SPEAKER_01: 0:12

Hello everyone and thank you for joining us today. My name is Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor at Israel Policy Forum, where I host the Israel Policy Pod. I want to welcome those of you who are joining Israel Policy Forum for the first time today, as well as our returning viewers and those listening on Israel Policy Pod later on. Before we begin, a big thank you to Israel Policy Forum supporters. Our work, including today's program, is made possible by you. Israel Policy Forum relies on donors like you to produce free expert analysis and informational content on the most pressing issues affecting Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If you enjoy Israel Policy Forum's webinars but don't yet support the organization's work, please do so by visiting Israelpolicyforum.org slash support to make a tax-deductible donation today. So, with all that said, uh the reason why we're all here yesterday in Washington was a big day, a beautiful day, potentially one of the great days ever in civilization, or so we were told, as President Donald Trump, alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, unveiled his 20-point plan for an end to the Gaza War, including, of course, the return home, hopefully soon, of all the remaining Israeli hostages. To help us break it all down and figure out if indeed all those adjectives were and are warranted, I'm honored to have with us today Israel Policy Forum's very own chief policy officer, Michael Koplo, and Rachel Brandenburg, IPF's Washington Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst. So, Michael and Rachel, before I start firing questions at you both, and then of course start taking questions from you, our dear audience, here are some of the big broad strokes of the plan as unveiled by the White House yesterday. And don't worry, I'm not gonna go read all 20 points. But basically, big picture the deal calls for an immediate end to the fighting, the release within 72 hours of all 48 hostages, 20 of whom are still believed to be alive, the disarmament of Hamas and demilitarization of the strip, a gradual, some would say very gradual IDF withdrawal, the setup of an international supervisory board and Palestinian committee to actually run Gaza, the introduction of an international stabilization force for Gaza, economic redevelopment, and more. Believe me, there is more. It's 20 points that are uh uh each one is a world unto itself. Uh but finally there are accommodations to have a reform to Palestinian authority, retake governance over Gaza, and also the plan sets forward a pathway to Palestinian statehood, however heavily caveated uh those two clauses are in the deal, which I'm sure we'll touch on in our conversation. So, with all that said, Michael, let's start with you. What are your first broad general thoughts about the deal? And what do you think was the prime motivating factor uh to your mind for Trump actually pushing for this in this way at this time?

SPEAKER_02: 3:10

Thanks, Neri. Broadly, I think that these 20 points make a lot of sense to me as a foundation for a plan to end the war and to get to a day after in Gaza. A lot of these points are ones that that you and I on the podcast have been talking about for almost two years. And um there's a lot here, a lot in here that I think makes perfect sense. In terms of the timing, and I should also add that I think it's it's structured particularly broadly because you have to get everybody to sign on. We've seen now for two years the difficulty of putting forward something that Israel can agree to and that Hamas can agree to, and that the US can live with, and that Arab states will actually back. So, you know, the the criticisms that uh of of individual points and in terms of details missing, details will be ironed out. I think that to if you're gonna get a new movement, it had to be broad uh in the way that this plan is brought. In terms of the timing of it, I think that President Trump has just sort of lost patience. Uh he's been talking about wanting to end the Gaza War since before he took office. He's been talking about wanting to see the hostages come home since before he took office. He saw his initial ceasefire, which was really the Joe Biden proposal, but it got over the line because of not even yet President Trump's intervention. He saw that break down, and I think he wants to get back there. And we all know that he wants his Nobel Peace Prize, and he also he likes things that are successful. And it seems pretty pretty evident to me that he thinks what's happening in Gaza is not successful. And he clearly was not happy in the aftermath of the Israeli strike on Qatar. Uh maybe he didn't like the strike itself, maybe he didn't like it because it didn't work. But I think we're now at a point where uh he really wants to end this once and for all. And I think this is the the last chance to do it. I worry that if this plan for, you know, I'm sure we'll talk about the the ways in which it is far from perfect and the various faults, but if this plan doesn't at least get off the ground and start to be implemented, then I think we're going to see Israel push forward as Prime Minister Snyahu promised that he would. We're gonna see President Trump wash his hands of all of it. And uh there's really no more off-ramps that I can see beyond this. So um, you know, I think this plan is the last best chance to get some movement, and I'm glad it's out there. And you know, now the hard work has to start of translating what are 20 points on paper into something that can actually be implemented and that both sides will actually see through.

SPEAKER_01: 6:01

Absolutely. Uh, implementation and really the technicalities of what it will look like on the ground um can make or break this very easily, which uh I'm sure we'll we'll touch on in just a moment. Uh Rachel, same question to you. What were your initial overall thoughts uh when this came down the pike and was unveiled uh yesterday? And uh what do you think the U.S. role and motivation in bringing all this together was? Uh, you know, especially for Donald Trump, who had been very supportive of Israel and really Netanyahu's kind of escalation of the war, even breaking the prior ceasefire earlier this year. And it seemed like this, it seemed like this was an about face.

