Speaker 1: 0:00

Please note that this episode was recorded on Monday, September 8th, one day before the Israeli strike targeting Hamas officials in Doha.

Neri: 0:13

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We have a very special episode this week with two returning guests and friends Israel Policy Forum's very own Israel fellow, nimrod Novick, who for many years was a senior advisor to the late Shimon Peres and is currently a senior leader in the Commanders for Israel Security Group, and Ibrahim Delalche, the head of the Horizon Center think tank in Ramallah and a longtime advisor at the US consulate in Jerusalem. So we're recording this Monday evening, tel Aviv time.

Neri: 0:52

Earlier today there was a serious terror attack in Jerusalem where two Palestinian gunmen from the West Bank opened fire at a major intersection, killing at least six people and severely injuring several more. It was a reminder as if we needed one, that the quietest front, relatively speaking, in this two-year seven-front war, the West Bank, shouldn't be taken for granted. Not at all. So that's why, among many reasons, I wanted Nimrod and Ibrahim on today to discuss the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian statehood, recognition at the UN in New York later this month and, of course, the current and future state of play in the Gaza War. It was a really great conversation with them both. That spanned a wide gamut, believe me, which, if you know them both, shouldn't surprise you in the least. Let's get to Nimrod and Ibrahim. Hi Nimrod, hi Ibrahim. Welcome back to the Israel Policy Pod.

Nimrod: 1:51

Nice to be here with you.

Neri: 1:53

Thank you. Well, it's my pleasure to you both. It's been way too long since last time you both were on and there's a lot to discuss well, in general, but especially this week. But I wanted to actually start with the situation in the West Bank. In normal times this would be top of the agenda, it's fair to say, especially over the past two years. But there are other fronts going on, obviously Gaza, lebanon, iran, yemen, probably a few fronts that I've already forgotten. But in normal times, the West Bank, I think, would be top of the agenda. Definitely, media coverage, publicly, diplomatically.

Neri: 2:29

But we got a tragic reminder this morning that the West Bank, despite being maybe the most relatively calm front over the past two years, is not actually calm at all the tragic shooting in Jerusalem that killed at least six Israelis this morning. So, basically, the lack of attention doesn't mean that things aren't happening in the West Bank. They are, I'd argue, most of which are negative. But, nimrod, let's start with you. The last few weeks we've seen a flurry of activity by the Netanyahu government and specifically Betel Esmotich, the finance minister, and also the minister in the defense ministry, pushing forward various plans, whether annexation of the West Bank or construction in the strategic E1 corridor between Jerusalem and the Maladumim, and so on and so on. Big picture. It's a very broad question, but let's start here. How would you characterize or describe Netanyahu government's policy vis-a-vis the West Bank really over the past two plus years?

Nimrod: 3:50

of going for legislated annexation in lieu of creeping or indeed galloping annexation on the ground.

Nimrod: 3:52

That has been going on and intensified over the last two, three years, and the situation on the West Bank has become quite explosive well before the horrific incident of this morning, well before the horrific incident of this morning.

Nimrod: 4:05

As a matter of fact, a month ago, I published a piece in Time magazine and CNN did the follow-up on it, and the title was the Violent Gazification of the West Bank, where I pointed out several contributors to the explosiveness of the situation. But the bottom line was that Israeli violent settlers, getting the back wind from their leaders, who are now in government, and radicalized young Palestinians, who are radicalized in response to the Jewish violence and terrorism, as well as to the two years war in Gaza. The two groups are using each other to justify violence, feeding on each other and, in the process, killing innocents, destroying property and setting the stage for a major explosion. So I think that the fact that eyes were on Gaza, and also on Syria, lebanon, iran, was a very good cover for our messianic annexationists to expedite their ambitions. And I must say I never believed that I will live to the day where the US ambassador to Israel, who is an enthusiastic supporter of the settlements, will approach the Israeli government and say watch it. The PMA collapse and the consequences are going to be devastating.

Neri: 5:46

Sure, the US ambassador in Jerusalem, mike Huckabee, did say that a few days ago. I think an apt warning. We'll get Ibrahim's thoughts about the PA's stability or not in just a second. But also, you both know as well as I do that the Trump administration has given a green light to a lot of the worst impulses at the top of the Israeli government vis-a-vis the West Bank. So there is a back window. So I guess, going the other way, coming from Washington, ibrahim, you're coming to us from your home in Ramallah. Given all the above that Nimrod laid out, what has it been like in the West Bank over the past, especially two years, whether socially, economically, politically, since the start of the war?

Ibrahim: 6:33

Actually, the situation has really worsened in the past. I would say four to six months, but the situation has been bad since October 7, 2023. But I think you know, with the scale of violence in Gaza, also the other fronts, exactly as my friend and colleague Nimrod pointed out, I think there was some sort of like a cover, an eclipse basically to what's been happening in the West Bank, but I can basically describe it as like it has been ampers under ashes for nearly two years now, most recently, I think the way to describe the West Bank is that you know you have a situation where the PA is going through a crippling economic, financial and economic crisis. It started impacting people at different levels those who are employed by the PA, and here we're talking about nearly 100,000 people in the West Bank who are employed by the PA and, with their families, have been actually with no income for the past three months, to be specific, and on partial salaries for the past few years. So you know this has impacted services. The PA had to cut down on working hours. We're talking about health care system, that is, that has shrunk in terms of service provision.

