Neri: 0:05

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum, walla News. Chief political correspondent and friend of the pod, tal Shalev, is back with us to discuss Netanyahu-Trump round three, which happened this week in Washington. It's the third time Prime Minister Netanyahu met withump Round 3, which happened this week in Washington. It's the third time Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Trump in less than six months since Trump's inauguration in January, more than any other world leader, which seems significant.

Neri: 0:36

Tal and I discussed exactly just how significant or not this meeting was in our conversation, especially coming after the 12-day war with Iran and just ahead of what many people hope will be a new Gaza ceasefire for hostage deal. We also discussed what Bibi may be thinking now in the wake of his rather successful campaign against Iran, and we'll also get into the current state of play in Israeli politics, both in the coalition and God help us in the opposition as well. Just a reminder we're also now a video podcast available on YouTube so you can see us and not just hear us, but we're also, of course, still audio only. As always, wherever you get your podcasts, do subscribe and leave a nice rating and comment if the mood strikes you. All right Housekeeping over. Let's get to Tal Shalev.

Tal: 1:29

Hi Tal, welcome back to the podcast Hi Nuri Happy. Thank you for having me again.

Neri: 1:36

It's really our pleasure to remind you, tal, last time you were on was in April, just ahead of Pesach Passover and just after the second Trump-Netanyahu summit in Washington. So I wanted to have you on now for round three to break it all down for us. I think it's fair to say that back in April the consensus was that it wasn't a very successful trip for Bibi Netanyahu to go meet with Trump. Trump back then announced direct talks with Iran. Seems a bit well, seems a bit funny. Now. He also pressured Netanyahu on things like Turkey and Syria, etc. But we're now after a war with Iran and possibly just ahead of a Gaza ceasefire. So I guess the first question to you, tal, and the question on everyone's mind here and in many other places what did you make of the two meetings between the two leaders yesterday, on Tuesday, and then the night before Monday for dinner? What do you think in terms of the messaging, the optics or lack thereof?

Tal: 2:40

I think it's too early to call. I've been saying basically we need to be, let's be patient. I mean I know everyone is very. You know these meetings yesterday and even the meeting before, they're not exactly the traditional protocol meetings we're used to seeing between presidents and prime ministers, even between us and Alan Frank. You know you have the traditional protocol in which they have the oval and they might have, you know, a press conference later, but here everything is in a much more familiar, like even family-like, manner. I mean, the first meeting, the first meeting was dinner with sarah and nathaniel. There, um, and it was extremely unusual, um.

Neri: 3:30

And the second, I mean I was gonna say unusual is is, to put it loudly, they were sitting around. They were sitting around a dinner table. They let in only the american journalists and so they're asking questions to both leaders. Nathaniel has his back to the journalist, so he's turning around talking to the journalist, talking to trump.

Tal: 3:49

I mean, it's not traditional by any stretch no, so um, and the meeting yesterday was without any press at all, so um it it's. It's definitely an interesting visit, right, uh, like all Netanyahu visits to the White House usually are. But if there's one thing that I've learned from all of these visits even in Trump one and his third visit in Trump two is that looks can be deceiving and sometimes there might be a really grand presentation or facade for the optics, but at the end of the day, not much is left of it. Even if we go back to the first meeting between Trump and Netanyahu in this term, in the second term, the February meeting, where Trump basically starts dreaming about a Riviera in Gaza and you know Trump's dreams here of the right wing dreams of transferring the Palestinians from Gaza I don't know. We're almost we're five months later and nothing has really happened there besides, like here in Israel, getting a lot of hype about it, but in reality, not much has happened.

Tal: 5:00

So one of the things I have learned with these meetings is a it's OK to take a pause and say I don't know, I have no idea, I don't really understand what's going on there. It's clear that something is going on, right, but there are so many scenarios that I can make up into that, going on, spanning from Gaza to Iran to Syria to, just, you know, netanyahu, giving Trump nomination for a Nobel Prize and just like being very nice to him. It's clear that Netanyahu, from his political point of view, he, you know. It could be that this is also a facade, that this is something like this is just a show of showing a lot of pressure from trump on netanyahu, or whatever it can be. So many scenarios. So I think we're just in the middle of the visit um, and we might even be seeing another uh meeting um I.

Tal: 6:01

I carefully dare to predict that there's a high chance that we can find it, and I was staying there until Sunday or Saturday, just like previous visits to DC, and suddenly a weekend in DC will will appear on his itinerary. So, basically, I think it's too early to try and give signs to this. I think it's too early to try and give science to this. And another thing that I've learned is that we are working with, or we are covering, not working with. We're covering and trying to analyze two leaders who thrive on disinformation and misinformation, not only as a political strategy but, as we learned in this whole 12-day war with Iran also in their geo strategy, so a geopolitical strategy. So I think it's very difficult to try and analyze and to separate. What is reality, what is the alternative reality they're both trying now to create for their supporters, and where what exactly is happening in reality and not in the visuals?

Neri: 7:15

so that's a very important point. I think all of us, not just in the business, but all of us looking on at this relationship between the two leaders and the two countries, the US and Israel, need to be a bit more humble after the Iran war Because, like you said, that was a purposeful campaign of misdirection, misinformation. It was deception to get the Iranians off guard and it worked because I, as listeners of this podcast know, I got on a plane to Greece the day before it all started.

Tal: 7:48

I got on a plane to the US the day before it started, so yeah, yeah.

Neri: 7:52

So we all have to be a bit more humble. And yes, if in April it seemed like it was an unsuccessful visit, there were tensions, this time it seems like there's a lot more warmth, a lot of hugging. Trump said you know, we have a tremendously successful relationship. I mean, there was a lot of warmth there. At one point I think you probably saw it too at this weird dinner table press conference, non-press conference Trump was asked about both the two state solution and his idea for the Gaza Riviera and kicking out the Gazans, and he just deferred to to BB. He gave the. He gave the answer to BB which I don't think I've ever seen.

