Israel Policy Pod
A weekly podcast that goes beyond the headlines to bring you analysis from Israel Policy Forum experts and distinguished guests.
Israel Policy Pod
Gaza: Escalation or a Deal?
On this episode, Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow and Distinguished RAND Israel Policy Chair Shira Efron join Tel Aviv-based journalist and Policy Advisor Neri Zilber to discuss the current juncture in the Gaza war, including Israel's impending Gaza City offensive, prospects for a deal, Israel's mass demonstrations on Sunday, the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the role of the Trump administration, and more.
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Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod. I'm Nery Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. So a lot to discuss, as always. But this week we have our regular catch-up with Israel Policy Forum's very own Chief Policy Officer, michael Koplow, and our dear friend and colleague, shira Efron, who, as of today, in fact, is a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and their distinguished Israel Policy Chair. So mabruk and mazel tov to Shira from all of us.
Speaker 1:All eyes obviously are still on Gaza and the war, so we touched on if and how Israel's much threatened offensive into Gaza City would play out and could play out. We also talked about the mass demonstrations across Israel on Sunday demanding a deal to release the hostages and end the war and definitely not escalate into Gaza City, and we also talked about the humanitarian situation inside Gaza as well, as the Trump administration Can't get away from it. As we were recording, reports came out that there may be emphasis on, may be some movement on, a new slash old ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas Obviously good news and, don't worry, we got into all of that as well. A great conversation with these two, as always. So let's get to michael and shira hi michael hi shira.
Speaker 3:Welcome back to the podcast hi guys, hi mary, hi michael uh, hi to you both.
Speaker 1:Uh, we're recording this monday afternoon, tel aviv time. I think it's maybe been 48 hours since we all saw each other. Uh, I told you both at dinner on Friday night don't talk shop, save it all for the podcast. So here we are.
Speaker 2:Although I'm not sure that was a successful order.
Speaker 1:Never, never. Successful order. What food-wise?
Speaker 2:No, I'm not sure it was a successful directive from you. I think we probably talked some shop anyway.
Speaker 3:Yeah, but it's when are?
Speaker 2:we going to talk about Michael's t-shirts? No, apparently my t-shirts are controversial to some.
Speaker 1:Very, very controversial. We're going to do like only 20 minutes about Michael's t-shirts and then the rest of the time we'll talk about the Gaza war and various other issues related to the Gaza war. No, I'm kidding, but the moral of the story is don't give away free content, especially or including at dinner. But I just it's really good to see you both once again. The big issue, obviously, both at our dinner and for this podcast the Gaza War and various related things to the Gaza War and stemming from it, including, by the way, a big day of protests here in Israel yesterday, on Sunday, which we'll also touch on.
Speaker 1:But I wanted to start with general thoughts about the new potential threatened offensive by Israel into Gaza City that the Netanyahu government ordered about 10 days ago exactly. We got into the details of the operation last week on the podcast with Michael Milstein that the Netanyahu government ordered about 10 days ago exactly. We got into the details of the operation last week on the podcast with Michael Milstein a deep dive, and I don't think he minced his words or held back about what he thought about this offensive. But I'm curious to get your thoughts as we start off the conversation.
Speaker 2:As we start off the conversation, michael, what do you think about the idea of the offensive? The timeline for when it could start is that. It's almost as if people have no short-term memories. How many times have we heard that an offensive is going to be the thing that gets the hostages back and that defeats Hamas? We don't have to go back that far. Just let's go back only a few months to Gideon's chariots. That was also supposed to be the thing that was going to definitively break Hamas and bring back the hostages. It has not brought back even one living hostage. Not one was rescued during this operation.
Speaker 2:If you listen to the Israeli government, it clearly hasn't broken Hamas, because now we need yet another offensive that's allegedly going to break Hamas. So I don't understand why people keep on believing the rhetoric. I do understand why the Israeli government keeps on selling it because they don't have any other ideas, and so I feel like I've described this as Groundhog Day on this podcast. I don't even know how many times consistently now for almost two years, but it's just the thing. That is the abiding way for me to describe all of this. It's Groundhog Day. It's the same thing over and over again, and this offensive, if it actually happens, is not going to be any more successful than the previous one or the one before that or the one before that, and, furthermore, gideon's chariots caused unbelievable, incalculable damage to Israel in all sorts of ways.
Speaker 2:I know we're going to talk later about the United States and what's going on, but we have the condemnation coming from all over the place about the humanitarian situation, which, of course, was directly linked to Gideon's chariots.
Speaker 2:We have pretty much everybody at this point, except for the United States, signing on to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state in September, something that I think is a bad idea and that isn't going to actually accomplish anything for Palestinians but just feeds into the sense of Israel's isolation. And I got to tell you here in the United States, where there's this perception, that it's fine, the US is on board and whatever the government and the IDF want to do, they have the backing of the Trump administration. That might be true, but pretty much with every other constituency in this country, israel is failing and failing badly. So I just I think this offensive is going to be just as bad, if not worse, when push comes to shove, than the one that just ended, as to whether it's going to start or not. To me, this is entirely about Israeli politics and Bibi's political survival, and when the Knesset reconvenes in October, he'll decide whether he needs this offensive or whether he doesn't, and that's what's going to determine whether it happens or not.
Speaker 1:So hold that thought about the reaction in America and Israel's growing international isolation. We'll touch on it later on Shira, what do you think? And also, by the way, shira, why was the IDF so opposed to this plan, which was ultimately approved by the cabinet? And well, chief of Staff Yael Zamir in the IDF is, by order, moving ahead with plans for this offensive.
