Neri: 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We have a great episode for you this week with Ambassador Dennis Ross joining us to discuss President Donald Trump's visit to the Gulf, the status of the Netanyahu-Trump relationship, the present and future of the Gaza War, us foreign policy big picture and Dennis' reflections on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which you definitely want to hear. Dennis Ross is, of course, the Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a former senior official and Middle East envoy in the Reagan Bush, I, clinton and Obama administrations, including as a lead envoy and negotiator during the Oslo peace process in the 1990s. And finally, he is also the author of the new book called Statecraft 2.0, what America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World. Out now, in the interest of full disclosure, dennis was my boss at the Washington Institute back in the day twice. There are few people who can meld current affairs and historical analysis and personal experience trust me, like Dennis can. It was all on display in the coming hour. I hope you enjoy the conversation just as much as I did. Let's get into it, hi, dennis. Welcome to the Israel Policy. Pod Niri, great to be with you. Thanks for having me. It's really my pleasure.

Neri: 1:29

Dennis, as we touched on before we started recording, been meaning to do this for a while and I thought I'd pick the correct week, and I think this week, with everything going on, is the correct week for our listeners. They should know we're recording this Wednesday afternoon, tel Aviv time, and President Trump is still in the midst of his first official overseas trip to the Gulf Saudi Arabia yesterday and earlier today, qatar currently and then the UAE tomorrow. Pointedly, israel is not on the itinerary, unlike his first maiden voyage as president in his first term, which was Saudi, to Israel. That's not happening this time. But I wanted to start here, dennis. As a veteran of what I can only imagine are countless presidential visits and summits to and in the Middle East, what do you think of this one, at least so far? The optics, the rhetoric, the potentially trillion dollars in business deals about to be signed.

Dennis: 2:25

One of the things that characterizes President Trump is he is not. This isn't a gross understatement. He's not your typical president. His approach to foreign policy rivets less on traditional geopolitical interests, less on security architecture questions, less on alliances. There is a worldview that is shaped very much by bilateral ties and everything, with a huge emphasis on the economy, on deals. He's a transactional president. He understands that. In his mind, what matters more than anything else are business deals with big numbers. So we're seeing the announcement of $142 billion in terms of defense projects, and then there's talk about $600 billion over the next four years of investments investments in the US, american company investments in the region. The numbers right now, whatever they're declared. The reality of delivering those numbers it will probably never completely match up. But there is an interesting irony this time, I do think. If you go back to his first term, where again he announced huge numbers of deals that would be struck as a result of his visit to Saudi Arabia, then the gap between what he said and what was actually delivered was huge. This time there'll still be a gap, just because it takes years for some of these things to materialize and some will never fully materialize. I think the New York Times was saying when they added everything up at this point it's $283 billion. But okay, let's say it goes beyond that. There is an irony Many of the deals struck were prepared during the Biden administration. That's even more true when it will come to the UAE, which is talking about $1.4 trillion over 10 years. This is $600 billion over four years. That $1.4 trillion grows very much out of discussions that were done by the Biden administration to.

Dennis: 4:33

There was a concern about look, this is such a cutting edge technology states who understand with President Trump. One way you build his stake in you is by doing deals Again. More traditional presidents focus more on a set of security arrangements. This is not a traditional president. But when you do $142 billion in defense contracts the largest ever you are creating a reality where there's an American presence in Saudi Arabia in the security domain that will be enduring and the investment in major parts of Saudi, different Saudi sectors, including AI. They have one virtue that the UAE doesn't have they have a lot of space. Data centers require a huge amount of space. The Saudis have that In the case of the UAE. They will be investing in American companies here because we have the space. Here you have a case of in the Saudis. You have a case of investment of American companies in, because we have the space here. You have a case in the Saudis. You have a case of investment of American companies in Saudi Arabia. But that also from Trump's standpoint and he will say this that builds our stake in them and they have an interest in us having a stake, because the likelihood of a defense treaty between the Trump administration and the Saudis, I think, is very low for a variety of reasons.

Dennis: 6:26

I don't think that he's a huge fan of defense alliances because they imply a set of obligations. As I say in my book, there is an American tradition that Trump reflects. America first is an American tradition. I don't mean from the 1930s, I mean from really the 19th century is an American tradition. I don't mean from the 1930s, I mean from really the 19th century. We were activists internationally, but not with alliances, because alliances limited our freedom of action and that's very much kind of who President Trump is. So I look at this trip as he is achieving what he wants, but, to be fair, the Gulf states also believe that they are building his stake in them and that will serve their security interests, not just their economic interests.

Neri: 7:19

The speech he gave what was it last night, wednesday or Tuesday night in Riyadh, in terms of Iran, the Gaza war, even the issue of? He went back and slammed the neocons and the interventionists who, he said, you know, did nothing On those more ideological issues. Did anything stand out to you?

Dennis: 7:39

Yeah, let's start with the ideological issues, because again it kind of fits who he is. We will not be interventionists. We will not be nation builders. We will focus on sovereignty. What countries do internally is their own business.

Dennis: 7:55

This is not an administration of values, this is an administration of interests. Every administration to be fair, every president there's a continuum of interests and values. Some presidents tilt more heavily towards interests, but they never give up values. Others tilt more heavily towards value but they never give up interests. And in this case there's not really a spectrum. And that's who he is. So it's important to recognize. That's who he is, so it's important to recognize so that's my first observation that this was an opportunity for him to again repeat what his philosophy is for foreign policy, which is you know, he said it in his inaugural address, especially when he said we will measure success not by battles won, but by the wars ended and the wars we don't get into. So what you heard yesterday was the interventionism we're against that and the neocons, because they basically produce the interventionism and the nation builders and those who wanted to export democracy. This is not who he is. So we got a very clear reminder of that number one. Number two, his style of approach. No permanent enemies. This relates to interests and not just interests. This relates to values. No permanent enemies. That means you can pretty much talk to anybody. This administration that, as you know, talked directly to Hamas. No administration has done that Right Because, in a sense, you know nobody is, in a sense, off limits and so you talk directly to Hamas.