Tal: 8:35

Yeah, again, we've been hearing a lot. Also, let's get back to like the real issues on the table. Besides the atmosphere, which is clear, that why there's a warm atmosphere right now they're both after a very successful campaign politically, or at least in its first image, in its first response. It's a select, successful campaign and they both want to project their victory. That's the atmosphere.

Tal: 9:06

But you know, on the table, basically, if we put aside iran, because there's probably going some something going on between them, the regards around, and there's probably something going on regarding syria, but we look to, you know, where people's lives are waiting to the hostage deal and the war in Gaza, ending the war in Gaza, then I keep getting a real sense of deja vu to the February meeting, because in the February meeting it was just after, you know, the January hostage deal and the White House was briefing that they will want to discuss the terms for ending the war with Netanyahu, and then Netanyahu came up with all these terms. He didn't come up, presented his terms, expelling all the Hamas leadership and demilitarization total demilitarization.

Tal: 10:00

and here we are five months later and the White House is briefing exactly the same thing, and Net White House is briefing exactly the same thing, and Netanyahu is briefing exactly the same thing. And we're not really moving forward in ending the war on Gaza. You know, if we think about that first visit I remember I was with Netanyahu there Then we went to Washington expecting President Trump to, you know, knock on the table and tell him you know you got to end the war in Gaza. That didn't, that didn't happen. So I don't know.

Neri: 10:31

And no, it didn't happen. And also Trump and his administration. Let Netanyahu restart the war in March, exactly.

Tal: 10:39

On the other hand, you know, we still have the impression and we know the very strong impression. And you know, we still have the impression and we know the very strong impression. President Trump came back from his visit to the Gulf states and we know that the Gulf states want to warn Gaza over. So it really, I think, depends on how much President Trump is going to let Netanyahu prolong this war without you know, because he does have the power and ability to stop the war if he wants to, just the way he did, you know, after 12 days with iran, um, he has the capability and the ability to do so he does.

Neri: 11:19

but it's, like you said, deja vu with regard to earlier this year, where the consensus here for weeks was that, oh well, trump will end the war, trump will force Netanyahu to end the war. That wasn't true back then.

Tal: 11:36

And I'm still not convinced it's true. Now, and you know, the whole geopolitical establishment that is dealing with this issue continues to abide by the formula that is designed for Netanyahu's political needs here in Israel, which means that you will have a phased deal instead of one ceasefire permanent ceasefire, ending the war in exchange for all of the hostages. So we're continuing to split the ceasefire into a never-ending ceasefire and hostage deal so that Netanyahu won't need to end the war. And just earlier this week, before he left well, as Netanyahu was basically leaving for the US the Defense Ministry's live chat had a briefing with the military reporters in which he presented before well, as nathaniel was basically leaving for the us, the defense ministry side talks had a briefing with the military reporters in which he presented israel's new goal, which is, uh, building a humanitarian uh city near rafah um and moving all the palestinians there.

Tal: 12:38

And it's exactly. You know, and we're hearing so much about you. You know the Morag corridor, that is the. You know, a year ago that was Philadelphia and a year and a half ago that was Rafah. So he just continued to find excuses or you know, pegs, to campaign on them, which are basically conditions that make a ceasefire almost impossible, because the Samaritans will never accept these terms.

Neri: 13:10

Right. So we also have to be a bit humble. We're recording this, as mentioned, wednesday afternoon, tel Aviv time. So you know the mood music yesterday from Steve Witkoff was well. We're hoping for a deal by this weekend. We'll see. I think that's a bit optimistic, but you never know. But my question to you, tal are you optimistic that at least this initial 60-day ceasefire, the first stage of a ceasefire, will be attained, that we'll get the terms between Israel and Hamas and get at least half the hostages back? I mean at least that let alone, you know, leaving aside end of war negotiations and hopefully culminations, but at least the initial 60 day ceasefire. Do you think that's possible?

Tal: 13:55

I'm not sure that's even possible, given Netanyahu's insistence now on the Morag corridor. If he continues to insist, on the.

Tal: 14:03

Morag corridor? I'm not sure it's possible, uh, but I will try. I am still trying to remain optimist, even if it's not necessarily uh realistic. To remain uh optimist because I think you know we are at a moment at at large, regarding this deal, regarding the war in d, regarding the Middle East, that you know there is an opportunity to design, you know, to rise from the ashes of this war and really design a better environment and a better, you know, regional, a better regional security system or architecture, and I think that you know, of all people, probably President Trump is the one who may be able to do it so, and I do think that he's the only person who can end the war on Gaza.

Tal: 15:01

So it's better to be optimistic than be pessimistic at this moment, even if it doesn't really it doesn't, it's not really compatible with reality. But someone mentioned, by the way, someone mentioned a quote by Simon Peres. It's not an exact quote, but something about you can be an optimist and you can be a pessimist, and the end you die. It just determines how much everyone dies, it just determines how much you suffer on the way till you die. So it's better to be optimistic.

Neri: 15:35

It's definitely better to be optimistic, but also realistic. I'm curious why are you more pessimistic than many other people here and other people that I've spoken to who think that a 60 day ceasefire is is attainable? You know, again, they need to negotiate the final details, including about the morgue court.

Tal: 15:54

It's attainable, it's attainable, as President Trump tells Netanyahu let's get it over with. But and we need to. I mean, I mean, probably Hamas also needs to be pushed a bit more. But I can also see a scenario in which these conditions blow it up. I mean, at the end of the day, you know, and this has been true since January 2024. Hamas wants to end the war, netanyahu doesn't wants to end the war. Netanyahu doesn't want to end the war. I mean, that's their main demand and that's his main condition. And since January 2024, you know, because of this architecture and these, there have been many phased deals that have been designed. But at the end of the day, in order to end the war, you have to have Netanyahu willing to end the war, and with this coalition he can't do that.

