Neri: 0:02

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We have a great episode for you this week with Dan Shapiro joining us to discuss Iran, the Gaza war, both past and present, and the state of the US-Israel relationship. Us-israel relationship.

Neri: 0:27

Dan was, of course, US ambassador to Israel for the vast majority of the Obama administration, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East in the Biden administration and, in general. He has held a slew of senior policymaking positions at the State Department, the National Security Council and the US Congress, dealing with such issues as regional integration, Israel, Iran and most other things that we all care about. Dan is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council in the Scolcroft Middle East Security Initiative. It goes without saying, but I'll say it anyway Dan is one of the best observers of, and practitioners in, the US-Israel relationship. This was an illuminating conversation with someone who has been at the business end of all of it for well over two decades. With all that said, let's get to Dan Shapiro. Hi, Dan, Welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.

Dan: 1:21

Thanks, neri, good to be with you.

Neri: 1:24

It's great to have you, Dan. As we were just saying, it's a good week, I think, for various reasons, to have you specifically on. So I'm really looking forward to this conversation and we do have a lot of things to get into and I'd like to touch on. But first question to you it's been five months since the Biden administration finished up its term in office and the Trump administration came in. Seems already like a lifetime. How is life outside of government treating you personally?

Dan: 1:53

Life's treating me well. I'm at the Atlantic Council, which is a great institution in Washington that allows me to do a lot of work. On other things I care about, especially Middle East regional integration and picking up on the successes and the advances we had in moving forward Middle East regional integration in the defense sector during my last year in the Biden administration at the Pentagon, and I do other things as well. Certainly have some concerns about the state of the world. I have some concerns about the state of my own country, but basically life is good for me and my family.

Neri: 2:30

Right, as they say here, but maybe also in the States. Personally doing fine, but except for the obvious, yeah, except for the obvious Sounds right.

Neri: 2:41

Yeah. So first issue I wanted to get into with you, dan Iran Sounds right and withdrew the US from the previous agreement signed by your former boss, president Obama, but really they're trying to hash out a new agreement. This weekend, I believe, they're going to be meeting in Oman for the sixth round of talks, led by US envoy Steve Witkoff. You guys in the Biden administration, right after you came into office in 2020, tried to renew the deal, get a new deal and restarted negotiations to put Iran's nuclear program I think it was called to put it back in a box, as it were. That didn't didn't quite succeed. So now Trump, I suppose, thinks he can do better.

Neri: 3:41

But the first question to you, dan as things stand now, what do you think the chances of success are for this Trump team to get a deal, especially since it seems like, with every couple of days depending on which US official is talking the goalposts seem to be moving, especially in terms of the key issue of nuclear enrichment yes or no on the part of Iran. So what do you think? Nuclear enrichment, yes or no on the part of Iran? So what do you think?

Dan: 4:06

I think the Trump administration went into these talks without having settled on what its goal was, and that has played out in the conflicting statements you referenced, from the special envoy, steve Witkoff, from others in the administration, sometimes from the president himself, about whether that fundamental question of whether you allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium would be permissible in some future deal. That was one of the main criticisms of the JCPOA, the deal President Obama signed in 2015. There were others that it had sunsets, that there were expiration dates on various restrictions or that there was too much sanctions relief. But when President Trump withdrew from that agreement in 2018, one of the main criticisms that critics had voiced was that Iran had been able to continue to sustain its enrichment capability. Then it continued to advance that capability after President Trump withdrew from it and including into the Biden years, with more advanced centrifuges and higher levels of enrichment and building up a higher, a bigger stockpile of highly enriched uranium that it could, on fairly short notice, enrich to weapons grade. So almost in any circumstance, a deal would involve Iran downblending or shipping out some of the highly enriched uranium, but they insist that they must retain a domestic enrichment capability to fuel what they say is a peaceful nuclear energy program. The problem is the technology and the knowledge has advanced so much that that almost by definition gives them the ability also to enrich all the way to weapons grade and then eventually be able to produce a weapon. There should be verification, there should be inspections that would make sure they wouldn't do it.

Dan: 5:52

But that has been kind of a black and white issue going into this sixth round of the negotiations where it seems that the administration is more or less settled on the no enrichment requirement. That's something they were pushed very hard on by Republicans in Congress and that is something that the Iranians say they will never agree to. They're looking at various creative solutions. Some have been floated in the past A consortium, allow Iran to be part of some regional grouping that could do enrichment that would serve everybody in the region's nuclear energy needs. But this is pretty far-fetched and certainly long-term.

Dan: 6:28

So there's a big decision coming up for President Trump. Is he going to hold to that position of no enrichment or is he going to find some way of saying he's held to it but actually allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium? And I think it's very difficult. I think always the more likely scenario for this year and then we can talk a little bit about some of those derivative scenarios. Is in negotiations up to a certain stage a crisis. By October, the European governments who are still part of the JCB would be able to trigger the snapback of sanctions, the return of sanctions under the former deal, and then Iran would potentially retaliate, withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or expel inspectors or make some other move toward a breakout. And then the decision point arrives for President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, probably on whether or not to use military force.

Neri: 7:26

Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu probably, on whether or not to use military force. So that's a good segue. In terms of the military force option, you've written of late that you think that the military option, a credible use of force, should very much be put on the table, including with and through the Israelis. Fair to say, trump himself seems a bit lukewarm to the idea of actually using force or, as he put it, the destruction and death option. The more isolationist wing of his administration definitely seems like they're not in favor of the use of force. So, in terms of your own view, do you think the military option is just a course of diplomatic tool you know to find leverage, or do you actually believe that, if push comes to shove in the negotiations themselves, that Israel and or the US should actually use the military?