Dennis: 9:34

In addition, I would say, with the Iranians, he staked out two positions You're not going to have a nuclear weapon. You got to stop supporting troublemakers in the region. Okay, I want to do a deal with you, but you can't have a nuclear weapon. Now, not having a nuclear weapon gives you a lot of space for an outcome. You don't have a nuclear weapon today. The issue will become already has become will they have enrichment, domestic enrichment? The administration sent mixed signals before. Now it's sending a signal no domestic enrichment. That will become a very interesting test. Iran needs a deal Again, one of the interesting things in the new book which we'll get into.

Dennis: 10:19

I have a long chapter on Iran, going through the whole history of every administration, from Carter to today, their approach to the Iranians, what tended to work, what didn't tend to work, and Iran did. Make tactical. The Islamic Republic made tactical adjustments and concessions when they felt it was important for them to do so, almost always under pressure. Those who say pressure doesn't work on Iran, they ignore Iran's actual behavior. Actually, pressure does work. It doesn't mean it works if you don't give them a way out. It doesn't mean you always get exactly what you want, but they will adjust their behavior.

Dennis: 10:54

Will they go along with absolutely no enrichment? My guess is probably not, unless they think the consequence could be that they lose their entire nuclear infrastructure that they've invested in for the last almost 40 years with more than a half a trillion dollars. Maybe they might do that. I suspect still probably not, because it's too much of a surrender for them. There's a lot of ways, even short of that. I mean, for example, you could be allowed to enrich, but then everything you enrich has to be shipped out of the country, so you get your fuel rods from outside. The virtue of that is they would have a face saver in terms of being able to enrich, but they couldn't accumulate any. They couldn't accumulate any fissionable material, and you'd have to have that completely monitored and verified. But if they can't accumulate any fissionable materials, then they can't build a bomb.

Dennis: 11:46

So the objective again this comes back to good statecraft is marrying objectives and means. The objective needs to be that Iran is giving up its nuclear weapon option. It's not enough saying you won't have a nuclear weapon. You want the Iranians to demonstrate, not because they say it, but because either the structure of their program or the way you've set it up in terms of shipping out, or because there's no enrichment, means they're giving up the option. So he what he's saying, no nuclear weapons is a kind of interesting elastic standard. There's a lot of different ways to achieve that. There's a lot of different ways to achieve that and we'll have to see.

Dennis: 12:29

Does Steve Witkoff, if he comes to Trump and he says, look, we can get a deal if we allow this kind of enrichment and this kind of ship out, but we can't get a deal if we allow no enrichment, does he then say that's it no deal?

Dennis: 12:37

If you look at the way he negotiates on tariffs, stakes out maximal positions and then makes adjustments that seems to be the character of how he negotiates on tariffs stakes out maximal positions and then makes adjustments. That seems to be the character of how he negotiates. So I would be, I guess, surprised if we didn't see something similar in this case, but we'll have to see. The only other thing that struck me is you know he clearly wants to warn Gaza to end, but we're not yet seeing actions that reflect that. Now maybe we may be on the brink of it the release of Edan Alexander, the fact that it was done by us, that it was done without Israeli involvement, and now you have Witkoff telling the families that he's optimistic, there can be a deal. We'll see If there's going to be a deal. My guess is it probably almost has to happen while Trump is still in the region or almost immediately afterwards.

Neri: 13:36

Because of the looming threat of the Israeli offensive into Gaza or other reasons.

Dennis: 13:41

No, I think it's because Trump would like to demonstrate his successes and so getting a deal while he's there is another manifestation of his success. He can claim it as a triumph. Or, if it happens immediately afterwards, where he can come out and say I went to the region, look what we did. So I think that's it. I think the looming Israeli threat certainly it has an impact on the countries, on the Egyptians as well, on Hamas, I'm less certain.

Dennis: 14:12

If Hamas cared at all about the Palestinian public, they would have found a way out of this war a long time ago. Their readiness to sacrifice the Palestinians in Gaza has been demonstrated over and over and over again. Not only do they see the sacrifice as serving their interests, because it stigmatizes Israel and they're no longer a military, but they're still a terrorist organization and they can engage in an insurgency. In Gaza there's a lot of unexploded ordnance which they turn into IEDs. So you've seen Israel lose soldiers last week. So they can function as a terrorist group in an insurgency. Yeah, they fired three missiles yesterday. As a military, they have basically been destroyed.

Dennis: 14:58

The question is, can you produce an outcome where they can't reconstitute or rebuild themselves? I think you can, but what we need to see is does the Trump administration have an approach to the day after? And we haven't really seen it. We've seen the emergence of a plan for how to distribute aid, humanitarian aid. We haven't seen all the allies, but we've seen something begin to emerge. We haven't seen anything. The only way this war can really end is not only with the release of hostages, but if you also have an alternative to Hamas, something the Israeli government has. This Israeli coalition has shied away from developing or wanting to develop.

Neri: 15:41

Yes, listeners of this podcast are well-versed on that issue in terms of no day-after plan, no post-war plan and, well, the looming offensive and what it could mean. We had our friend Michael Milstein on last week and he's not a dove and, as he likes to say, he's not naive, and even he says this could be a disaster for Israel if it goes ahead. I assume we'll find out in the coming days. Dennis, you kind of beat me to the punch. I wanted to get into more of US-Israel relations but, fair to say, it's more Trump-Bibi relations. You have more Bibi hours, as it were, than probably most non-Americans, going back to at least the 1990s.

