Shanie: 0:05

Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod. I'm your host, Cheney Reichman, the Director of Strategic Initiatives and of IPFFT at Israel Policy Forum. I'm joined by Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and Policy Advisor at Israel Policy Forum. Hi, Neri.

Neri: 0:19

Hi, cheney, great to be back with you.

Shanie: 0:25

Shani, great to be back with you, good to see you. Today we're going to cover the spectacle in the Israeli Knesset, prospects for a ceasefire, hostage deal and Israel's engagement in Syria. So are you ready to start?

Neri: 0:33

I am ready to start, and what we had in mind for this week was this kind of not even midsummer but deep into summer laundry basket, various hodgepodge of various issues domestic politics, gaza, syria but, as always, shani, never a dull moment here. So it's not recently, but in the not too distant past, even here in Israel, the summer was a slower period, but, yeah, nothing like that of the sort these days, for obvious reasons. So, looking forward to to try to break it all down for for our listeners and our viewers. By the way, a reminder, we are also a video podcast, so you can check us out on youtube and not just on the various podcast platforms that you've been listening to us, uh. So check it out, subscribe and, yeah, content should be the same, but you get to see our faces, and usually it's the guests' faces are beautiful this week notwithstanding.

Shanie: 1:34

And you can also catch some clips on Instagram if you follow Israel Policy Forum on Instagram With that.

Neri: 1:40

Very important.

Shanie: 1:41

Very important United Torah Judaism. Just to start off with the knesset stuff, as always, united torah judaism is the ultra-orthodox ashkenazi party, not to be not to be confused with shas. The mizrahi party left the coalition in protest of the government's failure to pass a law exempting ultra-orthodox men from military service. This has been an ongoing drama for years, decades, between the ultra, the ultra-Orthodox parties and sort of everybody else. Now Shas has also quit the government, but they stay in the coalition, which I don't really know what that means. Maybe you can tell me. All of this is a very long-winded way of asking will there be an election and how do we know?

Neri: 2:21

So that's a good setup, shani. Yes, some drama over the past week in domestic Israeli politics. The ultra-Orthodox, the Haredis, essentially left the government Again. Have they left the coalition? This is like a Talmudic disputation. When does a party actually resign from the government, resign from the coalition? When is a government a minority government? Can it be both a minority government and not a minority government? It's a strange animal at the moment, the current Netanyahu governing coalition, and I'll explain why in just a second. But yes, they've essentially left in a huff in protest at the fact that this coalition has not provided them with a get out of jail free card, not literally, it's get out of the IDF free card, basically an exemption for their young boys and men to not have to serve.

Neri: 3:16

Now, again, we don't have to go back to the very beginning and into the weeds of this issue. But, yes, you're right, this has been going on for years, shani, and every time the can has kicked down the road, there's never been a real solution, primarily because, for the vast majority of this time, benjamin Netanyahu has been prime minister and Bibi Netanyahu owes his entire political comeback back in 2009 and longevity through successive elections, successive coalitions, successive coalition crises, etc. To the Haredim, to the ultra-Orthodox. They're really his safety net the Haredis, that and basically his core base of support inside the Likud party, but in terms of the broader Knesset, the parliament, it's the Haredis. So now their patience has run out, for the most part, but not completely, because at the beginning of this government, way back in late 2022, when we were all much younger and it was much simpler times, they won the election and they were promised by Netanyahu and this government to pass a real law that would exempt them, their boys, from service. That never happened for a variety of reasons. Number one the judicial overhaul overtook everything else, so that was a big as you say here, balagan big chaos. By the way, the judicial overhaul was meant to pave the way to legally allow the ultra-Orthodox to get this bill passed, but obviously that was stalled back in 2023 due to the efforts of the Israeli people on the streets. And then, obviously, october 7th and the war overtook everything else, at least for a year or so, before everything came, came roaring back, uh, and really netanyahu has been able to deliver, uh, that bill for them.

Neri: 5:11

Uh, for two reasons. Number one uh, the person with his hand kind of on the uh, on the remote uh is yuli edelstein, who, until about an hour ago, was the head of the very important Knesset committee, the foreign and defense committee in the Knesset, and so basically, the bill had to go through his committee and he he's, by the way, part of the Likud party, he's the chairman of the committee and he was refusing to play ball. He actually wanted to ostensibly pass something with teeth that would get a significant number of Haredis into the military and, if not, then to pass a bill that had actual teeth to sanction the draft dodgers and the, let's say, the overall ultra-Orthodox community Basically sanction them personally. Things like travel ban you can't leave the country, you can't take out a license and collectively to free subsidies to various yeshivot and schools and the like that were not abiding by the law. Basically, that never got off the ground either and, like I said, an hour ago, yuli Edelstein was dismissed as the head of this committee by Netanyahu and basically a Likud loyalist, a stooge, boaz Misput, was put in charge of this committee with the eye basically to paving the way for a bill to be passed through the committee and then by the Knesset to give the Haredis what they want.