Neri: 16:54

Right, so we'll get into potentially end of war. I mean, that's kind of two or three steps from now in just a second, trust me. But let's let's play the optimists for a second. Let's say that Trump nudges Netanyahu and Hamas towards a deal. They agree on 60 days. Again, the details still need to be firmed up and they're, I think, more in flux now than they were maybe a few days ago, but hopefully there will be a deal. Do you think if there's a 60 day pause in the war and an IDF withdrawal and all the other things Israel has to give to get at least half the hostages back, that Netanyahu's coalition can't survive?

Tal: 17:36

That's tough.

Neri: 17:37

And, by the way, tal OK, that's interesting because you said the same thing back in January when we had you on, and you back then. Then you don't remember this, I do. I also went back and checked. You said smotrich will stay in the coalition yeah in in january, before before the deal, and that wasn't a given, because he, like smotrich, does issues a lot of threats. Smotrich stayed in the coalition bengville left for two months and then he came back. What do you think will happen?

Tal: 18:01

so one of the reasons that Netanyahu is so adamant now on the Morag corridor is for Smotrich not to leave the coalition in a 60 day deal. That's one of Smotrich's conditions. But I still think that Netanyahu's coalition can survive a 60-day hiatus in the war and ceasefire and another partial deal. A because you know Smotrich didn't leave the previous time, so why should he leave now? He still doesn't pass the electoral threshold in most of the polls, so he still is the only one in the coalition I mean he has the least interest in the whole coalition to bring down the government. B Ben Gville already kind of made a fool out of himself in the previous deal when he left and then after two months rushed back in. He can't play that trick again. So that's the second reason. And the third reason is just the timing, and this could also be one of the reasons that we might see a delay in the timetable for such a deal.

Tal: 19:14

So today we're on the 9th of July, the Knesset dissolves for its summer recess on the 27th of July, but the last week is literally nothing. So basically there are two more weeks left for the coalition to survive and if Netanyahu stalls this deal even a week, then there's no even real practical way to bring down the government. I said it'll be very, very difficult procedurally, even if there is a big, big, big fallout in the coalition and, by the way, this applies also to what's happening with the Haredim and the draft crisis, which we'll talk about later. But just the timing is good for Netanyahu. Netanyahu just needs to survive two more weeks in this Pneset session and then he has three months of summer recess in which the coalition is not likely to fall. So it just seems like the timetable. So that's why I think Netanyahu is trying, or might be trying, to push the deal as close to the recess as possible, in a way to secure his coalition from falling apart, even from another interim deal.

Neri: 20:36

Right, I think our friends Shira Afran and Michael Koplow, on last week's episode got into the whole timetable issue and yeah, wouldn't be surprised if it, if it took the negotiators exactly two, two more weeks to nail down all the details and then he can go for a 60-day ceasefire, uh, with a cleaner and uh well, a cleaner, a cleaner mind, cleaner conscience, uh. By the way, the knesset recess uh goes on until, I think, mid-october, after the holidays, so it's a very, very long break. Also, another thing in terms of just timetable, not a minor point the courts here in Israel also go on summer break. I think in the next week or two they come back, I think, for a short period in September, but then obviously the holidays interject. So basically, netanyahu has to make it for another two weeks and you know he can go on vacation. I mean he won't, but he could. He could at least politically and legally, um, okay. So very interesting.

Neri: 21:39

With regard to the coalition, you don't think they have as much leverage as they pretend. You don't think bengal and small teacher, you know um going to threaten and actually execute, toppling the government over this, uh, the ceasefire deal, despite the fact you know as well as I do that? Elections are already in the air, early elections do you think that's spin, speculation, unrealistic?

Tal: 22:05

Well, I think you know, even there wasn't like kind of speculation or rumor or report after the Iran war was over that Netanyahu was contemplating a speed election. A there's no such thing in Israel as speed election. I mean by law, it takes three months and it's very difficult to make it shorter. B as far as I know, netanyahu is not considering any speedy elections at the moment. A it's not as if the Iran attack, the Iran success, uh, totally changed the polls and from his point of view, it had minor impact.

Tal: 22:46

It does.

Tal: 22:47

It did have some impact, but it was minor, uh, not dramatic enough at the moment for him to feel secure enough to go uh to uh to an early election and see it's already you. The timetable for the next election is quite clear, without like being a profit, but you know the Knesset is going to come back from its summer recess in October and the government needs to pass another budget, the 2026 budget, by the 31st of March to the latest Right. So the assumption is that they will not pass another budget because the budgets include a lot of tax raising and difficult measures that will not be popular if you're going to elections anyway in October 2026. So, to the latest, the government will fall by the 31st of March and it might be earlier, a bit earlier, but it's not going to fall in October. It's not going to fall. There won't be elections in October. The earliest timetable that you can see elections right now, and again without being a prophet, seems that January 2026. So the elections will be somewhere between January 2026 to October 2026. We'll have elections.

Neri: 24:25

Still, it'll be one of the longest lasting governments this country has had in the past few years, which is interesting enough. Well, it's interesting because they're the government of October 7th Exactly, and even before that.

Tal: 24:34

Yeah, they are one of the most, let's say, aggressive governments, to the least that the country is at, but they share a lot of interests, so their shared interests kind of keep them together and I don't see, you know, there are slight creeds in their shared interests, but not enough yet to bring the government down.

Neri: 25:01

Right? Well, we'll do a postmortem about this government when elections are called.

