
Israel Policy Pod
A weekly podcast that goes beyond the headlines to bring you analysis from Israel Policy Forum experts and distinguished guests.
Israel Policy Pod
The Diplomatic Tsunami
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Jeremy Issacharoff, Israel’s former ambassador to Germany. They discuss the growing "diplomatic tsunami" facing Israel, how Israel's current international standing compares to years and wars past, why and how Israel got to this low point, what can be done to remedy the situation, the craft of Israeli diplomacy, Iran's nuclear program after the 12-day war, and more.
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Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We have a great episode for you this week with former senior Israeli diplomat, jeremy Isakarov with us to discuss Israel's international standing now, 22 months into the Gaza war, the diplomatic tsunami now growing in strength against Israel, who's to blame for the state of affairs and what, in his opinion, can be done to reverse these negative trends? Jeremy is, of course, the former Israeli ambassador to Germany, the vice director general of the Israeli foreign ministry, as well as the former head of strategic affairs at the ministry, the Israeli Foreign Ministry, as well as the former head of strategic affairs at the ministry, and also the former number two at the embassy in Washington, amongst a host of former senior posts. He is currently a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichenman University in Herzliya and to my mind, there are few people better placed than Jeremy to explain how Israel got to this point in terms of global public opinion and, for better or worse, where we may be headed going forward. But before we get to all that, a few thoughts from me.
Neri:So we're recording this, on Tuesday afternoon, tel Aviv time and I wanted to give a short state of play on where the Gaza war stands at the moment, which is really, to my mind, a hinge moment and a critical moment in the entire campaign, now nearly two years after the horrible, horrible attacks of October 7th. So let's be clear despite our best hopes and prognostications, including on this podcast, negotiations to get a 60-day ceasefire at at least half the hostages out of Gaza collapsed about two weeks ago. Yes, we got that wrong here, but not for lack of trying. We don't need to get too deep into the reasons why the talks collapsed. Hamas hardened some of its demands, which were then helped along by the massive international pressure campaign on Israel due to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions inside Gaza, campaign on Israel due to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions inside Gaza, and Israel, for its part, of course, was still unwilling to fully and finally commit to ending the war. Fine, that's what happened with the negotiations over a partial ceasefire for hostage deal, but that left us in this precarious position now where the Trump administration and Benjamin Netanyahu then said OK, we can't get a partial deal. So now we're going to demand a full deal where Hamas has to effectively surrender, disarm and release all the 50 remaining hostages, or else, or else what you may ask or else we, israel, are going to expand the military offensive into the remaining 25% of Gaza that the IDF doesn't yet control, including into places like Gaza City and the central camps of the Strip.
Neri:Over the past week, we've been hearing more and more of these threats, including into today. Hamas will either need to capitulate or Israel could emphasis on, could move to reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip. A decision on this could be made even in the coming days. Let's be clear. It's not potentially that far off. So, brass tacks. Where does that leave us in practice?
Neri:I'd argue we're looking at three options, by the way, with the full understanding that the threats themselves being made by Israel are a leverage play and a form of pressure tactic to get Hamas to respond and do what Israel wants. So option number one because of these Israeli threats, hamas somehow softens its position and goes back to negotiations over the original partial deal. Like I said, a 60-day ceasefire, half the hostages come out, the IDF withdraws, maybe not from the entire Gaza Strip, but parts of the Gaza Strip, etc. That's option number one which I think even Netanyahu would agree to if and it's a big if Hamas was willing to go back and play ball. So option number two Hamas again somehow caves, agrees to a full deal, what US envoy Steve Woodcuff called an all or nothing deal and some kind of formula is worked out that actually ends the war. The chances of this happening, I'd argue, not very high, let's be honest. But you never really know what's happening in the shadows, behind closed doors. But to get to that kind of formula where both Israel and Hamas somehow compromise and agree to a full end of the war amongst various conditions that both sides are demanding and have been demanding for a year and a half, very high bar indeed. So that leaves us with option number three.
Neri:In the absence of any kind of deal, partial, full or other Israel has to actually make good on its various threats to at least do something militarily, and it expands its operations in some way, something militarily, and it expands its operations in some way, shape or form or another into that last remaining 25% of Gaza. The implications of this, I'd argue, could be profound, extremely profound, which is the reason why I call this a major hinge moment in the war. Now, think about it there are now 2 million people, million people, gazans that are located in those three enclaves right on the Mediterranean coast, who may now have to be forcibly evacuated outside and out of the fighting zones once again. Or think about the humanitarian aid issue, which has only just recently begun to be improved, after Israel what a week and a half ago, reversed its policy on aid 180 degrees. So that just recently started.
Neri:Or think about the reaction by the international community, which is already very, very unhappy, to say the least, with Israel, as I get into with Jeremy. So think about the reaction by the international community to such an expansion of the ground offensive. And then finally, and for many people, most importantly, think about the fate of the 20 living hostages that are still being held by Hamas in precisely those areas that Israel is now threatening to go into. So all of the implications of this possible Israeli move are bad and negative, I'd argue, all of them. So begs the question why, you may ask, is it even being considered by Israel? And really, the answer is that, after 22 months of war, bibi Netanyahu and his government don't have any better ideas. They're out of ideas, they're out of options and, first and foremost and most importantly, because they're still promising the Israeli public a fantasy with regard to the Gaza war. So, with all that being said, let's get to Jeremy Isikarov. Hi Jeremy, welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
Jeremy :Thank you, Nery. Thank you for inviting me.