Ibrahim: 8:01

Education barely the school year has started because of partial strikes and divisions within the teachers sectors, commercial activities have really gone down, real estate and all other sort of like activities that were, you know, especially in an area like Nablus or Ramallah had been a boom for many years now has actually gone into some sort of had been a boom for many years now has actually gone into some sort of recess where people do not really recession, where people do not really spend anything because of their fears and concerns. And in addition to that, of course, you have, like the general situation of frustration, demoralization looking at what's happening in Gaza, a war that is not ending. Demoralization looking at what's happening in Gaza, a war that is not ending, and its impact on the PA. I want to remind you that during the first two weeks after October 7, and this was also something that was not really, I think, well noted during clashes between the PA security services and lots of youth and people here who wanted to go out to the streets and protesting what was going on in Gaza, there were 13 to 15 people who were actually killed during those.

Ibrahim: 9:11

So the PA had to crush, you know, initial sort of like mobilization to the street and that same system, that is to say, the PA, has actually been weakened over the past two years and now rendered almost irrelevant because of, again, shrunken services provisions, weakness in terms of relevance On the security front. I think the PA continues to do what it takes in terms of security coordination and all of that. But the PA has been weakened even in a security sense by the large Israeli army operation in Tulk Aram and Jenin earlier this year, where it was seen as redundant, irrelevant, cannot protect citizens. Settlers' violence, I think, also plays a very big role where the PA is seen as only enabler of an occupier, not really a protector of Palestinian civilians who are being subjected to settlers's violence, including in areas very close to Ramallah, which is like the administrative capital, if you will, of the Palestinian Authority. All of those elements together, I think, has put the PA in a very weak spot.

Ibrahim: 10:19

And I don't have to mention the fact that even when things do go wrong and the PA tries to stop them or tries to play a role where they today condemned the attack in Jerusalem, for instance I know the wording might not sound perfect to Israeli ears, but still you know there was a condemnation from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah Then you get yes, it did, it issued a statement on that.

Ibrahim: 10:42

But basically, again, you know like the idea is that you got Smotrich, who is an Israeli minister, who basically time is now to wipe out the Palestinian authorities.

Ibrahim: 10:50

So it just shows that the PA and its narrative and its actually line of working on a peaceful approach, doing security coordination, all of these things is not really resonating and is not really making life better for people in the West Bank and this, I think, is causing the PA to lose even on writing a narrative when it comes to its own strategy versus Hamas's strategy. With all the frustration with the bankruptcy, insolvency of the PA, not being able to deliver services, all of that, it's becoming as irrelevant as the Hamas governance in Gaza is. Under the circumstances, if you know what I mean. There is nothing that the PA can point to and say look, here in the West Bank we're actually better off under my policy. It's going through all kinds of pressures, including, you know, the question of annexation possible or not. De facto annexation is happening, such as violence is continuing and therefore the PA looks as completely irrelevant and weak in the eyes of the general public.

Neri: 11:59

Yeah, unfortunately, that's what I was expecting you to say. Yeah, unfortunately, that's what I was expecting you to say. It's a very difficult situation in general, but also Israeli government policy is making it actively worse. Nimrod, you've been following this longer than I have Usually. In years past you've had the Israeli security establishment, whether IDF, shin Bet and others, come to the government and say look in the West Bank, you need to prioritize well economic life, you need to move forward on issues and policies that promote stability and not try to actively undermine the PA and make things worse. Do you see a real shift? Both, I guess, not only in terms of Israeli government policy, but also in the ability of the Israeli security establishment to actually counsel restraint to this Israeli government?

Nimrod: 12:55

I would say that counseling restraint has not changed to the point that when very senior levels of IDF and Shin Bet well, let's go to what is in the public domain or sort of public domain, and that is when they go to the Knesset Security Committee and speak on the subject, and, given that our Knesset Security Committee is almost like a press conference, everything leaks from there, and we know that the IDF and the Shin Bet praise the Palestinian Authority for cooperating in counter-terrorism against Hamas and others and credits the Palestinian Authority with saving countless of lives, and the revertiv saving countless of lives and derivatives, of course, watch it, treat it differently. There is a change, though, and that it's lower ranks, where officers with a different worldview are coming up to more senior positions, and they share the smart, rich Ben Greer approach, and we found elements of that in internal arguments in the security establishment, and also, some people attribute passivity on behalf of the IDF, relative passivity vis-à-vis Jewish terrorism, to that factor. With your permission, you mentioned earlier the American elephant in the room. You mentioned the sort of gin light for the Netanyahu government to do as it pleases in Gaza, and now also, with Rubio quoted as saying you want to go for annexation. It's your thing, not our business.

Nimrod: 14:53

I have a feeling that this Washington, unlike all predecessors, doesn't understand the game played in Jerusalem. It is no accident that Netanyahu's classical coalitions save for the current one. He was the center of the coalition, there were people to his right, there were people to his left to make sure that neither can drag him too far in any direction, and whenever he was dragged, his favorite countermeasure used to be but the president of the United States doesn't agree. It was Clinton, it was Obama, it was Trump won. It was Biden. And suddenly this president deprives him of a very important instrument to restrain the extremists, when the coalition that he formed for the first time ever is extremists only.

Neri: 15:57

Yeah, it's true. A former Israeli security official told me the same thing in the Gaza context right, that usually the American president would come in and say, look, you need to stop this. And then the Israeli prime minister, bibi for the past few years, would say, come to his government and say, look, I have no choice but to end the war because Washington is coming down hard on me, as we all know, and we'll get into in just a minute. We all know and we'll get into in just a minute vis-a-vis Gaza, that has not happened yet, even in the Gaza context.

