it's a kind of cosmetic solution, but Hamas will not rule Gaza but will be one of the players. And of course, you know, once again, we are not naive. We do know that they will keep their weapons.

Michael: 20:07

But when we deal with Trump, maybe and of course we need to understand that there are a lot of economic, strategic considerations for the American administration, mainly with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states Maybe they will say listen, it seems okay, it seems okay, it seems okay, it seems okay. And my main fear is that Israel will be imaged, or the image of Israel will be, as the stubborn player that always knows. And you know, we may find ourselves very soon, maybe next week, in front of a new initiative and in front of Trump's announcement that it seems to him okay and we will touch it in a minute. We'll learn something from the case of the negotiations between the Americans and the Yemenites and the Houthis, so I will not surprise if there will be surprises at this point.

Neri: 21:09

Yes, look, it was true even before the second Trump term and it's definitely true over the past 100 days. Nobody knows what he's liable to say or do, and it could change tomorrow. You and I were talking before. We started recording that here in Israel, after Trump was elected, the Israeli right and this government were rejoicing. They were saying you know the B'nai celebrating yes, the Messiah is coming. He's going to give us everything we want.

Michael: 21:40

And then in January, you can implement all the fantasies you have.

Neri: 21:44

Everything, everything you know. Just hand a list to Washington and they'll just green light it Sure. And then in January the mood on the Israeli right changed dramatically when Trump forced Netanyahu to accept the six week ceasefire to get the hostages back. They weren't happy with that. They're like you know why is he pressuring us to stop the war? That he was going to give us a carte blanche. And then the mood got even better in March when the Americans let Netanyahu and Israel, shall we say, not live up to the commitment in the ceasefire agreement, as our listeners know. So the Israeli right was very happy about that. And then, more recently, like you said, the Houthis, the deal that was struck behind Israel's back and they were surprised. It's confirmed. Israel was surprised by the fact that Trump stopped the military campaign against the Houthis. The negotiations directly with Iran over the nuclear program also came as a surprise. Direct talks between Trump administration officials at Hamas over the hostages also a surprise. Between Trump administration officials and Hamas over the hostages also a surprise. And I mean it's not a minor point.

Neri: 22:53

Trump is not going to be visiting, as far as we know, israel on this trip to the Middle East, unlike in his first term. I'm sure you remember Mifed, because it was a two-day circus here. Trump visited Saudi Arabia and met with the Arab leaders and then he flew directly to Israel and, at least for right now, that's unlikely to happen. Getting back to Gaza, mikhail, and just in terms of the least worst option, I have to play devil's advocate, because I hear the counter-argument just as well as you do, I'm sure, from friends and colleagues. They say we can't stop the war now, colleagues. They say we can't stop the war now Strategically if we don't fully defeat Hamas quote, unquote, whatever that may mean, then the next October 7th is only a matter of time, and that it would be military malpractice, strategic malpractice, to actually agree to a deal that ends the war without getting all the job done. How do you react to those arguments which you hear from even? You know don't have to be a crazy BBist and right-winger to say it, even though I personally disagree with.

Michael: 24:02

What do you?

Neri: 24:03

think.

Michael: 24:05

I agree with you. Actually, this is the basic strategic argument of anyone who really supports the idea of let's give priority to the war, this idea. First of all, I tell them that I think that this, you know, hamas presents, or if Hamas will stay on the defense, is not the worst alternative, because getting into a war with no consensus, with a very tough rift in the Israeli society, I think this is the worst scenario. I'm asking a lot of people who wave this slogan there is a nuclear program of Iran. I think that this is the real existential threat for Israel.

Michael: 25:04

According to this opinion, or according to this logic, we had to attack the nuclear program of Iran yesterday, a year ago, 10 years ago, we didn't do it and describing Yemen, the Houthis and Qatar, natalio himself, he described them as very complicated challenges. So, when it comes to Gaza, it must be now, it must be immediately and totally. And I'm afraid Nery that religious and ideological considerations are mainly from the Smotich point of view and the other religious Zionism leaders. This is the main reason from their point of view, and not any other strategic consideration which is actually a cover. For example, this argument of we will not leave Hamas sitting on the fence?

Michael: 26:05

Okay, and what you will do with Syria? Will you occupy Damascus? What you will do with Hezbollah? Are you ready to occupy Beirut? So there will be no Hezbollah in Lebanon. Enough this argument, and once again, when we are getting deeper into this swamp called Gaza, it means that we will not be focused on other, more important threats, mainly Iran. So I find that going right now, directly to occupy all Gaza right now, it's much more damage than any achievement that we will see.

Neri: 26:56

Yeah, I happen to agree with you, michal, and I've also said, both publicly and privately, that if, after 19 months of war and the damage that's already been inflicted on Hamas, that the IDF can't protect southern Israel from whatever may come out of Gaza, then you might as well fold up the IDF the idea that they're going to be surprised again by a massive cross-border operation, like we saw on October 7th. Then what are we doing here?