Neri:It's really my pleasure, jeremy. I really wanted to have you on this week. I thought you'd be the right guest at the right moment. Really a difficult moment here in Israel, with what we call the diplomatic tsunami crashing over the country due to the ongoing Gaza war. It really does seem like relentless waves coming in from all over. We don't need to belabor the point and list every single country in action, but needless to say that we've seen over a dozen countries just over the past week or two saying that they're likely to recognize a Palestinian state next month, in September.
Neri:The European Union is considering additional steps and sanctions against Israel. Israeli tourists and business people almost on a daily basis, we hear in the media find it difficult to travel to many places in Europe and Latin America, et cetera, et cetera. Even in America, as I'm sure you're aware, jeremy, opinion polling about people's perception of Israel has gone way down into the negative, both amongst Republicans and Democrats. So, with all that being said, jeremy, the first and most obvious question to you, as someone who has been doing this a bit longer than I have have you ever seen it this bad for Israel in the court of both global public opinion and just diplomatically around the world?
Jeremy :Well, I think it's as far.
Jeremy :I've been in the Foreign Service for over 40 years and I retired three years ago and I do not remember a situation that has been so critical in terms of our international standing, attacks on our legitimacy and criticism against the government.
Jeremy :When I was in the Foreign Service, I found it perfectly legitimate to have a debate with people who disagree with you, to have a debate with people who disagree with you, but I think this is creating an atmosphere of isolation of Israel.
Jeremy :I was also in America over the last three weeks and I was actually quite taken back by the media outlets, which are generally pretty favorable towards Israel, or at least fair and objective, favorable towards Israel, or at least fair and objective and seeing that they had also assumed a pretty negative attitude to all the pictures that have been flowing in over the last weeks from Gaza situation, the humanitarian situation there, and I think you know this is having clearly an impact on many different levels, not just on the media, not just how it's seen in the public discourse, but also on the various political systems in various countries in which the media is playing out. But beyond that, I think it's a sense that people are not sure where Israel is heading for, when this war will end, how the present fighting will achieve its goals, and I think that's one of the things that I think is missing and creating very major question marks and leading, therefore, to actions and measures that countries are considering in the light of this uncertainty.
Neri:And so is it a sense reading between the lines of your answer. Is it a sense that many countries and governments and people around the world don't understand where Israel is heading in this war, or is it more of a sense that they're I don't want to say anti-Israel, but they have a predisposition to be critical, because, you even said, even favorable or friendly media outlets in America are even asking the question now.
Jeremy :Right and obviously in America, you can see that we're losing to a great extent the Democratic Party. But even on the right, on the right of the Republicans and some of the MAGA proponents, like Marjorie Greene, talking about genocide, and there's other talk on the Hill regarding arms or limiting of arms sales to Israel, arms embargoes, in addition to what's happening in Europe, which is also a period in which many different proposals have been raised that would restrict Israel. But I think it's not just the fact that this government hasn't enunciated any sort of day after policy, or even I don't like the idea of the day after, because I think we need a policy now and that's one of the reasons we need to get out of this crisis and I just I think it's a very clear perception in these countries, which, which are not automatically anti-Israel, they're not anti-Semitic, they're concerned about Israel and its national security. They are concerned that Israel is moving towards taking the whole of Gaza and assuming, you know, full military control over Gaza and also extending Israeli law to the rest of the territories in the West Bank. And this is a very clear perception that not only they disagree with, because it's, in a way, totally undermines any possibility of a two state solution or any political horizon with the Palestinians. And as much as many of these countries support Israel I mean, I was ambassador to Germany and the support of Germany for Israel's survival self-defense is being absolutely rock solid but they have also a very clear position regarding the need for a two-state solution.
Jeremy :Now, a two-state solution, whether you support it or not, it's not going to happen in a month or in a year.
Jeremy :It'll take time, and I speak to Palestinians and they understand regular, moderate Palestinians understand that this is a process that could take anywhere between five to ten years.
Jeremy :So what I'm trying to say is that not only is there no vision of a political horizon with the Palestinians, but what the Israeli government is doing now in Gaza and in the West Bank is undermining any possibility of that ever happening, and I think that's a very crucial factor.
Jeremy :This is, you know, this is a period of time where, as I said before, some of our best friends are sending us very critical signals, and I, you know I, as a diplomat, I obviously care about what happens in the international arena, how countries relate to Israel, but first and foremost, I want to do things that are important for our national security, and today, I believe that our national security, for us, for the Israeli people, demands that we concentrate on ending this war, bringing our hostages back and also considering how we create not only a political horizon with the Palestinians, but how we create a broader political horizon with the region as a whole, with our countries that we have peace with, like Egypt, jordan, the Abraham Accords. How can we bring Saudi Arabia into the picture? Is there a possibility of bringing Syria eventually into the circle that could be not a circle of fire, but a circle of peace around Israel and even Lebanon? So these are the things that I think about, and I think this is the sort of path that we should pursue.