Neri: 16:36

Ibrahim, changing the topics slightly, maybe a bit of good news for the Palestinian Authority? Maybe In exactly two weeks we're going to have high-level UN meetings in New York where a big part of the agenda will be Palestinian statehood recognition. At this point I've lost count how many countries, but definitely over a dozen, including some major countries like the UK, france, australia, canada and the like, not small players on the global stage and also just in terms of their relations with Israel. How is this potentially good news going down in Palestinian public opinion on the so-called Palestinian street? Is this a moment of joy? Is it met with a shrug?

Ibrahim: 17:24

What are we expecting in two weeks in Ramallah it's a smart question to ask about Palestinian public attitude towards this, rather than the Palestinian Authority's response or interaction with it, because clearly there are differences.

Neri: 17:37

I'll get to them in a second. But yeah, I'm very curious how the public is.

Ibrahim: 17:40

Yeah yeah, sure, no, no, I think the public in general. It's actually two things to relate to the Palestinian public. One is that people are overwhelmed with the situation. Again, they watch Gaza, they look at the economic distress and hardships, the economic and financial problems. I also forgot to mention the fact that about 150,000 Palestinian workers who used to work in Israel have been basically jobless for the past two years and this actually constitutes more income to the Palestinian market and Palestinian people and Palestinian public than actually PA salaries, by the way. I don't have the exact figures, but I think it's two times as much. Actually PA salaries, by the way. I don't have the exact figures, but I think it's two times as much.

Ibrahim: 18:32

The Palestinian public as such is overwhelmed with the problems of day-to-day that they see. Recognitions of a Palestinian state is something that people watch, listen to in the news, but it doesn't really relate to their day-to-day issues and concerns, which have been overwhelming for the past two years, and therefore I think people are generally I'm not going to say indifferent, but they don't really. You know they're not jumping in the streets of joy because of those recognitions, or promised recognitions during the General Assembly and the New York, you know, the two-state conference that will be held there. On the other hand, I think there is and you could actually see that very clearly in internal debates where there are two narratives here, where the PA is basically trying to say this is a result of my, you know, peaceful approach to the conflict and basically sufficing with a two-state solution, 1967 lines, et cetera, and our, you know, quiet diplomacy and working with without resorting to violence and armed struggle, whereas you have those who actually say, hey, without the Gaza October, you know, attacks, none of this could have happened. And even if it does not really have an immediate impact, it will actually accumulate in terms of international law and international politics.

Ibrahim: 19:44

And there are those who actually talk about, you know, two superpowers, two countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, who are joining the recognitions. These are not marginal countries and, you know, key question is what is it that they're going to do? You know, after? Israel, especially the current Israeli government, will totally ignore their recognitions and any impact that it may have. So you know, that debate, I think, to me is more important than seeing, like, the immediate reaction of people to these recognitions, because again, people are overwhelmed on one hand, but again writing the narrative and actually saying and this is something that I personally relate to, because if people actually conclude that armed resistance is what brought this, essentially we're actually bringing in a new generation believing, like Hamas did write the narrative of the second intifada it was only by force that the Israelis pulled out from Gaza. They will do it again with a new generation and therefore this is likely to plant the seeds of another conflict that is yet to come, that we are not seeing even today, and you know that, I think, is how to characterize or look at it. You know.

Ibrahim: 20:50

So I'm one of those who basically join and again, as I mentioned earlier, the problem is that the relevance of the PA is being weakened by the day. So, even when you try to actually present that argument that this is a result of a moderate, pragmatic, you know, peaceful approach to this conflict with israel, and therefore you know we have a, you know, possibly, uh, um, an opportunity to translate that into real, uh, uh, reality, sort of like facts on the ground, uh, then you get, like this motrich-Pingvir statements, where they were an agendas and actual work on the ground. It's not only about statements that we're going to destroy this PA. That is far more dangerous than Hamas, so people go, you know, like in a different direction. So, I'm sorry to say I would have loved to say that this is actually resonating, but it's not. It's a debate that is continuing and I'm hoping that this would be the way to go in terms of writing the narrative and convincing people that this is the right approach, rather than the violent approach to this country.

Nimrod: 21:52

May I jump in here, nery? Of course, of course. Look, ibrahim described it as well as anybody can from the inside out. I'm trying to look at it from the outside in. I'm trying to look at it from the outside in, and here is a not very popular position among those like us who are thoroughly committed to an eventual two-state outcome. I look at it. I think that the Israeli reaction, the Israeli hysteric reaction, is a put-on. I think that those involved realize that nothing is going to change on the ground when the number of countries recognizing Palestine is going to go from 147 to 150 or whatever, even if it includes two members of the Security Council.

Nimrod: 22:47

In the lead up to this effort, I had the opportunity to discuss this with people who were involved on the French presidency side and on the Saudi side that were driving this initiative, and I made two points.

Nimrod: 23:05

One was that it reminds me of the moment that the Palestinian flag was raised for the first time at the UN Plaza, when the PLO was invited as a I don't remember the title to the General Assembly. The PA leadership did a huge party in the center of Ramallah and the public was laughing at it. It was laughable because they felt that nothing is changing their lives in the morning after. And what I argued with the Saudis and French and the others was this is a feel-good measure, and French and the others was this is a feel-good measure. This is the easiest substitute for actually fighting for that cause, for doing the heavy lifting of promoting the two-state solution. There's nothing easier than going to the UN raising your head and say I recognize. Easier than going to the UN raising your head and say I recognize. So I felt that out of context, it's at best not a great damage, but I urged them to create a context. Where is the action plan for what you do from the morning after and on in order to bring that outcome about?