SPEAKER_00: 6:40

Yeah, thanks, Neri. I I agree with everything Michael said. I would just add a few things. I think Donald Trump's primary interest is Donald Trump. And to me, the one thing that may have sort of really lit a fire under him to bring everyone together and push forward something. Because this this 20-point proposal, for all of its pitfalls and for it actually being very light on details, it's more like principles than a plan. It is the first assertion of policy on a lot of these issues from the United States in this administration. So we heard President Trump on, I think it was Friday, say, no, I won't support annexation, which incidentally is not in the 20-point plan, but he sort of put a line in the sand on that, but on very few other issues that are now part of this 20-point proposal. So I think it is helpful in at least indicating where the United States is. Um, there are, however, a ton of loopholes and a ton of caveats and a ton of opportunities for hedging. Um, so as Michael said now, the hard work needs to begin. If Hamas accepts this, there is so much to be done, not only to work out the details of how do you implement any one of these 20 pieces, but also to ensure that Trump doesn't lose attention, that Netanyahu doesn't find a way to wiggle out of it, and that all the parties actually um continue to move this forward so it doesn't just end up a failed piece of paper. I think uh back to my first comment about President Trump's ego. As of last week, we saw for the first time not only the future expansion of the Abraham Accords threatened, but the actual agreements and the combination of Israel's conduct and conduct in Gaza, and then really the Israeli, the current Israeli government's push toward formal annexation, which was in reaction, as they say in reaction to the flurry of international recognitions of Palestinian statehood. But that actually led Arab countries, the UAE, to say uh if Israel moves forward with annexation, not only will it threaten future expansion, uh future normalization agreements, but it may also threaten our current agreement. And that may have been a wake-up call to President Trump, realizing not only are the days running out to expand the Abraham Accords, but there may actually be um uh they may actually be rolled back if action doesn't come soon.

SPEAKER_01: 9:02

That's right. Uh a threat to his first-term legacy. And we saw it last week at the UN. Uh Trump spent a lot of time touting his own abilities to end wars, um, and the UN's ability in his mind to not end wars. Uh, and it seemed like a real point of pride uh for this US president. So um I'm sure that was a a motivating factor to get, I think it would be by his count, number eight uh on the list of wars that that he ended. Uh doesn't matter that he let it continue for for the better part of this year. That's a a separate issue, which we don't need to touch on. Um but it's a good point. We should mention for for our uh viewers and listeners, all of what we're talking about is contingent on Hamas actually agreeing to this deal. Uh which again, uh we'll get into the the maybes of that in just a second, trust me. Uh and you're right, Rachel, the uh the clear articulation of US policies on these issues, and supported, by the way, by uh the Arab and Muslim states who came out in support of this plan, and by the way, also by the Israeli government and the Prime Minister Bibi Nyao. Uh no annexation by Israel of Gaza, right? No new resettlement of Gaza, uh no implementation of Trump's own uh so-called Gaza Riviera plan, the voluntary so-called emigration of the Gaza population, right? So these are very uh important policy principles that are actually laid out there in this deal uh on black and white. Uh so that's you know, in terms of the principles, that's a a major point, uh, an important point. Um let's get into it. The the various players, the the winners and losers. Everyone wants to know uh who who came out ahead, who who may have conceded more. Uh Michael, let's start with you and let's start with Israel. Uh obviously, to my mind, there's a lot of upside here for Israel, uh, but also some pitfalls, uh, especially politically for Netanyahu among his far-right political allies, uh, who are already quite upset. We've seen that uh during the course of today, although not everyone has come out uh and publicly slammed the deal. Uh Itamar Benvir has been suspiciously quiet. Yeah, oddly silent. Oddly silent, eerily silent. Um So let's start with Israel, uh, obviously. Uh do you think, like I do, number one, that Israel actually came ahead in this deal uh uh on its merits, um, and that if the deal is actually consummated, then we're likely heading to early elections pretty soon because BB can't and won't be able to keep this coalition together.

SPEAKER_02: 11:33

I think Israel definitely comes out ahead on the merits of this deal. Prime Minister Netanyahu, one of the first things he said yesterday at the press conference was that this deal um is in line with his five requirements for ending the war in Gaza, uh was to remind remind viewers and listeners um our uh return of the hostages, complete disarmament of Hamas, demilitarization of Gaza, Israeli security control of Gaza, and uh government that is not Hamas and not the PA. On some of these, uh I think that that claim definitely stands up, and others not so much, but there's enough wiggle room that that he was able to somewhat credibly argue that all five are men. And it's also the case that in this deal, Israel gets what it wants pretty quickly. If it goes through, then all the hostages has to be released within 72 hours. I think that's gonna be a really tall order. Um, if Hamas knows where all the hostages are, um, and particularly where all the bodies of the deceased hostages are, I'll be surprised. But you know, at least in the contours of this deal, Israel gets this up front. And then what Hamas wants most of all, which is full IDF withdrawal from Gaza, that comes maybe at the end, but it's very nebulous because the the standards for um when the IDF is gonna have to withdraw are literally in this document to be negotiated by the IDF in conjunction with other parties. And then the IDF gets to determine when those standards have been met. And, you know, one of the standards in there for full complete withdrawal is no terrorism from Gaza. That's that that's that's not a standard that I think um anybody can ever promise. You know, we have terrorism in every country in the world, including including right here in the United States. So it's possible that what this ultimately looks like is a deal where Hamas capitulates, um, and as as they should, as they should um principally, but also as they should because they're getting pretty badly beaten. Uh, but Israel may not actually have to end up giving Hamas the thing that it wants. So from that perspective, this is definitely a deal that is weighted towards Israel up front. With that said, there are things in here that Prime Minister Netanyahu promised would never happen. Um, one of them is that it explicitly says in this agreement that there is going to be a path to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. Is that the phrase Palestinian state? No, but it's awfully close. Uh, it explicitly says in this document that the Palestinian Authority, at the end of a process of reform, is going to take over from uh the Gaza Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force. There are other things in here that uh I think will definitely hit people on the Israeli right um like a gut punch. The the parts where Hamas has to completely disarm, um, they're gonna like that, but but Hamas Hamas members get complete amnesty if they simply hand over their weapons and and make a pledge to peacefully coexist alongside Israel. And I think that's something that not many Israelis contemplated. Uh so there are definitely things in here that are gonna be hard for the Israeli right to swallow. And I think you're correct, Neri. If this goes through, then it has to mean early elections because Netanyahu is gonna have to run on this. He's gonna have to spin it as, you know, I promised to get the house truths back, and I did. I promised that we would defeat Hamas, and this is the defeat of Hamas. I promised that we would move toward normalization and look at all these countries in the region that are now helping us out and contributing in Gaza. So his only chance of staying where he is, I think, is creating a deadlock in the next election. And the only way he's gonna get the two, three, four seats he needs to at least force a deadlock is by running on this as a huge success. Uh, so I think I think that that is the path forward for him politically if Hamas actually signs on and if this actually gets implemented.