Neri:You're not going to find any differences of opinion on this podcast, as you know, and amongst Israel Policy Forum, we wholeheartedly support that long-term vision for Israel and, like you said, for Israel's interests and for Israel's national security, and not as a favor to this or that foreign government or even this or that neighbor.
Neri:We wholeheartedly agree, jeremy. Just a quick follow-up in terms of the historical context, at least, in the beginning of the war, I tried to calm some of my friends and family down. I said look, there may be a lot of criticism of Israel after October 7th and the launch of the war in Gaza specifically, but it wasn't, you know, necessarily a picnic back in the days of the Second Intifada in the early 2000. It wasn't a picnic during the First Intifada in the late 80s, early 90s or even the First Lebanon War in the early 80s. Do you personally, or even the first Lebanon war in the early 80s? Do you personally feel a difference now in terms of the international discourse and the international criticism of Israel after 22 months of war? I mean, is it really different? Or is it just that our world is different, our social media ecosystem is different, or is there actually more criticism of Israel objectively now than there was ever in the past.
Jeremy :Look, it's always difficult to make comparisons between different times and different contexts, but I do feel that we are in a very particular moment now where we're not only confronted by dangers continuing, of the situation getting worse, but what I'm scared about is that we're losing valuable opportunities. When I look at the, you know, I don't think you can compare. We've had previous rounds, whether the second Lebanese war, the second intifada, first intifada, whether the second Lebanese war, the second Intifada, first Intifada, all of these things. But what happened after October 7th was a multi-front war and I believe that, while that indicated a very basic collapse of Israeli national security, its deterrence, its intelligence, on October 7th we at least took us a few days, but we contained the situation and began to reverse it. And if I look back and compare Israeli situation, in January of this year we had shattered, in essence, the leadership and the capabilities of Hamas. We had really damaged in a very profound way Hamas' Hezbollah's leadership and its capabilities. We had also rebuffed two major massive missile attacks from Iran and basically it foiled the. You know the impact that they could have had and we responded, I think, in a very measured way. We'd contained the Houthi threat and continued to have missiles going off, even over the last few evenings, and one of the things that I think was a very profound change was the collapse of the Assad regime in December of last year.
Jeremy :So, when you get to January, in my opinion Israel had, to a certain extent, rehabilitated its deterrence, which I think is a very vital, which I think is a very vitally important issue, regardless of what one has a political opinion about. We had seen very dramatic changes, not only in Iran's capabilities strategically against Israel, which were used by Iran and shown to be indications of strategic weakness rather than strategic strength. We also showed that the proxies of Iran that had undermined our stability, whether in Hezbollah, hamas or Houthis or Islamic Jihad, were, you know, severely curtailed. Now, why I say this is a very different situation to what we'd seen in previous wars is that this had in fact really begun to change the strategic reality and created a massive opportunity for Israel. And this was January where I think I think the present government, netanyahu coalition, should have declared victory, gotten the hostage remove, had to make a deal to get all of the hostages out, not in stages, but in one in one go, and then begin to consider how we deal with this new strategic context in a regional sense, and how we go forward in dealing with Iran, and so that would have been the preferred option from my point of view. So I don't think you can really kind of compare previous situations Now, unfortunately, we did not stop the war and we went into a hostage exchange which was supposed to have more than one stage, and by March we decided to continue the fighting in order to shatter Hamas even more and also get out our hostages.
Jeremy :Now this did not achieve its goals period, I mean so far. You know, the amount of hostages that have been freed through military force is very low. The amount of hostages we've received through negotiation and deals that have been made, whether through Egypt or Qatar with the help of the United States, has been far greater, and therefore I think that was a very vital mistake. And the real problem was that we had, in January, major strategic gains and, as a result of continuing the war, those gains began to be weakened and deteriorated and basically brushed aside.
Jeremy :And the whole point of military force is that you take the military force, you use it, but you use it in order to achieve political goals, and the political goals are what you need in order to consolidate your position, and essentially, that really is the reason why we are in the situation today that we are going. In a sense, if I was Hamas now, a very weakened, brutal terrorist organization, I would say look at how we're putting the pressure on Israel, how they're feeling isolated, how they're feeling pressured. This should not be happening. And again, I think that any possibility of widening the war and pursuing total occupation of Gaza, with all that implies, is going to make the situation much, much worse. So there's a whole different situation in the Middle East, looking at the dangers, but also looking at the opportunities which we could be losing.
Neri:Definite dangers, definite cost to Israel, not just in terms of eroding the military gains, but, as we know, diplomatically, politically, economically, the cost is going up and, yes, I think the Netanyahu government squandered an opportunity to close this war earlier this year and now Israel is in a much more difficult negotiating position because we've lost a lot of the leverage that we had.
Neri:Jeremy, I wanted to take a step back a little bit. Obviously, a big part of why we got here is the decisions taken, and not taken, by this current Israeli government and the current Israeli leadership, but I wanted to talk about the international context specifically and, as a veteran member of the Israeli diplomatic corps and the Israeli government and really this whatever you want to call it the pro-Israel media ecosystem, everyone wants to know who's to blame, right? How is it that 22 months after October 7th, after the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, and after really much of the entire world did rally around us and around Israel and supportive of Israel's war aims, how do we reach this low point, this low ebb, 22 months later? Is it strictly, like you hear in most Israeli TV studios, a Hasbara problem, a messaging problem, a PR problem, or does it go to your mind much deeper than that, leaving aside the actual policy of the government and the conduct of the war.