Neri: 24:29

And Nimrod, I know you must have written a memo laying out the action plan. What would some of those actions be? So it's not just a symbolic move with nothing changing.

Nimrod: 24:42

The day after they recognize Palestine move with nothing changing the day after they recognized Palestine. Yeah, the suspicion is well grounded in more than one memo, and I wasn't the only one, and there are dozens who were doing it. But no, I'd rather not go to it right now, in the hope that, at hope that at least some of it, uh, will see the the the light of day.

Neri: 25:11

Okay, this is the first time nimrod novik has not laid out his vision. No, I'm kidding you. You've been. You've been very uh uh. Well, let me, I'll stop there, but you've been. You know, usually don't hold back, but maybe in more, more private settings and not on a recorded podcast that will go around the world. That's fine. That's fine. Not as a journalist, it's not fine, but as a discrete analyst, that's fine. Ibrahim, what do you think about Nimrod's argument of the case?

Ibrahim: 25:40

First of all, I think that there is a, you know, general consensus that among intellectuals from a Palestinian perspective and among the Palestinian people in general, that things do actually change when on the ground, when there is a Palestinian-Israeli agreement. And that's why, you know, like we, for good or bad, we've been through Oslo process and we have a Palestinian authority, a Palestinian national identity, because the PLO and Israel did agree on that 30 years ago. It was not really the Palestinian, you know, like the UN recognition, by the way, started in 1988 when the PLO announced a state in Algeria and we had, you know, 100 plus recognitions at that time. But you know, the situation did not really change until we got into an agreement with Israel. So I think that there is a consensus here that includes the Palestinian leadership. By the way, I don't really think that they are in a euphoria over this. The problem has been, from a Palestinian perspective, is that there is no, currently there is no Israeli government to be a partner with in order to get to a two state solution or even a peaceful resolution to the conflict. You've got an Israeli heavy right-wing agenda that talks about the elimination of the Palestinian national character, all of it. So I think just to differentiate between the official position and the public.

Ibrahim: 27:01

The public I agree fully with Nimrod, but people just don't see that this is going to change anything on the ground and therefore they go almost indifferent about it. When it comes to the Palestinian Authority, I think they find a condolence to the fact that there is no room, there is no political sort of like maneuver, for many reasons. The only thing that they got in their hands is the connection to Saudi Arabia, now the French, the international recognitions, and that's the only thing that they have. They do realize that this is not going to translate into concrete anything on the ground, but you know, at the end of the day this is an accumulative international law. You know diplomacy.

Ibrahim: 27:37

What I'm concerned about, as I told you, which is an internal Palestinian debate, I understand, is who writes the narrative for this. Even if it's symbolic and does not really change people's lives, it's still seen as a sort of gain, and that is very crucial. I think it's very important for us, as Palestinians, not to give up on the line that actually eventually takes us to a peaceful resolution to the conflict and actually swear more out of frustration and a belief that this was a result of armed struggle and indeed it's a game. That to me, is actually a much more crucial issue on the internal Palestinian domestic political landscape and debate.

Nimrod: 28:17

Another layer to this story Nery and Ibrahim which I can't help but mention, is an American decision to deprive Abu Mazen and his team of visas to come to the UN. I must confess I don't remember a single more counterproductive act by a US administration on a completely secondary issue, not war and peace. I cannot remember a more counter productive approach than to send a message to palestinians that diplomacy is not the right venue.

Neri: 29:02

This is insane so you beat me to it, nimrod. I was going to ask Ibrahim how that decision by the Trump administration to essentially not allow the Palestinian delegation to come to the UN meetings in New York, including President Mahmoud Abbas, how that has gone over in Ramallah.

Ibrahim: 29:22

The PA PLO are very annoyed with this and, by the way, this is actually the new thing in it is that first of all, historically there has been a problem with PAPLO visas to the US official visas to the US because of the US laws that designate the PLO as a terrorist organization. So it has always been including during the heydays of Oslo that people you know always been including during the heydays of Oslo that people you know officials will only get those visas when they get a waiver system which overrules the application of or freezes or suspends the application of law and gives them an exceptional basis and usually it was like confined in terms of time and in terms of areas that they can go to the US. Now this is even the only exception to that was the visas that they go to UNGA, which is the UN General Assembly, because of the UN agreement with the US, what is known as the headquarters agreement. So it didn't really come as a major earth-shaking to the Palestinian public, because to the Palestinian public, to the officials, it's extremely annoying, but it's not the only annoying thing that they really had from this administration, whether the Trump administration or one or this one. I mean even on a much larger scale. What I can tell you is that and I think Nimrod is right it's not only insane, it basically pushes people to actually believe that such US policies are making things worse for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only to Palestinians. That's one. Two.

Ibrahim: 30:55

You know what hit Palestinian people even more is that all Palestinian passport holders are no longer allowed to enter into the US. It's not only the PA officials or the PLO officials. There was a New York Times article about that and it's substantiated. There hasn't really been an official statement, but it has been substantiated. People apply for a US visa for tourism, for business, for pleasure, for study, for whatever, and they're not. You know they are designated as 20. There's a special designation for it, which is refusal, and as such, not you know they are designated as 20, there's a special designation for it which is refusal and as such, you do not really process it.