Speaker 3:Right. So, first of all, in terms of where the IDF is on this, you know the chief of staff is speaking a lot about the need for soldiers and officers to get you know refreshing up. People have been in reserve duty for 650 days. This is unimaginable. It's taking an immense toll on the enlisted soldiers, but also on the reservists, israel, at the end of the day, this is a small military right and it's a small country. So if you look at what is happening in practice in the IDF, it doesn't look like there's now. We're about to break into a huge operation and this will be a huge operation. So it is a question of if Michael is talking about after the holidays. There is supposedly a directive from the government to begin this operation before October 7th. I don't know what begin means operation before October 7th. I don't know what begin means. I also know that often we hear about fighting that is happening and about operations, but you know this, neri, also very well that in practice there's very little fighting that is happening in Gaza.
Speaker 1:Yeah.
Speaker 3:And there has been very little fighting for a long time. So also when there were humanitarian pauses, for instance, this was almost a facade, because in areas where there was no fighting to begin with, we talk about aerial strikes, but also those are limited and soldiers just sit there holding a line, not even performing policing.
Speaker 1:Destroying infrastructure, buildings, looking for tunnels.
Speaker 3:I mean, they're not actually fighting or just sitting there and waiting to be told what to do in a great heat wave, like others there and waiting to be told what to do in a great heat wave, like others? I'm not. This has been basically just holding forward, but not active fighting. It doesn't mean there are no casualties obviously more on the Palestinian side, but also soldiers, but they're hit by IEDs and other things, but not the active fighting that we've seen before. So we'll see if this operation is operation, this stage of the fighting is implemented or not.
Speaker 3:I agree with Michael that we heard that the bane of our existence, right, the bastion of our support, was the Rafah crossing at the time. Then it was right, philadelphia, and then it was Han Yunus, and then it was Jabalia and Zaytun, and now it's the last one we're promising you. It's Gaza City, and after Gaza City it's going to be the central camps and everyone's going to be shoved into the Muassi. And I think, before even I go into the costs, which I do want to elaborate on for Israel, not just the international damage but other things that are- you know sort of like more tangible that we can reach.
Speaker 3:My understanding is that the underlying assumption that this more pressure eventually will lead to Hamas surrender, hamas will give up. Now I don't know of any other jihadist organization in the world that has ever given up. So this is an assumption. If it hasn't worked with force until now, we'll just apply more force, and that will help, even though it can make Hamas have even less to lose. And if this is the direction where we're going, because it hasn't worked until far, I think what makes sense to ask Israel is okay, let's operationalize this. Let's say I'm with you in Hebrew, zoemet. Okay, whatever you say, I accept it didn't work until now. Because we didn't do it. Well, let's do it again. How does Hamas surrender look like? How does Hamas disarmament look like? Is there a big box and a tent, everyone goes, gives their kalach, we leave.
Speaker 3:What does exile mean? Who do you want to exile? Is it 10 people? Is it 200? Like, I think, even if we're not, we cut Israel some slack and say, well, maybe this time it will work, even though it hasn't worked in 23 months. How do you actually operationalize all the stuff? And you don't have that? And this is, I think, is very unfair for all of us. I just heard President Trump. He just tweeted on his true social many, many things. Not all of them were OK. I'm not sure everything was accurate, but he did say that Not all of them were okay. I'm not sure everything was accurate, but he did say that Not everything was coherent.
Speaker 3:I'm going to be, again, I haven't done the fact checking. I will just say that I think he's saying the hostages will come back only when Israel finishes Hamas. So I think with this trump, uh, green light wait, shira, hold on.
Speaker 1:This is you're breaking news in a live recording with. Well, you're breaking news for me.
Speaker 3:Oh, it was just like 10 minutes before we got on the phone so wait he.
Speaker 1:He tweeted out basically full-on 100 support for the israeli offensive he said one.
Speaker 3:the last things he said was Basically. It's interpreted in Israel basically Trump saying the hostages will be released I'm reading the Hebrew translation when Hamas will be destroyed completely. And in Israel it's interpreted as the message from the president is fight, but fight to win and do it quick. So that's how it's interpreted here.
Speaker 1:That's major news.
Speaker 2:Yeah, win and do it quick. So that's how it's interpreted here. That's major news, I mean also in line with what he told reporters last week. So at least he's maintaining some consistency for a few minutes.
Speaker 3:But then we come to the question what does victory look like? We never receive this answer, right? Is it every teenager with a green bandana on their forehead eliminated? Is it something? And we haven't received this?
Speaker 3:Now, when we're talking about the specifics here and we also talk about why the IDF has been so opposed, this has immense implications. First of all, it's for IDF soldiers. Right, there are going to be casualties, and many, not just the IDF. It's de facto. They're not going to call it like this, but this is the general's plan. Right, we're going to put, we're going to buy fire. It's a forced displacement of people from Gaza and anyone who is not going to leave to the designated areas and they're not going to be in many designated areas, because the territory that Israel is talking about condensing the opposition is small, smaller than the population should have Then, if we're talking about this and anyone who stays, they will assume they're a fighter or something and will be the siege. So there's going to be immense humanitarian damages and, in terms of occupation, just the cost of this if this eventually leads to some sort of full occupation and the establishment of a military rule, which I know Netanyahu says he doesn't want to, but you can get dragged into this. We are talking about Karnit Flug, who was from the central back of Israel and now with the Israel Democracy Institute, idi. She had a podcast on this. I urge our listeners to listen to her.
Speaker 3:But the costs are enormous. Like to set up the only this operation now could be 25 billion shekels for the military step. In terms of the 20 billion shekels a year for running Gaza right, not talking about the cost. I mean, if you look at the proposal of how much it is just to quadruple, like GHF operations, this is immense. And already Israel, among the OECD countries, is a country that has way more military expenses to civilian ones.