Jeremy :Look, I don't to be frank with you, after 40 years in the foreign ministry, I do not believe in Hasbara. I believe in adopting serious policies that serve your national security interests. And I'm saying this from pure analytical perspective, not a political perspective, either from the left or the right. And you cannot explain a policy that, to my mind, if I was an ambassador today, I know what I would say. I would say personally this is what I think, and any coincidence between that and the government policy would be entirely coincidental. And so, from that point of view you know, you you need to understand the policy that is being pursued. I think it is going to be absolutely impossible to defend a policy that you don't know what it is, but definitely a policy that in a sense advances the process of annexation of gaza and the west bank and the negation of any possibility of a settlement with the Palestinians. I just don't see how you explain that. And again, it's not because of the explanation for other countries, rather it's for our own, for our own national security benefits. You know, in the absence of any sort of political solution with the Palestinians, we're just gliding into a one state reality between the river and the sea, and you know I believe in a Jewish democratic state and I simply do not understand how that can be maintained with. You know, additional areas in which you have anywhere between seven to eight million Palestinians that either have rights or don't have rights, and I think you understand. You know where I'm coming from.
Jeremy :But having said that, where we've gotten here today, let's not forget and sometimes we can be critical of ourselves but also the October 7th war was initiated, started by Hamas. This was obviously the fact that we weren't prepared for it, weren't there to block the attack was something that it showed that deep in the psyche of Israel's mind, or at least in the mind of the people who were in charge, that Hamas had been deterred and they were looking in a different direction. We failed, there's no doubt about it, but we were also dealing with one of the most horrific attacks against Israelis that killed around 1,200 people on the day and took, as you know, 250 hostages. And you know, I frankly couldn't see a lot of the. I didn't have the strength to see the videos of the horrific attacks because, in a way, israelis are still in trauma. We're not in a post-trauma situation, and I wouldn't wish it on anyone to have to negotiate with such an organization.
Jeremy :I mean, hamas did not go to this war in order to make peace with Israel. This wasn't a Sadat move to cross the canal in order to get the Sinai back and have a political process. This was a massive terror attack. If they could have gone all the way, even further north, they would have done that. This was also to undermine the Palestinian authority and show that Hamas is the leader of the Palestinian people, which I don't believe they are leader of the Palestinian people, which I don't believe they are. And thirdly, it was also to prevent any possibility of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have meant that Saudi Arabia would have entered the picture, been much more supportive of the Palestinian authority and created a much stronger dynamic to have a Palestinian-Israeli situation.
Jeremy :And again, I come to the point that if we come out of this, after two years of war, out of almost 2,000 people that have been killed, soldiers and civilians, without a political horizon, and not to mention what's going on on the other side, which is, you know, horizon, and not to mention what's going on on the other side, which is, you know I don't diminish what's going on there in terms of its severity. If we come out of this without any possibility of a political horizon between Israel and the Palestinians, in my view, hamas has won. That is the victory. That is what they sought. They do not have a political agenda. So you know, I think Israel has got a great deal of responsibility in making the right decisions, taking the right course of action.
Jeremy :But we need to also make a serious assessment of what we're dealing with. How do we move forward and how the possible? You know, up till now, we could have peace with Egypt and with Jordan, and you have the Abraham Accords and there wasn't a final deal on the Palestinian issue. That's changed. That's changed and you know we're going to need to have a very serious Palestinian component if we want to maintain a good relationship or a stable relationship with Jordan and Egypt. And believe me, as somebody who's worked very quietly and effectively with both the Jordanians and the Egyptians, believe me the importance of our relationship with those two countries cannot be overstated. People will say it's a cold piece or that. Okay, it's one thing. Believe me, there are things that happen out of the public eye that are very much more crucial, plus the issue of the Abraham Accords. Issue of the Abraham Accords. If you go towards, like I say, full annexation, the Abraham Accords will not expand and I worry about what?
Neri:They may even shrink.
Jeremy :They could even kind of regress, and I think these are vital interests of how Israel lives in an area and how we begin to seize positive opportunities and not lose them. And not to mention the fact that if there is no solution with the Palestinians, then I guess we are condemning ourselves to you know. We are condemning ourselves to you know, and not only us but our children, to another future with more possible October 7th, and this is something which I find impossible to accept.
Neri:So I wanted to unpack a few things you just mentioned, jeremy. Number one and maybe our listeners and viewers are yelling at their phones or their screens while you were saying it, but you know if these issues, in terms of Israel's necessary future trajectory, is so important for Israel's own national security.
Neri:How is it that this government is pursuing the exact opposite course? Doesn't your former colleague at the United Nations back in the 1980s, bibi Netanyahu? Doesn't he understand and see all of this? Is he blind to it? Does he think that he can mold reality to his own purposes? Is it strictly short-term political considerations? I mean, how do you explain the decisions taken, and not taken by this Israeli government over the past? It's now more than two years.