SPEAKER_01: 15:48

Rachel, what do you think of the the Israeli politics of it all and uh whether Israel came out ahead in terms of of the deal relative to, well, the other parties.

SPEAKER_00: 16:00

I agree with everything Michael said. I think Israel certainly came out ahead, and particularly in the amount of caveating and hedging that are in the 20 points. Um what I what I think is also interesting, though, is we've seen an outpouring of support after yesterday's press conference. Even though Netanyahu pretty much hedged even in the press conference, he said, thank you so much. This is a, you know, all credit to the president for getting us this far. But he also said, you know, I don't support a Palestinian state. And there's enough um uh it's light enough on details to allow him to continue to Wordsmith as he needs to politically for now. What I think will be interesting to watch is to what extent do some of the other international actors now come in and how heavily to make sure that if Hamas agrees, this does continue to build momentum and there's some meat put on the bones of the 20 points. The Europeans, uh, as individual countries as the EU are probably at the moment among the actors with the most facility for details and the most background in kind of past negotiations, different sets of terms for the PA, for Israel. Um and in a the United States, a different US administration would have and probably could have played a role in a way different than this administration in actually being the ones to drive the negotiations and put different plans on the table. I don't see this administration, this American administration, doing that with respect to the details. So I think the Europeans have a role to play in that respect. And the Arab states who may have less um ability or interest in really getting into the weeds have a tremendous amount of influence with this US administration, particularly the Gulf states. So I think there's an interesting dance to be done between those who do have the information and the capability to turn this 20 points into something real, and those who have the uh the influence with the United States and then the United States with Israel. But it's got to be kind of a coordinated dance happening all at the same time, uh, with everyone still willing to move in the right direction. And um that that would be a tremendous feat if it actually is pulled off.

SPEAKER_01: 18:15

Uh a tremendous feat of diplomacy that will need a strong uh guiding hand. Um didn't mention it at the top, but uh Trump uh he claimed he wasn't self-nominated to be the chairman of the board of the International Uh Advisory Group or Board or whatever. It's called the Peace Board. The Board of Peace. Um I don't know if I completely believe him, but he's supposed to head it. Uh and Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, uh, will be on this board as well. Um it will need a strong uh guiding hand. Uh hold that thought, Rachel, about the Arab states. I'm gonna come back to you to uh unpack that a little bit more, but just to wrap up the issue of Israeli politics, um wordsmithing is is a nice term for it. Uh the the ink wasn't yet dry uh on the document uh that wasn't signed at the White House uh ballroom last night, and Netanyahu was already issuing videos from DC uh in Hebrew, uh uh you know, assuaging his base that uh you know there the Palestinian Authority uh has no role in this future plan. There's no Palestinian state in the plan. The IDF will not have to withdraw uh as part of this plan. Obviously, all of that is included in the in the deal. So yes, uh there was already um, as you said, wordsmithing and spitting uh coming from the Israeli Prime Minister. Uh but yes, I think, you know, aside from the Palestinian Authority issue and the Palestinian state issue and all those, I think in in brass tax on the ground, there are issues that may complicate Israel's life going forward, and that some hawks and hardliners, call them what you will hear, were we actually concerned about. I think maybe for legitimate reasons, like introducing into the Gaza Strip a international force uh made up of potentially Emiratis and Indonesians and Europeans and Egyptians. I mean, that may complicate the IDF's life in future if it feels it needs to take action. Um also as part of the deal, uh, this was a bone of contention that Smotrich had with the plan that you know you're outsourcing Israeli security to foreigners. Uh the plan says that quote unquote international monitors will be responsible for monitoring Hamas' disarmament. I have no idea who these international monitors are and who uh will send them into, I don't know, Gaza City or Khan Yunis or Dilbalach or wherever to make sure that Hamas has actually disarmed. So, yes, um a lot still to be uh figured out, uh a lot of very, very tricky detail, especially on security, uh I'd argue. Um Back to the Arab States, uh another key part of this entire dance uh Rachel. Um I mean, we already talked about this in conversation uh offline with some of our IPF colleagues, but uh some of us were quite surprised that a lot of the red lines or very, very hard lines that the Arab governments had taken for many months, i.e., you know, a direct and immediate role for the Palestinian Authority, uh perhaps um a full IDF withdrawal before they agreed to deploy forces into the Strip, had been, shall we say, somewhat diluted. Um and yet the Arab states all came out last night and supported the deal. They're now urging Hamas to accept the deal. So what do you think? I mean, did the Arab states actually I don't want to say capitulate, but they soften their position, did they not?

SPEAKER_00: 21:39

I think everyone's ready for the war to be done and the region to be able to move over, move, move on. I'm sorry. And I think uh at this point, nine months into this administration, nine plus months into this administration, uh, everyone's pretty clear-eyed about how things work and don't in the United States. And also that you can say one thing one day and say something the next day, and you know, so be it.

SPEAKER_01: 22:04

Um you're saying word words have no longer have any meaning.