Speaker 3:I mean, what kind of country will you have if you do this? So is immense. And already Israel, among the OECD countries, is a country that has way more military expenses to civilian ones. I mean, what kind of country will you have if you do this? So, and not to mention all the other issues. So I'm sure the chief of staff, he knows this and he knows what it's going to do, but eventually it's a democracy right, and he received an order and I think he is at the stage where he is trying to mitigate the damage and have the sort of plan that will create more damage and maybe even stole through the bureaucracy, through letting the soldiers be out, and I'm sure he will never admit it, but this looks like where it's going looks like where it's going.
Speaker 1:No, he can't admit it, especially since, on a daily basis, he's under immense political and public pressure by the defense minister, by the prime minister, by the entire government and also the government's mouthpieces and the right-wing quote-unquote media ecosystem. So he's under immense pressure, which is why they're at least moving forward with preparations for the plan and this new offensive. By the way, just for our listeners and viewers, if you didn't listen to the podcast last week, Gaza City, the central camps in the central Gaza Strip and the Mwasi are basically the three enclaves that are left that are not controlled by the IDF, so basically 25% of Gaza. That well, netanyahu is threatening to take care of and take over, but not, according to him, occupy, because he wants to hand it over to an unnamed, yet to be determined international Arab force. Again, we don't have to belabor that point. That is well, that is almost pie in the sky at this point we all spent.
Speaker 3:We all spent, uh, the last weekend um in an unnamed conference with many arab officials with unnamed people and but everyone took um made it pretty clear that no such arab force exists. Not in this context, obviously, and we wrote it ourselves. Obviously, if it's in the context of a political horizon for the Palestinians and recovery and reconstruction, you can get Arab support. But this whole concept of like no Palestinian state forever and we're going to annex territory in the West Bank.
Speaker 1:And no Palestinian authority, which is a major uh condition for the arab international uh community maybe no palestinians yeah, uh, again, we don't have to get into all the details, it's um, well, the day after, as you both know, better than better than most uh, there has been no serious thinking on the israeli side about the day after this war ends, if it ends. And I will say just from my point of view, I actually take this government at their word when they are threatening and ordering the IDF to prepare and launch this operation. I think, barring any diplomatic intervention and some kind of deal, I think there will be an offensive into Gaza City in the coming weeks, I think before the High Holy Days. I don't think it's going to be very popular to start it on Erev Chag, so I think they'll probably try to start it beforehand and try to kind of mitigate the public backlash. October 7th, obviously this year, is right in the middle of the Chagim, so I don't think they're going to wait until the first week of October to launch it.
Speaker 1:And you hear it from Netanyahu and really over the past week, on an almost daily basis, he's repeating the five principles and five conditions, these maximalist conditions that he has for the end of the war, and he's promising once again a swift victory, whatever that means. And at a certain point he will have to make good on something, if not actual victory, then at least the perception of movement on the ground, in the military space, to convince the Israeli public, and especially his base, that he is working towards some kind of resolution to the war. That's what Netanyahu is promising publicly for well, for now a week and a half, two weeks consistently, and I don't think he can just, I don't know stall or allow it to be stalled. You know, whether he can accept the deal, I think is a different conversation which we'll touch on in just a second and final point. Tashira's well-taken point.
Speaker 1:What does victory look like? What does the defeat of Hamas look like? What does disarming Hamas look like? Will Hamas, on a personal level, these thousands of young men with Kalashnikovs, ak-47s, will they just hand over the AK-47s? Is that the bar? And again, it doesn't even have to do with Israel. It's only for their own personal protection from all the many people in Gaza who hate them. So are they expected to go into that proverbial or literal tent and hand over their AK-47s because Israel demanded that they do so?
Speaker 2:Or is it more likely and, at the beginning, right? The expectation is that this happens first and then after there will be some sort of Israeli withdrawal or ceasefire and the problem?
Speaker 3:is what's happening in Lebanon, right, which is where there's a historical decision by the Lebanese cabinet to disarm Hezbollah, with instruction to the army to work on this plan and, God willing, it will be successful and Lebanon needs all the help that they can. Right, but like if you can portray a victory over Hezbollah where the situation is. Hezbollah, I would argue, is more organized than Hamas today, right, and its stocks are not depleted. It suffered a big damage, so why can't you tell the same story about Hamas? You have an off-ramp if you wanted one.
Speaker 1:Yeah, but Netanyahu, to my point, he's made clear that he does not want that off-ramp. He's not preparing the public for that off-ramp, Quite the opposite. He's steering in the opposite direction. At a certain point, even for Netanyahu, who's a master spinner and can sell ice to Eskimos and sand to the residents of Beersheba, even for him, I think that's a bridge too far to mix multiple metaphors. That's a bridge too far to mix multiple metaphors. So yeah.
Speaker 1:And again, why can't he accept a similar end to the war that he agreed to with Hezbollah in Lebanon, in Gaza, with Hamas? Because he's promised total victory for 22 months and he doesn't want to step back, and now, obviously with the backing of the us president. Uh, maybe he feels like he doesn't have to um, I want to make one.
Speaker 2:I want to make one, one last point on this, which is that yesterday israel had a huge general strike that shut down all sorts of things, and you had, you know, somewhere between hundreds of thousands and a million people in various places on the streets.
Speaker 2:And the government's main criticism is that every single time, israelis go out and protest that they want an end to the war and they want the hostages back home, it gives strength to Hamas and it makes them raise their price and become more intransigent in negotiations. What happens when the Israeli government keeps on launching operations and each one is supposed to be the one that's going to destroy Hamas and it doesn't happen. So then they say it again and it doesn't happen. They say it again and it doesn't happen. Why does that not give strength to Hamas? Why does that not raise the price for the hostages? I've lost track of how many times we've been on the cusp of an operation that's going to defeat Hamas and bring total victory, and every time it doesn't happen. You don't hear the folks in the government saying oh well, maybe promising it again is giving strength to Hamas.