Neri: 25:07

Believe me, um, that will be, uh, that will be a fun day and a fun episode. Uh, just to finish up this, uh, netanyahu and it's related to trump, but it's mostly about netanyahu. You have, uh, a lot of netanyahu hours, as I say here. Uh, you've been covering him for years, you've met with him countless times. What do you think he actually wants right now? Coming out of the Iran war, the 12-day campaign very successful I mean leaving aside the kind of military achievements, but just it's viewed in Israel as very successful. It's Netanyahu actually achieving his ultimate dream and his life's mission to bomb Iran and its nuclear facilities. And so coming out of it. There's a lot of questions and speculation. Okay, now that he did that, what does he want to do? I don't want to say with the rest of his life, but with the rest of this political term, and there are obviously all kinds of ideas between ending the gaza war, a deal with saudi for normalization three deals.

Neri: 26:13

Some people are a plea deal retirement um what do you think?

Tal: 26:19

so here is where I am. I admit that I sometimes don't know, especially since, you know, 2023 and this government was established because, you know, netanyahu always had his two big goals, which was Iran, the normalization of Saudi Arabia. These are the things that he wrote in his autobiography that he wants to leave as his legacy, and that is basically, you know, been one of the school of thoughts through which we analyze Netanyahu over the past few years. But when he established this government in January 2023, after the 2022 elections, he basically, you know, the judicial overhaul and the very right-wing partners that he chose basically are counter-effective to these two goals.

Tal: 27:18

A. For the first nine months, this government, you know, waged a war inside Israel, attacking the same pilots that brought Netanyahu his victory in Iran and, you know, waged this very deep internal war, which only made Israel weaker, which is against, you know, netanyahu's whole philosophy of peace through strength, whole philosophy of peace through strength. So that is where I started to question, you know, what are Netanyahu's real goals? Because you have Netanyahu, you know the statesman who has these two goals of Iran and Saudi Arabia. One of them, it seems like it's been a huge success. We don't know how it will go. I mean it has been a huge success. We don't know how it will go. I mean it has been a huge success, military, but from the point of view of the nuclear program it's still. We still have to wait and see. I mean, right, the operation was a huge success from israel's image and you know some of the destruction and we have hit major facilities and the overall operation was war was very successful. Regarding this specific goal of the nuclear program, I think it's too early for us to call a history.

Tal: 28:32

We'll probably uh right if this uh was the truth call, but there's also nathaniel the politician and nathaniel who the was indicted, and these n Netanyahu the politician always wants to survive and that's the first and most important thing for him. And Netanyahu, who's indicted and is in court, also wants to get out, doesn't want to go to jail. So having all of these three different Netanyahus together makes me question what does he want? Because on the paper, he wants Saudi Arabia and Iran. But when you take the two other aspects of his personality and leadership the fact that he will do anything to survive, including building a coalition with the most radical elements in the political arena, and his will to survive his trial. That has changed. You know, changes his calculus in a way that it somewhat difficult to predict what he wants or understand what he wants uh, hugely difficult to uh to analyze and predict.

Neri: 29:43

Uh. Also, he may not have decided either, so that makes it even harder to say with X certainty.

Tal: 29:51

He probably wants everything and he's just throwing all the balls and see which one of them falls. It's also one of his house tactics, right? He plays on a lot of games and one of the games will turn out his way. Right? He paints on a lot of games and one of the games will turn out his way Right.

Neri: 30:08

He paints on a very, very wide canvas to his credit and then he chooses usually at the I don't want to say the last minute, but usually after the last minute which direction he's going to take, it which direction he's going to take. But it is curious. You saw it during the Iran war and after the Iran war it was almost a different Netanyahu. He was out in public, like his Churchill moment, going to impact sites in Batyam and Beersheba. He's back giving press conferences. He didn't give press conferences for months.

Tal: 30:40

Yeah, it wasn't a real press conference. It wasn't a real press conference. It was a press conference on video right, it was a Zoom press conference.

Neri: 30:49

Yeah, but he also. He was standing in front of the hospital of Soroka in Beersheba answering questions from journalists.

Tal: 30:55

Well of course, because he wanted to claim his victory. You know it was his chance to make the rounds that he didn't make after October 7th. You know he disappeared after October 7th. He wasn't Completely Because he didn't want the photos on October 7th to serve in his next campaign or in his opponent's next election campaign, but the photos of Iran is exactly what he wants.

Neri: 31:21

But late last week he did finally go to Nero's, the kibbutz down on the Gaza border that was the worst hit. A quarter of the population, the residents there were either murdered or taken hostage. So he waited a year and a half, over 600 days, did not go to Niros, did not deign to go to Niros because of those images that he felt so threatened by. And yet end of last week he went. Why? Well, first of all, Because he felt more confident.

Tal: 31:50

Yeah, because he felt more confident because he has now, you know, rebuilt his image as Mr Security. And it's important to know Neil O's today does not look the same way it looked 640 days ago. It's already, you know, in the process of rebuilding itself. I mean, it's not that walking in the you know paths of Nero's it's still quite a shivering experience, you know haunting experience. But it's not where, a year and over a year and nine months after the massacre and this is a community that, at the basis of it, wants to, you know, revive itself.

Tal: 32:31

So that's the Niroz he arrived at. And he also arrives at Niroz at a moment before he goes to the US to negotiate a hostage deal and to supposedly bring back some of the Nilo's hostages home. And in that respect, you know, no one in Nilo's had, you know, the gut to tell him, or not. No one, some of them, some, but you know most of the people, of the hostages families. All they want to make sure is that their son will come home right now.

Tal: 33:05

So it was, I think, a much calmer atmosphere than it was. And I got to say, you know the fact that he went to Niroz after 630 days, I think it was, or when he was there 634, 630 days, I think it was, or when he was there, 634. It doesn't erase the fact that he wasn't there for the 634 days up until that. I mean, it does, you know, start amending? And he's, by the way, he's the first Israeli prime minister ever in Israel's history to ever come to Neot, ever in Israel's history to ever come to Neroz, because it's such a distant and far away kibbutz that no Israeli prime minister ever had reason to visit Neroz.

Neri: 33:53

Is that right? Not any of the labor prime ministers? No, wow, okay.