Dan: 8:17

option of going into the beginning of this year, coming out of 2024,. Iran was made significantly weaker and more vulnerable, based on actions taken largely by Israel, but also by the United States, during the course of the war, of course, israel largely decimated Hezbollah and Lebanon, the largest and most well-armed and equipped Iranian proxy right on Israel's border, that had long been feared to be Iran's essential second strike capability. If Israel or the United States were ever to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, they could rain terror down on the skies of Tel Aviv. Hezbollah is not destroyed but, uh, its capability to conduct that kind of attack is severely, severely diminished. Uh then, uh, on October 26th, the following, the second of the two Iranian attacks on Israel, which was on October 1st, when they sent over 200 ballistic missiles to Israel, largely defeated by the U? S and Israeli, is, I should say, israeli and US missile defense capabilities. Israel struck on October 26th in Iran, severely damaged Iran's most advanced strategic air defense systems, the S-300s provided by Russia, as well as some of their ballistic missile production capability, and really left Iran much more exposed, first of all, demonstrated they could reach those targets, and left untouched targets that would be much harder to protect because of the diminished air defense capability. So we go into the year and we go into this attempt to negotiate with Iran in a much more vulnerable state, not unable to respond if they were ever attacked, but certainly without some of the tools to defend against and retaliate for such an attack. So the military option, or at least the threat of military force, becomes a very crucial tool to use if you're going to try to advance diplomacy and get the Iranians to move off of some of their very stubborn positions, particularly on the issue of enrichment.

Dan: 10:26

Actually, I think President Trump used the presence of US force by elevating what was already a very significant US posture in the region. Early in his term it was largely defined as being used for the strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. But the same capabilities a second aircraft carrier, b-2 stealth bombers placed in Diego Garcia, additional air defense units were all relevant if there were going to be some kind of confrontation with Iran. And the Iranians took notice and it actually, I think, helped Iran dispense with a lot of its usual delaying tactics even getting into the talks. Sometimes it takes months just to figure out where to meet and the shape of the table and who's talking to whom. Very quickly, by April those talks were underway and I credit that to very much the President Trump's use of the military tool as a way of focusing Iran's mind on what was at risk if these talks wouldn't get underway.

Dan: 11:29

Then there were some opposite signals, especially once the talks began. First there were some leaks out of discussions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump, in which President Trump apparently said you know, I don't want an Israeli strike on Iran. Ok, fair enough, while talks are underway. But anytime that leak, that story is leaked, it sends a message to Iran that well, ok, there's some less pressure.

Dan: 11:55

Then you have very prominent voices in President Trump's coalition, and one in particular I think is worth paying attention to. That's Tucker Carlson, a very influential tribune, let's say, of the more isolationist wing of the MAGA coalition, speaking out very bluntly saying that any war with Iran or any military action with Iran would put the United States in grave danger, and strongly opposing it. I won't go through all of his arguments, and he is seen as speaking for let's call it the JD Vance wing of the folks internally in the administration. That wing of the coalition seems to be ascendant to the administration. More hawkish members, like Michael Waltz, the former National Security Advisor were dispensed with, or Marco Rubio seems to have downplayed many of his long-held positions. Rubio seems to have downplayed many of his long held positions.

Dan: 12:44

And then, of course, President Trump went to the region. He met with the Saudis and the Qataris and the Emiratis, all of whom seem to be sending signals that they want to focus on deals, they want to focus on economic and technology development. They don't want to have. The look of the talks is that if they insist on moving forward, they're already essentially a nuclear threshold state and maintaining and sustaining that capability that it's going to be very unlikely to get a deal. So I think there are a number of steps, which I wrote about and I can go through them, that the administration could take that would put that threat very much on the table in a way that would hopefully focus the Iranians' mind threat very much on the table in a way that would hopefully focus the Iranians' mind, definitely useful to have leverage in any negotiation on any issue.

Neri: 13:50

But I'm curious okay, if the Iranian minds is focused and they do come to the table, I say sincerely and earnest, looking for a deal, but they're not willing to give up all enrichment. Do you think as a US, leaving aside what the Israeli government may or may not want, but if you were a US policymaker advising this US president, would you tell him okay, zero enrichment, no enrichment. Dismantling of the entire nuclear program in Iran may not be realistic, may be a bridge too far, but we were willing to settle for a bit less in order to get a deal and in order to really kind of limit the Iranian nuclear program and its kind of ability to break out to an actual weapon. Would that be your advice to this US president?

Dan: 14:39

Well, of course I supported the JCPOA in 2015. I was the ambassador of the United States to Israel, so of course you know the president's policy was my policy.

Neri: 14:50

I never-. You were just to say for our listeners, you were on the. You probably had, I don't want to say the hardest job, because the negotiators in Vienna had a really tough job, but to be the envoy of the US, administration, negotiating that deal and dealing with that Israeli government not an easy job either.