Speaker 1:Yeah, I mean you're looking for consistency from a government who doesn't care about public opinion gaslights on these issues and nearly every other issue.
Speaker 1:It's like I've said this before on this podcast but in every argument it's heads I win, tails you lose. So you can't win an argument. In every argument, it's heads I win, tails you lose, right, so you can't win an argument. And even the best example was yesterday, during these mass demonstrations which, again, I wasn't here to cover them, so I'm going to be a bit humble with regard to the scope and the scale, but I think it was definitely the largest demonstration since last September, after the six hostages were killed and murdered in Rafah, in the tunnels of Rafah, in southern Gaza. So we had a big, big demonstrations and not a general strike, but a nationwide partial strike back then I think I don't know if it was bigger than last September, but significant nonetheless, although I would maybe quibble with the numbers. And the strike didn't include the biggest trade labor union in the East of the route, so it wasn't, you know, the country was still functioning, but again it's.
Speaker 3:But the streets were empty, neri. I mean I went by, you know, just like Main Street in Tel Aviv driving. I mean I went by, you know, just like Main Street in Tel Aviv driving. I got back yesterday and I mean it seemed like I'm sure there was GDP. You know, sort of the economic activity of the country has not stopped and maybe he hasn't emerged, but lots of stores were closed with, I mean in the Tel Aviv center area.
Speaker 3:We're out, we're striking, we're with hostages, we're on the streets. The reports are talking about 400,000 demonstrators. I don't know if it's true, but it was big Look.
Speaker 1:Far be it for me to minimize these demonstrations honestly, as someone who is out on the streets with them usually. But my colleague in Jerusalem said Jerusalem was completely normal, so we shouldn't necessarily extrapolate Tel Aviv to the entire country. We have to be wary of that for our own biases. But, again, significantly nonetheless. Even more significant was the reaction by the government right.
Speaker 1:So nearly every government minister and coalition member tweeted out in late morning what you alluded to, that this is only giving support to Hamas. It's only hardening Hamas's position. It will how did they say it? It will stop the hostages from coming home. Netanyahu said it verbatim. He also said that it would lead to another October 7th if we end the war. So basically blaming the victims of Hamas again, the hostage families and the people of the families, the relatives of those who were killed, that were leading these demonstrations and this strike action. So he's blaming the victims of Hamas for helping Hamas. He's helping. He's arguing that the families of hostages are the ones who don't want to bring their loved ones home again and again. So it's complete and utter gaslighting. Up is down, down is up. I think. The question to you, and we'll touch on the demonstrations first, shira, you know. Do you think it'll move the needle right? So do you think it's sustainable? Do you think, you know, like the hostage families are calling for to shut down the country, do you think they'll actually succeed? I?
Speaker 3:don't know. First of all, I just breaking news here, right, so it's also reported. The Al Arabi channel just reported that Hamas gave their answer to the mediators and the context of there's context for President Trump's tweet, which is basically, like Hamas was given, you know, a fight, kind of a final offer and if not, hold us, we're coming in.
Speaker 1:You're doing a great job of you're like a broadcast journalist.
Speaker 3:Sure, I'm a broadcast journalist.
Speaker 1:But the audience, the audience, basically, is just me and Michael, because it's going to come out tomorrow and all of this. We don't know.
Speaker 3:But I'm just saying I don't know if it's going to move a deal or not a deal, because I'm not optimistic, but but if, if, if we play this out right and again, it might be not relevant tomorrow. If Hamas says yes and then Israel says, oh, screw this, we can't. We are not going to go for partial deal because now we are going for the mindset in Israel. I mean, a lot of people understand that, a lot of the reasons why I'm not. There's nothing good to say about hamas, nothing right there's. No, I can't believe. After two years, I even have to say this it's not about this.
Speaker 1:But hamas has been fairly consistent about wanting demanding an end of the war, and israel said no, um, so in israel and, by the way, israel has said no, and also israel's demands of Hamas are maximalist, right, essentially surrender, complete capitulation.
Speaker 3:Right, and Israel violated the terms of the January ceasefire, in a sense right, because it didn't agree to discuss the end of the war after 42 days Anyway. So I'm just saying like it all depends, I guess, on what also Hamas says now and how is it portrayed now says now and how is it portrayed now. And then, if the Israeli public is enraged so much to to continue this protest and shut down the country. But you know, the Israeli public is is tired, right, there's fatigue here, it's really hard. But the fact that there were so many people in Tel Aviv, you know, on the streets yesterday, in August, I think it does tell you something.
Speaker 3:And all these steps that are happening against the Israelis and Jews, obviously around the world, and there are there's an awakening of parents, parents to soldiers that don't want them to go because they don't want us to fight. So it's not just about the hostages, right, the hostages are a big, big, big part of it, but there's so much more. If this turns into sort of the tipping point, that does something and if the government responds Right, because this is a question, as you said before, do they care? They care about what their base says, not about the rest of the country.
Speaker 2:Right, right. Even even if they are successful shutting down the country, I don't know that it'll make a difference. You know the polls that are out just today show, every single poll shows that the government is still massively underwater. And it doesn't matter what combination of opposition parties you have, whether you know Eisenhower is running on his own or with Lapid or with Bennett, every single poll shows this current coalition at 49 or 50 seats. I don't see anything they can do to turn it around. So if the country is shut down by protests, is that going to get this government that has not been responsive to public opinion on anything? Is that going to get them to shift course? I don't think it will, and I say that with my sympathies, basically completely with the protesters and the hostage families and their gold and what they want. I just don't know that this will be an effective tactic.