Ibrahim: 31:31

Now there is a practical solution. I'm not sure whether I want to say it on air, but basically there's a practical solution to this. But you know it's a hit to the Palestinian Authority. It's like you're basically revoking the Palestinian passport. It says on it it was issued in accordance with the agreement that was signed in Washington. So you're basically canceling out everything, not only in the eyes of the Palestinian people.

Ibrahim: 31:53

Generally speaking, you are taking steps and I understand, when you come to apply that on the PAPLO because of Taylor Force, atca, this, that they did comply, they did not comply with certain US regulations or whatever, but when it comes to the Palestinian people, canceling the whole passport, I'm frankly I don't really know what's the use of this or what purpose does it serve, other than alienating people, creating anti-American sentiments again across the board, because you're punishing everybody for no clear reason as to why you're doing it. There is no even explanation and the practical solution I'll tell you off air. I mean, you know we'll go back to pre-1993, basically not with Israeli La Sefa citizen travel documents, but with other travel documents that you know Palestinians are given in the region. So what's the purpose of it? It's like, basically, destroying the PA.

Speaker 1: 32:51

Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure Jewish, democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic US policy towards the conflict, us-israel relations and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures, the conflict, us-israel relations and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political, denominational and generational spectrums. Our Young Professionals Initiative, ipf-ateed, works to elevate the discourse among next-generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at israelpolicyforumorg and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipfli slash supportthepod or at the support. The show link in the show notes yeah for the record. At ipfli slash supportthepod or at the support the show link in the show notes.

Neri: 33:48

Yeah, for the record. I don't like when my guests withhold information from well our listeners and viewers, but especially me.

Ibrahim: 33:57

No, no, no no no, I'm kidding.

Neri: 33:59

I know there's a reason why I'm just trying to create some sort of a profile.

Ibrahim: 34:04

We all West bankers, are entitled to Jordanian temporary passports, non-citizenship passports. These are like travel documents, basically that the Jordanian government has been giving to Palestinians since 1967, and is Jerusalem, by the way and this means that when I go to the US embassy in Amman or anywhere else, I apply as a Palestinian. They know that. But on a Jordanian temporary passport they know that and therefore you know it just adds a burden on people to actually go through a bureaucratic. You know, travel to Amman and get a Jordanian passport and individuals are then allowed, because what is being hit is the Palestinian Authority and its stature. So you know it's not Now.

Ibrahim: 34:48

I'm not saying the Palestinian Authority is like the angels of all peace in the world. I'm just saying you've got options on the ground. Now, as we talk about Gaza and thereafter and I've read some of what Nimrod and many other experts, including Israelis, who wrote on this You've got like two practical solutions or options, you know one with Hamas and its cronies and the remnants of Hamas in Gaza, and one with the weakened Palestinian Authority that needs to be rehabilitated and you know, and work in terms of recreating its governance in Gaza within certain principles and all of that. So if you destroy both, what is it that you're going to do, like immediate occupation? If that is the case, I'm telling youinian people cannot really stop that from happening, but the situation would be worse for both israelis and palestinians a hundred percent and we're going to get to gaza, trust me, in just a second, uh.

Neri: 35:37

But to tie up the issue of well, well, uh, us policy vis-a-vis the palestinians and the palestinian authority and palestinian statehood recognition, I'll say it, the craziest argument I've heard both from the Israeli prime minister and also senior Trump administration officials, publicly over the past week or two as well. The PA is taking unilateral steps against Israel in the national arena, icc and whatever. So now Israel may take unilateral steps against the Palestinian Authority and, by the way, the US administration is within its rights to take, you know, to sanction the PA. I've never heard of a more ridiculous argument, because you know, this Israeli government not only violates the Oslo Accords, you have senior ministers saying that they want to destroy the Oslo Accords. Right, and it's just a circular logic that I've heard from both American and Israeli officials, and it's like you're living in Fantasyland.

Nimrod: 36:42

It's even worse. It's even worse because what are the measures that the Palestinian Authority is taking to do all this unilateral stuff worse? It's even worse because what are the measures that the Palestinian Authority is taking to do all this unilateral stuff? Diplomacy. So what do you want? To shut the door on diplomacy in order for them to go where? Ibrahim?

Ibrahim: 37:04

I just wanted to say, even when you have an insane situation like this, governments who have, in my opinion, an extremist position that truly is seeking to destroy the Palestinian Authority Nimrod said it's diplomacy. So if you really want to actually take countermeasures, you resort to reciprocity. If you will, you resort to, and it means but destroying the entire, you know, political stature, financial, economic and even impacting its own security. I mean the PA as your partner in the West Bank, because it is still a partner in the West Bank, by the way, and I'm saying this assertively because I do know that security coordination channels are still operating. Therefore, you're not only hurting the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian people, you're also hurting yourself.

Ibrahim: 37:59

By the way, with all due respect, I worked 20 years for the US government and I do not mean to attack the US government, but I do. I'm one of the strong believers that if we wait for the US to come to fix our situation, both Palestinians and Israelis, we will be disappointed. Let me say that I think we are the ones who could actually make things move and once we do, the US will come to support that approach, because otherwise they will continue to support whatever Israeli government is there without really, you know, going into the nuances of our conflict, which are far more confusing to you. Know a number of individuals right now who are basically dealing with this complicated political file and not alone with many other files in the region and the world actually.

Neri: 38:48

Yeah, but the problem is you have a US administration in power now that is not only kind of abetting the worst impulses of this Israeli government and Israeli far right, but they're actively pushing and promoting policies that make things worse. Right, that's the problem.