Tal: 33:59

So again, I think you know it was personally. For me, the visit to Nilo was after the massacre, was one of the most defining, you know, moments of this war, and I also was very critical of Netanyahu not going there for so long. So I'm really happy that he went there, but do I think that people will forget in the OZ that he wasn't there for all this time? Not sure.

Neri: 34:35

No, I mean, these aren't exactly the coup voters anyway, and, like you said, though, they received him very respectfully I don't want to say warmly, but it was very respectful. Well, they're men, right?

Tal: 34:49

one of the things that we learned about these amazing communities and the Gaza envelope is that they really are like people that you want to grow up and be like them, and they're, you know.

Neri: 35:01

So they're just a group of men, so that's why they were very polite to him yeah, uh, I mean, we've we've all seen it in under the worst conditions and context possible due to october 7th, but, uh, it was uh one thing that came out of octoberth and this war is the reminder that, yes, there are still kibbutzim in Israel and yes, there are still kibbutznikim in Israel, and it actually is amazing communities and amazing people that still exist in a real way and also you know that the people living in these communities on the Gaza border are, you know they're protecting us, you know.

Tal: 35:50

Anyway, they are very moving people. They really are.

Neri: 35:55

They could have been your neighbors, Tal, if you had moved down there.

Tal: 35:59

You never know, maybe they will be one day.

Neri: 36:02

Maybe they will be. I know that's you would seriously consider it. Mm-hmm, it will happen one day. It will happen one day, maybe they will be.

Tal: 36:05

I know that's uh, you would seriously consider it will happen one day. It'll happen one day yeah, it's uh.

Neri: 36:10

I mean we've talked about it. Uh, both on this podcast and privately.

Neri: 36:13

It's, it is. It is a beautiful and amazing part of uh, of this country. Um, that was went through, you know, a mini holocaust uh, on that day. Uh, yeah, awkward transition, but I'm going to transition anyway. Let's get into the great game Israeli domestic politics. We'll start with the governing coalition, then we'll switch to the opposition. In terms of the coalition, right now, the big issue before the Iran attack was the crisis over drafting the ultra-Orthodox, the Haredim, into the IDF, into the idf uh, and the big crisis as we speak today, after the iran war uh, is the crisis over drafting the haridim uh into the idf, and the hardy parties are back boycotting uh the coalition and any legislation that the coalition wants to propose. Uh, there was even an op-ed this morning. I'm sure you saw it brilliant big ashkenazi.

Tal: 37:10

It was brilliant. I loved it, so let me. I loved it so for our, for our listeners and viewers.

Neri: 37:15

Let me just explain so. In one of the big um organs of the ashkenazi uh heresy newspapers and it's a big thing because obviously they're less online than um, than me and tal and all of you so the newspapers still carry a lot of weight, the hard copies. Uh, there was an editorial that compared netanyahu to churchill.

Tal: 37:36

Uh, and not in a good way well, it didn't really mention what was brilliant about it and it wasn't even mentioned by his name. It was just like right, the story of churchill it was. And guess who loves churchill? Who is the biggest admirer of Churchill in Israel? Netanyahu. So it was a clear message to Netanyahu.

Neri: 37:59

And it wasn't that Churchill won World War II and that he was a great leader. It was how this great leader, the magic, expired and he wasn't reelected right after the war. And yes, netanyahu wasn't mentioned by name, but the message definitely came across. Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3: 38:20

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Neri: 39:16

So given this editorial and given the behavior of the Haredi parties in Knesset, are you concerned for Netanyahu and the future stability of this coalition? Or are they flexing their muscles but really they're not going to leave?

Tal: 39:34

So we went through the timetable right. We have about 14 days for this coalition, that it needs to survive and it's. The Haredi are serious at Netanyahu, at Yulia Dostain, who is the head of the Defense Committee in the Knesset, who's supposed to be drafting the bill. You know, de facto, and there's definitely a lot of emotions and noise in the air, but A just like Benghazi, you know the Haredim are already threatening to bring down the government two weeks, three, four weeks ago, before the attack on Iran. So they can't really use that stick again, right, and they also don't really have an interest to bring down the government as long as it seems like the next government could be established without them. And, given the anti-ultra-Orthodox sentiment in Israeli society right now, that is like a real possibility that there will be a government without the ultra-Orthodox parties that will actually legislate a real draft bill, because it's such a hot topic, you know, right now in Israel and there are people who will make it a hot topic in the next elections as well. So the atmosphere in the Knesset is not as of a real crisis, but like everyone understands that there's not enough time right now, but everyone has to play their game, so the Haredi need to make themselves sound angry and say you know hates and stories about Churchill to Netanyahu, so that everyone knows that they're angry and they're threatening Netanyahu, but nothing is really happening. That being said, two weeks is a long time.

Tal: 41:37

So when Netanyahu gets back from Washington, you know the fact that he went away in the midst of this crisis. Also, you know if it was a real political crisis, a real, real, real political crisis, we know Netanyahu has no to postpone or delay flights, so we're just not in crisis mode. We're just not in crisis mode right now, but there is it's also. It's kind of a deja vu, right? I mean, basically, since this government was established, every few months the parading are angry that Netanyahu hasn't promoted the draft exemption bill yet, and every few months they have to threaten with something and nothing happens. At the end, everyone is just like stalling time. One of the things that does disturb the Haredim very much is the fact that you're hearing voices from the IDF preparing to have a wide scale operation in. Not if they're not, if the operating don't, don't come to to to the army.

Tal: 43:00

So that is a big issue. I mean, if we start to see Yeshiva boys arrested because they didn't go to the army when they got the draft notice, and that will bring down the coalition immediately.

Neri: 43:15

But that hasn't happened yet right and it remains to be seen how. I mean how widespread the well the draft notices will go out, but how widespread the actual enforcement of the draft notices will go out, but how widespread the actual enforcement of those draft notices will be. I find it hard to believe that the IDF is going to send military police into Bnei Brak, banging on doors and carting off yeshiva boys.