Speaker 3:But it's still important right, because there is signaling and also feel that there's hope. Officials sent Trump a picture of this protest to do to show that the Israeli public is the views of the Israeli government that they represent is not representing of the view of the Israeli public, and I think you know this gaslighting narrative. You spoke about how we are not. We are. I was on the street. People that are protesting are the defeatist that are giving Hamas the chance to have another October 7th and only because of them, right, hamas will not win.
Speaker 2:I mean, I think there's no one in this country that doesn't want Hamas defeated, but there are a lot of people who don't want to commit suicide on the way and this is the issue and Lapid was making the point yesterday and today, clearly for the audience of one in the White House that look at what's going on in the streets of Israel. This is representative of the Israeli people and Israeli public opinion, not necessarily what you're hearing from the prime minister or from John Dermott.
Speaker 1:But well, if the response by that audience of one Donald Trump was a green light fully backing the Israeli government's position, then I don't think those images from last night in Tel Aviv and the tweets from Lapid really swayed him.
Speaker 3:I guess Otherwise maybe we would have seen a different reaction.
Speaker 3:Right. But I mean sorry, I'm just going to say like, yeah, dual citizen, the whole thing, right, it's fine. But I mean as an Israeli, I'm saying it's OK, you get a green light from Trump and it's really important. Israel's strategic right, the most important ally, it's all good. Trump's money, occupation, diplomatic. Israel's going on the pathway of I mean the things I'm hearing now it's like the South Africa lane, right. So you know it's fine if Trump says that, but this is not the only consideration Israel has. And again, I just want to couch, because I don't know if the president issued this threat as part of the idea to pressure Hamas in its response to the mediators thing. But you know, the president says he can say a lot of things. He doesn't need to implement the plan.
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Speaker 1:No, he doesn't. And, like you said, what is the cost really to Donald Trump and the US? Right, this is Israel's war. Unlike other fronts across the Middle East, it doesn't directly implicate America and Shira, to your point. The cost of continuing with this war and even escalating this war for the average Israeli is only going up.
Speaker 1:So it's everything combined, coupled with potential demonstrations and strike actions and what could be the trigger for larger demonstrations or a real, genuine nationwide general strike that really shuts down the country. I don't know, but I suppose the people on the streets last night and really every week since I don't want to say since the start of the war, but early on in the war demanding the hostages come back there, they are the platform back there, they are the platform, they are the vanguard to uh hopefully get more people out on the streets and and a larger uh, larger mobilization, but uh, look, in terms of uh really shutting down the country. I think they stood with the big uh trade union federation. I think they made the right decision not joining yesterday. I know that's probably an unpopular opinion, but this is a quote-unquote doomsday weapon and a bullet in their chamber that they can't use too often, if at all. They have to be very, very judicious when they fire that bullet.
Speaker 1:And they squandered a lot of that the kind of deterrence factor with respect to the government last September, when they did call a general strike and it was unsuccessful, mostly because the courts didn't allow it. They reversed a lot of it. So they tried to actually shut down the country last September and it didn't go that well, I think, spurred on Netanyahu to take various actions on various fronts because he knew, or thought, that the threat of a real shutdown of the country wasn't as great as he had feared. So you can't, or you should be, sparing with both threatening this action and also with implementing this action. If you're the East of the Luton and various other big bodies here here in israel, um, only when it really comes down to it, either with regard to a gaza deal, or if he tries to fire whoever, uh really fire the attorney general or do something completely unconstitutional, then uh, or it violates the supreme court order, which I think is the real red line for the east, according to their, their chairman, um yes, we're already well down.
Speaker 2:We're already well down that rabbit hole.
Speaker 1:Yeah, but not down the rabbit hole, but I guess not over the red line, because you still need that deterrence and that is important. The deterrence is important, so it remains to be seen In terms of a deal. I personally think Netanyahu would probably accept a partial deal. 60-day ceasefire get half the hostages back. He allows more time. It allows the IDF to do the things that Shira was talking about. 60 days also gets you past the hakim, past the high holidays. It's not necessarily a bad deal if Netanyahu can get it, if Hamas agrees. What do you think? You both look at me like maybe.
Speaker 2:Maybe. I mean it's topsy-turvy land right. We've spent almost two years with the Israeli government saying only a partial deal, no comprehensive deal. And now it's the Israeli government saying only a partial deal, no comprehensive deal. And now and now it's, you know, the Israeli government saying only a comprehensive deal, no partial deal. And I'm clear if that's all the government, I'm clear if that's Ron Dermer versus others, and you know I just there's no way. There's no way of actually knowing what, what they, what they actually want, what their actual position is, what the position of different ministers are, whether they're in line with the negotiating team or not. I honestly, at this point, have no idea what the Israeli government actually wants, what they'd be willing to accept, what they're going for. I just don't know.
Speaker 3:And Hamas. We have to also say Hamas, I mean if you say to Hamas give us 10 live hostages.
Speaker 3:I know we're saying the 20 are considered to be alive. We don't know that right. And there could be less, there could be fewer. So for Hamas to sign on a partial deal to give 10, to return 10, so their asset will be even less, only for Israel to better plan for implementing the master plan to eliminate. I mean, what is Hamas' calculation when Israel's back is against the wall? When they see those assessments if I know the numbers, I mean they know the numbers they see that the IDF is resisting and is unhappy about it. They see the international campaign against Israel. Let Israel drown. They want to come into Gaza City.
Speaker 3:We're waiting, you're going to try to move us all to the Moasi. What do you think? No, because this is really something that I think people are not talking about Gaza City. There, I'm talking about Gaza City. There are three population centers now that are big in Gaza. Right, it's the Gaza City, where they're considered to be a million to 1.2 million people. There's the Muassi area, which is supposed to be a humanitarian area, where Israel is, and there's the central camps In all those areas. Who do you think is managing the affairs?