Dan: 15:18

Let's just give you some credit here Solved the problem. It wasn't the greatest deal of all time. It was the least bad option or the best available option to buy the most time by keeping Iran verifiably at a distance of about a year from the ability to create a nuclear weapon and keeping them there for 10 to 15 years, always with the knowledge that we would have to come back and revisit that question before those sunsets, before those expirations, and ensure we find a way to extend those restrictions and potentially even consider military action if requireduges that do the enrichment much faster and much more efficiently. So that's one thing that has changed. They have that knowledge. So that's one thing that has changed. They have that knowledge. In fact, by now we couldn't get them back to the one year breakout timeline that the JCPOA provided, because they would have the ability, if they chose to violate a new agreement, to rush with this new capability to a much faster enrichment of the weapons grade material. The second thing that's changed, of course, is we saw Iran twice in 2024 break a longstanding cautionary approach to avoiding direct confrontations with the United States and Israel with these two massive barrages of, in the first case, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones and, in the second case, double the number of ballistic missiles against Israel in April and in October, and that is a very alarming development. If Iran now feels that the taboo has been lifted on direct state-to-state attack rather than using proxies, rather than using deniable means that they have some ability to distance themselves from, deniable means that they have some ability to distance themselves from, but a direct state-on-state confrontation against Israel, it raises the danger or the stakes much more about Iran having that capability to move toward a nuclear weapon in a relatively short period of time. So I do think that the requirement of removing their enrichment capability and having that verifiably monitored is more important now than it was in 2015. And I do think that's the right standard, that the military option is a serious one, to try to focus their mind.

Dan: 18:08

First, as I said, I think they have to fear those strikes. They have to fear it because of the vulnerability of their reduced air defenses, because of Hezbollah's decimation, to help ensure that these negotiations have the best chance to be successful. One way you do that is through consistent messaging that has been lacking in these first two months of the negotiations, as you mentioned, some statements back and forth, but I think it's becoming more consistent that the goal is zero enrichment and we prefer the United States prefers to achieve that through diplomacy, but it's prepared to do it through force if necessary. To do it through force if necessary. The second is through better coordination with Israel, rather than have the coverage dominated by the leaks about the United States saying to Israel don't do this, don't do this. I need more time, even though that's a legitimate thing for a president to tell an Israeli prime minister he doesn't have to give a green light, but he should. I think the negotiations and the leverage in them would be advanced by creating the opposite impression, and there are various ways you can do that that don't give a green light.

Dan: 19:10

General Eric Carrillo, the commander of USENTCOM, who travels to the region frequently, could be sent to Israel for very high profile consultations with the Israeli military command, and it'd be known the kinds of things they were discussing. In the past, israel and the United States have conducted advanced joint exercises the Juniper Series, particularly Juniper Oak in 2023, which rehearsed long-range bombings and suppression of enemy air defenses and messaged in such a way that it was very clear what was being rehearsed. There are other forms of indicating that in certain scenarios, the United States wouldn't necessarily restrain Israel while still giving the president the full ability to communicate when he would be open to that actual activity. There, of course, is Pentagon planning on a US military option. That's true all the time and it goes through various updates. It, of course, has had to be updated since the Iranian air defenses were hit last October.

Dan: 20:09

There are ways that can be briefed, that don't reveal what shouldn't be revealed, to make clear that the United States is also looking at its own military option. And then, of course, to think about the timing of such a strike. If you go through a negotiation process and you reach the crisis point of snapback and is Iran withdrawing from the NPT or something that's probably the timing that becomes most relevant. The point is that a credible military threat actually increases the odds. You don't have to use it. By increasing the odds, you can get an agreement in negotiations, but if those negotiations fail and Iran continues to want to sustain its threshold current nuclear threshold status and the ability to move, at a time of their choosing, very quickly toward actual nuclear weapon, I think the military option has to be very, very seriously considered. A credible military that's only credible if you actually are prepared to use it when it's called upon.

Neri: 21:05

Very interesting. Unfortunately, we have to shift to other topics. We could talk about Iran, I think, for another 40 minutes, but I wanted to really get your sense because you were a unique role just before October 7th 2023, and the outbreak of the Gaza war. Obviously you were the coordinator for regional integration out of the State Department. So I want the definitive answer how close was the US in brokering and getting Israel-Saudi normalization deal on October 6th 2023?

Dan: 21:43

I don't think we can say that we were right on the verge of the agreement, but I think we can say that we had made very significant progress on that agreement and some other progress in regional integration. By the way, I'll just mention the other briefly One of the things I was tasked with in that role at the State Department was to continue to move the NEGEV Forum forward. That was the outgrowth of the Negev Summit from March 2022, when Secretary Blinken met with Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign ministers of Egypt, morocco, uae and Bahrain, and then an ongoing series of working groups called the Negev Forum emerged for projects in six areas, and there was work underway to have a second ministerial summit, which we had actually scheduled for October 19th in Marrakesh you probably don't remember it because of course it didn't happen at which not only those six countries but other countries were likely to participate Jordan and Palestinian Authority and some other Arab states, and maybe some Muslim states outside of the Arab League would have participated as observers. We really were making progress on building out this broader regional integration. On a separate track, there were very advanced discussions with the Saudis on both the US-Saudi bilateral negotiations negotiations, the bilateral agreements, security commitments and energy and technology agreements that would be accompanying and undergirding a Saudi decision to normalize with Israel, and on what the sort of Palestinian component of this agreement would be.

Dan: 23:21

The Saudis had always been clear that they sought some pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Exactly what that meant, what that required, what the Israeli government would have to say, was not exactly clear and was going to have to be negotiated. But there were advanced discussions between Saudis and Palestinians, between Saudis and Americans, in fact, on October 6th I know I've heard my colleague Brett McGurk describe he had a Saudi delegation in his office on October 6th going over the latest drafts of some of these proposals. So we weren't right there, but we had made very good progress and it was advancing and I think there was a very decent likelihood that 2023 would have been the year of the breakthrough had the October 7th attacks not occurred. And of course, we know that among Hamas' motivations for those attacks was the desire to derail this expanding integration in Israel's increasing recognition and normalization in the region.