SPEAKER_00: 22:09

Uh have less meaning. Have less meaning. Um, but at the end of the day, it is in the interest of all of the Arab states, um, particularly though, Egypt and Jordan, and the goal for this war to be over, for the region to be able to move on, for some amount of stability to begin to be developed. Um, they have their own politics to deal with. They also have their own economic interests to deal with, different different situations for each country. But um, it seems to me that this the Israeli strikes in Doha had something of a unifying effect on the region, both in terms of, you know, it's a rare day that the Imradi and the Saudi leadership flock to Doha in solidarity with Qatar, but also in unifying everyone around, it's enough. Israel is no longer a stabilizing force. Israel is um not necessarily acting in even its own interest, and the United States is not guiding them, and the United States is not playing a leadership role. So it's time for us to do something. And if President Trump can get Prime Minister Netanyahu to agree to his 20 points with all of the challenges for Israeli politics that Michael laid out and all of the loopholes that we've all talked about, it's still something and it's still a starting point. So if I were them, any of them, I would also say, okay, we support President Trump's effort. Not, and I didn't read every statement, but the ones that I saw, very few of them said we support this deal, right? They said we commend President Trump's effort, we support this process. I think everyone realizes that this is not a deal that is going to be implemented the minute it's signed. It's the beginning of a process. But if you don't start here and if you lose this opportunity to move on from something, as Michael said earlier, that's it. This is sort of this is the last best hope for a process to begin to get where everyone wants to be. So if that means fudging their um enthusiasm for it a little bit in order to keep it moving along, I expect they've made the calculus that that's okay.

SPEAKER_02: 24:18

And just to jump in on that, I think there's also something to the fact that what they've seen from President Trump so far have been wild pie-in-the-sky fantasies, right? You know, we we have the Gaza Riviera, we have the constant threats to open the gates of hell on Gaza. Um, you know, these are things that obviously the the Arab states were not going to engage with. And so I think that once they had this meeting with President Trump last week and he presented them something that seemed like a reasonable plan that could come from could have come from the previous administration, quite frankly. Um, I think that they're probably gonna want to jump on it and try to hold them to it as much as possible.

SPEAKER_00: 24:59

I would also add there are a couple key areas where it reflects progress, and we've all alluded to these, but no longer is the United States calling for the transfer of Gazans out of Gaza. No longer is the United States or President Trump saying, I'm gonna own Gaza and turn it into, you know, the Gaza Riviera he talked about months ago. And for the first time, I think this administration, the United States, is acknowledging that the PA will have a role down the line. And it is putting out at least something on a recognition of, I think it was framed, you know, we acknowledge that Palestinians want um sovereignty in addition to the credible pathway for Palestinian statehood, right? That's the first time we're hearing this this times Trump administration uh state these things. So for the Arab states who want this and more, this is a better starting point than where we were even two weeks ago.

SPEAKER_01: 25:53

All valid points. And yes, I think um I use this word a lot last night uh with various uh bosses and and other people I spoke to. It's a very clever document because, like you said, there is something there for everyone, and there are certain compromises that each party has to make. Some, as we've talked about now, uh more than others. Some have to make bigger compromises than others, but uh there are compromises nonetheless. So um credit to the Trump team for kind of putting it all together. Now, obviously, implementation will be will be key, and then the devil is always in the detailed, especially especially in the Middle East. Um, a reminder for all our viewers, uh please leave your questions in the Q ⁇ A box, and we'll do our best to uh to address them uh in due course. So keep them coming. Um and just uh a final point uh about those uh bigger picture issues that you raised, uh Rachel. If I were a uh conspiratorial fellow, which I sometimes am, uh this is classic Netanyahu and Ron Dermer, right? Where you create major, major problems and major threats that get everyone uh all up in arms and bent out of shape, like West Bank annexation, like essentially the transfer of Gazans out of Gaza, uh like uh, you know, as Smartrich said the other day, uh, you know, Gaza being a real estate bonanza, and then offering it up uh at the altar of a end of deal, end-of-war deal and hostage release, uh, as major concessions by Israel. Even though each one of those steps would have been, I'd argue, disastrous for Israel. So um, you know, we gave credit to uh to the Trump team. Maybe we have to give some credit to uh Netanyahu and Dermer for uh navigating uh well, the various actors into this position. Um we'll we'll find out uh maybe maybe when when one of them writes a book uh in future when uh when they're uh retired on the coast of uh well, I don't want to say which which country or which uh which city? Um we have to talk about uh Hamas. Uh obviously uh we're still all waiting for their response, and like we said, it may all be moot, but um we have a question from uh well anonymous uh who says above all else, this is a document of Hamas surrender. What chance is there actually that Hamas will surrender and give up its key asset in the next four days, as Donald Trump demanded uh today? So he basically said, Yeah, we we want them to respond in in the next three or four days. Uh basically, Michael, we'll start with you. Do you think Hamas will and can accept this deal?