Speaker 1:It's.
Speaker 3:Hamas Now. It's not the same as Hamas before, but we need to remember that Hamas is a terrorist organization. It is a terror army. It's gone, but is trash still being collected here? I mean, how are you going to do this so we can say, if Israel, michael takes on Israel, but without Israel? And we go back to this, and we've been talking about this since I don't know, november of 2023, right, without thinking of the day after, without having a viable plan out of this mess. And I also just don't see anyone helping Israel with its humanitarian bubbles, humanitarian zones, getting out of this and also what is in it for Hamas. It's not just Israel here I agree with the Israeli government that says that Hamas doesn't agree. Well, put yourself in Hamas's shoes, would you agree?
Speaker 2:No and for sure. Yes, I tend to pick on the Israeli government, but of course they're dealing with Hamas. I mean, we all know what Hamas is and doesn't need any further elaboration. What frustrates me is that that's what you expect from a deeply ideological, islamist, nihilistic, terrorist organization. You expect them to constantly be shifting the goalposts and not actually care about the people that not their citizens, but the people that they have responsibility for. We're supposed to match that standard for the Israeli government. We're supposed to have it that Hamas behaves this way, so it's okay if the Israeli government behaves this way. No, I expect more from the Israeli government than Hamas. So sure, let's remember, hamas has a huge share of blame, of course, but if we're now at a point where we expect Hamas and the Israeli government to have the same standards, then Hamas is one.
Speaker 1:Before we do anything, yeah, I mean Israel obviously has a lot more to lose and Hamas has made it 22 months into this disaster of their own making. They have a lot less to lose now than they did on October 6, 2023, and a lot less leaders that they've already been eliminated. So, yeah, it's like a bank robbery with hostages, where the police outside are saying, well, we don't really care about the hostages and we're going to both take out the robbers and also retrieve the hostages, when you know that the robbers don't really care about their own fate and definitely don't care about the fate of the hostages they're holding. Right, I mean, it's ridiculous and definitely don't care about the fate of the hostages they're holding. It's ridiculous.
Speaker 1:The rhetoric and also the strategy put forward, at least publicly, by the Israeli government, where they continue to state we're going to both eliminate Hamas and get all of our hostages back. How, by, by the way, destroying Gaza City and potentially the rest of those enclaves that Shira mentioned. We have to move ahead. The next topic of conversation the humanitarian situation in Gaza, which I know many people all over the world are very aware of, very concerned about Shira. You are our resident expert and also an expert writ large.
Speaker 2:I urge everyone to Everybody's resident expert.
Speaker 1:Yeah, everyone's resident expert. I urge everyone to go and check out Not resident. Yeah, shira's op-ed in the New York Times last week laid out the big picture about the humanitarian situation and the aid situation in Gaza right now. But I'm curious, shira, give us a sense. Has there been any major shift, slash, improvement, since this Israeli government changed its policy 180 degrees late last month and finally allowed, I guess, more aid back into Gaza, to your understanding? Has that improved things?
Speaker 3:So, first of all, it has improved things in terms of how much aid is actually going in. Right, there are many more trucks that are going in. Where we haven't seen meaningful improvement is that the vast majority of these trucks and I'm talking about I haven't checked in the last three days, but we're talking about close to 90% it was majority of these trucks and I'm talking about I haven't checked in the last three days, but we're talking about close to 90% it was last week of trucks maybe are being looted. The organizations that are able to get trucks aid in without being looted use some sort of protection. I'll get to GHF, srs in a second GHF, the distribution centers that Israel is in. They're in a different situation.
Speaker 1:The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
Speaker 3:Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. I will get to them in a second. I think what has not improved is the. There are a few things. First of all, the situation was so terrible right beforehand and it takes it would take more than what we're seeing now to actually see meaningful improvement. The second thing is that I think we're constantly talking about the food and of course, the food is the most visible sort of visceral to see the images from Gaza. But humanitarian is so much bigger. Right, there's the water and sanitation and, you know, a medical system, a health system that really doesn't exist. I know everyone's talking about the field hospitals, but this is not a proper health response to what's happening. And shelter, with 90% of Gazans are being displaced, and this is not addressed at all even in the current response. I mean, you have some medicines, you have stuff, but the big scale, the big picture, and this is not addressed at all even in the current response. I mean you have some medicines, you have stuff, but the big scale, the big picture and you know, if we look at the core of this and we go back to like things we spoke about, it's really frustrating because the same conversation, the same issues, the same fundamental issues.
Speaker 3:Hamas sadly right, and a lot of things to Israeli policy throughout the years grew up to this monster that it wasn't just a terrorist organization, you know, a cruel, cynical terrorist organization. It was also the sovereign, it was the de facto sovereign. Israel when it fights Hamas, it fights it very legitimately because it's a terrorist organization. The humanitarian organizations sort of used to work with Hamas because it was, you know, the government, you like it or not, the UN. You work with them. We can go into everything that's wrong and infiltration of Hamas into the humanitarian systems and other NGOs. But the fact is that this dual characteristic of Hamas makes it very difficult to, because Israel went in and wants to break the system, but without having a proper system in case. How do you solve the issues? Then what's wrong also is that Israel and the humanitarian community at large, but led by the UN, have non-functioning relationship. So if you say let's solve this fundamental problem or let's discuss it, let's have some grown up in the room that can bring us together and kind of, ok, what do we do with this? You don't have this conversation, it doesn't exist.