Jeremy :As you said, I worked with Benjamin Netanyahu in the past. He was my ambassador in the UN and also I worked with him when he was foreign minister, and I also worked with him on a range of important issues when he was prime minister that were in the purview of my work in terms of disarmament issues with the Arab world. So I dealt with him on issues of sensitivity and I always felt that he saw the bigger picture and was able to take into account various strategic considerations way above any political considerations, and I think that that was something that I feel is in danger now Because, for example, in 2020, there was the possibility floated of extending sovereignty to the West Bank and in the end, there were many different issues that were pursued. The UAE ambassador from Washington wrote an article about the need to stop this process and move towards normalization with Israel and, as a result of that, we signed the Abraham Accords. I mean, netanyahu walked back from this, and whether it was a threat that wouldn't be materialized or not I don't know, but in the end, the benefits of not doing this were absolutely vital and it was a signing ceremony which I attended on the White House lawn with the President of the United States and Israel and representative of the UAE and the representative of Morocco and Bahrain.
Jeremy :You know so. To me that's. You know that is what I would expect of Prime Minister Netanyahu to take stock of the present situation. Now there's a lot of speculation I'm not an expert in Israeli politics of how much he is beholding to these ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich B'Tselel, smotrich these are people that I do not admire and I'm being very, very diplomatic at this point and, to my mind, are pushing very clearly into a situation where we reoccupy the whole of the Palestinian territories and I just think that is, again for the reasons I've said before, is a disaster, and I would hope that in the moment, before we make any further decision of going expanding the war in Gaza, that the prime minister will reconsider this. Have asked and addressed President Trump to try and get him to engage with Netanyahu to stop the war, release the hostages and move towards a political horizon. This is something that I hope he would still consider and move towards, but I can't say I'm optimistic at this point.
Neri:I was going to add. One can only hope, but I personally have seen no indication that he's going to prepare the ground for some kind of move like that. Quite the opposite. I think we're both aware these days that he's looking to, more than likely, expand the military offensive in Gaza. To what end, I don't know.
Jeremy :It could also be the possibility that you know things are being said and things are being put out, because usually you know governments when they're going to do something like that, they do it, they don't talk about them happening and they obviously understand this is not going to be, you know, the most popular act by Israel at this point in time.
Jeremy :So, you know, I live in hope that maybe this is done in order to maybe engage and if I could just add a very critical point I mentioned it before because we talked about how you know, the issue of the hostages is impacting us and I think that you know it's so critical to bring this back front and center because, you know, one of the things I've been mentioning in interviews with German, French and British outlets is the need not only to concentrate on this issue of recognizing the Palestinian state before the General Assembly, but to appear to be pressuring Israel to stop the war.
Jeremy :If you're really interested in stopping this war, the key factor is going to be getting out the hostages, and that these European governments the Americans and I'm sure they're doing it should use every element of influence they have on their Arab counterparts in order to secure a release of all the hostages in one go, as soon as possible. In my opinion, opinion, this would be the game changer that could stop this war, which would again barring other extremist opinions. This would serve the broader strategic interest of israel, of the united states and of the european countries, plus our arab neighbors.
Neri:So I mean get out all the hostages as part of a deal to end the war between Israel and Hamas. Because, you know, at the end of the day.
Jeremy :What's happening now is that the you know the European statement of the 30 countries that want to recognize, first of all, you know, let's fast forward.
Jeremy :If they recognize the state of Palestine, is that going to change the reality on the ground? No, it's a state of mind, it's not a state that actually exists and it's not going to stop the war. And again, the key factor here is to remember it's not just a factor of pressuring Israel, which is one element of the game, but the other element, and the more crucial element, in my opinion, is the issue of hostages, because as long as these hostages stay in Gaza under Hamas's captivity, especially after these pictures of emaciated Israeli hostages, it's just, these are images, and I was ambassador to Germany and you never, ever, thought you'd see emaciated Israelis and Jews in this fashion. This is something, again, as I said, we're not out of the trauma, we're not in a post-trauma situation, and this is one of the things I think will be critical to changing the mindset in Israel to say, ok, if we get the hostages out, that's it. We need to move forward and we need to move into a different vector.
Neri:OK, we'll be right back after this brief message.
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Neri:Absolutely and hopefully someone's listening, including on the Israeli government side. The other question that occurred to me, jeremy, you know you've served all over, like you said, germany, washington and the like. If the Israeli government is pursuing a policy that you personally may not be, shall we say, fully supportive of, whether this government, previous governments, whatever government, how do you navigate that as a professional diplomat, especially a professional Israeli diplomat? I mean, you go in there and you have to, I imagine, defend whatever it is the Israeli government just did or said. How does one do that? Defend whatever it is the Israeli government just did or said.
Jeremy :How does one do that? Well, up till now, as long as I was in the foreign ministry till April of 2022, I was able to basically, you know, deal with the policy of the government of Israel and able to understand it. It was a policy whether I liked it or not, was pretty clear in different elements and there were, frankly, times that I said, look, my personal opinion is such and such Because, look, the truth is, when you're an ambassador, you have to maintain your credibility and if you're just going to be an ambassador that recites, you knowites, the government line that people see in the press and official statements, in the end people aren't going to talk to you and you don't say things in order to make people like you. You say things because you need to analyze aspects of the dilemmas we face, of the challenges we face, that they don't necessarily always see. So I always try to take an emphasis on the analysis and not just on the policy, and I think people appreciated that and I think that's what we need.