SPEAKER_02: 28:37

I think that they can accept it if they want. I think that if they decide that they want to sign on the dotted line, then they can very easily spin a story here that says we fought the IDF to a standstill. Um you know, we have now offers from Israel of amnesty, and uh sure we have to give up our weapons, but we can stay in Gaza. And our great rivals in the Palestinian Authority are not gonna be the party that come in immediately and and take control. We're still gonna be rooted here, and at the end of this, the IDF is gonna have to withdraw after promising that they would never do so. So there is a story here that Hamas can tell itself and tell its supporters if it wants to paint this as a victory. Is Hamas gonna do that? I don't I don't think that uh anybody has has ever lost any money by betting on Hamas intransigence and um Hamas not being cooperative. So you know, I I I think it's probably a long shot that they come with a yes. And you know, we're already seeing some of the Tipo Hamas behavior, which was the initial response was okay, we're gonna we're gonna study it and we'll come back with with an answer. And then Hamas leaking that they have revisions they want to all sorts of things. And you know, earlier today was reported. That American Israeli officials say that maybe there can be some slight revisions, but this is this is the deal, and Hamas can either take it or the IDF is going to keep on doing what it's doing. So we'll see what Hamas has learned from this two-year process. I do think that this is an instance where the IDF operation in Gaza City may end up working as as it should work, which is putting more pressure on Hamas to actually agree to something that will avert the continued IDF operation in Gaza City. But we're operating in such an information vacuum, especially given that the Hamas leaders in Doha are underground and Hamas military military leaders in Gaza have uh thankfully been picked off by Israel one by one. And at this point, you know, unless you're somebody who um has been studying Hamas middle management for 30 years, and that's not me, um, you're not gonna have a sense of you know the the folks in charge what their inclinations are. So I'm certainly hopeful that the cutries and Egyptians have enough leverage over Hamas and you know can can lean on the various wings of Hamas to say yes, you know, even if it takes a few days and even if they first demand some revisions in certain places, whether it be the IDF with the specific IDF withdrawal lines or the timetable, I hope that they get there. Uh but I think it would be foolish to bet definitively on them actually agreeing to this.

SPEAKER_01: 31:35

So all valid points. Um Hamas middle management, uh especially in the Gaza Strip, uh it could go both ways, right? They have a lot less to lose, so why essentially, you know, play ball and give up? Um, or you know, maybe they'll accept the amnesty, safe passage, whatever provisions are provided in this deal to uh, you know, live and fight another day, maybe out of Gaza. But again, that would be a major, a major step for them. Um before we get to you, Rachel, uh, Taya Benami is asking uh why we haven't heard yet from Hamas. Uh haven't they have they really not gotten the deal delivered to them? Um so they have confirmed that they got the deal. The Egyptians and the Qataris confirmed, uh, as Michael said, that uh they delivered the deal to Hamas, and Hamas is uh deliberating over the deal. Um various Hamas spokespeople have taken to uh various Arab media and satellite channels uh saying various things. Uh I think you know they're they're not happy. Their initial inclination is not to be happy with this deal, and their also initial inclination is probably not very happy that the entire Arab and Muslim world is urging them to take this deal. Um, they still have to officially uh come together and decide on that um, hopefully soon. Uh, Rachel, what are your thoughts about Hamas? Yes, no, maybe, no, actually agree.

SPEAKER_00: 33:00

Yeah, I'm also who knows, right? Who knows what they're gonna say. The things you just alluded to something that I find interesting is now that all of these other countries have come out in support of the deal, whether or not Hamas accepts will also reflect back on Qatar, Egypt, maybe to some extent Turkey and what leverage they have. So for those countries who have basically said, okay, we support and are also waiting for Hamas, what do they do if Hamas says no? I know what Israel does, right? And the United States for a time probably says, fine, gloves off Israel, but Trump has said that already once or twice before. But the this is the first time that both the United States and Israel and the Arab world have coalesced around a set of principles. And I'm um I'm curious to see what happens for those negotiating partners, the mediators, if Hamas says no.

SPEAKER_01: 33:56

Yes. Uh what what the consequences will be. Uh they may truly be adrift and and left alone. Um do the the guys in the tunnels in in Gaza actually care? Maybe. Uh the officials that were apparently not killed in Doha and Qatar probably care a lot more. Uh we'll see who who's actually calling the shots. Um final or one of the final major issues and actually questions that I had, and you two are probably the really well positioned to answer this. Uh, and it's a actually a question raised in the Q ⁇ A by one of our viewers, um, the role of the West Bank, and I'll expand it, the role of the PA in all of this. So basically, uh there is a provision there for the PA to reform itself and then be allowed to retake governance over Gaza, right? Now, the word reform um I think is in the eye of the beholder and may mean certain things to certain people. Uh even Netanyahu yesterday uh how did he put it? Uh a leopard can't change his spots, or maybe that was at the UN last week. But Netanyahu's cabinet secretary, Yossi Fuchs, um wrote on Twitter slash X very explicitly, again, after the press conference at the White House, uh the PA will never reform, right? It literally it will never reform, and so it will never take control of Gaza. So I'm curious, Rachel, uh PA reform. A, what have they done so far, and what more needs to be done in your mind to actually reform itself uh to the satisfaction, this is the second question, to the satisfaction of who? Who actually will decide according to this broader framework deal uh that the PA has actually reformed itself and is uh now allowed to go back to Gaza?

SPEAKER_00: 35:50

So I think a lot of this is um somewhat intentionally not spelled out yet, because you have to come up with something that the PA, the Arab states, Israel, and the United States are all willing to get behind, and that's hard. Um, there are a number of things that the PA has begun to do that the United States hasn't recognized. At least uh beginning the process to end martyr payments, for example, which they've invited the US multiple times to come check, sort of check our homework, look and see what we've done, and the US has yet to comment. Um, there are so many more things that will have to be done. Uh, but we're also at a time when the United States, for example, has cut off all assistance to the PA. So other countries are going to have to step in. And the EU has to some extent, other European actors have to some extent, um, the Saudis and the Emirates have to some extent, both with financial support and technical support to try and initiate some of these uh some of the reforms that are needed. There also has to be a political horizon, though. And I think that's where this plan, if if pushed in all the ways we've talked about, and if it is the beginning of the process, can potentially set out a political horizon in a way that we haven't yet seen in a while, simply by that sort of pathway to a credible, I'm sorry, a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood and recognition of the desire for sovereignty, those sorts of things, um, which right now is just rhetoric and just words. But if uh if some of the stakeholders who do care to represent the PA and who do care to push for reforms uh and an eventual path to statehood, if they're willing to really get behind uh this process with technical and financial support, we could see um we could see more progress happen. Uh, but absent that, we're just gonna be stuck where we are because there are quite a few ways for Israel to continue to say, but they haven't made enough progress. We're not actually gonna follow through on the things that we've agreed to. So in that way, I go back to kind of what we have so far is light on the details and fairly vague. Um, but there's also a lot of room to make it better.