Neri: 24:19

Absolutely. I think you may have made some news there, dan, in terms of Jordan and the Palestinian authority going to Marrakesh for the NEGA forum because they initially refused to take part in, I think, what was it 2022? They didn't take part, so you heard it here first. Just on the issue of the Palestinian component and what they used to call, I believe, a significant Palestinian component as part of the overall Israel-Saudi normalization deal, I mean, do you think that this current Israeli government which was the same Israeli government back in 2023, could have given anything on the Palestinian component without perhaps risking its survival and, I guess, follow up to that? Given the ongoing war, has the Saudi position, especially vis-a-vis the Palestinian government component of any deal, hardened because of the Gaza and, I guess, also the behavior of this Israeli government?

Dan: 25:15

So that question has, of course, hung heavy over these discussions all along and I think, personally it was always a concern and, I think, a source of maybe some skepticism that we get all of the pieces put in place, because it would ultimately require an Israeli government to make some gesture and some signal, whatever that requirement for the Saudis was and they would have to speak for themselves on what they were looking for but signaling that the path toward Palestinian statehood and some future two-state arrangement over some period of time was still possible or was still the political horizon. And obviously, a government that is really dominated, I think you could say, by rejectionists of that vision Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and whom Prime Minister Netanyahu was totally dependent on for his political survival, is not a government. You would expect to be able to say the magic words, whatever those magic words are. So there was always a question that hung over these discussions If a real opportunity for Saudi normalization presented itself and that had to be folded into it, would that require a cabinet shuffle? Would that require even elections in Israel? That is something that I think was an unknown, but certainly the conversations that were underway with the Saudis were done very transparently with the prime minister and with the Israeli government. So you know he was also thinking about those questions. If it came to it, in order to achieve cybernization, how would he deliver whatever he would need to deliver, or would he just choose not to? So that was, that was a question.

Dan: 26:58

Of course, all of these talks were put on the shelf after October 7th. All the focus turned to the war, to trying to negotiate the release of hostages, to working on humanitarian assistance. Secretary Blinken's diplomacy in the region really focused on that set of issues over the months that followed to the discussions again on the bilateral US-Saudi agreements that were to accompany normalization and were expected at that point to perhaps be part of a broader package of how you would end the war. First you'd get a ceasefire and a hostage deal of all the hostages released and then, as part of that, you would pivot to the big move on normalization, the signing of various Israeli-US-S. I was part of his delegation, along with Brett McGurk, thomas Hochstein, derek Cholet and others, to really try to complete these agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia. We didn't complete them, nothing was signed, but we advanced them to the point where we knew we could complete them and that was a mutual defense treaty, a very significant US commitment to Saudi Arabia's security and, of course, saudi commitments to us in terms of their relationships with China and US basing and the things of that sort, a defense cooperation agreement, an economic agreement and a civil nuclear energy agreement to allow Saudi Arabia to have access to nuclear energy.

Dan: 28:48

And following those talks, jake went to Israel and this was all public. He spoke to the prime minister Netanyahu and he said I think we're at the point where we could deliver those agreements, so let's get to the ceasefire, let's get to the hostages coming home, and then we should be able to execute on this, still pending the question of the Palestinian component component. It was a couple of weeks after that, maybe less than that, by the end of May, that President Biden announced the framework for the hostage and ceasefire deal. And had we been able to complete that in the summer, let's say, then I think we would have had at least enough time to try to put the rest of these pieces together. It would have involved bringing a treaty to the Senate, the United States Senate, for ratification on US-Saudi mutual defense. Of course it would have involved the Palestinian component, raising very much again the question you raised a moment ago about whether this Israeli government was poised to do that. But since the talks on the hostage and ceasefire deal just dragged on and on through the summer and we really were never able to get to that moment, that breakthrough moment, those agreements remained on the shelf. And now we'll see.

Dan: 30:03

If President Trump went to Saudi Arabia last month, he didn't talk about it very much. He mentioned it. He was much more focused on various economic deals with the Saudis, technology deals, very little discussion of a US commitment to Saudi Arabia's security. Frankly, if I were the Saudis, I'd be asking a very serious question is would a President Trump be willing to make such a commitment? He's not such a big fan of the alliances we have and he doesn't treat our alliances, our allies in those alliances in NATO and in Asia the way most previous presidents have done, certainly doesn't speak about them the same way.

Dan: 30:49

So, second, would you really be right? Would you really be getting that kind of security commitment, even if it was signed? And third, would President Trump, governing as he does in a kind of scorched earth fashion, be able to get a treaty ratified by the Senate? That would require 15 to 20 Democratic Senate votes. I don't think the Saudis would know the answer to that, but those are real, very legitimate questions. So the whole structure of the deal that we were trying to build, I think, is in some question right now, but of course it's also still stalled by the fact that the war drags on and on. Hostages remain held, and so I don't think it's anything that's likely to emerge this year, let's say Right that's likely to emerge this year, let's say Right.

Neri: 31:38

I was going to add, before you mentioned the issue of the ongoing war and the fact that at least this Israeli prime minister and this Israeli government have shown no inclination that they're going to end it anytime soon. That may shift, depending on various factors, whether here in Israel or in Washington, but I suppose, like you said, there is this carrot that's been dangling out in front of the Netanyahu government since, well, a year ago, which is the prize of Saudi normalization as part of this overall grand bargain to end the war, to get the hostages back, et cetera, et cetera. Not a bad bargain.

