Neri: 0:05

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. It's boiling hot here in Israel these days, and it's not just the weather. The Netanyahu government, as I'm sure many of you heard late last week, decided to escalate and expand the military offensive against Hamas in Gaza, starting with Gaza City. To explain what it all means, including the very real costs if and when it does happen, we have our good friend back with us, michal Milstein. To break it all down for us, michal is, of course, a colonel in the IDF reserves and the former head of the Palestinian arena in Israeli military intelligence, the advisor to the IDF general responsible for the Palestinian territories and the head of the Palestinian Studies Center at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.

Neri: 1:02

This was, as always, a terrific conversation with Mikhail, tel Aviv University. This was, as always, a terrific conversation with Michael. As you rightly pointed out, there are still a lot of question marks, which we did our best to answer, don't worry, but a lot of question marks nonetheless about the weeks and months ahead. But we also had to be honest with you, our viewers and listeners. All of the likely answers are not looking great, to say the least. So with that fair warning, let's get to Michael Milstein. Hi, michael, welcome back to the podcast.

Michael: 1:32

Hi, Nery, I'm glad, of course, once again that you are having me.

Neri: 1:39

We always love to have you on the podcast, michael, and we try not to abuse this privilege, but you may remember you were on three months ago already, in early May, and I'll remind you, michael.

Neri: 1:52

The introduction to that episode was verbatim and I'll read it. Our good friend, michael Milstein is back with us to discuss where the Gaza war is heading after the Israeli government approved plans for a major new offensive that it says will finally defeat Hamas. This was three months ago, in early May, ahead of the Gideon's Chariots offensive. So now you're back with us, michael, today to discuss where the Gaza war is likely headed, after the security cabinet early Friday last week, ordered the IDF to quote unquote prepare to take over Gaza City as part of a new offensive that Prime Minister Netanyahu promises will finally defeat Hamas. So deja vu all over again. But my first question to you, michael. It's unbelievable, but before we dive into the actual details of what this offensive uh may look like, what were your first general thoughts and impressions about what the cabinet decided uh late last week and this looming offensive uh into gaza city?

Michael: 2:54

at the very least, and, if you remember, mary, actually we heard the the first time about the decision, or the five points of the decision, during Thursday night. And you know, when I heard them or actually I read them my first impression was that, you know, I agree with everything. You know, I read all the five points and I think that you can convince that it's really about them. But then you start to elaborate question marks and it seems that you cannot implement even one of the five points and that they are kind of hollow points. Is that we seek, or Israel seeks, the effort to defeat Hamas and in the same time to release the hostages? And I'm asking myself, after 22 months, didn't we learn that you cannot really implement the two goals in one time?

Michael: 3:58

And second, there was a kind of a general argument, or actually a slogan, that we want to establish a new regime or a new order in Gaza which will not be Hamas but will not also be the PA. So it's a kind of a mystery who is this next future Palestinian regime in Gaza? And another point which is full of questions is how are you going really to convince almost one million people in Gaza City to evacuate their homes and to go to other places in Gaza. And what will be, for example, if only one or two or three percent of those Palestinians will say no, we resist, we oppose the evacuation? How are we going to solve this problem about the impression of the government's decision is that we are not being, or the government doesn't really tell us the whole truth.

Michael: 5:13

I mean, you know you decided to take control or to occupy Gaza City. That's okay, but in the same time, you should explain to the Israeli public what is the price, for example, the security From the security. As for the price, for example, the security from the security. As for the economic and the political aspect and we will speak about it during our talk. And you know, once again I found myself Thursday night in the very sad, deep impression that here in Israel, our government really prefers to rely on slogans and sometimes on sentences, instead of realistic strategy, because otherwise you cannot really understand what is the plan or how are you going really to implement all your five principles. It seems that you know, once again we find ourselves like when Israel promoted the GHF, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, or the gangs, all the clans that are being promoted by Israel. Once again, fantasies and not realistic strategy.