Jeremy :Now. Our ambassadors are in a very difficult situation because, as I said, the policy that people see are growing efforts to annex the territories, as opposed to a serious Israeli at least declared desire to move towards a Palestinian-Israeli political settlement and that's why I think that I think it's going to be an incredibly difficult situation for the ambassadors. I've seen some interviews with various officials from the government abroad which have been frankly disastrous, and you know, it's just we're look, when you're on the battlefield, you need guns, you need F-35s, you need every form of military equipment in order to defend yourselves and whatever. When you're in the diplomatic context, you need tools, you need diplomatic tools. You need to fight with words, with policies, with ideas, with visions. And the truth is our diplomacy not out of fault for the Foreign Service of Israel, but out of fault for the government that doesn't provide a coherent policy. We're just simply not on the playing field and that situation is virtually impossible, both for Israel and also for diplomats abroad.
Neri:So you beat me to my next question, jeremy Israeli diplomacy. Again, I'm not going to use the word hasbara, which you don't like, we've established that but in terms of just the craft of diplomacy, the craft of strategic communications with the world and I'm obviously biased, but with the foreign media, right From where I sit, from my vantage point, to use your analogy, it's like bringing a rusty knife to a ballistic missile fight. That Israel is either, I don't want to say on purpose, but even just kind of professional malpractice. They're not equipping their people to go and fight that battle in the global information space. Now my question to you, as someone who has seen it from the inside why is that? Why is Israel so poorly equipping its people to fight that fight?
Jeremy :I wish I could answer that I probably could, but I would feel awkward about criticizing the previous organization which I worked for for over 40 years. And still, I was very lucky to have an amazingly interesting career and be involved from everything from peace negotiations with the Egyptians to work with the Jordanians on sensitive issues and also on first contacts with the Gulf, with the Emirates, with the UAE in 1994, dealing with Iran, nuclear issues, etc. Etc. And I was incredibly. But you know, for that you need to have, you need leadership and you need vision. And again, I can't emphasize that enough you need, you know, the, the, the, the government has to provide a vision that people can relay, can reinforce and can use. You know, in all of these different media. Well, again, don't get me wrong, I think Hasbara is important, but it's simply not a substitute for policy. You know you can't not have a policy, bomb Gaza to smithereens and expect it just to explain itself, not going to happen, and that's why, in the end, you have to find, think of a better solution. But look, I, you know there's one thing, for example, as we I'm also thinking about what happened recently with Iran we're in a 12-day war with Iran and after everything, with all the situation that was happening, israel decided to take action against Iran and I think it's important to note that. You could have seen at that point, you know, given the overall situation, the tsunami and everything else, that Israel would have been condemned in the Security Council, condemned here, condemned there.
Jeremy :Interesting that the international reaction was actually more understanding and it was actually coming in the wake of the border governors, of the IAEA in Vienna, the UN watchdog on nuclear affairs that had a very tough decision against Iran, and even the American, british, french and German saying policy of Iran has been one of deception, obfuscation, obstruction and concealment, very tough words which you don't always hear.
Jeremy :And so you know I was interested. I mean the action against Iran, I think, has been important. It might have been chosen to be done at a different time, but let's not get into that. But again, the reaction number one. The reaction was actually not negative. Number two in that situation, ambassadors have clear talking points and ability to be able to explain why you're doing this against a country that has totally ignored its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty, continued to enrich uranium way above levels needed for civilian purposes and continued to develop advanced ballistic missiles and also proliferate these to their clients in the area. So you had a framework in which you could talk and you could present the issues, I think, in a favorable way.
Jeremy :And that's a good example. Now, if I could take that one step further. And we diplomacy today is not just crucial vis-a-vis Gaza, the West Bank, our relations with Egypt and Jordan and with the Abraham Accords. It's also vital because of Iran. Now we, we did what we did, the Americans joined the attack on Iran, but but we're still not beyond the point where we don't have to worry about Iran anymore.
Neri:So we're going to get to Iran in just a minute. Trust me, jeremy, we're going to deploy your expertise on that issue. You were diplomatic because you are a diplomat. I'll be less diplomatic because I'm not a diplomat. People don't know this, because why would they? Israel, ie, the prime minister's office, doesn't have a foreign spokesman other than the IDF, other than the military, which is both shocking and not shocking, and I think also, from what I've been told relative to previous Israeli governments, was not the case, right? So this is par for the course under Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Netanyahu has been Prime Minister for many years, pretty much as long as I've been doing this, and I think that also explains at least a bit of why Israel is losing globally.
Jeremy :Yeah, I can't disagree with you. It's actually weird because, you know, over the last few days I'm being approached by so many media outlets, you know, from all over the place, from India through to Europe, through to America, and it's quite. You know, I feel almost. You know one is filling a void, which is clearly there, because people don't want to have a Hasbara conversation. They want to understand what the Israeli mind is thinking about, what the Israeli mind is thinking about. And while I can't justify it, at least I can try and explain it. And, you know, unwrap it as you say, unpack it as much to the best of my ability. But you know, as I said, I'm a retired ambassador and not an official spokesman.