Speaker 3:And then, in addition to that, if you look at the logistical capacity, we have to say it's not working right, like the logistical, the UN is broken. They're not enough people, I guess, from the trucks that come from, wherever they come from, through the taxation, security, security inside Israel, what Israel wants? The registrations organization, the registration prioritizing the privacy of the people. I mean we don't have time to go into the weeds, but the whole chain is kind of like broken and those things all feed each other because Israel says to the UN and Israelis really believe this, look at those UN, they're not doing their job and the UN can't do their job. And then the UN also says look at Israel, what is Israel doing? And Israel says but we're allowing everything. So Israel is correct to say they're not limiting. But what? They're only allowing? The registered organization that completes the registration process.
Speaker 3:I think there are four or something to bring stuff in. They there are. No. The secure roads are complicated and you know the UN and other organizations. They can't travel with IDF soldiers to provide aid. They don't feel comfortable. By the way, other organizations not. This is where GHF, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, differs. They, the IDF, created roads for them and they are escorted by IDF security into areas that are under IDF control.
Speaker 1:Right.
Speaker 3:This is okay for an organization like that, but any other humanitarian organization can. So I mean what encourages me now not because what occurs now that I think that, unlike those back and forth that we saw with Israel turning on and off the humanitarian situation, I think the message from the United States and the rest of the world has been loud and clear and I think this policy will remain. The problem is the implementation of the policy and there are a lot of issues to solve for Israel, but it would have been good if there would be someone else helping with those technical issues.
Speaker 1:What do you mean like an outside influential actor?
Speaker 3:I think the fact that this whole idea is that the solution is portrayed in Israel is like oh, we are going to quadruple, have 16 distribution centers run by GHF instead of four and thinking this and maybe the US will pay for them? I've seen the price tag.
Speaker 1:I doubt it, michael for those only listening to us, michael's face. When Shira said maybe the US will pay for it seemed well classic Michael face. Yeah.
Speaker 3:I mean, president Trump said that the US is the only party that gave $60 million to the humanitarian. They didn't. There's a conditional commitment to $30 million. That is a grant that has to go through 12 stages for approvals. The numbers here I'm talking about are very entirely scale. I mean, it's something very, very different. So if the US pays but even if the US pays for it, which I really doubt because the price tag is quite big does this solve the problem? Does this provide shelter? Does this provide new community kitchens? Does this provide no? So that's why you need a comprehensive solution that brings everyone together, you know, maps out all the issues and say, okay, let's solve this. And it would have been if there was a US serious effort at this, also with Israel. And we also need to say I mean, the UN's leadership has not been a constructive partner on this Sure.
Speaker 1:That was a good overview, shira. We could spend an hour just on the Sure. That was a good overview, shira. We could spend an hour just on the humanitarian situation. And, yes, I mean this is all the current situation after the shift in Israeli policy, the major shift in Israeli policy, but before a potential offensive that will relocate potentially a million people to a different area of Gaza with different humanitarian and logistical infrastructure or lack thereof. So what kind of humanitarian impact will that have? Again, we don't need to answer that question today, but just as a thought experiment. Yeah, it will require a lot to do this properly, and I don't. Well, after 22 months of war, I don't see whether the Israeli system can do that kind of appropriate planning, and you know partner organizations in Gaza either.
Speaker 3:Which right and, by the way, which is one of the things that you know at least, it was leaked that the IDF chief of staff, yael Zamir, did say this. He cited several reasons for his objection for this, but apparently it was leaked but posted on Israeli press that he said that. Where will those million people go? What kind of health response do they have? Who's going to take care of them. What do we have now?
Speaker 3:So I don't know if it's encouraging or not, but I'm reassured that at least leadership of the idea of the professional leadership, there's someone who understands the magnitude of the issues. It doesn't mean he has the tools, by any means, to address them.
Speaker 1:Right and those areas where those million Gazan city folk are supposed to move. It's a wasteland. There's nothing there. Michael, your thoughts about the humanitarian crisis and also the discourse surrounding the crisis.
Speaker 2:I defer to Shira completely on the crisis itself. Nothing I say is going to add to her expertise On the perception and the rhetoric around it. I'm just to build on something Shira said. The Israeli government now keeps on saying, oh look, we let in this many tons of food and this many trucks, and the GHF keeps on tweeting out how many millions of quote-unquote meals they've distributed, when in reality GHF hasn't distributed even one meal. A meal is not a 45-pound box of dry goods that you need water and oil and a kitchen to be able to make anything out of.
Speaker 2:I would love to see in the United States somebody go to a soup kitchen and say they're giving out bags of flour and dry lentils and pasta and claim that somehow they've made somebody a meal. So we're still at this point where the rhetoric on this seems to be for a lot of people, the priority. It's not actually solving the problem. It's, you know, can we win the information war? And it's just incredibly disheartening, the information war, and it's just incredibly disheartening.
Speaker 2:And when the US plan, you know, as noted, is to increase the currently what is it, shira? Three GHF operating sites to 16, but to not actually change the practice of what they're giving out and how they're distributing things. I just don't understand why anybody thinks this is a viable plan, even if the US was going to fund it, which, as you noted before from my face, they absolutely are not. So I wish that everybody and again, yes, there's blame here to go around on literally everybody Hamas, the United Nations, ngos, the IDF, the US administration, literally everybody has blame for this. I just wish that people would be far more focused on how you actually solve the problem versus everybody here, whether it's the Israeli government or whether it's NGOs. I wish everybody here was not focused on trying to win the war as to who is more to blame and who is more at fault, because ultimately that is doing nothing for Palestinians who can't get food.
Speaker 3:There's an image in the New York Times of a child suffering from prior conditions, or someone who died of leukemia and out of hunger. I mean, first of all, the most vulnerable society are going to get hurt first, so it doesn't mean that people that are sick and with other previous conditions don't deserve food. That's one thing. The second thing is that, with Israel even if you know, I agree, that the media, international media, can be sometimes very irresponsible and I wish they did better fact checking on this it doesn't help Israel's case. I mean, israel convinces those who are already convinced. Right, everyone helps Else.