Ibrahim: 39:09

Yes, that's exactly what's happening.

Neri: 39:11

yes, which, again, you don't have to convince me, ibrahim. As you know, I wrote a whole book about the Palestinian Authority Security Forces and the cooperation between them and Israel, dating back now over 15 years at least. Well, the Israeli government officials, including this prime minister, know that, the smart people in Washington know that, and yet people act like it just doesn't exist and take it for granted until. Well, one day it may not actually exist anymore. We have to get to Gaza.

Neri: 39:49

As we speak, the IDF is continuing its offensive into Gaza City, primarily via the air, via airstrikes. As you both know, netanyahu is demanding nothing less than Hamas's surrender, that it lays down its arms, that it releases the hostages. Yesterday, sunday, donald Trump announced a ceasefire quote, unquote deal that again would require Hamas to release all the hostages, all 48 remaining hostages in Gaza, on day one and then engage and promote talks to end the war between Israel and Hamas, with some vague US guarantee that it would actually end the war. First question, I suppose, to you, ibrahim, as someone who follows Palestinian politics quite closely, both in Gaza and the West Bank is there any way Hamas can accept the Donald Trump proposal as we understand it from yesterday? Hamas?

Ibrahim: 40:47

has not rejected the Trump proposal but, as has been the case for the past two years, inserted language in their official public statement and, I'm sure, in their private channels to the US administration, that we need guarantees that what the president is saying is actually going to happen. There will be no situation, in my opinion, that Hamas will hand over all the Israeli hostages because they use them as strategic security chips. That's the only thing that they actually have and sorry to use that language in this context, but that's how it's framed and you know they will not do that and wait for the good intents of Trump to actually come at Israel with pressure that would, you know, stop the war. That's on one level. On the other level, you know, like I think, one of the things that went missing is that when they released the Israeli-American soldier, there were promises, reportedly, that were made to Hamas that this will improve this and that, and the terms will be different. And what actually happened, you know, was an intense Israeli military campaign in the aftermath, israeli military campaign in the aftermath. So I think you know for them, because they are defending, they are seeking survival at so many different levels, whether it's individual or organizational, the way that they look at it, the only card that they have is the hostages and therefore they will not hand it over because, you know, because of a US offer. Now they're smart enough not to actually come publicly and say, hey, you know this is not going to work. They just use, you know, whatever advice they get from other countries involved, mediators and others.

Ibrahim: 42:38

And's much easier to reach a partial agreement rather than an end of war agreement where you have with Hamas, where you have, you know, demands like disarmament, you know, end of governance, although they had actually approved that. But I don't really think that you will see Hamas handing over or disarmament to the Israeli army. That's not going to happen. You need another mechanism which is like Palestinian, arab, international, different governance, which are already there. We have plans for these, but they have not really been approved yet by the Israeli government. So, in short, I think that they will respond, and they already responded publicly, but they will do that privately. There will be conditions and terms that they will be asking which will complicate these negotiations. Unless we have a situation where the Israeli government does actually give guarantees to the US president that they hand us the hostages, we'll stop and nothing will happen, and I don't really think that this is feasible or realistic at this point. So I'm very skeptical that this is going to take us to a different zone in terms of ending the war.

Neri: 43:47

Yeah, I mean Hamas's statement, I don't know. Yeah, no, I mean we'll get Nimra I'm very curious to get Nimra's opinion about this and also the day after plans, if and when they may become realistic. But just for our listeners and viewers, hamas issued its response. Like Ibrahim said, they didn't reject the Trump proposal, if you want to call it that outright, but they just reiterated their longstanding demands that, okay, they're willing to release the hostages in return for guarantees that it would end the war, that it would guarantee that the IDF withdraw from Gaza and, like you said, they're willing to hand over at least governance in Gaza to a technocratic committee of Palestinians and Arabs and internationals. But, yes, a reiteration of their longstanding position.

Ibrahim: 44:36

Yes, Neri, I just have one quick thought to throw out there which I strongly believe in. When it comes to day after arrangements in Gaza. This, in my opinion, cannot be negotiated with Hamas, because you're basically talking about completely dismantling the military infrastructure. Otherwise it wouldn't work in my opinion, not for Israel and not for the region. Therefore, the ones who need to actually be engaged in that is essentially the Arab mediators, the international community and the PLO, as a replacement for what will actually no longer be in Gaza, which is weapons, which is Hamas' governance and all of that, but negotiating that with Hamas itself is a situation that I think is nearly impossible. It just won't work that way.

Ibrahim: 45:24

And since we have no approach yet that these kind of negotiations on ending the war and post Gaza are not really done with a valid Palestinian partner, regional support, including all the countries involved in it, with international and Israeli consent, I just can't imagine, even plausibly, intellectually, how are you going to talk to Hamas and say you need to dismantle yourself, you need to exile yourself, you need to give me all of your weapons?

Ibrahim: 45:49

They'd rather continue doing and dragging. You know the situation in Gaza as is today, for as long as it takes Just now, you know, the Israeli army announced that four soldiers were killed in Gaza during combat today. So they are still out there doing their thing of guerrilla warfare here and there and thinking that this way they could at least survive. And, by the way, hamas's fighters in Gaza, I think, if they are not provided the ones who are not ideological if they're not provided with an alternative to being killed and exterminated, they will continue fighting because there is no choice. So, again, if you do not really have a different strategic framework for these kinds of negotiations with an acceptable partner, with regional support and Israeli consent, I just don't see how it will work in terms of Hamas proposal versus US trying to pass that with ultimatums, like turning Gaza into hell, has been done over the past 20 plus months. So I'm not sure you know what is it that this kind of threat is doing to Hamas' psyche in terms of affecting its negotiations tactics?