Neri: 6:21

Yes, you and I have spoken at length I don't want to say for 22 months, but throughout about the gap between Israeli slogans from the leadership and even war plans, and the reality of what can be done and should be done in the Gaza Strip. We'll get into all that in just a second For our listeners and viewers. The five principles that Netanyahu laid out, as he said said, for the conclusion of the war uh number one hamas has to lay down its arms. Uh number two the release of all the hostages, so 50 remaining hostages, 20 of whom are still believed to be alive. Uh number three, as he said, the demilitarization of the gaza strip. Uh number four this alternative regime, uh civil administration, that's, uh, not israeli, but he only said not israeli in english, not in hebrew, which is interesting, but an alternative regime, uh, that you said not is not hamas, not the palestinian authority. So what is left? Uh, nobody knows. Uh. And then the fifth one I think uh gaza should no longer pose a threat to Israel in future. I think, if I'm not, mistaken yes.

Neri: 7:28

Which we can also.

Michael: 7:29

And security control of Israel on Gaza.

Neri: 7:32

Not direct one, not on the civil affairs, but only on the security level Right and, as you said, everyone can sign up for that. But it's a question of whether the current trajectory will achieve any of those goals. But it's a question of whether the current trajectory will achieve any of those goals. So, again, we'll get into that debate in just a minute, michael.

Neri: 8:04

Ok, aside from the grand strategy and the principles for ending the war, in the immediate, I guess, weeks or perhaps in the coming two months, there may be an IDF offensive into Gaza City. I think that's fair to say. I mean, they've promised so much, although there is maybe one off ramp that we'll talk about in terms of new negotiations. But OK, let's say the government has to make good on these threats and send the IDF into Gaza City. Professionally speaking, from your point of view, what is the time frame the IDF needs to prepare both its forces and, like you said, evacuating the million people in Gaza City, the humanitarian infrastructure outside of Gaza City that needs to be prepared? What are we looking at in terms of just timeframe and preparations needed for this offensive?

Michael: 8:39

As you described it correctly, nery. Not only you know a military mission, you know focused on military operations much more a complicated mission, because you need also to take care about one million people. You need to establish a military regime or a single administration and take care about the life of one million people. I assess and this is a very cautious assessment that first of all, you will need between six to eight divisions in order to promote the ground maneuver into Gaza City, and it means that you know it's actually much bigger. I mean, the number of the units of the soldiers is much bigger than Israel had a year ago. According to all kinds of assessments here in Israel, israel or IDF will need between 250,000 to 350,000 soldiers, which means that many reserve army soldiers will be called again to this mission.

Neri: 9:46

Mikhail, why so many soldiers? You're talking not just Gaza City, but the entire strip.

Michael: 9:52

Yeah.

Michael: 9:54

But, actually the next. The coming operation is going to concentrate on Gaza City, but once again, you need to remember that inside Gaza City, first of all, there are one million Palestinians, almost one million Palestinians, according to my assessments, between 10,000 to 15,000 members of the military wing of Hamas and dozens of thousands of members of Hamas I mean not members of the military wing, but you know, of all the civil and the political departments of Hamas. And this is going to be a very complicated mission because, at the same time, idf also emphasized in a very clear manner that General Zamir emphasized, that we want to make sure that no one of the hostages will be hurt by the operation. So you know it's not a kind of a very limited command operation. It's something very, very complicated. And you know we spoke only about the military as how many soldiers and how many units you will need.

Michael: 11:14

But we must understand, nery, that in the day after and we mentioned that we will need to I mean Israel will have to establish civil administration from zero in Gaza City and you need to control two million people in total destroyed area, by the way, two million people who are full of hostility toward you after this tough war.

Michael: 11:41

And you know, we didn't start to speak about the economic aspect, the financial one, but it's going to cost Israel, I think you know, something between 30 to 40, even 50 billion shekels, because it seems that after Israel we occupy Gaza, or after Israel we'll promote this new operation. Most of the world, and mainly the donors, the Arab donors, will say to Israel we will not take part in reconstruction or supporting, from the civilian point of view, the population in Gaza point of view, is the population in Gaza. You are right now, the total, the only responsible for the life of the people of Gaza and you will pay for that. So you know, we will find ourselves, if we will implement and finish this operation, with a very heavy price from the military, economic and also from the international and the regional political aspect.

Neri: 12:51

Without a doubt, harrowing analysis, Michael. I wanted to unpack a few things you just said Six to eight divisions for this new offensive.

Michael: 13:02

No, between six to eight, I meant.

Neri: 13:05

Yeah, between six to eight divisions. That's a lot of divisions At the height of the offensive, I think. What in late 2023, early 2024, I think there were six divisions.

Michael: 13:17

Between five to six.