Dan: 32:11

I should say yeah, it's true, but I should say, in fairness to the prime minister, et cetera, et cetera, not a bad bargain here.

Dan: 32:18

Yeah, it's true, but I should say in fairness to the prime minister, of course most Israelis I know, including those who have long been supporters or proponents, or at least open to some sort of two-state outcome, are not ready to have that conversation as long as hostages are held, ready to have that conversation as long as hostages are held, as long as Hamas the risk of Hamas hanging on somehow and re-emerging as a governing authority and threatening entity in Gaza remain. The notion of a Palestinian state on the model that was considered through many years of diplomacy following the Oslo Accords, basically in the West Bank and Gaza, and that same type of entity existing alongside Israel's population centers in Central Israel, is a very difficult proposition for most Israelis to absorb. So I'm not sure, even if it was a different government, that this is the right moment for that. Certainly we have to get past the war, have to get hostages home and have to get Hamas reliably removed from power in Gaza.

Neri: 33:16

That's a fair point. Probably the majority of the Israeli public doesn't want to even countenance the idea of territorial withdrawals and the establishment of a real Palestinian state. But beginning the process, putting together the framework for making it possible in future, I suppose, with with some kind of leadership, even even in Israel, even post October 7th, maybe, maybe you could sell it. But like you said, I agree, you know it would be a hard sell, given, given the trauma of October 7.

Dan: 33:48

It would be. And, by the way, any discussion of a pathway I think that's the word that we sort of landed on a pathway to a future Palestinian state is going to look different than all those post-Oslo negotiations, some of which I took part in. Territorially security-wise, the timeline will look different. It would certainly only be possible if we knew Hamas was no longer in power and a really different and reformed Palestinian authority was in charge. So we're not talking about next year sort of a handshake on the White House lawn that creates a Palestinian state. I don't think in any circumstance.

Neri: 34:31

Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3: 34:34

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Neri: 35:30

Dan. Last question, in terms of looking back, I have to ask, since you were there in the room and in the building, set the record straight for us, if you could? A lot of people in Israel, from the prime minister on down, keep saying and I believe it to be true, that President Biden and his administration placed an arms embargo on Israel a year ago due to the offensive in Terafah in southern Gaza and that now Trump has kind of lifted the embargo, opened the floodgates. What's the truth actually behind the US weapons and aid shipments to Israel during the war, especially under President Biden? I know there was one large shipment or maybe not a large shipment, but a shipment of large bombs. That was suspended for a time. But what's the truth behind the spin that many Israelis believe to be true?

Dan: 36:30

Yeah, the notion of an embargo is nonsense. Starting immediately, on October 7th, president Biden directed the Pentagon and the State Department, which has an important role, to accelerate to the maximum degree the provision of assistance, assistance that was pre-positioned in Israel, assistance drawn from US stocks, israel assistance drawn from US stocks fast-forwarding processes that normally take weeks to months or even longer, to hours to days, and suddenly a huge, huge flow of weaponry was coming. It was all manner, it was aerial munitions, it was artillery, it was small arms, it was really just about everything that Israel uses and needs and that was flowing very quickly in the in the first two to three months of the war. At a certain point some of the lower hanging fruit of that provision had been used up. That provision had been used up, the US stocks that could be drawn on without putting US readiness beyond what it should normally be kept at. There were competing demands from Ukraine for certain systems as well. So you couldn't do the same surge in April as you could in November, just simply because we didn't have the stuff to search but the main provision, and there was a very rigorous cross-department working group at the Pentagon to streamline and cut through normal bureaucratic processes to make sure that everything flowed as quickly as possible. Then there's a separate process at the State Department that requires approvals and then to send to Congress for notification. There is, and President Biden did use initially, an emergency procedure to bypass the congressional notification, but that's extraordinary and so the congressional notification. Sometimes there were some delays in that. All concurrent to that, of course President Biden was pushing to pass the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, which ultimately passed. To that, of course President Biden was pushing to pass the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, which ultimately passed, I think about April, about $14 billion. Some of that backfilled what had been previously provided. Some allowed for new shipments.

Dan: 38:43

So there was a massive supply of weaponry to Israel to ensure it could defend itself and fulfill what President Biden said was the requirement to ensure Israel can respond appropriately to the October 7th attacks and make sure it can never happen again. And that was true throughout the war. Now you highlighted the one very well-known shipment. There was a shipment of one ship that contained both 2,000-pound bombs and 500-pound bombs. It was in North Carolina. These were already Israeli munitions and they were getting ready to sail. And there was a certain point I think it was early May when President Biden directed that that shipment be paused.

Dan: 39:27

We actually at the Pentagon learned about it, I think through the news actually that the Pentagon learned about it, I think through the news and the concern that he expressed was that the 2,000-pound bomb in particular. There were a number of occasions when that munition had been used in very densely populated areas of Gaza and we know that Hamas embedded itself within and underneath civilian areas of Gaza and that was one of the huge challenges Israel faced. But there were obviously a number of cases where, when it was used, there were significant civilian casualties and that was the concern he expressed. Fairly quickly, the 500-pound bombs were separated from that shipment and they were provided, and so the remaining pause was just on the 2,000-pound bombs.