SPEAKER_01: 38:00

Yes. Uh the bar I think is uh intentionally very, very high, if not um, well, non-existent for Israel in terms of PA reform. Uh Michael, what do you think uh in terms of PA reform, how far it's come, how far uh more needs to be done, how much more needs to be done.

SPEAKER_02: 38:20

The Israeli government is clearly counting on PA kleptocracy to win out. That's and again, it's another uh another bet that you know, if you bet on it, you you would never have lost in the past 30 years. But I also think it's important to acknowledge we're in a moment, even before the release of this plan and the call for PA reform. We're in a moment where where the PA seems to actually be undertaking real reforms. And prisoner and martyr payments is an interesting one because as Rachel noted, the PA declared in June that they had reformed the prisoner and martyr payment system, that they had they had transformed it, but it's now a completely needs-based system. Um, and they invited the State Department to come and verify it. And the Trump administration has just not literally not responded. And so right now, the PA is apparently paying international auditors to come and verify that they've done what they've said that they're gonna do. Now, I don't know if that's gonna be enough to meet the standards of Congress, and the Taylor Force Act requires the State Department to verify that prisoner and martyr payments is is over if the US is gonna start sending money to the West Bank that uh that directly benefits the Palestinian Authority, let alone get back to supporting the Palestinian Authority budget directly. But uh the Palestinian Authority seems to be confident enough that they invited the US and again, this administration to come and uh, as Rachel said, check their homework. So I I would have no way of knowing whether they've done everything they need to do. But it would seem like a very risky move to invite the Trump administration, Marco Rubio State Department, to come and verify that they've done what they need to do if it's all just window dressing. On top of that, in the context of the various European recognitions of Palestinian statehood, the PA made a number of public commitments. Now, yes, these are just commitments, they're just words, but they're committing to do things and specific things to a much greater degree than we've seen from them in a very long time. Um, you know, certainly for for at least 15 years. Um and, you know, it includes uh, of course, prisoner martyr payments, but they've also committed to holding presidential and parliamentary elections within one year after the war ending. They've committed to um overhaul their their education curricula in line with UNESCO standards, they've uh committed to um to transform and and make more transparent their budget. So they're making a number of promises, and Israel is counting on them not doing any of them, but but given the pledges that they're making to European states and to Arab states to entities that actually fund them, this definitely seems like a moment to hold their feet to the fire and get them to actually do what they're pledging. Um and you know, the the West Bank portion of this is interesting too, because I'm pretty sure that the the words West Bank and uh and certainly the words Judea and Samaria do not uh appear in this 20-point plan. Now, last week there was all sorts of reporting what that the original 21-point plan included a pledge that Israel would not annex the West Bank. Um that's obviously not in this version. And uh, you know, and I saw a bunch of comparisons today of the version that was leaked last week and the version that actually came out yesterday. And there was nothing in there in the previous version either about West Bank annexation. But President Trump came out, you know, we all saw him. He said it very forcefully to the cameras on Thursday that he's not going to allow it. Uh, and it's clearly an expectation of the Arab and Muslim states that that met with President Trump last week and uh and that have that have backed this document and that issued their own statement yesterday where you know they support this plan. And in their statement, they emphasized, they didn't actually mention the Palestinian Authority, but they emphasized uh a two-state outcome. And that can only can only happen if we're talking about a plan that isn't only Gaza but includes the West Bank. So it isn't in this plan, but I think it's the the West Bank is the subtext that's that's in the background here. Because when the plan talks about Palestinian self-determination and statehood, that has to involve the West Bank. And for these countries to get on board with doing anything in Gaza, they're gonna need some real Israeli concessions on the West Bank and an actual political horizon. So, you know, it's not in here, and the role of the PA is gonna continue to remain murky. Um, but I do think that this is a real opportunity to get the PA to actually carry out these reforms. Um, you know, get get get them to do what they're what they're not used to doing, which is um putting the burden back on Israel and saying, we've actually done what we're supposed to do. Now you have to follow through as well. Uh if this ends up being something where Israel takes this plan um and uses it as a way to do whatever it wants in the West Bank, I think that this plan, the Gaza components of this plan, are going to fall apart very, very quickly.

SPEAKER_01: 43:43

So uh in terms of, you know, originally this was a a 21-point plan. Uh yesterday they unveiled a 20-point plan. I saw a report that the 21st point was uh a pledge by Israel not to attack Qatar again. Yeah. But that was uh um overtaken by a phone call uh in the Oval Office by Trump and Bibi Netanyahu to uh Doha, uh where Netanyahu apologized for the strike earlier this month and said it would it won't happen again. Um so again, the 20 the the elusive 21st point uh we can we can quibble about that. You know, there have also I've I've been told also that there were commitments, take it for what you will, but commitments made um by Israel via the US to the Arab States that the whole issue of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque Temple Mount compound um status quo on the mount wouldn't be wouldn't be altered or messed with. Uh again, as part of these kind of broader uh uh commitments made by Israel. Uh again, remains to be seen, right? Uh status quo has been has been altered uh in recent years. And uh yes, the the commitments by the PA uh predate the Gaza peace plan, as it were. Um even last week, right, in terms of the French Saudi proposal. Uh Abu Maz and Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, made a lot of commitments to to them and and the other states that recognize Palestinian statehood. So he needs to fulfill and follow through on those on those commitments, uh irrespective of uh new Gaza and what happens there. Uh but yes, Michael, ideally it would be it would be linked.