Tal: 43:42

Yeah, I find it hard to believe.

Neri: 43:44

So again, but they're not going to raid Bnei Brak like it's. I don't want to compare it to something else, but I find it very hard to believe. Also, the Israel police under Itamar Ben-Gvil I don't Will they take part in that? I doubt it. So I'll believe it when I see it. But I think they're unhappy with Netanyahu because he did promise them a whole bunch of things. But I think they're unhappy with Netanyahu because he did promise them a whole bunch of things and now what? Two, two and a half years into this government, it hasn't, they haven't gotten anything.

Tal: 44:16

Yeah, but it's their fault, right? I don't know. I mean tough flesh. I mean there's a long list of people who believe Netanyahu's promises and you know commitments and like there's a whole graveyard of them. You know of broken promises by nathaniel, so, um, they. You know, if we go back to this, historically, this was the core, um, one of the four elements of the coalition agreements that nathaniel made with the already parties, that he would legislate a bill that would regulate the fact that they don't go to the army. Um, but then came the judicial overhaul, and that was more important for him to promote when the government was established, and you know, so on and so forth.

Tal: 45:01

Here we are, two and a half years later here we are each time he told them after the budget, no, after the next budget, after the next budget.

Neri: 45:09

So yeah, yeah, and, and now they're, uh, they're making their voices heard, but, uh, in terms of, uh, I say, a graveyard of broken promises, a boulevard of broken dreams, uh, I mean, the the experts in this are is the opposition. So we have to, we have to talk about the opposition and bennyz is the expert on it.

Tal: 45:31

We'll get to Benny.

Neri: 45:34

Gantz in just a second. Benny Gantz is only the latest and greatest.

Tal: 45:41

I think of the current opposition, Benny Gantz is probably the man who has accumulated the most broken promises from Netanyahu. Yeah, but that's because again we chose to believe him to begin with.

Neri: 45:56

Yeah, again, we'll get into Benny Gantz and the whole issue surrounding him in just a second. But I'm old enough, and you're old enough, to remember Shaul Mofaz, the head of Kadima, whose political career ended almost overnight when he believed Netanyahu, by the way, over this very issue drafting the Haredim into the army back in what was it? 2012. Ewood Barak also lost his political support because he went into government with Bibi Netanyahu. And on and on and on it goes. Anyway, we're not here to look back, we're here to look forward, looking forward.

Neri: 46:36

So the first opposition figure I wanted to talk about, gadi Aizenkot, the former IDF chief of staff, who entered politics and joined Benny Gantz's National Unity Party ahead of the last election and last week split with Benny Gantz at his National Unity Party. And also, gadi Aizenkot left the Knesset. He resigned, but he is planning on coming back. Just a question of in what formation, formulation or context. So what do you think of Gadi Aizenkot's move and what do you think the future holds for Gaddi Eisenkot, who is a very popular politician here in Israel, I have to be said?

Tal: 47:15

Well, he's a very popular figure. He's one of the most popular figures in Israel, but I wouldn't Gaddi. Eisenkot is not yet a politician, even though he has been in politics for three years.

Tal: 47:31

It's a very important distinction to make. Yes, I'm not sure he will ever be a politician, and that's one of the perhaps one of the reasons that he's so likable and so popular, uh, as a person, um, but um, I think we need to start this discussion a with benny dance, because it should be mentioned that Daddy Eisenquist is Gantz's fifth partner leaving him since he entered politics. Benny Gantz entered politics in 2019, late 2018. He had Moshe Ya'alon not with him anymore. Then he had Yair Lapid not with him anymore. Then he had Gabi Eskenazi not with him anymore, and now he had he had Gabi, I think, what left him as well.

Neri: 48:22

He also he also you left, you left out of. You left out a few people no no, the number.

Tal: 48:27

Speaking about, about the number, like the number two, the people that are the number two partners.

Neri: 48:33

These were partners.

Tal: 48:34

he built a partnership with lapid gabby eskenazi and, we'll say, alone, and he built a partnership with viva sal and daddy eisenfeld, and both of these partnerships collapsed. And this is a man whose main campaign is that he is a person of agreements and partnerships, but but he can't even. I mean, if we look at his record, he has no ability of maintaining partnerships in his own household and in his own party. So, first of all, I think that Gadi Aydinput's leaving Benny Gantz is crucial, or it might be, you know, the final block in seeing what isot leaving Benny Gantz is crucial, or it might be, you know, the final block in seeing what is happening with Benny Gantz. He has had his ups and downs, but Gadi Aizenkot was Benny Gantz's main political asset in the previous campaign, in the previous elections, and it'll be very difficult for him to reinvent himself right now. We can get back to him later.

Tal: 49:32

Now about Isingkort he basically needs to decide what he wants to do. He basically he can go wherever he wants. He has an offer. Well, it's not on the record, but it's clear that if he wanted, yair Lapid would offer him the head of his party. Really, yeah, lapid has been vague about it, but it's on the table. Lapid is not doing well in the polls, yair Golan is like going ahead of him inside his own block and he needs to find a way to reinvent himself, and Daddy Eisenkot is a way to reinvent himself. He also has an offer from Naftali Bennett, but not to be number one, to be number two. And you also have Y yan golan from the left and his party calling for some big unification, uh, of all of the parties. And he needs to decide what he where he wants to go. Does he want to be number one? Does he want to be prime minister? Does he want to? Where does he want to take his political rear from his statements? You know, gaddi Eisenkot is a very sincere and authentic person, so you understand that he wants to be part of the leadership that replaces this government and replaces the current leadership. But he's not necessarily keen on being the leader. And if he wants to be the leader, then that's what he needs to decide. And he will need to start, you know, building a block, or building at least an image, or campaigning on that image.