Dan: 40:09

We actually had worked out with Defense Minister Gallant an agreement that he was coming to Washington to sign. I think it was in July that he said I no longer need that munition in Gaza. I do need it for Lebanon, I do need it for potentially other situations, the Houthis or elsewhere. But I'm willing to sign that I'm not going to use that munition in Gaza because of the concern that had been expressed and we were all set to have him come and sign that A few days before Golan's visit, prime Minister Niaou did a video where he sort of lodged this allegation of an embargo, created a very bad environment to try to do that agreement, as if the Prime Minister was being the president, was being directed to do that, and so it was delayed.

Dan: 40:57

We still thought we'd get around to signing it. Unfortunately, we never did get around to signing it. It was something we in the Pentagon were trying to solve throughout the remainder of the administration, but that was the one very well-known shipment that was not provided. But I think the notion of an embargo is really a misnomer.

Neri: 41:15

Okay, so I'm happy you're here to set the record straight. Big picture and maybe even on a more personal kind of gut level, does it make you angry that Israelis and even you know, don't necessarily have have to be right wingers, but many Israelis, I want to say most Israelis, many Israelis now view Biden, and before him President Obama, as somehow anti-Israel? Does that make you angry, as you know someone you personally know and love Israel? You've spent many years living here. You speak Hebrew, dan. Doesn't it drive you crazy when you hear this?

Dan: 41:57

When you're President Obama's ambassador to Israel, you develop kind of a thick skin or you need one going in. So no, I don't get angry. Everyone's entitled to their views and I've had no shortage of Israelis expressing their views to me, which is totally fine. Shortage of Israelis expressing their views to me, which is totally fine. And I express my views to them.

Dan: 42:20

I think history will bear out that both administrations were strong partners to Israel. There were definitely disagreements. Obviously, we know the ones in the Obama administration won't go through all that history, they're well known. But the same administration was also a very good partner at Israel in expanding its strikes in Syria against Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. The same administration signed a $38 billion MOU for military assistance, which I helped negotiate. There were a lot of advances in military equipment and training, the F-35, the funding for Iron Dome. All happened during the Obama administration.

Dan: 43:00

So I think all that history is also very relevant and I think you know President Biden, who of course, spent his whole career speaking about his emotional attachment to Israel, calling himself a Zionist, really recounting in very moving terms how he learned about Israel's story and connected with it and visited throughout his career.

Dan: 43:20

I think his response to October 7th is something that history will also record was a tremendous support, coming to Israel almost immediately, embracing, literally and figuratively, the Israeli leadership in public, saying we're with you, we'll stand with you, and then providing all the assistance that I mentioned, vetoing multiple UN Security Council resolutions trying to short circuit the operations before without blaming Hamas, which all those resolutions didn't didn't, making clear that defeating Hamas was an absolute requirement, putting all of the focus on getting hostages released. The first successful deal in November of 23,. And then, unfortunately, a long process that didn't produce the next agreement until near the end of the administration. So I think the record will definitely show that both of those administrations I'm proud to have served in them were close partners and delivered on Israel's essential security needs. Had differences were forthright, as friends need to be when we did, but did so in an appropriate way. So no, I don't get angry, but I just turn back to the fact just to turn back to the facts.

Neri: 44:31

Very diplomatic, I will express anger on your behalf and on both of those presidents' behalves, because I agree with you. I think the historical record and the objective facts will show that both men were hugely supportive of Israel and friends of Israel. We may get back to that in just a second. Final issue I wanted to tackle with you, dan and it's a big one the US-Israel relationship, both the present and future of the relationship.

Neri: 45:01

I think it's fair to say that right now, the standing of Israel in the US and even on Capitol Hill definitely amongst the far right and also on the far left Hill, definitely amongst the far right and also on the far left is really really bad. It's also debatable how you define how far each far right and far left is these days, given the politics in the States. I mean, first off, how concerned are you about Israel standing amongst Americans? In other words, is it just a reaction to the past 20 months of war and the images coming out of Gaza, or is there kind of a deeper and longer term shift in the offing there?

Dan: 45:40

I think there would be elements of both. I mean, obviously, as long as a war of this difficulty and the violence associated with it. War is hell and terrible things happen in war, associated with it. War is hell and terrible things happen in war. It casts a very heavy shadow over the relationship, simply because that's the main thing people think about and talk about. Of course, there's a great deal of sympathy and support for Israel, attacked as it was by a terrorist organization so brutally on October 7th and with hostages still held, including, I guess, two deceased Americans among them. But at the same time, you know the discussion around humanitarian assistance, whether sufficient aid is getting into Palestinian civilians something we worked a lot on in the Biden administration with the support of the Israeli government, certainly with the support of the IDF and obviously civilian casualties. That also is in the part of the discussion and people are concerned about that and I think anybody who's human should be concerned about that, whatever your politics are. So one question is how much longer will this go on and what direction will it take?

Dan: 46:55

I do think there's a serious decision point really that the president is at and it's even coming out in real-time news reporting about whether he really wants to tell Prime Minister Netanyahu, or has told Prime Minister Netanyahu the war needs to end and, if so, what leverage he will use to do that? It seems that the main leverage they're trying to use is through the Qataris, on Hamas to agree to a 60-day ceasefire and release of 10 hostages, but it's pretty clear. And that, of course, would open up eight spigots as well, but it's pretty clear. I think that President Trump would hope that, once that ceasefire occurs, the war does not resume at the end of it. There's an alternative version of using the leverage that he has, which is to go to the prime minister and say we can't waste time on a two-phase deal.