Michael: 27:26

honestly. Yeah, by the way, you know, nery, this is also a result of the fact that there was no commission of inquiry, because if there is no commission, serious one of inquiry, it means that all the things that were wrong, all the mistakes, all the failures, you actually preserve them and you are going to repeat them, and you are repeating them right now, and one of them is this slogan of more and more power will lead us to a white flag over Gaza. Once again, a conception.

Neri: 28:05

Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message. Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message, an impact. Donate now at ipfli slash supportthepod or at the support the show link in the show notes. We'll get into Hamas's thinking, which I know you tried very closely, and again in just a second. But I have to get into the weeds with you, the brass tacks of what this offensive actually means, what it will look like.

Neri: 28:56

To the best of our understanding, it's a multi-stage offensive, from the ground primarily so, sending in masses of armor and infantry, also covering firepower from the air and the sea, very aggressive, and the IDF says that in territory that it moves into and I'm curious to get your sense of where that territory may be, at least in the beginning the IDF won't leave. It's going to hold the territory. It won't leave. No more raids. This in and out operations. That was part of the original war plan. Also, the humanitarian aid distribution system is also supposed to change. What else? They want? To move most of the 2 million people in Gaza down south, south of Famunis also not a small issue, that's right. So what should we understand as laypeople and not colonels in the IDF about this new offensive? What will it look like when, once, or if, the IDF gets a green light?

Michael: 30:06

You know you described it in a very accurate manner and I must say, nery, that after 25 years in the army, 20 years in Amman in the military intelligence and five years in Kogat, I do aware the fact that things that seem wonderful in papers and in presentation, on ground it's totally different. And you know, I'm quite afraid from this. You know kind of engineering, a war. That will be very clear. First of all, we will occupy the territory, then we will evacuate all the northern parts and the central parts of Gaza, which means all the refugee camps like Mugazi, userat, al-buraj and Gaza City itself, and we will create a tiny area, as you mentioned, between the southern parts of Khan Yunis to the Egyptian border, and then we will put two million people Actually there are no civil infrastructure over there. And what will happen? Okay, is it going to be a republic, I mean this tiny entity which will be ruled by whom and who will give the humanitarian supply? And what will happen on the other parts that were occupied? Because, motlich, if you will ask him, he will say immediately to establish or reestablish settlements over there.

Michael: 31:41

And once again, you know we said that in the beginning, we will emphasize it again there must be a clear message of the government. We said that in the beginning and we will emphasize it again there must be a clear message of the government and a very clear discourse of the government with the public. And right now, unfortunately, it's not surprising that there is such a deep turmoil. Deep turmoil, and you know the confidence. I would define it in a very gentle manner. There is no big confidence of the public in what the government thinks, plans, promotes, and it's not surprising, because no one really speaks in a very clear manner with the public.

Neri: 32:27

And confidence in the IDF, this new general staff, because no one really speaks in a very clear manner with the public and confidence in the IDF, this new general staff. They've already started calling up thousands and potentially it will be tens of thousands of reservists and, to be clear, I think the plan is to have them secure the borders in the north Lebanon, syria, and secure the West Bank and free up the regular army, the heavy offensive divisions, to actually go and do the bulk of the fighting in Gaza. What do you think the mood is, or what do you know the mood is, in terms of the reservists and the confidence in the generals?

Michael: 33:02

You know, first of all, mary, of course most of the data, most of the reports about it are clandestine.

Michael: 33:14

The IDF considered them and of course it's right to consider them as a secret about how many Reserve Army soldiers had already requited, reserve army soldiers had already requited. But it seems to me and I will be very cautious that of course there is a problem Because, you know, a year ago people were ready to sacrifice their life in a very justified war and they felt that, you know, they got a broad support from the people. This time I'm not sure at all. And you know you mentioned the talk between Eyal Zamil, the new chief of staff, and the government and we saw that during the last two weeks there were at least twice there were all kinds of clashes between them. First of all when there were negotiations in the government about who will be responsible for the humanitarian aid and Samir was very clear and he said no, he resisted the idea that IDF will be responsible for that. And you know we heard Smotrich even he elaborated the threat that your end will be like a healthy one.

Neri: 34:38

Healthy LNV. Yeah, the previous chief of staff.

Michael: 34:42

And, by the way, two days ago we witnessed an announcement of the new IDF spokesman and he said the most important target is to release the hostages, Only after that to defeat Hamas. And, of course, there were very critic voices among the government, among the ministers, were very critic voices among the government, among the ministers, who said, hey, once again you repeat the same voices or you elaborate the same opinions like a year ago.