Neri: 16:20

I think Conventional wisdom, at least on my end here in Israel, is that Netanyahu and Trump are now on the outs, or at the very least not as close as they used to be. Definitely on a slew of policy issues. You mentioned negotiating directly with Hamas by American officials. I can't imagine what the reaction would have been if you had tried something like that or Biden administration official had tried something like that. But that's a different issue the Iran nuclear talks, ending the military campaign against the Houthis even as of yesterday and even today, lifting sanctions over Syria and meeting with the new Syrian president, jalani al-Shara. So how would you assess, as a veteran BB watcher and also as a veteran US diplomat, the relationship between Bibi and Trump today?

Dennis: 17:05

I think the notion that they were really close was always a misperception, a mischaracterization. I think Bibi did have influence on Trump in the first term, but every place where he had influence on Trump in the first term was a place where Trump wanted to go anyway. Trump said the JCPOA was the worst deal ever done, and so the idea he would walk away from it he didn't need Bibi's encouragement to do it. Bibi might have helped enable it. Basically, being able to ferret out of Tehran, in one of Mossad's amazing coups, the entire nuclear archive and then being able to say show what was in it to Trump in advance gave him an excuse or a pretext to do what he wanted to do anyway. Did he need that pretext? Probably not because he wanted to do it anyway. I mean, he overruled his Secretary of State and his National Security Advisor and his Secretary of Defense, who didn't want to do that. So it wasn't because of Bibi, it's because of where he was coming in. So you know what he wrote about with regard to the killing of Soleimani, how he said that Bibi had backed out of it. So he is someone who has had a position towards Israel that is certainly favorable in terms of fundamentally supporting Israel. But I think what one needs to understand with Trump is he will always do what he considers to be in his interest, and his interests and America first are sort of synonymous, and where there's a Trump interest or an American interest, what he's demonstrated, that comes first. So the idea of striking a deal with the Houthis, even though, within less than 48 hours beforehand, ben Gurion Airport at least the environments around Ben Gurion Airport are hit by a ballistic missile. The deal has nothing to do with what Hudi does towards Israel, including towards Israeli ships, which, by the way, the way they define anything connected to Israel ships, it is the most elastic definition I've ever seen. So anybody who has a non-American flagged ship, which is a very small minority of the ships that use the Red Sea, is probably not going to test that proposition. So, number one, this was done without the slightest concern for the Israelis, as we said, talking to Hamas, not done by any previous administration without the slightest concern for the Israelis. Shara, who does he? He says he talks to Erdogan, he talks to MBS and he decides he's going to meet him and he's going to lift all the sanctions. I didn't hear Bibi's name mentioned in that, so we have a litany of moves that demonstrate that doesn't mean he's hostile to Israel I don't believe that. I don't think he is but it does mean he makes his decisions on what he considers to be in America's interest. It is America first. It's not America and Israel first. It's America first.

Dennis: 20:19

And obviously, ostensibly, he was coming for the tariffs, which he achieved nothing on, by the way, Right, he said he was coming for Iran and he was surprised that in his presence the president went ahead and announced that there would be direct talks with Iran the coming Saturday this was a Monday but even on the issue of the tariffs, how did he respond? Didn't give him anything. He said we give you $4 billion a year. So you know, I think one needs to have a clear-eyed view of this. He can have a. I believe he will continue to be generally supportive of Israel, but when something is in what he sees as American interests, those come first. One really interesting measure he wants to win the Nobel Prize. He's not going to get it for Russia-Ukraine. He's not going to get it for Iran deal, because I think in the best case, what you're going to see is a framework agreement, something that could be equivalent.

Dennis: 21:24

Now, I don't mean, it's not analogous to it in a literal sense, but a framework agreement like the JPOA, where you had a precursor, negotiated what was the precursor to what became the JCPOA. You could get a framework agreement that is similar in the sense. Maybe it's a freeze, maybe they down, blend all their 60%, maybe we lift a few sanctions and this is done to sort of buy time to do a larger deal so that the immediacy of the threat is dealt with. I wouldn't be surprised by that. So you might see that. But what will that mean? It will mean Israel can't act militarily against the Iranian nuclear program. And there is a window here because Iran doesn't have an air defense today, at least an air defense that can be effective against Israel, and it is feeling a real crunch economically, effective against Israel. And it is feeling a real crunch economically. The devaluation of the currency is extraordinary. They have electricity shortages which require blackouts, rolling blackouts Sometimes. You know 24 of 31 provinces have had to close the schools, close businesses and close government offices because of shortage of electricity. This is a country that produces natural gas and oil and yet it has shortages of electricity. This is a country that is running out of water and at some point that will be a major source of instability. It needs a deal. So if it gets a framework agreement which removes the military threat, gives them time to rebuild their air defense, gives them time, gives them some sanctions relief, it won't be a panacea for them even if they had a full-fledged deal, because banks will still be reluctant to do business in Iran so long as there are anti-terrorism laws on the books, anti-laundering laws on the books, and they don't address that, they don't open up their banking system. As long as there are human rights sanctions on the books, a lot of the financial institutions will be very hesitant to go ahead and go into Iran. We saw that, by the way, after the JCPOA. We literally had John Kerry going to Europe trying to encourage businesses to go into Iran. That's right, but the real, the kind of tremendous benefits economically they're not going to get. Although the Iranians seem to know how to try to appeal to President Trump, they're saying you can build up our nuclear industry here, you know there's trillions to it. So again, I say all this question because what he defines as being an America interest is going to come first.