Neri: 13:18

yes, Five to six right, so this would be even more than that, after 22 months of war across multiple fronts, where are these soldiers going to come from, michael?

Michael: 13:29

All over Israel. I mean you know, of course there is the regular army and it seems that you know almost all the army, all IDF, will be concentrated in Gaza, gaza and where right now we are lucky enough that we don't have another front, you know, the northern front in Lebanon and Syria. Of course there is nothing calm over there, but there is no really danger of a broad escalation and it seems that also in the West Bank we are not a few moments before a broad explosion. So first of all you will need, of course, the army, but you will need also the reserve army and once again we speak about hundreds of thousands of civilians who already paid enormous price for their service since October the 7th, for their service since October the 7th.

Michael: 14:26

And of course you know this kind, I mean once again enlisting so many reserve army soldiers, this kind of decision has economic and political impact on Israel. Impact on Israel, I mean the Israeli market will not be so stable if hundreds of thousands of workers will get actually out of this market for so many months. And once again, you know we spoke also about the political price we can. I mean Israel is taking risks of sanctions. You know the Europeans already declared, I mean Israel is taking risks of sanctions. You know the Europeans already declared. I mean several. I'm quite sure that we will have to prepare ourselves to much tougher challenges from the economic aspect.

Neri: 15:35

Without doubt. Last week I had Jeremy Isakarov, a former Israeli senior diplomat, and we talked about the diplomatic tsunami. So for anyone, I don't want to say looking to make themselves feel better, because you're not going to feel better after that episode, but for an analysis of the international dimension, also quite difficult these days, as we all know. Okay, so I mean, michael, if and when the government decides to pull the trigger literally on this operation, how long do you think we have until that moment occurs? Right, the issue of the timeframe. So, even or especially, if you need to call up thousands, hundreds of thousands, tens of thousands of reservists we're still in the August summer holiday with all the kids of reservists. We're still in the August summer holiday with all the kids. But then next month, late next month, rosh Hashanah and the High Holy Days. Is he going to wait until after Rosh Hashanah? Is he going to do it before Rosh Hashanah? Are soldiers going to be fighting in Gaza City? Erev Chag? What?

Michael: 16:39

do you think? Once again, one big question, mark. You know I assist once again one big question mark. You know I assist once again in a very cautious manner that the procurations will take something between two to three months. Decision that was taken last week relies on the assumption that this operation can be promoted from october the 7th 25.

Neri: 17:11

So we have something more than two, two months for preparations although bb bb said on sunday that he ordered the idf to shorten the preparations, that this would happen fairly quickly. I mean again, we don't need to take what he says at face value. But you're skeptical, this can get off the ground fairly quickly.

Michael: 17:31

There are so many other considerations, by the way, professional, regarding IDF and his situation right now, but also political and international.

Michael: 17:43

So you know, I cannot really assess when exactly IDF will declare we finished all the preparations, we are ready to promote the operation.

Michael: 17:55

I assess, nery, regarding the question of how long will it take, that from the military point of view it will not be so long event. I mean something between weeks to several months. I think that this is the time to occupy Gaza City. But, as we mentioned before, the main challenge and actually the main risk is not during the ground maneuver itself, but in the day after, because it seems that and we will speak about it immediately it seems that the basic challenge will not be to fight Hamas cells and Hamas units during the ground maneuver, but what will happen on the day after. Because we know, and you know, I think, that in a very high likelihood I can say that you can predict that, yeah, yeah, that in the day after we will find ourselves in Gaza facing guerrilla warfare and terror warfare, and it will be very similar to the challenge that the American had in Iraq after 2003. I mean, after Saddam's regime was collapsed. But you know, the adventure only began after the collapse of Saddam's regime.

Neri: 19:21

So I mean, I guess we're dancing around the major question, and this is the major question on literally everyone's mind here in Israel and everywhere else. So when Netanyahu says, ok, this is the final battle with Hamas, and we're going to go into Gaza City, and then we're going to go into the central camps, these remaining three enclaves, basically, that are not controlled by the IDF, and we're going the IDF, and we're going to eliminate Hamas, we're going to destroy Hamas, what does that actually mean? Is it every last person with a Kalachnikov? Again, how do you measure total defeat of Hamas? Elimination of Hamas? I mean, a guerrilla warfare insurgency is almost a given, but can that be eliminated, defeated, or how long will it take to?