Neri: 35:18

Yeah, I think the IDF spokesman may have been doing damage control, because I think the night before there were certain leaks attributed to Yaviz Zamil, the new chief of staff, to the effect that the operation will kill hostages. Yeah, yeah, I think the spokesman, he was a warning actually.

Michael: 35:41

He warned the government that the broad operation he can commit, he can promote broad operation, but the price will be the life of the hostages. So you know, at least for me, I'm not optimistic, but I think that we need to hear such a frank voice which says you cannot do both things in the same time. You need to understand or to explain that if you want full occupation of Gaza, it means that zero hostages will be released from the hands of Hamas.

Neri: 36:19

So on that point, that's both a very good and very bad transition to my next question, Michal. But when the government and not just the government, also IDF officials say you know, no, the goal of the operation, like the IDF spokesman said, you know still to relieve hostages, we're going to pressure Hamas with this new offensive to relieve hostages. I mean, isn't it more likely that the hostages will be either killed, murdered by Hamas or, inadvertently of course, by IDF bombs? And, by the way, follow on to that, will it work?

Michael: 37:06

You know, will Hamas actually be pressured enough to release the hostages if they see the IDF tanks coming, or the opposite? You know, we are in a kind of you know experiment. For 19 months, we stick this slogan of more and more and more power, and this time we say no, now it's serious. It will be very, very strong power against Hamas and this will lead, this will push them to give up and to be much more flexible. And you know, nery, this is my opinion. I think that, first of all, if you fail again and again and again, you need to, you know, check.

Neri: 37:40

Reassess.

Michael: 37:42

As Einstein said, something is wrong if you repeat the same experiment and it fails all the time. So, first of all, I think that there is something deeply wrong with this assumption and, second, I'm asking myself is it possible that most of those who support this idea do not really improve their understanding about Hamas? Because, you know, we had the failure of October the 7th and most of the people of the government who were responsible for this failure. Now they announced we learned the lesson and now we will not repeat the same mistake.

Michael: 38:22

And it seems that you didn't understand nothing about Hamas, the nature, the DNA of Hamas. Didn't you understand that we're speaking about radical ideological organization that is ready to sacrifice the life of his people, to commit a suicide and, of course, to kill the hostages, but not to give up or wave a white flag? And I cannot. You know, I'm surprised by the voices here in Israel that repeat once again the idea of we will push Hamas to evacuate Gaza, like Arafat did in 1982. You know, we're speaking about it for 19 months and we didn't see even one clue that Hamas is ready to consider this idea. So why think that it will happen now?

Neri: 39:18

Or pressuring Hamas to lay down its arms.

Michael: 39:21

Yeah, sure. And you know, I spoke with one of my Palestinian colleagues and he said to me listen, the term Hamas is Harkat Ha resistance, and if you will take this M out of Hamas, there is no Hamas. It's like taking the heart out of the body. And you know, once again, you need to understand Hamas in order to really realize that they will never give up their weapons. They will be ready to fight until death, but they will not give up their weapons. If you will continue creating fantasies and relying on assumptions or illusions actually not assumptions do you really want to promote successful moves? I think that it will lead us to catastrophe.

Neri: 40:12

Yeah, and it's not a theoretical experiment. If this goes ahead, this offensive, then we're talking about the lives of over 20 still living Israeli hostages, 59 total and that's also a primary war goal. It has been from the beginning. Maybe now a secondary war goal according to this government, but not according to the majority of the Israeli public. Mithail, final two questions for you. Number one, in terms of the offensive specifically, we've seen reports, assessments that the IDF thinks they can reoccupy most of the strip in three months and clear it and clean it of Hamas in nine months. So basically another 12 months of fighting. What do you think when you hear and see that kind of assessment?

Michael: 41:04

You know, regarding the three months, it seems to me likely, nery, you know, if IDF will get between five to six divisions, I think that this target of occupying all Gaza within three months and once again the price will be very heavy in the Palestinian side, but of course also in the Israeli one. But regarding the rest of the time, I mean nine months of cleaning, once again I do not like this term, you know. Cleaning Gaza, okay, it means that of course you will cause Hamas dramatic damage. But what will happen after these nine months? You know I assess that there will be terror and guerrilla fighting against Israel, I think that, against IDF, I mean. So I really wish that IDF, but also the government, will not use such scientific clean messages or terms. And once again, I think that the government should explain to people that we are getting into a very tough period.

Michael: 42:19

If Gaza Strip will be occupied by IDF and they cannot commit or they cannot promise that it will take only a year and after that, you know, we will live in a harmonic situation. Not at all. We are getting into a gate and behind this gate or after this gate, I'm not sure that I can really draw in a very accurate manner. What will happen? I do know that nothing very good will happen and once again, harry, we spoke about it. If the Israeli society right now is split, there is a very deep split about this war. I'm quite sure that it will continue and maybe even get wider. After the operation, the war will start.