Dennis: 24:05

Come back to the issue of the Gaza war. One thing he heard in Saudi Arabia was we're not against doing normalization. Nothing can even begin until the war in Gaza ends and the IDF is out. And even then we're going to require something credible. On the Palestinians, they're fairly those who say they know what they want. On the Palestinians, there's room to negotiate on that, but it is a factor.

Dennis: 24:33

So for Trump, if the only place he can get a Nobel Prize is here at some point, his attitude on the Gaza war is going to express itself in a more direct way and I suspect he will say at some point to Bibi you know, I gave you a lot of time, I gave you kind of a blank check, but I didn't give you forever. So I think that comes. Maybe we'll see. Maybe we'll see a deal done right during the end of this trip or immediately after it that produces what Witkoff has been proposing be conveying at least this is the impression of the Egyptians and the Qataris that he will do everything he can to try to then produce an end to the war in that 45-day period.

Dennis: 25:29

Maybe we'll see this sooner rather than later. I'm just not sure about that. But I do think at some point Trump's position is going to be okay. I gave you the time. Now it has to end. So the basic issue here coming back to the heart of your question, where it becomes an issue of what is in Trump's interest and those that don't align with Bibi's interest, then there'll be a problem and Trump will go ahead and do what he sees as being in America's interest.

Neri: 25:57

There'll definitely be a problem for Bibi Netanyahu and the Israeli right, who pinned a lot, if not everything, their hopes and dreams on the outcome of last November's general election and the re-election of Donald Trump. Take it from me the Israeli right here is already soured, turned on Donald Trump in some remarkably very frank and direct language on their part on television and the usual mouthpieces. Yeah, he's disappointed them.

Dennis: 26:23

I don't think Donald Trump probably cares, maybe with a Democratic president, he always had the Republicans that he could go to, and the Republicans would also. They would shore up parts of the Jewish community as well. He does not have that now. He doesn't have someone he can go to to create a pressure on Trump. He may sink the evangelicals Today that would be his natural community but they don't dominate the Republicans on the Hill. There's no joint session of Congress that's going to be open and available for him to come and castigate or challenge the policies of the American president. That's not an option. So the context is very different.

Neri: 27:10

That's a great point. There's no out to leverage one side of the aisle against the other, like Bibi has done for many years. And just on finishing up the Gaza question, dennis, trump wants the war done, concluded sooner rather than later. It's a question of how long Trump gives Bibi and Trump's patience effectively. And Woodcock is trying to broker this deal. And I think Netanyahu himself says I'll take the deal, multi-week ceasefire, maybe five or six weeks, get half the living hostages out. But even Netanyahu said yesterday after the deal runs its course, we're going to restart the war and go all the way to the end. We're not stopping. So how you know him better than I do, how does Bibi reconcile those two pressures, what he's promising his public here and what the American president may want?

Dennis: 28:04

One of the things that I think has always characterized Bibi is the capacity to play for time and something comes along and he figures something out or something helps to change the circumstance. I think he says everybody, even Smotrich and Ben-Gabir, will accept this right now because it's not an end to the war. And he's saying it's not an end to the war and we're going to go back in so they can accept this. And he can say look, at least we can get maybe 10 or 11 more hostages out. So he can say that the crux will come if there's a real seriousness on the part of President Trump and Whitcough to say we can end the war at 45 days. This is what it requires. If he says no to that, then he's saying no to them and then he has to worry about what the implications of that will be. Now, if they say to him okay, it's up to you, it's out of our hands, you know, and we're washing our hands of it, one also needs to be thinking about what does it mean if the US washes its hands of it? You know, I was worried when on Ukraine, when the threat was we might walk away. Well, if you walk away in one circumstance where you're also no longer supporting Ukraine, then that's a. You're giving Putin a big win. But if walking away means, okay, we're going to continue to support Ukraine, then you're basically saying to Putin okay, let's see if time is really on your side after all.

Dennis: 29:30

So it depends on if they decide to wash their hands of it. Does that affect some of what they're doing with Israel? I don't know the answer to that, but Bibi will have to make that choice. Assuming they say, okay, you can continue this, but we're not going to be involved anymore. I'm not sure. As I said, I'm not sure what it means In the end. A lot will depend upon.

Dennis: 29:55

Is the message that war has to end at 45 days, regardless of what Bibi's saying now? And he has 45 days to come up with to position himself differently? If it's going to end that way, maybe coming to the administration and say, all right, look, produce something for me with Saudi Arabia, or produce something, produce a determination one way or the other on Iran, iran, so that you know. If at the end of that 45-day period, you say the Iranians are not responding, then give me the green light to go against Iran. Then I could see him. At that point I could see him saying okay, iran is the bigger issue, to have the right kind of support for that, to do what we need to do, to focus everyone's attention on that. We've been in the war in Gaza. You could see there's a variety of different kinds of scenarios here. A lot depends upon where the Trump administration is in its negotiations with the Iranians, how much it wants to move on Saudi normalization, how quickly. That will heavily affect, I think, what Trump decides to do.

Neri: 31:06

Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3: 31:10

Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure Jewish democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic US policy towards the conflict, us-israel relations and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political, denominational and generational spectrums. Our Young Professionals Initiative, ipf-ateid, works to elevate the discourse among next-generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at israelpolicyforumorg and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipfli slash supportthepod or at the support the show link in the show notes that's a great transition to my next question about your book about statecraft.

Neri: 32:31

Explain to us I can hold it up if it helps, it could. We're also a video podcast. Yes, statecraft 2.0, because there was an original statecraft book. This is new new, not only just updated, but new about the new moment in global affairs the multipolar world order. I'm curious just give us a sense how you define Statecraft, why it's important, and then I'll ask you the kind of obvious question where does the Trump administration fit in into this rubric of Statecraft?