Dan: 47:47

Let's do the deal now that gets all the hostages out and declares the end of hostilities, even though there will have to be an ongoing effort to make sure Hamas is dislodged from power. That could be done through side letter between Israel and the United States, as there was after the ceasefire in Lebanon, so that Israel continued to strike as needed, and, importantly, a very upgraded diplomatic effort with the Arab states to exile Hamas leaders and fighters from Gaza, really remove them, send them to distant locations, and then only under those circumstances does the real reconstruction of Gaza begin. So that's another option President Trump has had. Doesn't seem to have taken that one. Actually, I think he made a very unforced error in February when Prime Minister Netanyahu visited for the first time and he declared that his goal was the Gaza Riviera, the US taking over Gaza, all Palestinians leaving Gaza and building the shape of hotels. It's never going to happen, and it's pretty clear to him, I think, by now that it's not going to happen.

Neri: 48:50

So I was going to say Trump himself, and I dare say every other US official working for Trump, hasn't even spoken about this in probably two months.

Speaker 3: 48:58

Correct.

Neri: 48:59

And yet, and yet, speaking to your point, every Israeli official, senior Israeli official, talks about it almost on a daily basis.

Dan: 49:05

Well, that's right. So he's emboldened the most extreme elements of the Israeli government. So Smotrich and Ben-Gurion now think that's the plan right. We don't need a day after plan, we have a day after plan. It's the Trump plan. And even the current operation seems scoped with this new humanitarian effort. That's sort of struggling to deliver, to consolidate the population in small areas.

Dan: 49:28

Smotrich says openly that's a prelude to them leaving, being expelled or so-called voluntarily. You're right. President Trump doesn't talk about it anymore. I think he understands. Actually, if people were forced to leave, that's ethnic cleansing, there's no other word for it and so he doesn't want to touch that. But even Prime Minister Netanyahu has now said yeah, a new condition to ending the war not just getting hostages home and making sure Hamas is removed from power. Those are legitimate goals of the war, but the new condition is implementation of the Trump plan. So I think President Trump's own initiative here has become an obstacle to getting to the end of the war, which is part of changing the discussion and changing the atmosphere in which the whole US-Israel relationship takes place. Now I don't think there's a question that this administration will continue to be friendly and supportive of Israel, and I think majorities in Congress will as well.

Dan: 50:21

But, as you said, we've seen, of course, the protests on campuses over the last year and there's definitely anti-Semitic elements to that, certainly anti-Zionist, and often those are fused and people calling not just to end the war or not just expressing very legitimate concern about Palestinian civilians or saying they want to see Palestinians have their own state, but actually calling for Israel's destruction. When you talk about from the river to the sea, that's really talking about removing a Jewish state. When you talk about globalizing the Intifada, that is talking about violence as a means to pursue political ends. And of course, we've seen these outrageous and tragic attacks in Washington and Boulder, Colorado, just in the last couple of weeks. So that's part of this atmosphere. But you also mentioned that on the far right another part of President Trump's coalition you have a growing, I think, voices of skepticism about whether Israel is trying to pull the United States into Middle East conflicts, that is, around the Iran discussions. You have a new discussion about whether the next MOU Memorandum of Understanding on US military assistance to Israel, which would in normal times be negotiated over the next year or so, actually involve a ph country it can handle itself, but also on the notion that you know, maybe enough is enough, and you hear that from members of the right wing in the United States as well.

Dan: 52:03

So I do think that there's work to do to reinforce what have always been the kind of core common values, common interests of the United States and Israel, kind of core common values, common interests of the United States and Israel. It's not helped by having the most prominent and certainly most influential members of the coalition be very extreme in their politics and how they express that about Gaza, sometimes very brutally, what they seem to be supporting in the West Bank in terms of settlement expansion and settlement settler violence. So that's that's not helping Israel's image internationally. It's not helping Israel's image in the United States and, again, I think, on both sides of the political spectrum. So you know, I think all of this is something that can be dealt with. But you know different Israeli leadership. But you know different Israeli leadership, focused American leadership by both parties and a lot of education to our own public and our own youth that there are still these core interests and core values. But that has to be expressed in reality. That has to be expressed in how people conduct themselves and how they speak and how they live.

Dan: 53:10

Again, getting back to the opportunity of expanding regional integration, expanding Israel's acceptance and legitimacy in the region helps push in the other direction because it shows that the conflicts are no longer defining everything about this region, that there's opportunities, there's growth, there's economic and energy and health and educational cooperation across societies.

Dan: 53:37

Palestinians can be folded into that. There's no reason that they have to be excluded from that. In fact, I've always felt that the best opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to find a future of living together and they're going to have to find a future of living together because no one's going anywhere, have to find a future of living together because no one's going anywhere is at a table convened by Arab states who recognize Israel and are friends with Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain and Morocco already do, and we hope the Saudis will and others but who also hold to a certain commitment to the Palestinian cause as well, with the United States as a partner to that, but not necessarily the main or only convener of that. That, I think, would do a lot to help create a very different vision of the region generally, but also lift up the Israeli story in a very positive way that many Americans of all sorts of different political persuasions would be able to identify with with Absolutely.

Neri: 54:39

But, like you said, I suppose they have to end the war first. And, I guess, last question on that topic Do you truly believe that the moment is coming soon that President Trump will come to Prime Minister Netanyahu and say, okay, wrap it up, it's done. Even if Netanyahu, let's say, agrees, or Israel and Hamas agree to a 60 day temporary ceasefire, that Trump will actually bring the hammer down and and say, ok, that's you know, you're taking the full deal permanent end to the war, with something that Bibi has not been willing to do in their most recent phone call.