Neri: 46:56

Right, I don't think you're going to find disagreement here. Negotiations techniques Right, I don't think you're going to find disagreement here. By the way, the issue of basically negotiating an end to the war, not with Hamas, but with the PA and other Arab actors we've had US officials, former US officials, on this podcast, like Barbara Leaf, like Dan Shapiro, make that same point, and yet it hasn't really happened, I think for a variety of reasons. But Israel has, netanyahu specifically, has said you know, no Hamas, no PA. In the day after the war, netanyahu also reiterates almost on a daily basis his conditions for ending the war, very maximalist conditions. What, to your mind, would be, as Ibrahim started to lay out an alternative, day after approach that both obviously gets the hostages back, ends the war, maybe sets Gaza on a better trajectory in the day after the war.

Nimrod: 48:01

I think that before the day after, I'd like to suggest a different take on the American plan from yesterday, what it entails and what it does not. Ibrahim is right Negotiating with Hamas the morning after makes absolutely no sense, and it is not there. It is not Hamas that is supposed responsible for disarming Hamas. It's the job of the next government that will be formed. There are elements there that surprised me me, given that my conspiratorial mind doesn't let go the thought that this document is copyright Netanyahu and Dermer showing up in the region via Washington, and therefore I really was surprised to see one clause there, which is that the Israeli withdrawal, once enacted and it is defined as in the shortest period of time as possible, is comprehensive, even no residual presence in the so-called parameters Perimeter, perimeter.

Nimrod: 49:41

Perimeter Perimeter, yes, because it's a Hebrew word that now we are using in English, you know.

Neri: 49:47

It's the accent. Yeah, yeah, but wait, nimrod, explain what is this one pager that you speak of?

Nimrod: 49:54

Well, everybody is talking about the American plan. So, the American plan, which is a bunch of principles governing a deal. Some of the elements have already been published, like all hostages on day one, end of war, declaration on day one. And some have been misrepresented, such as that there is in it the elements of demilitarization of Hamas. No, these are to be negotiated not negotiated, but to be tasked with that mysterious government and I'm saying mysterious because, like Ibrahim, I don't believe that there can be a third party government in Gaza that is not linked in one way or another to the Palestinian Authority and reinforced by presence of several Arab countries that will contribute to its survival operations potential success. And these countries, who are supposed to contribute to the Gaza morning after, have their own conditions and none of them are met in that American proposal. But that's because there is a distinction between ending the war, bringing the hostages, on the one hand, and the morning after on the other. So, just to sum up, looking at it from Jerusalem perspective, whether it was written by Netanyahu or not, when I analyze the components of the deal, I can see three potential scenarios shaping up, again from a Netanyahu perspective. Scenario number one Hamas accepts. If that happens, that's the closest equivalent to total victory, and Netanyahu can certainly claim total victory. It's a huge win for Trump, even in time for the Nobel Peace Prize. For Trump, even in time for the Nobel Peace Prize, and that's, you know, the best of all worlds.

Nimrod: 52:29

Since I think it is not very likely that this will be accepted as is, by the way, as we walked into Nery's studio, hamas made a little more of its position known, and that was something that we all alluded to but didn't know. It's coming so quickly and openly. And that is not all hostages on day one, yeah, hostages on day one, and the remainder later on, at a date to be determined, which obviously reflects the Hamas logic that Ibrahim spoke about. The second scenario is that Hamas rejects and Trump is trapped into greenlighting the Israeli operation with no expiration date. Scenario three Hamas accepts. All hostages are home. The new government fails to secure security, the war resumes with no need to worry about the lives of the hostages. So if I sit in the Balfour residence of the Israeli prime minister, I see these three scenarios, all of them, working well for me, so let's go for it.

Neri: 53:54

Yeah, of course, it's almost cost-free for Israel, because it's a Trump ultimatum. A final warning, as he wrote yesterday to Hamas Another final warning, another final warning.

Neri: 54:06

You know what does he say? Everything is in two weeks' time, so we'll see what happens in two weeks. Nimrod, just on the issue of day after, but also just the Arab government equities or role in a post-war Gaza scenario. We've seen, definitely over the past two years, but even more so in recent months, growing tensions between Jerusalem and pretty much every other Arab capital, but especially between Jerusalem and Cairo, between Israel and Egypt. As somebody who follows this relationship quite closely, is it concerning to you? Where does it come from? I mean, how angry is Cairo with what's happening in Gaza and also the rhetoric coming out of Jerusalem?

Nimrod: 54:55

I would say, when you talk about President Sisi, very angry. When you talk about President Sisi, very angry. When you talk about the security establishment, very worried in Egypt. You know they are convinced and I'm not sure that they are wrong that the anti-Egyptian campaign comes from the top here. It is almost reminiscent. You remember Yehuda Gil, the Mossad officer who fed the Israeli system with false analysis, false reports from a fictional Syrian senior Syrian source that almost brought Israel and Syria to go to war. Yeah, it was so alarming.