Dennis: 32:59

So let me say look, the essence of Statecraft is using all the tools you have at your disposal. Statecraft is not diplomacy. Diplomacy is a tool of statecraft. The military is a tool of statecraft. Economics are a tool of statecraft. Intelligence is a tool of statecraft. Information managing the information space is a tool of statecraft. Statecraft Information managing the information space is a tool of statecraft. So all the tools you have at your disposal. That makes up statecraft number one. What makes for good statecraft? You marry objectives and means. That sounds completely obvious.

Dennis: 33:32

I teach on this and I always start the class off by saying okay, that's a given right. My students nod and say it's a given. And then I point out it almost never happens. And then I point out it almost never happens. Why does it almost never happen? Because we don't adopt the right objectives, and we don't adopt the right objectives for a variety of reasons. Sometimes we have no idea what we're getting into.

Dennis: 33:52

Actually, trump was saying this yesterday about the interventionism that we intervened and we had no idea of what we were getting into. He was right. Interventionism, that we intervened and we had no idea of what we were getting into. He was right. Sometimes that happens. We certainly saw it in Iraq. Sometimes it's political factors that drive an objective. Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam didn't understand what he was getting into, but he had a political consideration above all others. He felt that the Republicans seized the loss of China and used it to gain enormous political advantage against the Democrats. He feared if Vietnam was lost, the same thing would happen. What he didn't realize is and this is a classic example of understanding you know, there's always a tendency to understand the cost of action but never the cost of inaction. You'd understand the cost of action but never the cost of inaction. That was really true, I think, for President Obama in Syria. He understood the cost of action but he never understood the cost of inaction. In any case, there are political factors that sometimes determine an objective, and that should never be. It is always a factor, but it should never be the only factor.

Dennis: 34:56

Sometimes you get into a situation with one objective and then you change. In Somalia, george HW Bush, who generally practiced statecraft quite well along with Jim Baker, we start off with we're going to intervene militarily to end the famine there, and that was no, and we succeeded. And then we decided to expand the objective from ending the famine to taking on warlords there. Well, that suddenly put us in the middle of what was a civil war. So you know, we changed the objective. There's a variety of reasons. You end up adopting the wrong objective, but if you adopt the wrong objective, you're never going to be able to match the right set of means to it. In any case, one of the reasons I just want to say one of the reasons I wrote the book.

Dennis: 35:45

You're quite right, I wrote a book on statecraft in 2006. It was a completely different world. It was a unipolar world. The Russians didn't resist us. The Chinese were still trying to build themselves up. They were still under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping, whose adage was bide your time and hide your strength. Don't be provocative. It was before President Xi, who comes along and says dare to struggle. So we have a different world. We have a different world on the outside. We also have a different world on the inside.

Dennis: 36:19

Even though there was division and debate over Iraq in 2006, when I was writing, there wasn't a fundamental debate over what our role in the world should be.

Dennis: 36:27

There was a fundamental sense America needs to lead in the world.

Dennis: 36:30

That's no longer the case.

Dennis: 36:32

One of the chapters I have I go through the five different kind of arguments that are made about what our role in the world should be, including, I start off with the American first view, quoting extensively from Trump's speeches in his first term, which we saw a replay of that in the speech in Riyadh, where he goes after, in a sense, the interventionists, the nation builders, those who, in effect, are trying to promote democracy.

Dennis: 37:00

All of that was in that speech, just like it was in his speeches from 2017, 2018. So it's a different world, and I was writing to say okay, in a world where we're more constrained on the outside and we don't have a consensus on the inside, we have to use all of our tools more effectively, because we won't be able to sustain a rule, however we define it, if we aren't seen as being more successful, and that requires you to apply everything successfully. So, then, the book has a lot of history where I draw out examples of statecraft done badly and also examples of statecraft done well, to distill the lessons, and then I apply it to China, iran and the Israeli-Chalistinian issue.

Neri: 37:42

Fascinating, important issues, all One of them closer to near and dear to our hearts, which we'll get into in just a moment. And in terms of Trump practicing, or not, statecraft how unorthodox, how out of the norm is he in relation to previous US presidents? Not just ideologically, he's different, he's different.

Dennis: 38:02

But look, an element of statecraft is leverage. For sure, he understands the principle of leverage, that's clear. But he defines it narrowly. When you give up soft power which is the power of attraction, that's one of your tools when you give up alliances, he sees alliances as a drag on us, but alliances actually constrain us. You look at every coalition we've created. First Gulf War, we had a coalition and it was quite successful.

Dennis: 38:33

The Obama administration didn't want to involve itself in Syria, but then, when ISIS forced its hand, it put together a remarkable. So alliances and coalitions are a source of strength. He tends to define things in a much more narrow way. Does he engage in statecraft? Yeah, because he does set out objectives. The question is how clear are the objectives? It gets back to what I was saying before. Sometimes, if the objectives are stated at such a high level of generality, you can't translate them into action. Level of generality, you can't translate them into action.

Dennis: 39:09

Take the Riviera and Gaza. Were there the means to be able to do that? No, but was he using that to try to force the Arabs to come up with something? Maybe the only thing is, egypt did come up with a plan. The problem was it was a half a plan. They answered the part of could you do reconstruction without having to move all the Palestinians out of Gaza? They answered that yes, you could, and here's how you would do it, and there was a plausibility to it. The problem was Hamas has never mentioned it in the plan. That's right. And there wasn't an approach to demilitarization. There'll be no reconstruction in Gaza if there isn't demilitarization. If Hamas remains in control, even indirectly, who's going to invest in Gaza? Remains in control, even indirectly. Who's going to invest in Gaza? Because they know Hamas will try to do this again. So if he wants to end the war in Gaza, this comes back.