Neri: 6:41

Now, hold that thought for just a second. It's an open question whether Boaz Bismut and this rearranged committee will actually get the job done, but basically the Haredis have not yet been placated, so they left. So UTJ, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox party, united Torah Judaism, left everything. They quit the government and left the coalition. Shas left the government, but not the coalition, and both parties made it clear that they're not going to play ball with the opposition to either replace the current government in the current Knesset or alternatively, and more likely, work with the opposition to trigger early elections. So that's why I say that you need a kind of a Talmudic scholar which the Haredis will not provide us, to actually figure out what they're doing and what they actually did. You know officially, but basically this is a play by them to show Netanyahu that they're really, really, really unhappy. And now Netanyahu has responded and at least is making a move towards trying to draft a bill more to their liking.

Neri: 7:48

Now, the important thing throughout all of this, shani, as you all know, the calendar. So this is the last week where the Knesset is in session for this Knesset session, and then all of our dear leaders in parliament will be going on a very languid summer, and then all of our dear leaders in parliament will be going on a very languid summer and then recess, so they're only going to be back in three months, basically mid-october. So nothing can really be done, not really until mid-october uh, not passing this law. So they'll be working to draft something, I suppose, in committee during the recess, and you can't, more than likely, trigger an early election during the recess. So Netanyahu has succeeded in achieving total victory, not in Gaza or various other fronts, but over the calendar, and Netanyahu essentially has played out the clock very successfully and gotten to the safe harbor of the recess without anyone, whether the ultra-Orthodox or the far right or the opposition, being able to kind of combine forces and trigger, a, the dissolution of the Knesset and then, b, early elections, and that's what Netanyahu was really going for.

Neri: 9:03

So again, when the ultra-Orthodox left the government quote unquote last week, everyone knew it didn't really matter because the government, and really the Knesset, wasn't going to be doing much of anything over the coming three months, and so this was a more symbolic move by the ultra-Orthodox.

Neri: 9:21

And then again Netanyahu responded, basically this afternoon and recording this, on Wednesday afternoon, tel Aviv time by getting rid of Yuli Edelstein, a dramatic move we should note for everyone listening and watching a highly unpopular move by Netanyahu to try to do this.

Neri: 9:41

You know, 80% of the Israeli public, including major major parts of the Likud and the far right parties who send their boys and girls to serve, want to see a more equitable distribution of the burden of conscription into the IDF. And so when you do something where you only have something like 20% support amongst the general public for it like getting rid of Yuli Edelstein in a bid to get basically a draft dodging bill through committee and then through Knesset, it's really just a move by Netanyahu to placate the Haredim. Again, we can maybe get into it in just a minute, but it likely won't work either. Again, we can maybe get into it in just a minute, but it likely won't work either. But this is essentially what we've been dealing with inside the Netanyahu coalition and government over the past week and really over the past hour or two.

Shanie: 10:33

What do you think is the likelihood that this actually leads to the dissolution of the government before?

Neri: 10:43

Remind me when it's supposed to actually end their four-year term. Well, officially, elections are supposed to be held in the fall of 2026, so a little over a year Before all this happened. The smart money here in Israel was that elections would likely be moved up to basically spring, summer of next year, because it would be very difficult to pass a budget in an election year. And then, after the Haredis pulled this schtick and this trick over the past week, then the smarter money was, yeah, there's probably going to be dissolution of the Knesset and early elections, really in October, early November of this year, and so we're looking most likely at elections January, february, march, timeframe of next year, like really the beginning of the year.

Neri: 11:33

But it just goes to show you, I think and I told this to some of our colleagues yesterday I was surprised that Netanyahu did this right, because it's so unpopular, as I said, and julie edelstein had been sitting there and, um, you know a thorn in netanyahu's side for months now and uh, he, he didn't get rid of him, didn't go to vietnam, edelstein, until today. So it shows you, I think, how scared netanyahu is of facing the israeli voting public, that at least in theory, he's going to try to buy himself a few more weeks, or a few more months in power until early elections are triggered, and so this, I think, was the rationale for trying to do this. I don't think he's going to pass an actual bill, right? You're not going to pass a bill exempting the Haredim from IDF service a few months before an election or in an election year. Let's put it that way.

Neri: 12:26

It's deeply, deeply unpopular. And to square the circle of passing something with teeth will just piss off the Haredim. So he doesn't want to do that for the reason that I mentioned at the top. They're his real safety net. So I think this move to make it seem like he's working towards some kind of bill to the hardy's liking is a is a play by netanyahu to essentially buy himself more time once the knesset comes back in october, to placate the hurting for a few more weeks. Like I said, a few more months, uh, and then, and only then, to actually go to elections. That that's my best understanding because, like I said, I didn't quite understand why Netanyahu was doing this in terms of the Knesset committee.

Shanie: 13:11

Nery. Obviously there's a lot more to it than this, but from where I sit, firing someone important, even when it's deeply unpopular, seems like something Netanyahu does pretty consistently. Over time, I've seen him kind of do that again and again, even when right firing the defense minister caused massive riots in the street, so he doesn't seem to shy away from firing people, even when they're very important and even when it upsets the Israeli public.