Nimrod: 55:46

What we're watching now is that on steroids. You know, since the peace treaty was enacted, there is an institution in the Sinai called the MFO, multilateral Force of Observers, a few thousand international observers, and this entity is owned, so to speak, by the US, egypt and Israel and has been monitoring compliance with the peace treaty. That entity reports to the three owners, to the three stakeholders. That entity reports to the three owners, to the three stakeholders, and their reports and I think we all can check in Jerusalem, in Washington and in Cairo. Their reports say that Israeli media report day in and out, including a public statement by the Israeli ambassador to Washington, that Egypt is violating the peace treaty and the messing forces in the Sinai in violation of annex three to the security annex to the peace treaty are all fabricated, that pictures of tank formations in the Sinai are not from the Sinai and the Egyptians.

Nimrod: 57:08

Look at this PR campaign that started with what we call in the country RunGate I'm sorry, qatargate where people were pumping Qatar as the only reliable mediator, smearing Egypt as not doing its job and so on.

Nimrod: 57:30

That's when it started and these people are now under investigation for treason and mushroomed into these allegations false allegations that Egypt is getting ready for war. So that's one element. The other element is they see our policy, and the policy seems to be driving Gazans further south in the Strip, further closer to the Egyptian border, with a declared intent of several members of the cabinet of exporting millions of Gazans to Egypt in violation of its sovereignty. So, yeah, the Egyptians are very worried, and you know, because the only mature adult that is responsible for calming spirits at this time is out to lunch and that's Washington that is too busy with so many other things and has no attention span for marginal issues like Israel and Egypt going to war. For marginal issues like Israel and Egypt going to war, nobody stands up and says, hey, I have in front of me the MFO report. Stop lying.

Neri: 58:46

Stop lying. Indeed, and it's a real PR campaign going on now for months, about the growing threat from the Egyptian army towards Israel, which seems ridiculous because it is ridiculous, towards Israel. Which seems ridiculous because it is ridiculous. But you know, you don't need to be a believer in conspiracy theorists, because the Israeli prime minister said in a interview to a local Telegram channel late last week that well, if the Egyptians would just play ball and open the gates in Rafah, then you know all the Palestinians could leave, because you know they all want to leave, which is obviously a major threat to Egyptian national security.

Nimrod: 59:24

An Egyptian friend responded to me privately on the prime minister's suggestion that Egypt open its border to Gazans, and he asked me doesn't Israel control two of Egypt's three land borders? Why shouldn't Israel open its borders to Gazans?

Neri: 59:44

Gaza's land borders, not Egypt's. Yeah, yeah, because you know why should we allow the Gazans into Israel, or even the West Bank? Of course not. Yeah, but you know the Israeli position. Ibrahim is smiling. You know it's voluntary immigration, so why can't they voluntarily emigrate, you know, to Al-Quds, to Jerusalem?

Ibrahim: 1:00:08

Ibrahim. I just had one comment on this, if I may. You know what the radicals? We have insane people on our side too. Do you know actually what they when they listen to these things and these positions and these attitudes basically destroying all of Israeli sort of like strategic allies in the region, including Egypt, including Jordan, for God's sake, UK, France, UAE you know what they say. They basically say look, this is much better for us, Let them destroy it. Let them go to war with Egypt and with UAE and with Jordan. This is a machine that produces the perfect storm scenario for all of us Like destroy everything.

Ibrahim: 1:00:56

It's just unbelievable. I'm just telling you wholeheartedly, because I'm a very strong believer in my life and even death, in coexistence and living together, and I see things that if I were an Israeli I would go mad in the streets because this, what is happening, is essentially pushing all of Israeli strategic interests and achievements over the past 70 plus years into a dustbin of history like Egypt. I mean anyway, sorry for the outburst, you can take it out. It's not, it's not me to say or tell that Israeli government what to do, but it's just bad, Feels very bad.

Neri: 1:01:35

First of all, we love to tell the Israeli government what to do on this podcast and you're not wrong at all, ibrahim. Very bad. First of all, we love to tell the Israeli government what to do on this podcast. Uh, and you're not uh wrong at all, ibrahim. There are a lot of Israelis going crazy on the streets precisely due to the things that you layout, that on every level. Uh, this government is just, uh, you know, severing the strategic uh infrastructure and achievements that have been built up through decades in this country, including in the US and including in the US, including global public opinion, including, soon to be economic, soon to be the stature and position of the IDF, soon to be stability in the West Bank. I mean, we can go on and on, but we won't. Soon to be stability in the West Bank. I mean, we can go on and on, but we won't. So hopefully cooler heads prevail, if not in Jerusalem, then in Washington and, by the way, someone told me last week that they looked into it, including at the highest levels in Oslo, in Norway.

Neri: 1:02:34

The deadline for submissions of candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize this year has already passed. So if Donald Trump wants to be a candidate, it will have to be for next year. No, bibi already submitted him. Well, I don't know. Was it accepted? Probably not, I don't know.

Nimrod: 1:02:56

With that, I don't think that the formality will stand in the way.

Neri: 1:03:01

Look, I don't know much about Northern Europeans, but I do know that rules are rules up there. It's not the Middle East, nimrod, it's not the Middle East. We're out of time both of you. Great to see you both and thank you so much and we'll chat again soon. Thank you, thanks, nery. Good to see you, ibrahim. Thanks, good Thanks.

Ibrahim: 1:03:16

Narek, good to see you. Ibrahim. Thanks, good to see you. Bye-bye Narek. Bye-bye Narek.

Neri: 1:03:19

Bye-bye, okay. Thanks again to Nimrod Novik and Ibrahim Dallalshe for their generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob Gilman, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so you can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast and, most importantly, thank you for listening.