Dennis: 39:51

What's your objective? The Riviera and the Gaza was too high a level of generality and there were no means to be able to produce it. But was it designed to be a lever? Just like tariffs, tariffs are a means, they're not an end. So what is the end he seeks? Is it to change the terms of trade? Is it to change the structure of the American economy? So did you bring back manufacturing here? Is it to generate more revenue, because you're doing tax cuts and you need to generate more revenue to deal with our budget deficits? Those could be all three of the objectives. I think today you couldn't say which of those are the real objectives. I would say, if you ask me, I would say there are two of three. I think it is to change the terms of trade and I think it's probably also to generate some revenue. It could be quite appropriate as a means to achieve those objectives. So he would be acting on statecraft there.

Dennis: 40:44

If he wants to produce Saudi-Israeli normalization, if that's his objective, then there's a number of things he has to do to be able to achieve it. In other words, you can stake out an objective, but then you have to think through okay, what are the means that you have to be able to produce it? What are the tools you have? Sometimes how you frame an issue is actually critical. It's a critical means Because again, it draws others in.

Dennis: 41:09

Sometimes taking the initiative is essential. Here, he heard, in Saudi Arabia you want to do normalization and the warm Gaza. It's not the sum of everything, but it's a start. Look every president, no matter what they say, they're engaging in some kind of statecraft because they spell out objectives and you can judge them by how well they do in terms of achieving their objectives. You can give them. When it comes to giving grades on statecraft, you can say, okay, you know you can. That was an A, that was a B, that was a C, that was a fail. So we can judge him based on the objectives that he's spelled out how he does.

Neri: 41:48

So I want to take you to a more personal space now with the time remaining. Don't worry, it'll still focus on policy, but I'm going to use our time wisely. First question to you, dennis if you were being sent by this US president or maybe any one of your former bosses and there were many former bosses to Jerusalem for a late night meeting with Netanyahu at the prime minister's office, what would you advise the Israeli prime minister in this current moment in time, 19 months after October 7th, 58 hostages still in captivity in Gaza. Now he's threatening a renewed offensive, as we talked about. What would you go there to counsel him? Obviously with the caveat that, as envoy and diplomat, you serve at the what do you call it? The pleasure, not the leisure, but the pleasure of the US president?

Dennis: 42:36

Yes, Not the pleasure of the president.

Neri: 42:39

The pleasure of the president. But leaving that aside, what would you actually tell this Israeli prime minister if he had to go meet them right now?

Dennis: 42:46

I think there's two things I would go with. The first I would go with would be what's the most important issue for Israel today in your mind? I mean, I would want him to define it to begin with and then I would respond based on what he said. If he were to ask me what I would regard as being most important which is not how you do it I mean, you go see an Israeli prime minister. You're saying, ok, tell me, what is it you're really trying to achieve now? Or what is the most important thing, I would think in his mind it's still Iran, because that's still an existential issue. But if he were to say I have to have, you know, I have to succeed in Gaza, then I would say, well, let's talk about what is success.

Dennis: 43:28

One of the problems is again a good example of the political pressures when Bibi first said the objective was total victory. Total victory is a slogan, it's not an objective. So you'd have to break it down and say all right, what does that mean? How do you define it? If the criteria of success is the hostages, you have to cover all the hostages, which should be, because that's a social compact that every Israeli government has had with the Israeli public. You're all collectively, we can get into the issue of the Haredi. You're all collectively served, but our obligation to you is we'll do whatever it takes to get you back, and so that is an overriding priority. It is also an essential reality that you don't want the outcome of this to leave Hamas in a position where it still controls Gaza, even if it's indirect. And I would say here, you know, to achieve that objective, you need to be able to have an alternative of FAMAS, and at this point we're 600 days in. Yeah, you had one short lot of time to achieve the objectives. You didn't follow the advice of David Petraeus, which was to clear, hold and build. I'm not quite sure what you're trying to do right now. I'm not quite sure how it looks different from what you've done before, but it looks like you're going to set yourself up for an insurgency that has no end to it, unless you are prepared to work to create an alternative.

Dennis: 45:10

Now the interesting thing is, the Egyptians came with a plan. What I would say is let's turn that plan into something that produces the outcome. You want not just the release of the hostages, but also an approach that guarantees that Hamas will not be in control. You have succeeded. They're no longer a military, they are no longer organized as a military, they no longer have the capabilities of a military. It doesn't mean they're with no arms.

Dennis: 45:36

On a transitional basis that could probably be an Arab-led with some other outside involvement, with some Palestinian involvement, some from the PA. A transitional basis, but with a ground rule that for those who want there to be a Palestinian state over time even if you're not prepared to accept that at this moment, there has to be change on the Palestinian side the Saudis, for example. I would say the Saudis can say we need a credible pathway to a state. But a credible pathway to a state has a series of actions by Israel, but also has actions by the Palestinians. If there's no reform, you're producing a failed state. If there's no fundamental change in the structure, there's no guarantee that this is a state that couldn't align with Iran, no guarantee that it couldn't have independent militias. So there's a series of things that would have to be worked out that address not just Israel's needs but the collective needs of everyone. But I would focus heavily on let's take that Egyptian plan. Use the American ready to support you on the kind of outcome.

Dennis: 46:44

Where Hamas is not in control, empower this interim administration that would be a transitional administration, say, for at least two years. Let's choke off the oxygen for Hamas. So, with the Egyptians, there has to be a regime that guarantees no smuggling and you get the US to say this is a fundamental American interest, that there's no smuggling, and you give them an incentive. At the same time, you get to be responsible for doing a lot of the reconstruction in Gaza, which would be a huge economic boon for Egypt, but it means no smuggling.