Michael: 20:06

Yeah, you know, it's not the first and not the second time that we will use the term question mark. We don't really know. You know, I think that and this is my personal assessment, mary that if Netanyahu is serious enough and if Netanyahu is really eager to occupy all Gaza but also to stay in Gaza, so he will be very close to the implementation of the basic goals of the war, I mean erasing the governmental and the military capacities of Hamas. But at the same time and here I think that the government doesn't really speak with the public in a very frank manner we will not release the hostages because Hamas will not be ready to wave a white flag and to release the hostages only because of a broad ground maneuver and even existential threat because of the Israeli operation. And it seems to me that you know once again, in Gaza and here we need to describe things in a very accurate manner Of course, hamas is not the same Hamas.

Michael: 21:18

I mean the same Hamas of October the 7th. They don't have the same capacities. Most of the members, most of the leaders were killed during the war, but and this is a very important point they still have a leadership, they still have a frame of decision making. They still have enough members and, by the way, they regret always young Palestinians to be instead of those who were killed. And right now and it's very sad for many Israelis to admit that, but you know, this is the right thing to say Hamas is still the dominant player in Gaza and if you want really to cause this player damage, that's okay. You can occupy all Gaza, but you must tell the Israeli public in a very direct manner we will not see any hostages and the price is going to be very heavy and it's going to change your life, the Israelis, for a long time. And unfortunately, the Israelis do not hear such messages from their leadership.

Neri: 22:32

Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3: 22:37

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Neri: 23:23

If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipfli slash supportthepod Israeli soldiers on the hostages, the Israeli taxpayer, the economic cost of it, and also it will take a very long time, long time. That would be an honest statement by the government to the public, as opposed to we're now ahead of an offensive that will bring us to victory in whatever two or three months. That's what they're selling. Final point, just to touch on something you said earlier, michael, the day after this question, still the day after Okay, let's say the IDF goes in, conquers the 25% of the Gaza Strip, that it still doesn't hold Gaza City, like we said, the central camps, the Mawassi humanitarian zone, quote-unquote defeats Hamas, although what that means we just talked about it will take a lot more time than anyone imagines.

Neri: 24:29

But then Netanyahu has said okay, we don't want to stay in Gaza, although he usually says it only in English, not in Hebrew. But okay, we'll take him at his word in English, american BB we don't want to stay in Gaza, we want to hand over control to an alternative civil administration. Is that to get deeper into this point? Is that realistic? I mean, how can Israel do that? That, okay, conquers everything and then hands it over to who, to what?

Michael: 24:58

I'd like to surprise you, Nelly Question mark.

Michael: 25:02

Mister we don't really know. You know, I heard several of Netanyahu's interviews to the Western media. Unfortunately, he didn't have time to speak. Several of Netanyahu's interviews to the Western media. Unfortunately, he didn't have time to speak only once with the Israeli media. And he said, by the way, he didn't only mention the fact that a kind of mysterious Arab player is going to take control over Gaza. He also said that Israel is going to free the people of Gaza from Hamas. Yes, and you know it's not a coincidence that he didn't speak about the message in Hebrew, because I'm quite sure that there is no one in Israel that can accept this measure or agree to this message, and that if he will elaborate this message in Hebrew to the Israeli public, I think that he will make a lot of Israelis very, very angry about the mission. Our goal purpose is to free the people of Gaza from Hamas. I'm not sure that most of the Israelis are convinced about that.

Michael: 26:10

Now, regarding the question of the alternative, you know who is the next address in Gaza if we say that it will not be Hamas, but not also the PA. So first there is the fantasy of a clan of chieftaincy. Rely on clans and big families in Gaza and you know, there is a kind of adventure during the last year of supporting Abu Shabab militia in the southern parts of Gaza, in Rafah area. But you know, once again, we need not only to accept all the slogans that are being elaborated from the leadership, but also say what is our professional opinion. And I'm very critical of this idea because, once again, I do think that this is a kind of a fantasy that, yeah, we can take the palestinian society in gaza and instead of one political national address, we can, we can create several traditional chieftaincies, which you know and the palestinians themselves they call this situation. But to town, you know, like all the the artificial states that they were created in south africa, uh, during the 70s and the 80s.