Neri: 13:36

So fair point counterpoint when he fired Gallant back in what was it? March of 2023, during the major upheaval internally regarding the judicial overhaul, that was a miscalculation by Netanyahu. So, yes, he fired Gallant and then, a day or so later, he had to Walk it back Right and he learned his lesson from that to go head to head with the Israeli public on an issue that was so deeply unpopular. And again, you know Galant's firing back then. There was no plausible deniability that it was about anything else other than the judicial overhaul and Galant warning about a clear and present danger to Israeli national security if this continued. Galant, sadly, was proven correct. What? Five, six months later, on October of 2033. But in the meantime, netanyahu fired Galant last fall and there wasn't a major pushback by the Israeli public. Again, for a variety of reasons, he's fired other people, like you said.

Shanie: 14:43

Attorney.

Speaker 3: 14:44

General.

Neri: 14:45

Well, he's tried to, trying to, again, he's tried to and it's again. Are they really trying to fire the Attorney General? Do they know that the Supreme Court will block the firing of the Attorney General? So he lets his ministers kind of play at firing the attorney general Again? I think the Israeli public would come out on the streets if she were truly fired and if the government, let's say, directly disavowed and disregarded a Supreme Court ruling on something that critical, I think the Israeli public would come out because they understand the stakes.

Neri: 15:22

But getting back to Yuli Edelstein, yeah, they fired a Connecticut committee chair that probably a large portion of the public has never heard of, because we talk about this stuff. But, again, the general public isn't in this on an hourly basis like we are, and no bill has been passed yet. So he still has plausible deniability that, oh, we're going to work towards a reasonable bill that will get the Haredis into the military, which is what Netanyahu is putting out publicly, right. He's not saying, oh, we're going to pass a bill that's going to exempt all the Haredis. He's saying no, we're going to find something equitable.

Neri: 15:57

He's still kind of playing that game, at least outwardly, uh, and in terms of his messaging uh, so can I say, you know, replacing a classic committee chair, fine, but again, in terms of the voting public, uh, if it comes to it, it'll do him damage. So he's, I think, banking on the fact that, uh, three months from now, the connective will come back. There'll be other crises, I'm sure, other issues. He'll try to spin it in a certain way. People will forget, and then we'll see if they actually try to pass something as ostentatious and as ridiculous and as deeply unpopular as a bill to the heart he's liking. So, yeah, he did it, I think, for more internal kind of coalition maintenance, to show the Haredim that he was doing as much as he can in their favor Again, to buy time on the other side of the contestant recess and maybe with an eye to a future election where he likely believes he can at least have a chance at winning. And then he'll need the Haredim once again.

Shanie: 17:08

Yeah. Moving to the potential for hostage ceasefire negotiations in Gaza, it seems they are back on again in their on again, off again situation. Israeli minister and netanyahu's confidant slash, bff, ron durmer, is supposed to meet with mid-east envoy steve wickhoff to discuss some kind of plan that will get us out of this war. What are the main sticking points here? Because, as we both know and all of our listeners know, this has been ongoing since the last ceasefire broke down in January.

Neri: 17:43

It has. And we should remember that, basically, a similar deal was on the table back in what March in terms of kind of moving ahead with the next phase, again, this phased ceasefire deal. That was Israel's decision, not anyone else's decision, to have it in phases. So, yes, netanyahu never fulfilled the second phase of the previous ceasefire, which likely would have forced Israel and Netanyahu to end the war. So now we're back at these kind of temporary truces again with an eye to extending it towards something more permanent. I mean some context right. So, yes, the negotiations got more serious earlier this month. Again, talking about the calendar, I don't think that's a surprise, shani. I don't think it's a surprise that talks are ramping back up, just as the Knesset is ramping down. Again, domestic politics above most other considerations when it comes to this prime minister. So, yes, the talks made a breakthrough earlier this month.

Neri: 18:46

I never bought into the idea that a deal was imminent. Say, two weeks ago that was some of the spin that we were hearing, because there were still a few more weeks left in the Knesset session. But, more to the point, there were still a lot of details to figure out and not minor details. Now, again, according to the people I've spoken to, a lot of the gaps have been closed, so they are close to a deal and, unlike previous conversations that I've had with you, shani, and other podcast guests, I'm still actually optimistic that there will be a deal. I think both sides understand that now is the correct time to at least halt the war for the proposed 60 days. Again, for different reasons, both Hamas and Israel would take that deal, I think, at the current moment. But in terms of the sticking points, look, the biggest sticking point is the guarantees or not that Hamas has been provided by the Trump administration, and less so by Qatar and Egypt and the other mediators, that this will actually lead to an end to the war after 60 days. They've gotten some kind of guarantee from the Americans, but nothing concrete, basically wording to the effect that the ceasefire will be extended if negotiations towards a permanent end to the war are ongoing and in good faith and constructive and something along those lines. Right, so you can extend the ceasefire. That's a guarantee that Trump gave Hamas, a guarantee that Trump gave Hamas.