Dennis: 47:22

There has to be also a mechanism created to ensure any material coming into Gaza for reconstruction, rehabilitation, there is a mechanism to track it every step of the way to ensure no diversion of materials. And if there's any diversion of materials, it all stops. And you should be asking us to come up with a multilateral device to choke off the money to Hamas. The era of Qatash supporting Hamas financially has to be over. So you can produce the outcome of the twin objectives of you get the recovery of all the Hashis alive and dead and you do it sooner rather than later and we work out what is an approach that guarantees Hamas will not be in control of Gaza. That's what I would be saying. I would focus very heavily on that and I'd try to be very precise. Let's talk through exactly what guarantees that Hamas is not in control.

Neri: 48:21

It all sounds reasonable to me and to many other people, but you know as well as I do that this Israeli prime minister and this Israeli government doesn't want to hear the words PA, Palestinian Authority, and again, correct me if I'm wrong, but the Arab states won't go in for this kind of plan without some kind of Palestinian Authority input. And it's been a bottleneck since I don't want to say day one, but very early in the war.

Dennis: 48:46

I would say two things. One I think there's an understanding Bibi in the end, isn't going to oppose the PA inviting. You know that's no Arab states going in without some sort of Palestinian invitation. They're not going in. And there I'll tell you what I heard from those who actually prepared to play a role we're not going in to rescue Israel. We're not going in to rescue Israel, we're going in to rescue Palestinians. We don't want Hamas.

Dennis: 49:09

The Saudis and the Emiratis maybe not the Qataris, but the Saudis and the Emiratis will be very clear with Trump they don't want Hamas in control of Gaza. The argument in Israel we need to eliminate them and they will want that too. That will prove to them. They understand you can't eliminate Hamas, any more than we were able to eliminate ISIS. We defeated ISIS. We couldn't eliminate it. It's an ideology. It's an idea. When you defeat it, you weaken the ideology, but you don't eliminate it. They don't want Hamas in there. And if you ask them the argument that they'll be more impressed by us eliminating them, they will not be more impressed by it.

Dennis: 49:48

If you're going to be there another five years, if you're going to be there several more years, you have no normalization with Saudi Arabia and if you really want to have an effective counter against the Iranians. People say you need normalization to have effective counter against the Iranians. It's true, but you have to explain it in greater detail. What does it mean? It means the Central Command has built an infrastructure for regional integration of defenses. It's an infrastructure but it can't be fully implemented. It is today. You have a common sort of radar network but it still takes calls. They're not connected. It still takes a phone call literally to say, okay, there's been a launch, they have common consoles but they're not connected because there are limitations. You can create an integrated regional defense system where you create a division of labor so that you have a real defense. You have a set of defenses against missiles, drones and cruise missiles. That infrastructure is there but it won't be fully implemented unless you have normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Dennis: 50:56

I'm focusing right now only on the security side, not even the economic infrastructure side, this whole. You know the deal that was struck to connect India with the Gulf, with Europe, and it would have run through Israel. That has dramatic implications for the well-being of the region as a whole, including the Israelis. So to get to regional people hear slogans and they're not persuaded by it. October 7th, I don't need to tell you, sitting in Israel, israel still suffers from the trauma of October 7th. 7th, I don't need to tell you. Sitting in Israel, israel still suffers from the trauma of October 7th. And as long as the hostages are there and as long as there's no accountability for what happened on October 7th, that trauma is not going away. There has to be the worst disaster in Israel's history.

Dennis: 51:39

There has to be a state inquiry commission and that state inquiry commission will look at what was the concepcia and the role of thinking hey, we can build up Hamas as an alternative to the PA, the notion that you can have calm with Hamas. And this was just the security establishment. It wasn't just a security establishment, it was a political establishment. Go back and read Libby's book how he says that both Bennett and Lieberman they wanted to carry the war, they wanted to try to wipe out Hamas and his sober understanding prevented that.

Dennis: 52:12

Shin Bet leaders will report, not just Ronan Barr. The Shin Bet leaders will report that they wanted, they saw this as a strategic mistake, right, so the conceptual will be that will be exposed, but it will also allow you to get at the issue. Okay, what should the relationship be with the Palestinians? We have never had really about. From June 14th to June 19th 1967, you had an interesting secret cabinet debate over what to do in the West Bank and you know it was literally everything you could imagine was sort of thrown out there for five days and in the end they decided to defer the issue.

Dennis: 52:57

Classic Israeli they did not have a serious. Well, you can. It's not hard to understand. I'll put it this way. There's no political leader I ever worked for who looked forward to making a decision they knew was going to produce an enormous political backlash.

Dennis: 53:15

It's not unique to Israel into a one-state reality and if you pass the point where you can't reverse it, that one-state reality is going to guarantee that Israel lives in a perpetual conflict, with being increasingly isolated. You look at the polling in this country Democrats right now, a majority of Democrats are not sympathetic to Israel. It's extraordinary that that's the case. Sympathetic to Israel. It's extraordinary that that's the case. And I'll tell you, if you pull the younger evangelicals, the numbers, the older evangelicals are dramatically in favor and support of Israel. The younger evangelicals are not. They tend to reflect the younger demographic. So if you have a long-term one-state reality, it's going to have an impact not just in the rest of the world. It's going to have an impact here as well. And it's an enduring conflict because the Palestinians A are not going away and they're not going to give up their national identity. They have a national identity, just as Israel, palestinians and rejections who think Israel is going to disappear.