Michael: 27:33

And you know, I don't think that every clan in Gaza is focused on its own territory, its own business. They don't care about what is, for example, a clan from Rafah, will not take care, they will not be very interested about what is happening in the northern parts of Gaza, very interested about what is happening in the northern parts of Gaza, and they cannot really be an address and they cannot really be, you know, something that the Israelis can rely on in the day after. There is the idea that is being once again elaborated in the Israeli discourse, but actually you cannot find any proof of that, and this is the argument that an Arab state will come and will take responsibility for Gaza. But you know, I didn't hear about no one who is ready to take this duty. I mean Egyptians. They already said no. Uae, of course not.

Neri: 28:31

And especially not without a role for the Palestinian Authority and some kind of diplomatic process vis-a-vis, I guess, the Palestinian Authority, but also the bigger picture of Palestinian self-determination.

Michael: 28:45

Exactly, absolutely. And you know there is also a kind of a rumor Nery about the Dakhlan, muhammad Dakhlan, that right now he lives in the UAE. He's very close to MBZ Muhammad bin Zayed, but you know, I'm not sure that he's powerful enough to take control over Gaza, that he's popular enough to be the new ruler of Gaza. So once again we find ourselves in a kind of what you know, I will be very gentle, it's a kind of an old situation with no strategy and no plans for the day after and a lot of illusions and a lot of slogans, but not realistic strategy. So this is a formula for disaster. Unfortunately, you know, we are taking a jump into this disaster and we know that we are fully aware of that.

Neri: 29:46

Well, some of us are fully aware of that, like the IDF and security chiefs, like, I guess, a big proportion of the Israeli public and a big proportion of the international community. We'll get to that in just a second. With regard to Mohammad Dahlan, obviously the former security intelligence chief in the Gaza Strip under Yasser Arafat in the Palestinian Authority, arafat in the Palestinian Authority he's now been living in exile from the Palestinian Authority in the UAE for many years, close advisor to the Emirati leadership. But I was told by someone who knows about these things that Dahlan has a very nice life in the Gulf. I don't think he and his people are going to volunteer to return to what is left of Gaza, to rebuild it Again. He may play a role, either politically or financially, but from afar, remote control.

Michael: 30:40

And, by the way, nery, you know he has a lot of rivals and enemies in Gaza because he is considered by many people in Gaza by the way, not only Hamas, but many Palestinian citizens as the prominent responsible for many violent events that took place between the years of 2006 to 2007. You know there was a kind of a civil war between Fatah and Hamas in the year before Hamas took control by force over Gaza and Fatah and Dahlan. They were responsible for the killing of many Palestinians. So you know, I am quite sure that he's aware that if he will return to Gaza, there will be a lot of Palestinians who would like to take revenge of him because of all the horrible things of the past.

Neri: 31:38

Yeah, I mean Palestinian politics being Palestinian politics Also. Dahlan and his men unfortunately lost that civil war in 2006-2007. And the people of Gaza and all of us here in Israel have been dealing with the consequences for well 18 years now that Dahlan and the PA lost Gaza to Hamas. Circling back, Michael, to the criticism of this Israeli government and Netanyahu plan, there was an alternative option floated by the IDF and Chief of Staff, Yael Zamir, for something a bit more limited Say OK, we're going to expand the offensive against Hamas in Gaza, but basically, instead of going all in into Gaza City and these other territories, we want to encircle Gaza City and wage this war of attrition against Hamas. Targeted raids, targeted airstrikes this was the alternative option presented by the generals in the security cabinet meeting last week. The security cabinet rejected that option, said it wouldn't lead to victory over Hamas, wouldn't lead to the release of the hostages. What did you think, personally, of this alternative option presented by the generals?

Michael: 32:55

Well, you know, I read about it and it seems to me that it's more the same, like the current situation. You know it's something in between which doesn't really bring us to a very clear point. You know it's not a kind of decisive move and you know it will only make the war longer and it will suck Israel in this one of Gaza more and more, in a kind of war of aggression. I'm really afraid that even if we will promote a siege over Gaza City and the other two enclaves in Gaza and we will say, from this time, we are going to wait until Hamas will be defeated, and we will find ourselves after two, three, four months, first of all that there is enormous humanitarian crisis over there and we will have to let humanitarian aid to get into those places, and that Hamas still exists. So what are you going to do? What would be your next steps?