Dan: 55:11

Obviously, we don't know, we weren't on the call, but the signals are getting louder that the president is looking for a hostage deal and is willing to go with Netanyahu's preference of the 60-day 10-hostage deal rather than the full hostage and full ceasefire deal, but that he sees that as an exit ramp to then get into the more permanent conclusion. That's, of course, been the nub of these negotiations. Hamas wants absolute guarantees that the war won't resume at the end of the 60 days, and now he's not prepared to give those, at least until now. It sounds like today maybe there's some hope of a little bit of narrowing, but it seems that President Trump, who speaks generally about his desire to end wars Of course we know he speaks about the war in Ukraine, not that he's been very effective there, but he he wants it to end.

Dan: 56:03

He wants to avoid a war with Iran, whether or not he's willing to hold that military option, but he's talked about wanting to be the peacemaker, wanting to to end killing, wanting to be the peacemaker wanting to end killing. He's even expressed some sympathy for Palestinians, which is not to be dismissed that Palestinian civilians are caught in a terrible situation in Gaza, between the IDF conducting its operation and Hamas, sometimes brutalizing them but also fighting from within them and making them human shields. So he has, I think, the kind of influence with the prime minister of the war. My government will fall because Smoltrich and Ben-Gur will bring it down. Then it's a question about whether or not he will actually go along with that.

Neri: 57:06

Yes, it's been a huge question and on that point, this Netanyahu government may not be long for this world, irrespective of what happens on the battlefields of Gaza or the negotiating tables in Doha. Having to do with the Haredis, the ultra-Orthodox. That's a separate issue which we won't get into in the time remaining. Dan actual last question to you and it's a surprise, because I didn't prep you for it and again it's more of a personal one. Maybe I want to take you back to September 30th 2016,. Mount Herzl, hare Herzl, in Jerusalem, the funeral for Shimon Peres, the former prime minister and president of Israel. President Obama gave a eulogy then and there. That, I think, is, if not one of the best speeches I've ever heard, then definitely the most Zionist speech I've ever heard, and it's not hyperbole when I say that. I've said that for many years now.

Speaker 4: 58:04

Shimon Peres reminds us that the state of Israel, like the United States of America, was not built by cynics. We exist because people before us refuse to be constrained by the past or the difficulties of the present, and Shimon Peres was never cynical. It is that faith, that optimism, that belief even when all the evidence is to the contrary, that tomorrow can be better that makes us not just honor Shimon Peres but love him. The last of the founding generation is now gone. Shimon accomplished enough things in his life for a thousand men. Shimon accomplished enough things in his life for a thousand men, but he understood that it is better to live to the very end of his time on earth with a longing not for the past, but for the dreams that have not yet come true an israel that is secure, and a just and lasting peace with its neighbors. And so now this work is in the hand of Israel's next generation.

Neri: 59:16

I urge everyone to go look for that speech. We're going to put a clip of it in the show notes. It's simply beautiful and poetic and poignant and, above all else, hopeful. So I've never, I think, brought this up in our private conversations. But how did that eulogy and speech come about? Who wrote it?

Dan: 59:39

I want to hear the backstory and a bad turn and of course he was President Obama in his final weeks in office and you know measuring every minute, you know, to try to maximize what he could get done. But I said to him, you know we sadly may have a funeral, and he said, believe me, I will be there for Shima. They had a real bond. President Obama was really inspired by President Paris's vision, his optimism, his history of you know kind of all through the history of the state of Israel, but also his forward looking optimism and belief that peace was possible and technology was a forward moving momentum that served Israel and served the region. And so there was really no question he would come. Of course, you know, when the president died it was, I think, a very short turnaround until the funeral, and so the eulogy was written on the plane.

Dan: 1:00:50

They took some inputs from the ambassador from Israel, but I'm sure he, and probably Ben Rhodes, did most of the drafting. But I think he did a lot of the drafting himself. Again, this was a very personal decision for him. He was on the ground in Israel for all of about six hours because of other commitments he had on both ends in the United States, but he was not going to miss it, and he took the opportunity, as you heard and just very beautifully recounted, to express what Shimon Peres' life and their friendship meant to him about the man, but also about the story of Israel and the story of the US-Israel relationship, and so everything expressed in that speech, I think, came from him very, very personally.

Neri: 1:01:34

Israel relationship, and so everything expressed in that speech I think came from him very, very personally. That's exactly what I was going to say, that it wasn't just about the man and his life, but also looking to the future. Also, president Obama got into the similarities and there were similarities between his journey and Shimon Peres' journey, uh, but really the the future of israel as shimon paris saw it and wanted it to be, and, coupled with that, uh, the history and future of the us israel relationship. Um, and and really it's a remarkable document. I actually watched bits of it on youtube uh, earlier today in preparation for this, for this uh interview and podcast, so we're going to have a link to that in the show notes.

Dan: 1:02:17

Thanks for the memory. I'll go back and take a look at it myself. It's remarkable.

Neri: 1:02:21

Dan. With that, I'll let you go. I know you have a busy day back in Washington, but thank you so much for doing this.

Dan: 1:02:30

Thanks, nery, my pleasure.

Neri: 1:02:31

Take care, talk to you soon. Okay, thanks again to Ambassador Dan Shapiro for Thanks, nery, my pleasure and, most importantly, thank you for listening.