Neri:Right, which is why we've seen, really from the first days of the war, even up until now, you have kind of unofficial ambassadors of Israel, influencers, people who have taken it upon themselves to try to fill that void. So it's, I guess, an unfortunate state of affairs, because it should be a Israeli official in a suit and not a uniform getting up there and explaining Israelrael's policy to the world absolutely.
Jeremy :And again, I think it's one of the things like watching israeli television over the last year and a half and I I I'm trying to watch as little as possible it's like make note that most of the spokesmen on all these panels are generals and, uh, people from you know, whether intelligence background or anything, and you know diplomacy has made look, even again, you don't you want to talk later about iran, but you know is the diplomacy of the foreign ministry over the last 30, 40 years has dealt with vital strategic issues from from of the highest order, and diplomacy is a vital tool in dealing with all of the different challenges that we face. And that's one of the reasons why you can't just think militarily and you know, in a way, you know we can win. We have a kind of like a pattern where we win the war but we lose the peace, and that is why it happens, because we don't employ and give enough importance to diplomatic tools and diplomatic thinking Right.
Neri:So that's a good transition to my next question, jeremy, and it's one on many people's minds. That's a good transition to my next question, jeremy, and it's one on many people's minds, given the diplomatic tsunami in Israel's current international standing it is kind of a temporary state of being which will kind of dissipate if and when the Gaza war ends that there's going to be a longer tail and more permanent damage vis-a-vis people's perception of Israel around the world. The brand of Israel, anti-israel sentiment I don't want to say kind of anti-Jewish sentiment, but just let's keep it on anti-Israel sentiment Do you think it'll be? It'll have lasting damage, what we've seen now in recent months.
Jeremy :I think very clearly that what happens in the coming hours and days regarding the decision of the government either to expand the war in Gaza or not and to move towards stabilization of the situation, as I've suggested, I think that's going to be critical in answering your question and I think that if we don't see this move to stopping the war, then I think this process will only get much worse.
Jeremy :And again, I don't think it's an irreversible process. I think we can impact it. I think obviously the Israeli government can curtail a lot of these pressures. They can address the issues of concern that countries have said very clearly, whether in terms of the humanitarian situation in Gaza or other aspects of this present situation. So I think we can reverse it. But again, it needs a very resolute Israeli government to take stock of the overall situation and to make the right decisions. And it also means that we need our partners now not to concentrate on issues which, in my mind, are less important, like the issue of recognition, and concentrate on actually doing something which can really take away the justification for any continuation of the war, ie freeing the hostages.
Neri:Gotcha Well understood, but I have to posit the counterfactual or the natural follow-up question, jeremy If the Israeli government makes the quote of Iran, and how Britain and France are going to be so critical in the possibility of snapping back sanctions before October on Iran.
Jeremy :If you don't do it by October, you've lost that option number one. Number two I'm worried about various measures that are being floated in the context of the European Union in which they want to reassess the association agreement between Israel and the EU. Let's not forget, the European Union is one of, is not the most important, trading partner for Israel, and, and one of the main countries that is stopping these calls either for changing the association agreement or changing or even adopting an arms embargo vis-a-vis Israel is Germany. Germany has been very staunch in making its positions known privately, even if it's critical of Israel, rather than taking steps that can isolate Israel. Another factor in the context of Europe is, for example, mention has been made of the Horizon Programme 2020, which is, as ambassador in Germany we worked very closely with the Germans in order to upgrade Israel's partnership.
Jeremy :This is one of the most important scientific collaborative organizations in the world. It's something that has benefited Israeli technology in a very scientific infrastructure in a very broad sense, and I'm not just talking about billions of dollars, but I'm talking about knowledge, and it's not just a one-way street of us getting help from Europe, but also how we contribute as the startup nation to the European expertise in these areas, to the European expertise in these areas. So those things are worrying me and also the fact, as I said before, we are in a situation with the British and the French and instead of engaging them and bringing down the flames, as it were, these are two members of the UN Security Council and if they go through with their decision to recognize the state of Palestine, this could come to the Security Council, and then we would be dependent also on whether the Americans will veto or not.
Jeremy :And I'm sure, an expert of the United States, you will know to predict exactly how President Trump will decide. You know, I hope and I want to be confident that he will support Israel. But OK, I'm just saying these are things. This is a process which can get very bad in many different directions. Not only to mention the areas of sport, collaboration, israelis going abroad. All of a sudden I hear an opera is not coming to Israel. It's taking Israel off the list.
Jeremy :Cultural exchanges, youth exchanges you name the different areas of cooperation that a country has, and we have many. In fact. These are areas which could be very badly affected. And just coming down to the fact of an Israeli going abroad and not being allowed in a certain restaurant or in a certain hotel, again, these are things that can happen. And again, I wouldn't change national security policy of Israel that I believe is important and crucial for our security. But, on the other hand, you know we have to take into account these factors. We live in a global world. No man and no country is an island and we need to live in this, in this world israel does.