Neri: 20:23

But the biggest sticking point in terms of getting into the first 60 days is again, to the best of my understanding, according to the people I've spoken to the extent of the IDF withdrawal from Gaza during the 60 days and we have to remember that at this point the IDF controls most of Gaza. By the IDF's count, about 75% of the territory. So basically you have a lot of forces not on every square inch of the territory but controlling about 75% of the territory. Basically, 2 million people in Gaza are now for the most part located in three enclaves, so basically Gaza City, the central camps, including Deir el-Balak, and then just a bit further south, kind of the Mawassi humanitarian zone and bits of Khan Yunus. That's it. That's it Again. A few thousand here and there and other places that the IDF controls, but that's pretty much it. So where the IDF will move back to is not a minor point and I think Hamas is quibbling about that. Some other minor points the identities of the quote-unquote heavier prisoners sitting in Israeli jails, ie terrorists that Israel will have to release as part of the hostage for prisoner and ceasefire exchange. So I think the lists are being kind of drafted as we speak. I think the ratio, the number of Palestinian prisoners to each hostage, whether alive or dead, they've kind of figured that out due to past precedent, so that's less of an issue.

Neri: 22:02

Aid in terms of humanitarian aid, less of an issue. I know there have been some reports. Well, there are reports all the time in the Western media, in the Israeli media, in the Arab media about this negotiation and a lot of it is spin put out by one of the various parties to either promote their interests or spit it in a certain way. Take it with a grain of salt, but aid isn't a big issue. We know that the old model, via the UN and other international aid organizations, is going to be ramped up during the 60 days and that's obviously all for the good, given the very, very dire humanitarian situation in Gaza right now, as we all know. So I think we're close.

Neri: 22:47

I think, well, I think, slash know that a lot of people involved in negotiations are now blaming Hamas for dragging their feet, and I think Hamas are playing games over the past week, trying to kind of maximize the concessions they're going to get, or think they're going to get, from Israel and in return, israel has ramped up the military pressure on Hamas. So some of our listeners may be aware that the IDF sent troops and tanks into Dir el-Balak in central Gaza. That's not a minor move by the IDF. There's a reason why Dir el-Balakh and the other central camps, as they're called, have been pretty much untouched by ground forces over the past 21 months, and it's not because the IDF, for whatever reason, wanted to spare central Gaza. It's because well, it's not a secret anymore the hostages are being held there. So they sent forces into southern Deir el-Balak to apply more pressure on Hamas, to focus Hamas minds to come to the negotiating table in, I guess, not good faith, because they're Hamas and a bunch of gangsters and terrorists, but better faith than they've been showing over the past week. And that obviously drew a lot of alarm and anger and criticism by the hostage families because, I would argue rightfully, it imperils the hostages that are being held in that general area. Let's hope the IDF has good intelligence about where exactly they're held and what they're doing in central Gaza.

Neri: 24:26

So again you have this kind of Hamas dragging their feet, the IDF ramping up both military pressure and threats, basically rhetoric, with the hope that it'll essentially get Hamas back with a reasonable proposal and that the mediators, whether Steve Woodcoff and the Qataris and Egyptians, can kind of close the deal. Like I said, I'm more optimistic than not, but again we have to kind of be clear-eyed about what this means and doesn't mean ride about what this means and doesn't mean. I think everyone would be very happy if the war was halted for 60 days at least and that hostages came home, especially at least half of the remaining 20 that are still believed to be alive. And well, there's going to be a number of the hostages that are deceased will also be coming out during the 60 days, according to the terms of the deal. But these are almost like the easy negotiations, right, cheney? This is like the appetizer to what will be a terrible main course, which will be the actual negotiations that are stipulated in terms of permanently ending the war and releasing all the remaining hostages. And those negotiations are going to be I mean, I can't curse on this podcast because we are nothing if not a family podcast but it's going to be very, very difficult because Netanyahu has made clear that he wants Hamas to essentially surrender, lay down their arms, demobilize, even maybe exile some of the leadership I mean, there's only a handful of leaders, well-known leaders, left. That's his demand, and Hamas's demand obviously will be not that they want to still leverage the hostages to A survive and B end the war. Still leverage the hostages to A survive and, b end the war. So I don't know how you square that circle, but those negotiations are supposed to start immediately once the initial 60-day truce is supposed to start, and that's going to be very, very difficult to come to terms. But you know we'll, as an old friend used to say, we'll blow that bridge up when we get to it. So uh, so uh. We TBD, uh, tbd, as the kids say, uh.

Neri: 26:50

And then one final point on the on the hostage stocks. Shani, uh, this is something I heard. It's not confirmed because the numbers, I think, are still in flux. I think they're more in flux than people realize.

Neri: 27:02

But in terms of the number of hostages that are supposed to come out during the 60 days and how many kind of phases and installments are supposed to take place, the initial proposal, as put forward, called for five phases and something like eight hostages coming out live hostages coming out in the beginning, and then, I think, two live hostages coming out on day 50.