Tal: 51:24

He had what was considered somewhat, you know, weak debut. He had a press conference last week. I think it's a bit I kind of defer to most of my colleagues on this that the acting code is not Bibi Netanyahu. He'll never be Bibi Netanyahu. He doesn't know how to speak eloquently like Bibi Netanyahu. He doesn't know how to campaign and do the optics and the visuals and the gestures and the.

Tal: 51:54

You know the whole show. He doesn't give a show. He's exactly the opposite. He's a totally authentic person. So even trying to judge him by Netanyahu's standards is just wrong. And one of the things here in Israel is that you know we've gotten used so much to Netanyahu's standards is just wrong. And one of the things here in Israel is that you know we've gotten used so much to Netanyahu's leadership style that everything is compared to him and everyone is like everyone needs to be a mini-BB. But perhaps I think that perhaps that he includes authenticity and you know the fact that Israelis believe him and they like him could be a real serious, a really significant asset if he, if and when he decides how he wants to take his career from from here on.

Neri: 52:46

Okay, so that's Kadia Azinkot TBD. But he doesn't have to be Bibi Netanyahu, but I think he does have to be an effective communicator and some kind of politician to do the job.

Tal: 52:59

Listen, I don't think he's not a politician at all. I mean he does. You know he's been, he understands. Up until now he was Benny Gantz's number two so he didn't need to play the moves. Now he needs to start playing the moves and, um, he needs to decide, I think, if he wants to play the moves and what moves. Uh, he wants to play and he needs to, you know, start building himself.

Tal: 53:25

Um, there's also kind of this um, you know he is in the danger of getting wearied off with time, um, so he needs to find a way to remain. You know he is in the danger of getting weared off with time, so he needs to find a way to remain. You know he left the Knesset you mentioned, so he needs to find a way to remain relevant, even if he's not the Knesset. So he has a lot of decisions that he needs to make if he wants to become part of the leadership. But you know, the main decision is what is the vision that he wants to present as his vision? Is it a Naftali Bennett vision? Is it closer to Naftali Bennett? Is it closer to Yair Lapid? I think that if he will join Yair Lapid, it will change the way, the map, it could change the way the map looks.

Tal: 54:10

We're also in that stage ahead of the election in which everyone is polling 25 different scenarios each poll. What happens if Gadi Azikot is number two and Avigdor Ivanovich is number three? It's a very exhausting stage in the election. It'll take a few months. So it also depends, I think, on what constellation god the eisenberg will believe he is the most significant in. I mean, in what constellation he can become most significant and, you know, contribute to bringing down nathaniel and replacing the government okay.

Neri: 54:49

Um, so our second uh figure already mentioned, uh, benny gantz. Uh, we touched on him a little bit but, like, why has benny gantz found it so difficult to get along with his political partners? Uh, and also, what does the future hold for him? At the peak right of his popularity, probably the first year of the actual Gaza war after October 7th, he was leading in all the polls, high 30s, sometimes close to 40. Now he's at four seats, in danger, like Batella Smoltych, of not even making it into the next Knesset due to the electoral threshold. So what happened?

Tal: 55:31

So, first, of all it actually covering it and now covering. I always talk about covering it now, but covering benny gantz when he took like a, when he takes like a glimpse from afar, um, it's been quite a roller coaster, right, because he for three election campaigns he was the main contender to replace nathanahu and then he was even substitute prime minister in their first government. And then he, from being the most promising politician in the center-left after he joined Netanyahu, he sinked down and almost didn't pass the electoral threshold. And then he hardly. Then he made himself. He brought in Gadiadzic and he didn't sound. And suddenly he was a medium-sized party again. And then in the midst of the war, right in the beginning of the war, he was the most popular politician again. And suddenly again it was like, oh, he's the next prime minister. And here we are, a year and nine months later, and he again, after Eisenkot leaving, he once again is close to the electoral threshold in the polls and there have been speculations that well, it hasn't been actually only speculation.

Tal: 56:46

Ali Ederi, netanyahu's partner in the coalition, the leader of Chass even, was trying to convince Netanyahu to bring Benny Gantz back into the government right now for the third time in order to secure a hostage deal without Benzir and Smotrich rattling the coalition. But Netanyahu didn't even want to hear about it. So Gantz is now basically. When eisencourt left, he launched a new campaign, which once again he's talking about a wide agreement um government. Uh, in the next, a wide consensus government, the 70 consent, a consensus government of 70 people in the next government, and this is like probably going to be his campaign all the way. But Benny Gantz will always have now like the question mark will he go with Bibi? After he does it twice? And in an election ecosystem and a political ecosystem in which you know, at the end of the day, the main question in every election is yes or no Bibi, that might become very unpopular and you know his brand is already so weakened I mean, it's such, the brand is just and he's also not relevant. So Gantz as well will have to make decisions where he's going.

Tal: 58:14

Someone in the anti-Netanyahu bloc said to me I don't understand why we continue to count him as part of our bloc, because I can definitely see a situation in which after the next election, he joins the government with Netanyahu and Gantz's campaign, as opposed to probably most of the other parties in that bloc, is going to be, that he's not going to disqualify Netanyahu, because there's no point in disqualifying Netanyahu after he's sat with him twice in the past five years. So there are. Gantz is going to be, I think, you know, I don't know how he can, you know, reinvent himself after you know, being so battered from all of, from so many directions. And if he doesn't reinvent himself, if he can't reinvent himself, he will reach a situation in which he might, you know, he could turn into the next Merav Mikhaeli, because he'll be very close to the electoral threshold. And then people will be pressuring him to either join another party or drop out of the race because of the risk of, you know, losing those votes if he doesn't pass the electoral threshold.

Neri: 59:36

Yeah, for our listeners. Merab Mikhaeli, obviously the former head of the Labor Party who, ahead of the November 22 election, refused to join forces with Meretz. She said both would pass the electoral threshold. Meretz did not pass the electoral threshold and it cost. I don't know if it cost the internet, but it could have been a very different result if Meretz had been caught.