Michael: 34:04

It seems that you know, like many, many former cases during this war, we always prefer a kind of interim way instead of a very clear way, and we stand for more than a year in front of a T-junction, but instead of taking one of the two ways of this T-junction, we prefer a kind of you know, a very bizarre way, which actually stuck us in a war of attrition. So I really believe that any kind of alternative to the idea of occupying Gaza City or all Gaza will not be really much better than the idea of taking control over all Gaza. Once again, we need to decide between two things Taking control over all Gaza or Edil. That's all In between, only fantasies, yeah.

Neri: 35:05

Again, you and I have been talking about this. I don't want to say for how long. I suppose the generals put forward this More than a year, yeah, more than a year. But I was going to say I suppose the generals put forward this alternative option because the costs of it are a lot less than the full option of taking control of all of Gaza City, all of Gaza and all the things we've been talking about for half an hour that they were essentially trying to minimize the cost to Israel diplomatically, in terms of Israeli lives, in terms of the threat of the hostages, all the things we know.

Neri: 35:40

But, yes, I don't even know if they believe that it will actually resolve the war. But maybe and this brings us to my next question maybe it's as a form of leverage to get Hamas back to the negotiating table. So I guess my question to you, michael, if we're talking about alternative options to well, this full offensive that Niaow and his government are threatening, is there still a prospect for Israel and Hamas to get back to negotiations, if not to end the war fully, at least a partial deal that we all know about six-day ceasefire, half the hostages? There's obviously speculation that all of these kind of threats and leaks and preparations for the offensive is just a way to pressure Hamas to get back to the negotiating table and that Netanyahu himself would take a deal. So do you think there is still a prospect to get back to that option before we go and invade Gaza City?

Michael: 36:41

Yeah, you know the answer is very clear and, yes, sure, the question is does Netanyahu or does the government really want to, you know, to adopt this alternative? Because, you know, let's say things in a very clear manner once, say things in a very clear manner, once again, a very frank manner, if you want to return to the negotiations. And, by the way, hamas announces about that, about the policy and about its basic readiness to return to negotiations in a very clear manner. But and here we must be very realistic Hamas still demands, or still seeks, two basic or two red lines First of all, that any kind of negotiations will lead to the end of the war and, second, that any agreement will be followed by a full withdrawal of Israel from most of Gaza. And you know, it seems that we prefer, or the government prefer, to seek this formula, or this assumption that if we will only promote more and more and more pressure on Hamas, so finally they will be more flexible and finally they will give up and finally they will be ready to wave white flags or to evacuate Gaza or dismantle themselves.

Michael: 38:10

And you know, it seems to me that again and again and again, we return to the same square and you know, we find that we you know it's ironic we feel, after 22 months, we do not understand the basic nature of this enemy, of this organization.

Michael: 38:32

This organization is ready to commit suicide, is ready to kill all the people of Gaza and, of course, to kill the hostages, but not to wave white flags. So, you know, it seems to me that the answer is yeah, of course you can return to the negotiations and you know, I think, that Hamas doesn't care if it will be partial or full, then, you know, as long as it will lead to the end of the war. And it seems to me that the basic key right now to any progress or any development in the negotiations will be President Trump, because it seems that, you know, he was the one who really succeeded a year ago to promote the former ceasefire, and it seems to me and to many Israelis that he's the only one that can really force both sides, and mainly Netanyahu, to end the war and to accept any kind of a ceasefire, even if it will be followed by a full withdrawal and an announcement about the end of the war.

Neri: 39:46

It's all dependent on Trump, almost all dependent on Trump, but the problem is that Trump and his people have shown no inclination to actually force Netanyahu to end the war. When Trump was asked about this, I think last week, he said well, it's up to Israel.

Michael: 40:01

That's right.

Neri: 40:02

Whether they invade Gaza City or not, and that's not a red light.

Michael: 40:08

It seems like a green light.

Michael: 40:11

And we both know, nery, that when was it? It was about a month ago, when Netanyahu had this visit to Washington and here in Israel there was even myself. We really had an impression that, maybe a hope, maybe a wishful thinking that this would lead to the next ceasefire trade agreement, and we found out that actually Netanyahu and Trump they hold the same opinion, or actually Trump holds the same opinion like Netanyahu and Trump they hold the same opinion, or actually Trump holds the same opinion like Netanyahu. So right now, once again, it seems that he's the only one who can really change the current situation.