Neri: 27:25

And in between, I think, 18 deceased hostages, their bodies, coming out. So that was the initial proposal as we came to understand it. That may not be the final proposal that we see if and when a deal is closed, I'll kind of leave it. That may not be the final proposal that we see. If and when a deal is closed, I'll kind of leave it at that. But there may be a slightly different formula. That again, I mean 10 live hostages should be coming out, but maybe initially, and then 10 live hostages maybe will be proposed to come out on day 60 or 61 if there's a final deal. That's something I heard and I reported and I think it speaks to the idea that it's not final until it's actually final.

Shanie: 28:14

Basically, a deal. Yeah, Thanks for that, Narek.

Neri: 28:18

So yeah, I mean, you know again, I hope this is good news and, like I said, we're recording this on Wednesday. Witkoff is supposed to be in Rome on Thursday, so tomorrow, to meet with Dermer and, I believe, a Qatari and Egyptian envoy, and then if Witkoff hears what he wants to hear, or sends the message to Dermer and others that needs to be sent, then Witkoff will continue on to Doha. And we've been hearing for well two weeks now that if Witkoff actually shows up in Doha, the capital of Qatar, where the talks are being held, then that will be a sign that we're actually pretty close to a deal. And let's hope, shani, let's hope. Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3: 29:09

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Shanie: 30:05

Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that news. Moving to Israel's northern border, Israel's gotten a lot of criticism lately, including from the Trump administration, for involving themselves a little too much in Syria. While most of the Western world is taking a wait-and-see approach with Ahmed al-Sharra's new government in Syria, Israel is putting its thumb on the scale by attacking them, partially in reaction to attacks on the Druze community in Syria. What's the logic here, when Syria's new leader has pretty clearly indicated he's not interested in fighting with Israel and has also indicated a level of openness to negotiating some kind of agreement with them? Whether or not you believe him, why stir the pot preemptively?

Neri: 30:48

Why stir the pot? Great question. Look, I'll be facetious to begin with and then serious subsequently. Facetiously, it's been a month since the Iran war, so there's only been one front, gaza, going on. So people here got bored. There was what I call the two-day war with the new Syrian government last week, and then it stopped and we'll get into the reasons why it stopped. But, yeah, it was too quiet, shitty, basically. So why not? Why not start a relatively new and open front, uh, in syria? You know why not? Um, more seriously, look, uh, I'll give you the official version and then we'll get into the problems with the official version.

Neri: 31:37

The official version by this israel since December, when al-Shara, formerly known as Jolani, and his rebels took Damascus and toppled the Assad regime, is twofold. Number one Israel will not allow southern Syria to turn into a, I guess, armed launching point for potential attacks in future against Israel, ie the Golan Heights and the communities there. Right, so Israel moved in, seized territory, right, essentially, there's a security zone, a buffer zone, at least 15 kilometers into Syria, basically from the Golan Heights in, since, since December, I mean their IDF forces, their nine outposts, I mean they're holding territory inside syria. Uh, what are we? July, sorority for almost eight months. That's number one. So israel wants to kind of uphold, uh, by force, this new doctrine. That's not unique to syria. It's same thing as playing out in lebanon, in the west Bank and obviously a very active way in Gaza, which is forward defense, forward defense and defense through offense. This is a lesson coming out of October 7th you don't just defend on your borders, you, if need be, take territory in enemy territory and then you attack from there and obviously from the air and through intelligence, a lot more aggressive doctrine. And that's not by mistake, not by mistake and again, not unique to Syria. So that was the first, shall we say, policy red line by Israel and again it's not unique to the Netanyahu government. I think it has buy-in amongst large parts of the security establishment as well.

Neri: 33:28

But the second issue was protection of the Druze in southern Syria and the Druze are obviously an important minority and a beloved minority here in Israel. The Druze are integral members of the IDF, so they send their boys to serve in the IDF. You know, you've had prominent Druze politicians in various quote unquote Zionist parties. So the Druze are, shall we say, blood brothers that's the term used here because they fight and they fall alongside the other IDF soldiers and have been for decades, right since really the beginning of the state.

Neri: 34:11

So what happened last week is that basically I mean to make a long story short there was an attack on a Druze trader, merchant Unclear, in southern Syria by local Bedouin clans. That led to kind of intercommunal fighting between the Druze and the local Bedouins in southern Syria, in Jabal al-Druz, pretty much Suwaita, which is the predominantly Druze city in southern Syria. And in retaliation, or again, depending on who you ask, either in a bid to quell the unrest and separate the two sides or in a bid to side with the Bedouin and attack the Druze, shara from Damascus sent his, I mean, and they got into all kinds of clashes and fighting with the Druze. Allegations I think pretty well founded, that they were killing civilians, obviously, infamously, they were capturing Druze and shaving mustaches of prominent elders in these communities and that triggered a major Israeli response, not just striking al-Shara's forces in Soweta but, as we all know, striking at the heart of Damascus, hitting the defense ministry, hitting next to the presidential palace really heavy stuff, really heavy stuff. And again that went on for two days before the Trump administration came in and said yeah, this needs to stop. So al-Shara's forces withdrew. Israel was forced to allow them back in on a certain level by the Trump administration. Israel stopped bombing Damascus and basically they figured out some tenuous ceasefire between the Druze and the Bedouins down there to restore calm. That's pretty much the long and the short of it.