Tal: 1:00:01

We know exactly that they wouldn't have won the election. I mean, Netanyahu still would have won, but he would have a 61 coalition and not a 64 coalition. And a 61-seat coalition is a coalition you can. It's much easier to bring down. A 61-seat coalition is a coalition you can. It's much easier to bring down a 61-seat coalition than a 64-seat coalition right.

Neri: 1:00:21

um, the uh, final figure in the opposition I want to talk about tal. Uh, I'm an order, so I'm an order. Uh, he's the head of the Hadash faction in the Knesset, which is predominantly Arab-Israeli and most definitely communist. It's usually part of the Arab bloc in the Knesset. There's a move underway to actually impeach him and kick him out of the Knesset After a tweet he wrote in January expressing happiness that both Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners were being released as part of the then ceasefire deal in Gaza back in January. So people saw this tweet as equating the two Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, caused a big uproar, and now they want to kick him out of the Knesset entirely Truly an unprecedented move. The big thing here is that the opposition MKs in the committee that voted on this last week. They voted in favor to impeach him, and also opposition leader Yaya Lapid said this past weekend that he would vote in favor of impeaching Ayman Odeh when it came to the plenum the full plenum next week On Monday yeah.

Neri: 1:01:33

So, yeah, I personally think this is a disgrace, um, and, by the way, just bad politics for the opposition, because, uh, they, they don't want all of the arab mks to be disqualified, because that will tilt the entire political map in netanyahu and the right wing's favor. The opposition, as the opposition here does, thinks about things maybe in very short term, short term terms. But what do you think about this whole saga?

Tal: 1:02:04

Well, first of all, I agree that it's a disgrace. I think it's for different reasons. I think it's a disgrace because this whole procedure that is used against Ayman Ulda is a procedure that was legislated in 2016. And it says that, basically, a majority of 90 MKs can decide to kick out another MK. I think, to begin with, the process of MKs deciding who or isn't inside the Knesset is absurd. The voters need to decide who is inside and outside the Knesset, and when it was legislated, the opposition adamantly voted against it. I mean including Yair Lapid, who is now intending to vote in favor of kicking out Ayman Oda.

Tal: 1:02:57

At the time, I just covered it at the time and I remember at the time that they were the ones that were warning that this is a dangerous process that will lead to persecution of minorities and of Arab MKs.

Tal: 1:03:17

Persecution of minorities and of Arab MKs, and one of the reasons I'm also against it is because I think that you know, today the Arab MKs are minority and tomorrow I mean in my worst nightmare I can envision a situation in which secular is a minority or women are minority in, and this can be used in various ways.

Tal: 1:03:37

That scare me very much and seeing again, this is basically a gig by one of the Likud members who you know. Ayman Oda is one of the most popular figures for Likud members to lash out at, and this whole thing started, you know, as a primary gig of one of Likud's MKs. And the fact that and it turned into, you know, a big coalition celebration over Ayman Oda and the fact that the opposition is cooperating with this coalition that in any other instances they are fighting against them just on this issue, I think is a disgrace. I do think, or at least there is a lot of work behind the scenes to make sure that the proposition does not pass in the plenum, even if Lapid will vote in favor, most or not, most or a large portion of his party will not arrive will just not attend, and a large portion of Benny Gantz's party is not going to attend, and the Labour Party is not going to attend.

Tal: 1:04:59

So I think that, just like the previous time by the way, that the coalition tried to expel an MK was often perceived last year also from Sadaj Tal they failed to achieve the number, the required number of votes, which is 90. And they only had 86. So I predict, or carefully predict, that it's going to fall in the same way, without you know, being approved in the plenum and then reaching court. Another thing that should be mentioned is that Aymanullah is not even running in the next election so so the whole that's the thing he's already.

Neri: 1:05:37

He's already resigned effectively, so the whole thing is just about.

Tal: 1:05:40

You know, it really is just about, you know, making a show and eventually, because the whole process, by the way, it was done in a very non-professional way, they didn't really gather all of Aymanuta's. Really, you know history of statements. If they wanted to, they could have found many more statements, but they only brought in to the committee, you know that, one tweet. The law is very clear. You need to have like a mass amount of statements to prove that an mk supported terror. So, in any case, this is going to be disqualified by the supreme court. But, um, the opposition is, I think, making sir or cooperating with the arabin case to make sure that it doesn't reach that point, that it's a clash with the supreme court and that it just doesn't pass the plenum.

Neri: 1:06:36

Okay. So that's good news, but yet I think the core point still holds the opposition is always scared of its own shadow, scared of being tarred as weak on whatever. And in the next election and after the next election, after the next election, they may need, if not active arab support, then tacit arab support to form a government.

Tal: 1:07:02

One of the keys, one of the main keys for the anti-nithyanian block to win the election is the voter turnout in the Arab sector, and that is a key to winning, and I agree that it's totally counter-effective to that goal. But there are some personal aspects to this Aymanullah has. I mean, some of the people in the opposition have personal grudges towards Aymanullah. So I just, you know, I just hope that it doesn't pass the plan the next day.

Neri: 1:07:39

Yeah, let's hope. On that. Note, tal, thank you so much as always for your time and your analysis.

Tal: 1:07:47

My pleasure.

Neri: 1:07:49

You were very honest at the start, saying I don't know which you never hear not on podcasts, definitely not in Israeli media. But we appreciate the honesty and the authenticity and until next time, hopefully we'll have well, hopefully we'll have a ceasefire in Gaza and hostages coming home, and then we can discuss what next Amen, amen, amen to that.

Neri: 1:08:12

Bye, take care, talk to you soon. Bye, okay. Thanks again to Tal Shalev, as always. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilliman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum to keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And, most importantly, thank you for listening.