Dennis: 54:22

They're wrong. They never understood the depth of the nature of the Israeli national identity, the civic culture. I look at the depth of that civic culture and I say this when I go to campuses. I say you know what Iran, hezbollah and Hamas never understood? How deep is the sense of identity and the civic culture in Israel? And the best example of it is it wasn't just government that responded to the needs of people in the South and people in the North. It was individual communities in Israel organizing themselves to basically meet the needs of people.

Dennis: 54:57

I was up in Metula in January and there were volunteers from all over the country cleaning up. They weren't connected to the government. The government did nothing. That sense of civic culture is so inbred, it is so much part of the psychology and the sociology and that's what the rejectionists have no idea of, partly because they don't have it. The Iranian regime knows they don't have that kind of fundamental support. You know, hezbollah may hope they have it. Maybe they had it before, at least with the Shia, but with no one else. You know they look at their own circumstance and they project it onto Israel. That's why when they see the division they think we couldn't tolerate that, we couldn't live with that.

Neri: 55:39

But Israel could. And real final question to you, dennis, on that point, on that issue, for all of us who care deeply about not just a peace process but also, ultimately, a two-state outcome, because it really likely is the only realistic and plausible option what do you tell people when you speak to them, either privately or publicly, about prospects for the future, for attaining a two-state solution? Attaining a two-state solution?

Dennis: 56:03

There's a long haul. That it's not. You know, I've worked on this, you know, for 40 years. In terms of the Israelis and Palestinians, I would say we're at the lowest ed during the whole period I worked on this because a complete loss of faith. You know, israelis are convinced that if you had a Palestinian state, it would be led by Hamas. Palestinians are convinced that Israelis are completely indifferent to them. They look at the loss, the death and destruction in Gaza and they think Israelis are completely indifferent to them. So it's a long haul.

Dennis: 56:35

I'll tell you what I think has to be done. First, you have to understand a one-state outcome is a guarantee for perpetual conflict because these two national identities there's always been a conflict over two national movements competing for the same space and they're not going to coexist in one space. So I say where we have to start now, given the trauma on each side and trauma on each side means each side can identify and absorb and identify only with their own pain, not with the other sides First, we have to reestablish the idea that cooperation, functional cooperation, can be done in a way that offers benefits, because you have to reestablish that the reality is. There are areas where functional cooperation, whether it's on environment, water, health, they take place anyway, but they have no exposure. There needs to be visibility to it so people can begin to see okay, we can cooperate. That's number one. Number two you need to use the Arabs, because the Saudi normalization is a lever, frankly, on the Israelis and the Palestinians. Because the Saudis can say look, we're not going to allow you to dictate to us effectively. If you look at Abraham Accord, what was the UAE saying? They're saying you know what? We're not forgetting the Palestinians, but we have things that are fundamentally in our interests, because there's a lot to be gained by our relationship with Israel in areas that matter to us and we're not going to deny ourselves what's in our interest, because you have a leadership that's incapable of ever making peace with Israelis. So you need them to use the lever. But also on Israel and say, look, this is what we require from you and the Palestinians. That allows you to begin to move forward. So, practical cooperation, use the herbs, and there needs to be. Use the herbs also. You look at the educational systems in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, how they've been fundamentally transformed. That does need to be applied also to the Palestinians From the standpoint of them allowing turning, if they're going to be a state, turning them into a state that can be a 21st century state as well, first century state as well.

Dennis: 58:49

So those are. I mean when I lay this out it means it's a long timeline. I would create, in addition to what I said, a parallel set of obligations on the Palestinian side and the Israeli side. And I'll close with this, one of the failures I think in the past, including in my time I can get into failures. I should have thought before we went to Camp David about creating a common script where each leader was going to spell out publicly the concessions they would, the broad concessions they would make on the core issues, before going. Once they did that, the pressures against them, the backlash against them would have given them an enormous stake to reach an agreement quickly, to show the payoffs.

Dennis: 59:27

There's things you have to do from a negotiating standpoint, but fundamentally, one thing we didn't do. When I said there's two movements competing for the same space, there was mutual recognition in 1993, but it was never an exchange of accepting the legitimacy of the other side. It was accepting the fact of the other side. The Palestinians never accepted this historic Jewish connection to the land and the Israelis never accepted. The Palestinians are a people who have a right to self-determination, but before they can act on that right, they have to demonstrate certain things, and Israel, for its part, it can't act on the ground in a way that makes a Palestinian state impossible, even if we're maybe a generation away from being able to produce a Palestinian state. You can't have actions now that make it impossible in the future. You can't have actions now that guarantee a one-state reality and you can't undo it. That's what Minister Smotrich is trying to do.

Neri: 1:00:22

He certainly is, dennis. We'll leave it there. We could have gone for another hour, trust me. The book is called Statecraft 2.0, what America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World. Where can people find the book?

Dennis: 1:00:35

Probably the easiest way is just to go online. You can get it from Amazon, okay, and they deliver very quickly, okay, so people should do that.

Neri: 1:00:43

And next time you come on, dennis, we'll talk about the NBA playoffs and the Golden State Warriors More positive things than Betula Smotrich and his plans for the West Bank.

Dennis: 1:00:50

I would just say if Steph Curry hadn't been hurt, he definitely would have reached it to the conference finals and who knows from there. I believe that's the truth, Not that I'm too pained by it but okay.

Neri: 1:01:01

Well, we are recording this Wednesday evening, so we'll find out what happens later today. I think right.

Dennis: 1:01:06

Yeah, tonight. I think I'm not optimistic tonight because I still don't have Curry.

Neri: 1:01:11

Right With that, dennis, take care. It's good to see you. Take care, bye-bye. Okay. Thanks again to Dennis Ross for his generous time and insights. Also, special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast and, most importantly, thank you for listening. Thank you.