Neri: 36:25

The problem and we get to kind of the criticism of Israeli government, the position and the policy is why are you involving yourself so deeply in this kind of intercommunal, inter-confessional fighting in a neighboring state? How far do you want to take it? Are you going to send the Golani Brigade into Soweta, into the Jewish community, to go and protect them? Is it just going to be from the air? Are you going to continue doing this? And bigger picture and this is why Israel stopped bombing al-Shara's forces in Damascus Trump administration was really upset, really upset, because their policy, their position, is they're trying to support al-Shara, they want to keep Syria unified, they want him to establish control over various or all of the country uh, something that he doesn't have not by a long shot, um, after eight months and so they want to see him succeed.

Neri: 37:24

Uh, israel, I think you know, if netanyahu was here with us today he'd be like I don't care about a unified syria, I want syria to be fragmented and weak and not pose a threat to israel and have it be this kind of failed state that we can, um, either either mold to our liking or bomb when needed. Uh, that's not what the americans want to see, that's not what, uh, the turks want to see, that's not what the gulf arabs want to see. So israel was uh, out on an island with this very aggressive policy and again it speaks to okay, you can have these red lines, but A what are you going to do to actually enforce them? Do you have international support and backing to do that? And what's the downside if you don't?

Neri: 38:09

And two, just the resources and continuing to hold territory inside Syria the damage, potentially, of getting intimately involved in a neighboring civil war. Israel doesn't have a great track record of that, dating back to Lebanon in the late 70s and 1980s. The Lebanese civil war drew Israel more and more in, leading up to a 20-year occupation of Southern Lebanon and many dead IDF soldiers. So again you can have this kind of post-October 7th doctrine, very aggressive doctrine, but it has to be, I think, smart and calibrated and not lead you into foreign adventures and foreign quagmires.

Shanie: 38:56

Are there any clear red lines right now in Syria? Because there were previously, before al-Sharaq takeover, but I would not have thought of attacking a Druze community as being one of those red lines. Honestly, I'm wondering if there's some internal pressure from the Druze community within Israel.

Neri: 39:11

You mean, oh, for red lines for Israel?

Shanie: 39:14

Yeah, like the red lines that Israel has for things that Syria would do that would cause them to intervene.

Neri: 39:19

Yeah, I mean, look, this wasn't this red line with regard to the Druze. Leaving aside, you know, israel made clear they don't want to see al-Shara send forces into southern Syria at all, which is a very maximalist red line. But Israel also said we don't want to see any harm befall the Druze. So this doesn't start last week right With the fighting. This has been now eight months of this position. So for Israel it was a declarative position vis-a-vis the new Syria whether it's going to be a new and improved Syria, TBD again, as the kids say. But yes, absolutely. This is something I failed to mention. There was a major internal domestic pressure by the Israeli Druze from the leadership all the way down, and I got messages and you could see it on Facebook. Even Druze who are not political right, not the activist types, not the former senior IDF colonels and generals who are very public figures, not the religious leaders and the Druze, just the average Druze here in Israel, were apoplectic, right. They're like how can this massacre be going on with our not only co-religionists but sometimes family members in southern Syria and our government, ie Israel, does nothing to stop it? And so there was major pressure internally to act in a strong way. I think, if you ask the Druze, not enough was done to stop the massacres early enough to stop the massacres early enough. That's when you saw hundreds, if not thousands, of Jews break through the fence on the Golan Heights and make their way into Syria. Most of them have returned, not all of them. So that was also a major issue because some of the Jews not all the Jews, but a lot of the Jews are Israeli citizens. So you can't have an Israeli citizen, no matter who they are, running around Syria, which, again, it's not exactly a coherent country at the moment. So that was a major, well, dramatic images and also a major problem for the authorities here. But yeah, undoubtedly it became a domestic political issue here. There was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, the general public here. But yeah, undoubtedly it became a domestic political issue here there was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, you know, the general public here to take a forceful stand, because the media here was also reporting and airing images of the killing and the atrocities perpetrated against the Jews. By the way, according to everything we understand, the Jews also gave, maybe not as good as they got, but they also gave right. So the Jews were also attacking, whether the Bedouins or the government forces that were sent down there. So a lot of blame to go around.

Neri: 42:14

But for now, a tenuous calm has been restored.

Neri: 42:18

Israel has stopped bombing inside syria.

Neri: 42:21

I think the trump administration is happy about that and, um, look it's.