Speaker 3:It doesn't help, and I can tell you this from like the number, from the hate I received over articles that I wrote where I said you know, it's a collective failure, it's not just Israel, it doesn't matter at the point. So this information war doesn't help. I will say, though, now, because I'm on this like I have this role here of breaking news, so I will say that, according to Al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera I don't know one of them that Hamas said yes to the proposal. I have no idea what yes by Hamas means, and if it's yes, what are the conditions?
Speaker 3:But maybe we're all so pessimistic and, for a change, some good news. So you beat me to it.
Speaker 1:I was going to break the news on this podcast. Oh, some good news. So you beat me to it. I was going to break the news on this podcast. Oh, sorry, sorry but this is your role today. You are the journalist, shira. Yes, according to various reports in the Arab media, hamas agreed to an Egyptian, qatari proposal, which I think is for a 60-day ceasefire. Now, again, the devil is always in the details. Did Hamas really agree? What did it agree?
Speaker 2:to.
Speaker 1:And then I imagine, even if they agreed, an Israeli delegation will have to go to either Cairo or, more likely, doha in Qatar, to actually negotiate the final details of whatever this deal is. And, as we've known, in this Groundhog Day, to use Michael's allusion, that's where things can get a bit arry. But hopefully the threats of the offensive maybe got Hamas to move a little bit, like many people wanted, maybe even Bibi Netanyahu, and hopefully there may be at least a temporary ceasefire. But again, we've been down this road before, so we shouldn shouldn't get our hopes too, too high.
Speaker 2:I'll add that this will only work if the Egyptian and Saudi proposal explicitly has the sign off of President Trump's to Wyckoff, because we've seen this before too, where Hamas agrees to something that the Qataris or the Egyptians before and Israel says well, we already agreed to the Wyckoff framework and it's different.
Speaker 3:So right and it could be, and we might record this again tomorrow, because this is all kind of wrong, no, no.
Speaker 3:It could be that it's all in the context of everyone's trying to use the Israeli threats to get Hamas to agree to ceasefire terms, and it looks like you know we call them the Witkoff model. So it's an updated Witkoff model, but the lines are the same in 60 days and within it there's everything we were so optimistic about a few weeks ago or at least I was optimistic about a few weeks ago in terms of also a commitment by the sides to discuss the day after within the framework, which, I mean, I would obviously wholeheartedly support. Let's hope Hamas did say really yes and that Israel also said yes and we're not going to go down this going to be sucked into a black hole, right that is Gaza.
Speaker 2:Yes, if the first segment we recorded today becomes completely irrelevant, I'll be thrilled.
Speaker 1:Yeah well, we're not going to re-record because a lot of the things that we talked about will still be relevant, whether or not there may be a renewed push for a partial ceasefire. So don't worry, we've been down the road before over the course of 22 months of war. I think we're okay for now because, as we know from this podcast, some of us were cautiously optimistic, cautiously pessimistic and a deal didn't materialize last month, even though I think it was generally close. So close doesn't mean an actual deal, but you could see it from both sides. Right? That for Netanyahu, okay, he can, like we said, take a 60-day ceasefire, get the army prepared, get half the hostages back, but doesn't have to fully commit to tending the war. And oh, by the way, two months from now brings him exactly to late october when the knesset comes back, so he can promise his far-right allies by late October. This IDF offensive is going to happen. So the political calendar still works for Netanyahu.
Speaker 1:For Hamas, obviously it can relieve the pressure on the battlefield, can forestall incursion into Gaza City. They can also prepare for whatever comes next. But it's not a cost-free decision by Hamas because, like Shira said, it's given up half of its assets right, by the way, half the living hostages and also half the deceased hostages, which we shouldn't forget, not for a second, to bring them back for burial in Israel and to bring closure to their families, without any real guarantee from the Israeli side that this will actually be an end to the war, unless Trump did something unexpected and provided that guarantee. But we don't. We haven't seen any indication of that. So, again, we need to be cautiously pessimistic, even if the reports today are accurate. I think we should leave it there for today. We'll see what happens tomorrow.
Speaker 1:There's going to be a lot of news on this podcast. That's going to be a day old for our, for our listeners, but but the analysis, the analysis is still very current and very spot on. But I did want to use this opportunity to wish Shira a big congratulations in Mazel Tov on her new position at the Rand Corporation. She is how should I put it? She is leaving the IPF home, but not the IPF family. You're moving out but not leaving the family. So she has assured us and she has assured me that she will still be participating on the podcast. So for my purposes, that's the most important thing, frankly, but I couldn't be happier. So, shira, we'll talk to you soon and congratulations thank you, thank you.
Speaker 3:You better keep inviting me and you know, michael and you are people I talk to all the time and I definitely intend to continue talking to all the time. So it's really once an IPF, you know, always an IPFP, and I'm definitely staying in the family and I love the organization, the people, the analysis, the mission. So, under maybe a different hat, but I'm committed.
Speaker 1:Absolutely, and well, you know I didn't want to leave it on this note, but to be continued and hopefully. Well, we'll see what happens if there's a ceasefire or not, but I hope to have you both on before the Hageem to talk about well, talk about a looming meeting in New York having to do with Palestinian statehood and the whole international dimension which you didn't have a chance to touch on today. But to be continued. So, thank you both, as always.
Speaker 2:Thank you guys.
Speaker 3:Thank you guys. Bye, Talk soon.
Speaker 2:Bye.
Speaker 3:Bye.
Speaker 1:Okay, thanks again to Michael Koplow and Shira Efron, as always, for their generous time and insights. Also a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you. Thank you for listening and don't forget subscribe.