SPEAKER_02: 45:18

Um and just it bears noting that for for BB's coalition politics, probably the one thing in there that would have forced Batzales Motric out of the coalition would have been a pledge to never annex or apply sovereignty in the West Bank. And you know, Batzala Smotric blasted the plan, but he also hasn't said he's gonna leave the government. So, you know, leaving that leaving that out may have been the most important component in there from the Israeli side.

SPEAKER_01: 45:47

Yeah, he hasn't threatened to leave yet, because I think everyone here, I mean he said it uh literally he he said it and wrote it. Uh hopefully Hamas will uh save us from ourselves and say no, and then we can go back to actually fighting the war and continuing the war. That's literally what he said. Um Rachel, uh a question came in uh which I'd love to get your thoughts on. Uh so to what extent do you expect the U.S. administration to be involved uh beyond investment deals, their words not mine, uh, in what is needed to reach the midterm and long-term goals uh included in the 20-point plan? Uh i.e., you know, is there enough bandwidth and attention and really just personnel on the US side to actually engage with the Israelis and the Palestinians and the Arabs to actually move this forward?

SPEAKER_00: 46:37

I think it's it's a good question. And I think it depends how we um how we frame involvement. In so many past rounds of negotiations, the U.S. has been the one convening the parties, driving the process with the pen, working out the details, shuttling between different sets of staffers from different sets of um stakeholders. I don't think that's the level of involvement that we're gonna see. The sheer number of people engaged, unless they bring back or hire a bunch. There's just you have basically one special envoy, Steve Whitkop, who is in charge of so many different major negotiations and conflict zones, he can't possibly give full attention to any single one. Jared Kushner seems to be back in the scene. Um, maybe one or two other support staff, but uh I expect to see the US role more as power broker and the one who's maybe bringing Israel to the table, or the one who's maybe, you know, deciding that now's the time to push on X, Y, or Z. As we've seen, this seems to this where we are now seems to be the result of at least some amount of US pushing, both to get this, um, to get everyone around these 20 points, but then also, of course, to bring Israel on board. So I would, I would imagine a different construct um than we've seen in the past. I also don't think we are going to, we as the United States are going to be um providing the level of assistance, financial support that past US administrations have. This administration just doesn't really believe in giving handouts. Um and most foreign assistance, particularly to the PA, to other parts of the Middle East, um, particularly for civil society support, has already been cut. So some of the things that will be needed to actually implement um or or figure out the details on some of those 20 points, I don't think the US is going to be writing checks for. I think they're gonna be relying and waiting for other people to do that. Um, which is why I sort of think of this as I think I mentioned, like a some sort of dance or the choreography that will need to be created where there are some stakeholders who are hammering out the details and others who are exerting influence on the parties uh where they need to. But someone needs to be responsible for pushing this forward. They seem to have named Tony Blair as the one responsible for sort of pushing any Gaza reconstruction process forward, if and when that happens. Uh, but someone's gonna have to be willing to marshal the whole thing, too.

SPEAKER_01: 49:13

Yeah. Um well, Trump may be the chairman of the board, but I think Tony Blair may be the uh the prime mover on that board. Um again remains to be seen. There are uh there are various proposals floating around about how this um new Gaza governance regime will look like, uh the Palestinian Technocratic Committee on the ground that will be responsible for implementing it, coordination with the Palestinian Authority, um, coordination with the UN and other humanitarian organizations, coordination with the International Security Force, um, there are a lot of moving parts, uh, to say the least.

SPEAKER_00: 49:51

Um, one additional thought. There are there are also templates, right? We've done this before. We've built the United States has built coalitions before. Europe has built coalitions before. If you have enough uh enough countries and enough leaders actually interested in creating the body, whether you call it a peace board or something else, but the coalition of folks who are interested in taking responsibility for different pieces of this 20-point plan, it can absolutely be done. I just haven't seen that level of interest in this administration just yet.

SPEAKER_01: 50:24

Yeah. Um hopefully uh they follow through for for all our sakes. Um before we wrap up, uh final question I wanted to pose to you both. Uh so obviously uh the plan was unveiled yesterday. Um we laid out the various kind of potential pitfalls, but also the upside, right? Um I think it's very easy, and believe me, I I I tried yesterday to to be very kind of cynical and pessimistic about the plan, to poke holes in it. Uh as someone said it's it's like Swiss cheese, very airy Swiss cheese with a lot of holes. Um and yet it's a it's a uh I think overall a positive piece of cheese. If it stops the war and the suffering in Gaza, um, especially for the people of Gaza, gets all the hostages back fairly quickly, whether in three days but fairly quickly, and then hopefully sets everyone on a on a more positive trajectory after two very, very uh at least very difficult years. Um so with all that positivity uh having been said, uh I wanted to get your thoughts about what the biggest pitfalls may be moving forward, um, to your mind. Uh if and when hopefully Hamas agrees and we start the process to actually implement this on the ground. Um, Rachel, what to your mind, uh out of all the things we've already mentioned or things we haven't mentioned, uh what do you think will be the biggest pitfall?