Neri: 42:26

It's going to be a major point of emphasis, not next week, not next month, but for the coming months, in the coming years, whether the new post-assAssad Syria can actually make a real go of it right, whether Shara or whoever else can actually keep this country united or basically reunify the country, rebuild the country, reintegrate the country into the broader region and the broader world. Like, like you said, shara at least uh wants to do um or not? And what does it not look like? And uh, again, you know, for those of us who have studied uh kind of the modern, uh, the modern history of the middle east, uh, syria was never, was never a successful state since, since it achieved independence from the French, a successive number of failed governments, coup upon coup upon coup, until Assad, the father, hafez al-Assad, basically took over and instituted a dictatorship that held for a few decades and then his well less qualified son threw it away. But that's not exactly a wildly successful country. So again, hopefully the future brings something better for Syria.

Shanie: 43:47

Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that. Nery, you wanted to take this.

Neri: 43:54

You're like. Good luck with all that.

Shanie: 43:56

I'm skeptical, but you know I love that cautious optimism, so I'm aligned we have to remain optimistic and I think, overall, it's good that Assad fell.

Neri: 44:08

Obviously, shahrra formerly Jalani, and the people who who deposed Assad are not everyone's cup of tea, to put it mildly formally affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other Islamist radical jihadist groups Fine, the burden of proof is on them. They are getting a lot of support from other actors in the region, other prominent states and the West, so everyone's trying to put them in a position to succeed. I think for Israel, despite what Netanyahu and his government may or may not want, I think it behooves Israel to play ball and try to make it a success and not just pound them from the air every time they do something not to Israel's liking. I think that would make better, better neighborly relations. And we have to be clear, shani, there were negotiations before last week, before the well, the two day war with Syria, about a real security slash, non belligerence agreement being signed between the new Syria and Israel. So those were real.

Neri: 45:16

Yeah those are real negotiations. Obviously, they've now been delayed. We'll see if they get picked back up, but you're right. Transitioning, I wanted, before we sign off, I wanted to ask you, from your perch in Midtown Manhattan and all across North America, as the head of Israel Policy Forum's young professional program, atid, what is the mood, what is the vibe in America, north America, at the moment with regard to these issues, other issues, israel. I get asked this question a lot from people here, but I obviously sit here. So you know I am of the community but not part of the community anymore. So give us an update, a temperature check.

Shanie: 46:05

I think that one of the reasons Israelis ask this question is because online they only see the two poles. So on one side they see the anti-Zionist movement and the other side they see a pretty traditional pro-Israel movement that's very comfortable with Netanyahu and comfortable with the ongoing war, and they don't see the other 80%. So I'll tell you about them. The discourse here is honestly what it's been for a very long time among young American Jews, which is to say they believe in a Jewish state, they care about Israel, they feel connected to Israel, they follow the news closely about Israel and also they feel that many of Israel's actions conflict both at a political and military level, conflict with their values, both morally and politically. They have enormous empathy for Palestinians and for Israelis and they feel a sense of urgency to resolve this conflict as a whole and, of course, the war itself.

Shanie: 46:58

I actually think that's really amazing because it shows how resilient the relationship is Young American Jews. They may feel really conflicted about things Israel does, but they don't feel conflicted about the fact that Israel needs to exist, the fact that Israel is still the Jewish homeland. To me that's really important that their relationship is resilient enough to survive beyond that. So I think of it as pretty positive, and we need to, of course, meet the moment and build spaces for the vast majority who are sitting in that kind of uncomfortable space of not knowing how to be supportive. Right, how can they support the Israelis on the ground who share their values when the government doesn't represent them, et cetera, et cetera. So that's kind of where most of the people I speak to are at and that's where most of the data points.

Neri: 47:42

Interesting. So basically support Israel per se, but maybe not the government or certain policies, especially vis-a-vis the war in Gaza. It's probably a healthy position to be in. It's probably well, not probably. It is the position of the majority of the Israeli public according to every opinion poll. Do you see people that are kind of on the fence, shifting one way or the other? So people that have become kind of very pro, I guess, pro-government or pro-current policy versus other people that have been like oh well, you know, the war and the policies being pursued by this government have put me off Israel completely.

Shanie: 48:23

I think the longer the war goes on, the harder it's become, and I joke that for the past two years I've been saying, oh, once the war ends it'll be so much easier to rebuild and have these really important dialogues and conversations.

Shanie: 48:33

Meanwhile we're still sitting here at almost the two-year point of the war, so at a certain point it does become really challenging to pick to separate Israel from the war, especially when where I think American Jews diverge a little bit more from Israelis in the ground is when it comes to the military. Ultimately, the IDF is comprised of Israelis' brothers and sisters and sons and daughters, and so they're not going to be as critical as American Jews who are sitting all the way over here and reading about things that make them deeply uncomfortable and critical in the news. That Israelis may not feel pretty connected, and I'm really curious about how Israelis interpret the American discourse if you have anything to add on that and the types of questions you're hearing. But I appreciate knowing that people care at least and want to know what's going on on this side of the ocean.