Neri: 43:12

It'll get wider because of the lack of consensus over the offensive, the fate of the hostages and also, we should mention casualties, sure Casualty, and the more casualties that you're going to take as the IDF, the more it's going to be felt on the home front. I agree 24, and since the uh ceasefire collapsed in march, the idf has been working to expand from the philadelphia corridor, from uh, the egyptian border up, and to basically clear out all of rafa up to this new corridor just south of of hanunis, the morag corridor, and uh, if you talk to reservists who are down there, they say, um, there's almost nothing standing, there's almost nothing standing. Uh, if there's a structure, if there's a structure standing, it's probably because the IDF is using it, and yet my point being the IDF still, even yesterday, a Golani soldier was severely injured by IED in Rafi'af. Yeah right.

Neri: 44:25

There was the ALom, the combat engineering forces, a few days before. So even in this area that's supposedly quote unquote cleared and clean, you're still taking casualties. I don't know how Hamas fighters are still there. That's, I think, a question maybe for another episode. So, yes, if you replicate the RAF-RAF model across the entire Gaza Strip with thousands, if not 10, 20 thousand, remaining Hamas fighters, very difficult, mithan. Actual final question to you. I'd be remiss if I didn't bring it all back to the US President, donald J Trump and the Trump plan for the quote unquote voluntary immigration, or essentially, the expulsion of Gazans from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli officials say, once the bulk of the population of Gaza is down south, it'll be easier to quote-unquote convince them I hate to use that word because it's not voluntary, I don't think but easier to convince them to leave via Egypt or the sea, or even via Israel. The Israeli right, as you know, loves this idea. Other people don't like it, for very good reasons as well. So how realistic, how practical do you think this plan actually is?

Michael: 45:54

You know, first of all, nery, you know, we must all be aware that the term used by all the Arab world and, of course, the Palestinians, for this plan is tahjir transfer, not anything else. This is how they consider this vision. And you know, it's quite amazing that right now, almost I think, between more than three months after it was elaborated actually Israel is the only state on earth which supports this idea. It seems that you know, there is no, no, not even one state that announced that they will be ready to open the gates for Palestinians from Gaza or to assist in the implementation of this vision. And you know, it's quite amazing because when you follow the Israeli media and the Israeli discourse, we are full of fake news, all kinds of illusions. You know, people speak here about Somaliland, puntland and all other. They're not states at all that we'll be ready to open the gates for Palestinians.

Michael: 47:05

And you know, a lot of numbers are being elaborated in the Israeli discos about thousands of Palestinians who are ready to leave. And you know, I really feel that the illusions, or the fantasies are much more stronger than professional, realistic assessments. And you know, right now I think that there are two basic problems. First of all, as you mentioned before Neri, during the last half a year a lot of let's call them red alarms were elaborated in front of Israel about the policy of Trump. I mean the first ceasefire, the negotiations with Iran, border talks with Hamas, the Houthi and even Trump himself. It seems that he's not there. He doesn't really support this idea today.

Michael: 48:02

You haven't heard him talking about it for weeks, and you know, when he speaks about Gaza, he says they are very poor people, we should help them.

Michael: 48:11

He doesn't say we should take them out of Gaza. And, by the way, also Witka, in the podcast he had a month ago, he didn't speak about the transfer from Gaza. So it seems to me that right now, first of all, even without promoting this idea, israel already causes itself damage, I mean damage regarding the relations between us and the Arab world. Saudi Arabia said no, no normalization if you will continue with this plan. And of course, you know Egypt and Jordan are very concerned about it. And second, and this is a very important point for you know, all the Israelis, mainly the decision makers since the beginning of the war, it seems that we didn't really learn all the lessons of October the 7th. We still prefer fantasies, illusions instead of realistic, sometimes very pessimistic assessments or facts, and I really hope that you know our government will be more realistic, not only regarding Trump's vision, but regarding everything that is happening since the beginning of the war.

Neri: 49:29

I hope so too, mithel. We can only hope Not too optimistic with this government, but you can only hope. But this is why we love to have you on, to not feed us illusions and fantasies, but actual, realistic analysis and assessments, the degree facts. And we can only hope for the best. And as you told me last time you were on the podcast back in September, hopefully we won't be here in another six months, neri, talking about the same dilemma whether to continue the war or to get the hostages back. So I'll say it again, so you don't have to. Hopefully, michel, we're not here another six months talking about the offensive and the hostages. And well, what a disaster this new clan is. We'll be a lot smarter then. So thank you again.

Michael: 50:25

Thank you for having me. Nery, Take care, Okay. Thanks again to Michael.

Neri: 50:26

You for having me, nery, take care, okay. Thanks again to Mikhail Milishin, as always, for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so you can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast and, most importantly, thank you for listening.