Neri: 40:51

Yeah, sadly, it's mostly up to him, to Donald Trump, but I think he also has been led to believe that with a little bit more pressure and a little bit more force, that they can get Hamas back to the negotiating table and make them capitulate, make them surrender, and, like you said, for 22 months. It's not that people don't understand it, it's that people here don't want to understand that that will almost certainly not happen. Final question, Michael, before I let you leave the big picture question. I think, okay, let's say that Netanyahu is forced or chooses to go to a deal that ends the war. Obviously he's refusing to do that, but let's say that happens, Hopefully.

Neri: 41:42

The argument you hear from Netanyahu and the reason why he refuses to do that is because he says that if Israel ends the war now, before Hamas is quote unquote totally defeated, that the next October 7th is only a matter of time. Basically, it's like a black or white proposition, one or zero. You either go all the way and finish the job, or you end the war now, retreat and then catch another October 7th down the line. Professionally speaking, what do you think about that? That argument put forward by Netanyahu and his government and his supporters, that everyone who says that the war needs to end in whatever shape or way or fashion is a defeatist that will pave the way for another massacre.

Michael: 42:30

Well, you know, I think that Netanyahu's analysis is right. And Netanyahu's analysis is right I mean, it's not something that I can argue, that. You know. You elaborate all kinds of fantasies, they will never try to commit once again October the 7th, not at all. But I think that this answer is quite biased and actually a partial answer, because you know, nery, when you check the other front, that Israel had during the current war, I mean since October the 7th, this argument of we will not let the Nazis, the Hamas, to be once again on our fence and we will eradicate them from earth, you know you do not implement the same argument with the other fronts.

Michael: 43:24

For example, in Lebanon, there is a kind of ceasefire. Your wish is not to eradicate Hezbollah from earth. And also in the West Bank, regarding Iran, which I consider as the basic challenge, the basic mission, the basic threat for Israel. So I'm asking myself, why do we need to be so dogmatic and so tough when it comes to Gaza? And of course, there are political and ideological considerations mixed in the current policy about gas, and I think that you know we okay, we adopted or we prefer taking control over all Gaza and staying Gaza. By the way, there will be some members of the. There are some members of the government who announced that their vision is not only to control Gaza, but also to evacuate the people of Gaza.

Michael: 44:42

You know, very similar to what they translate as Trump's vision and also to reestablish the settlements in Gaza, but please only tell us in a direct manner what are the prices? I mean the economy, the isolation, the sanctions, the internal rift that will be developed and, of course, the fact that there are no hostages. You cannot release the hostages if we take their full occupation, or we can adopt the other option, which is the deal, and we are not naive. We know that if Israel will prefer the agreement, it means that we will have to announce about the end of the war and we will have to commit almost full withdrawal from Gaza. Maybe Hamas will be relatively flexible regarding the perimeters you know the territory around the borderline between Israel and Gaza.

Michael: 45:46

And I think that if Israel will adopt the same policy, like the policy that is being promoted in Lebanon since the end of 2024, I mean then, okay, there is a ceasefire, there is an agreement, but that is being promoted in Lebanon since the end of 2024. I mean, ok, there is a ceasefire, there is an agreement, but every time when you recognize a violation, when you recognize any plan to attack Israel or to smuggle weapons into Lebanon, you attack. And you know, in Lebanon there is almost every day all kinds of aerial and other attacks. So why can't we adopt this formula also in Gaza? And I must admit and this is my personal opinion, nery that when I'm trying to compare the two alternatives and to ask myself what are the prizes of the two alternatives, I do think that the agreement, the ceasefire, of course it's a painful option, but it's the least worse alternative. When I'm comparing this alternative to the option of taking control over part or all Gaza, which is really an option that is going to change dramatically our life for a long time.

Neri: 47:05

I don't have anything to add. I think you put it really really well the cost versus, well, the current trajectory. It boggles the mind and hopefully either Donald Trump or some other outside power ends this war before, before things get worse Again. We can only hope, and to get the hostages out, of course. With that, Michael, thank you as always, and hopefully, when you come on in another three months, there isn't another threatened Israeli offensive that this time for real, will actually win the war and end the war. Hopefully they don't try to sell the same rhetoric and theory to us three months from now. So let's hope.

Michael: 47:51

Let's hope, take care. Thank you, nery, bye, goodbye.

Neri: 47:57

Okay, thanks again to Michael Milstein, as always, for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keeping a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast and, most importantly, thank you for listening.