Neri: 49:30

They do care. It is a major topic of conversation, by the way, not just the American Jewish community and where they are vis-a-vis Israel in the war, but also just American public opinion in general and where they are vis-a-vis the war. I don't know if you'll like my answer, but Israelis aren't the most sophisticated watchers and analysts of American society or politics. I know that's, I know that's shocking. No, no, uh, I mean, I've been saying this for for years uh, whenever you sit down with with an israeli you know me being american uh, the israeli will, will, I don't say mansplain, but israelis play in american politics to me, uh, well, it's just a trait, right, and I don't appreciate it, but I'm nothing if not polite about it.

Neri: 50:24

I don't tell them they have no idea what they're talking about, but oftentimes they have no idea what they're talking about. So that's a long way of saying for many Israelis. I think it's a caricature, right? Israelis don't see the nuance in the debate in America, especially amongst American Jews, about them, ie Israel and the war in the Middle East, right? So they think either everyone or a certain segment is with them and then another segment shall remain, nameless is against them.

Neri: 50:53

And it's really kind of black or white for many Israelis, whereas when I do engage Israelis on the issue of American politics and public opinion and Israel, I say there is a lot of nuance to the debate, that you can be a deep, deep and committed friend of Israel and be very critical of certain policies and Israelis sometimes don't understand that difference and that nuance, which I don't know if it's new, but I think it's definitely very commonplace here since October 7th. And it's a shame because you can't really have a constructive conversation when one side ie your side, shani, geographically at this point is waking up and following events here very, very closely and the other side, ie my side here in Israel, just view everything through this kind of prism of bad good. Yes, no, pro anti. You know it's a caricature. Again, I don't know how closely Israelis follow, you know, the debate inside America like Americans and really American.

Shanie: 52:09

Jews especially follow the debate inside Israel. I think what's most important for me for Israelis to understand is that they're not an island.

Neri: 52:37

no-transcript they get. It also impacts you, right, as we've seen tragically over the past 21 months.

Shanie: 52:51

Unfortunately, yes, and I don't believe that Israel, on a personal level, I don't believe that Israel need, on a personal level, I don't believe Israel should be making decisions on its national security based on how it impacts diaspora Jews not that, but I happen to, but I happen to not agree with a lot of its decisions.

Shanie: 53:07

So it's just a happy coincidence, but, um, but if it were those were the right decisions for Israel, then they should make those right decisions. And we will need to navigate anti-Semitism here, which you know in some ways could put us at odds with them. But that's our responsibility to handle our side of the ocean and their responsibility to handle theirs in some way.

Neri: 53:27

Sure and I think again, this is not a new debate, this has been true for decades right, that Israel will do what it deems necessary and fit for its own national security. Uh, interests as, as the government of the day sees it, fine, uh. But my point is, it wasn't just about diaspora jewry, right, it's just israel standing in the world, including amongst diaspora jews. Uh needs to be a major component of israeli decision making and a major component of how Israel understands its own national security, and that is, shall we say, lacking of late in a major, major way.

Shanie: 54:07

On that I agree, certainly in Israel. The way that they are perceived worldwide does affect their national security in tangible ways as well in the long term. So it needs to be considered when making any of these calculations.

Neri: 54:20

Right, and just final question to you, going back to what you said earlier. I mean, are the questions that you and IPF get? Is it pretty much about the Gaza war, the humanitarian toll and disaster inside the Strip, the death toll? I mean, is it pretty much just the images and videos and the headlines that people see for weeks and months on end, whereas in Israel obviously we've talked about it on the podcast before it's not something the average daily sees on a daily basis through its media diet. Again, that's a lot of self-censorship, although that is also cracking over the past two or three months.

Neri: 54:59

So is it as simple as like. Yes, the carnage in Gaza is so bad that I believe X, y and Z about wider issues, not just the actual war.

Shanie: 55:10

Honestly, neri, more than anything else, I think it's the aid and you and I know, and you've discussed in this podcast, the very many reasons which of course include a lot of Hamas, hamas's actions that lead to the aid issues. But hundreds of Palestinians have been killed while seeking aid. People know that. They're very aware of that. They also know that at different points in time, for different reasons, israel has cut off aid but also tried to distribute at different times. So they're seeing a lot of conflicting behavior here. I think a lot of it comes down to the aid. I think other pieces people can look away from, because they will argue and understand that it's a complicated war zone, that Hamas is operating there, et cetera. I think people are a lot less forgiving when it comes to the aid piece. So that's just important to say.

Neri: 55:53

I think that's a fair point and an important point and one, like I said, that is even cracking the high, high walls of the average Israeli's mind post-October 7th and hopefully the government does shift tack, regardless of the ceasefire, which, again, you're going to see a lot more aid go in as part of the deal.

Neri: 56:27

But even before the deal, I'd argue, and probably, agree, shani, that it needs to happen today, tomorrow, god willing. Thanks, neri. Thank you, shani. Have a good rest of the summer. Hopefully we'll catch up soon, hopefully once the fighting has been paused at least, and Hodges come out, hopefully we'll have a ceasefire next time we chat.

Shanie: 56:44

Amen amen.

Neri: 56:45

Bye, take care.