Neri:Uh, from the very beginning right, we wanted to be a part of the world, a nation integrated into the world and not isolated, and certainly not a pariah. But obviously, as you laid out, jeremy, the cost and the price of continuing and even possibly expanding the war grow with each passing day. The benefit not not clear? Not clear to my mind, not clear to many people's minds, especially given the fact that there are still 50 hostages, 20 of whom are living still in Gaza.
Jeremy :Final question Before I say that there's also the other factor of if we do continue the war in Gaza is the amount of how many more soldiers are going to be killed. Amount of how many more soldiers are going to be killed. That's one of the reasons why I would have stopped the war and not introduced five divisions into Gaza that become targets in the shooting range for Hamas, and that's one of the things that worries me a lot, because you need to have a clear vision of what you want to do if you're going to put our soldiers in harm's way. And losing three, five, seven soldiers and a number of others that have been killed over this period of time is again. It's a trauma we have to get out of.
Neri:Right. I mean it's more of the cost of continuing with the war. It almost goes without saying. But yes, not just the hostages, but also the Israeli soldiers, not to mention Palestinian civilians. On the other side, on and on and on, jeremy, in your area of special expertise, iran so we teased it a little bit you mentioned the potential snapback sanctions to be maybe introduced at the UN in October, but big picture coming out of the 12-day war in June between Israel and Iran. I mean, how do you assess the current state of the Iranian nuclear program and what are we looking at potentially, either militarily or, more likely, diplomatically, in the months ahead to hopefully fully resolve this problem set as the experts call it?
Jeremy :Okay. Well, I see this as a very crucial time, not only because of the two months before it would be possible to snap back the sanctions according to Security Council Resolution 2231. It is also a crucial time because we don't know the exact extent of damage that was made to the Iranian capabilities during the 12-day war. Now, I would assume that after the bombing of the B-2s in Isfahan, and also Fordow and Natanz and Awa military actions against these facilities, that serious damage was done to the program.
Jeremy :Now to what extent does? How do you define serious damage? Do you have a clear intelligence picture of 408 kilos of uranium enriched to 60 percent? I don't know what has happened and there are different opinions. Know what has happened and their different opinions. Some Americans have said that it has been destroyed.
Jeremy :The IAEA have said that it was removed and then the American intelligence said well, maybe we have been able to put back the program by one to two years. Do we know what's the level of the advanced centrifuges and the capability of Iran to produce them? Do we know what's happening with their weaponization efforts? Also, given the fact that once you have enriched uranium to 60% and if you still have advanced centrifuges, you could and also have weaponization capabilities, you could move very quickly to an operative nuclear device, and the fact that there are no inspections now in Iran, this is the time to have that.
Jeremy :Israel should insist and even really make this a major point with the American administration.
Jeremy :We need to have an agreement, a renewed agreement that America should lead with Iran that prevents enrichment on Iranian soil, prevents production of advanced centrifuges and also curtails the Iranian missile program, which has become very advanced and despite the fact that we intercepted many Iranian missiles.
Jeremy :There were missiles that got through and of a more sophisticated nature that did create a lot of damage, not to mention 30 or so Israelis that were killed, and also to bring about the possibility of, you know, clear, intrusive inspections by the IAEA in Iran on the various sites.
Jeremy :But at the end of the day, we do not have a clear intelligence picture of what capabilities have remained in the Iranian hands and as long as we don't have that picture, we cannot assume that we have succeeded in destroying the Iranian nuclear program or its missile capabilities. And that is why I think this is a critical time to insist on a renewed agreement, using the leverage of snapback of sanctions to bring Iran to the negotiation table. By the way, even Vladimir Putin, the way even Vladimir Putin, there were reports that he even supports the fact that there would be no enrichment on uranium soil on Iranians, no enrichment of uranium on Iranians. So I think this is a time where we have leverage still on Iran, but you need to use it. And right now the present situation is not optimal for using that diplomacy on one of the key strategic issues that Israel faces. That I even would say, you know, far outweigh Hamas as a threat.
Neri:But that's my take on it, and do you think there's a high or low probability that the Iranians will be willing to enter into renewed negotiations and to cut a new deal after the?
Jeremy :Iranians will be happy to have a conversation with the Americans, with the Europeans, for the next six years and do whatever and to give a sense that they're being serious, they're listening, they're being moderate, but they don't have all the cards. And after we did what we did, they threatened to leave the NPT, to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, to attack American targets and in the end there was this kind of like Hollywood production of a missile attack on Qatar that was kind of pretty much foiled completely. You know the Iranians listen. There hasn't been regime change in Iran, but in my opinion, Iran has come out of this conflict with Israel a changed country. It's gone through very serious challenges. It's lost a lot of its assets, its capabilities have been severely impaired, and that's something we should take into account. We have at this point and it's not going to be for an endless amount of time we have serious diplomatic leverage and all I'm saying is let's use it.
Neri:Very interesting, Jeremy. We're going to have to leave it there. We could continue on just about Iran for another half an hour, but we won't. Thank you so much for your insights and let's hope that the Israeli government is listening and that it chooses the wise and correct course in Gaza and obviously, as we've talked about over the past hour, wider reverberations beyond Gaza. So we can only hope. But thank you, Jeremy.
Jeremy :Thank you, it's been a pleasure, my pleasure.
Neri:Okay, thanks again to Jeremy Izakarov for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so you can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And, most importantly, thank you for listening.