SPEAKER_00: 51:48

I think the biggest pitfall will be if nobody picks up. I I would love to, I can't figure out the cheese analogy. Nobody picks up the bait, right? Nobody takes this as their own and actually drives it forward. Uh someone recently described it as sort of a a book with the titles for the chapters, but the chapters yet to be written, right? Someone needs to take the pen and actually write those chapters and figure out what they're going to say and figure out what they mean. Um, and absent that, then it just becomes another piece of paper that maybe got people's hopes up for a few days and then lets everything proceed a pace in, I think, what we'd all agree has been a pretty terrible way, with not a lot of opportunity to shift course absent this process that's now been put on the table.

SPEAKER_01: 52:36

Michael, what do you think the biggest pitfall may be?

SPEAKER_02: 52:40

So we talked about the nebulous security standard. Um, you know, that can easily enable the IDF to to stay in Gaza um forever. But there's another one, which is that you know, at the end of at the end of the proposal, uh one of the last points says that if Hamas delaze or rejects, everything above is going to proceed in the terra-free areas um that that uh that the IDF uh hands over to the international stabilization force, um, including the step up eight operation. Now, if Hamas doesn't agree, I really don't see a world in which the international stabilization force ever gets created. I don't think any of these states are going to agree to go in there and and send their own troops um when it's still an active war zone and Hamas is still fighting and has not agreed to lay down its arms and Israel's not agreed to stop the war. Um if President Trump says to the Israelis, okay, Hamas said no, but you know, we're still gonna, like this plan says, we're still gonna proceed as follows, um, including with the stepped up eight operation, then you're literally taking something that's supposed to end the war and get Israel out of Gaza and turning it into a document for the creation of an IDF military administration in Gaza. Because if you're demanding that the stepped up eight operations happen, well, that's gonna be on uh on the back of the IDF. And um if you're talking about handing over areas from the IDF to an international stabilization force that never gets created, then that means the IDF is just occupying these areas and administering them directly. So I think that in some ways, if Hamas says no, there's um a very dark timeline whereby this lays the groundwork for a full IDF occupation and military administration of Gaza and every facet of Gaza. Um so you know, to me, that's a that's a huge downside. And um, as I said before, I desperately hope Hamas says yes. But if Hamas says no, then there are a lot of different ways this can spin out of control beyond just what we've seen over the past two years, you know, of an endless war, but the actual status quo not changing. I think that there's a world in which the status quo might change anyway, um, but in a in a far um more difficult way.

SPEAKER_01: 55:08

Yeah, I uh you beat me to it, but I'll take it in a slightly different direction. I think the security aspect will make or break everything because ultimately Gaza is a security problem. I mean, it's it's it's a whole host of problems, obviously a humanitarian problem, a political governance problem, a regional problem, but it's fundamentally a security problem. Um I'll do you one better, Michael. What if Hamas says yes and someone has to go in and actually disarm them, as we alluded to earlier? Uh the International Stabilization Force is meant to, I think, control the perimeter of the Gaza Strip, according to the proposal. They're supposed to help raise a Palestinian civil police force from, I imagine, inside Gaza, but good luck sending them to go and disarm the Qassam brigades. Uh as I mentioned, there's this amorphous entity called International Monitors that's supposed to monitor Hamas' disarmament. So you can already see uh a succession of events where Hamas agrees to the deal, the war is ended, hopefully the hostages come out, but then you have you you rub up against the the big issue of Hamas not actually disarming like maybe it committed to, uh, and then the IDF is still present in major parts of Gaza, and it goes into quote unquote disarm Hamas, demilitarize the strip, and then you could very easily be on a glide path towards uh renewed conflict. Um I think that's the biggest pitfall. I mean, there are other pitfalls, but I think to my mind that's uh the biggest pitfall. Um I think as we've now talked about for nearly an hour, it needs to be uh fleshed out ahead of time. So it's not just uh sending, I don't know, Indonesians to man, you know, a checkpoint and try to disarm uh the Kassam brigades. Um and then my my actual answer, and we'll we'll end with this, uh the real pitfall here is that uh if Hamas agrees to the deal, uh Ben Vir and Smartwich leave the Netanyahu coalition, uh, and yet no new elections are triggered, the coalition survives because Benny Gantz uh goes in and um makes up the numbers. And I did back of the envelope math uh earlier this evening, and yes, if the ultra-Orthodox parties that have already left Netanyahu's coalition uh come back along with Benny Gantz, he still has uh over 60 seats just barely in the Knesset, and so potentially he could hang on. Um I don't deem it to be a high probability scenario. Uh I don't know what Benny Gantz will do in a coalition with the Ultra Orthodox when you still need to pass a conscription bill for the Alharis, but uh crazier things have have happened, especially when uh Benny Gantz is involved. So that I think is the biggest pitfall that if we actually got a deal, the war has ended. Uh everything is moving smoothly, but uh well, we're still stuck with more or less the same Israeli government, uh, no elections, no uh return of the mandate to the Israeli public after two say three years of this. Um that's my real, my real pitfall. Uh with that, uh Rachel, Michael, thank you as always. Um and uh once again, uh we'll say a big thank you to Israel Policy Forum supporters who are with us on today's webinar. Um again, I invite the rest of you to join Israel Policy Forum uh and its family of donors by visiting Israelpolicyforum.org slash support. The recording of this webinar will be posted on the briefings page of the Israel Policy Forum website. Um please subscribe to the podcast, uh Israel Policy Pod. I hear it's fantastic. Uh sign up to receive the weekly coplo column in your email inbox. Also fantastic. Uh and please visit the Israel Policy Forum website for more insight and analysis from our team of experts. Um stay tuned for the next Israel Policy Forum video briefing. And until then, thanks again for tuning in. Shana Tovah, Gamal Khadimatova, to all those observing, and we'll see you again soon. Take care.

SPEAKER_00: 58:59

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01: 59:00

Thanks.