SPEAKER_01: 0:14

Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for joining us. I'm David Halperin, CEO of Israel Policy Forum, and appreciate your joining us on this momentous and hopeful day. 734 days after Hamas's horrific assault on Israeli communities on October 7, 2023, it appears we have a deal, a deal at least to see the Israeli hostages who have been held in captivity by Hamas in the Gaza Strip to be released in return for at least the beginning of what could lead to a sustained end to this Gaza war. I want to thank you all for joining us, where today we'll have a chance to unpack the latest developments, what actually has happened, what does it mean, and what might we expect upcoming. I will be joined by my colleagues. Throughout this conversation, I encourage you to ask questions. There will not be a QA session. I encourage you to use the QA function to type your questions at any moment in time. I will try to get to as many questions throughout our conversation as possible. I want to thank all of those who are joining us either on our live stream or uh via recording. With us is from Israel, with us is Neri Zilber, Israel Policy Forum uh Policy Advisor, and of course host of our podcast, Israel Policy Pod. Neri is an independent journalist, regular, regular contributor, reporter for the Financial Times. Uh, and so pleased, Neri, to have you uh have you with us. We're also joined by Nimrod Novik, Israel Policy Forum Distinguished Fellow, longtime advisor to the late uh uh president and prime minister Shimon Perez, um, who has a regular dialogue with colleagues in the Arab world and will want to unpack uh with Nimrod how this is uh shaking out in the regional contributions. Uh and we're also thrilled to have with us our colleagues from Washington, uh Rachel Brandenburg, our Washington Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst, and Michael Koplau, our chief policy officer. It's a big panel, but really this is a conversation amongst our team. And as I was mentioning in the pre-call just a moment ago, it's actually the first time that we've had a chance to all talk about this momentous uh moment. So uh I'm I'm eager to have this uh public conversation in real time and hear what you all think. And Neri, I want to start with you. Can you first just walk us through what is this agreement? How did we get here in recent days, and what should we expect in the days to come?

SPEAKER_03: 3:05

Sure thing, David. Uh well, first of all, I'm honored uh to be with you and all of our colleagues, uh, along with all the uh watchers and hopefully listeners in future. Uh, but really uh a momentous day. And we said this on, I believe, last week's uh webinarslash podcast. Uh, you know, a great day for civilization and uh everyone here in Israel and Gaza and the Middle East. But I think today is actually that's true. Uh there was a just a surge of optimism overnight and this morning in Israel, uh, a real sense of hope for the first time in a long time that uh the hostages at least were coming home, and like you said, a potential uh sliver of hope that this war will come to an end. Uh but in terms of the brass tax, I think we have to be clear about what was agreed today in Sharm al-Sheikh Egypt and what the Israeli government is set to approve uh in short order here in Israel, uh, and what wasn't agreed to. Uh, we have to be clear what was agreed to was really the first stage of an overall uh deal uh put forward by Donald Trump uh a week, week or so ago. Uh and this first deal, first stage of the deal is really a ceasefire for hostage and prisoner release. Uh uh i.e., uh what is going to be approved by the Israeli government uh tonight is essentially a deal um that commits Israel to halt the fighting. It will pull back the IDF from most of the population centers in the Gaza Strip. And in the coming days, see the release of we hope all the 48 hostages uh still languishing in in captivity in Gaza, uh 20 of whom are still believed to be alive, uh in return for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, uh 250 of which are serving life sentences for serious terror uh related offenses, uh i.e. uh real blood on their hands. So not a not a small price. Uh but this is essentially the first stage uh of the deal uh and should be completed, uh we hope, uh, in the coming days, uh, with the added, shall we say, news value of Donald Trump himself likely coming to Israel uh on Sunday, uh at least to to monitor developments, if not to actually greet the returning hostages. So that's what was agreed. Uh what wasn't agreed essentially was everything else. Uh the second stage of the of the overall deal, the 20-point plan put forward by Donald Trump, uh calls for a lot of other longer-term objectives uh vis-a-vis Gaza and Hamas and Israel, like Hamas's disarmament, like the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, like if not the complete withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, then from pretty much all of it, uh except for maybe the overall perimeter. Um and coupled with uh setting up some future governance uh system with international and Palestinian technocrats, I mean essentially a new government for Gaza that still needs to be fleshed out and agreed to, uh, and on and on. I mean, there is a lot of heavy lifting to be done, uh, and that's all in the second stage. Uh, in terms for Israel, uh, that will be a heavy lift uh in terms of actually agreeing to this and agreeing and committing itself to end the war. Um to answer your question, I know we'll get into it, but what happened? Uh Donald Trump happened, truly. Uh Donald Trump put the entire weight of the US presidency and really his own US presidency uh on the various parties, but especially on Prime Minister Benjamin Tanyahu and on the various Arab states, who I assume uh my colleagues know this better than I, applied their own pressure on Hamas to come to the table. Uh so really uh Donald Trump happened. And I'll just say uh in terms of what we may expect moving forward, uh, I fully expect the coming days to actually unfold um relatively okay, with various caveats perhaps having to do with um uh deceased Israeli hostages uh whose bodies will take a bit more time to find and recover and rescue and bring back for burial in Israel. Uh but it's really two competing narratives. Uh, who do you want to believe in terms of uh what happens after the next few days in terms of this uh first stage and what comes after? Uh Benjamin Tanyahu, who says he and his you know various allies here in Israel say, well, we only agree to this first stage and we'll see what happens afterwards, and there's no real guarantee that we'll even get to agreement over the second stage. And Hamas leader Khalil Haye, who said about two hours ago that no, we got real guarantees from the US and the various other mediators, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and others, that this will actually be a permanent end to the war. So I leave it to uh to my colleagues to decide who they want to believe.

SPEAKER_01: 7:34

Well, that's fascinating, Narry, because I I think um it's it's very clear that uh President Trump uh was uh clearly a difference maker in getting uh to this deal. But we are seeing two other kinds of narratives emerge. One is that this deal happened because Trump pressured Israel, and another that this deal happened because Trump was able to pressure the regional players to pressure Hamas. Uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring you in to unpack this a little bit. The question really is why now? Uh how did, you know, why why did it come about now? And what role did Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey play in this 11th hour in pressing Hamas to actually accept a deal, which, as Neri outlined, doesn't have a guarantee there will be a phase two?

SPEAKER_02: 8:20

Um we uh are in the early months of the war, we already heard uh from uh neighboring countries, uh particularly those with uh substantial population like Saudi Arabia, uh great concern that what happens in Gaza doesn't stay in Gaza. Um and and their concern was twofold. One, the effect of the images, uh the visual images from Gaza on their young population, and they saw trends of radicalization. And the second one uh is the overall impact of regional instability on their very ambitious uh socioeconomic uh transformation plans. Uh, MBS's 2030, uh, and the others have uh similar ones as well. Um as a result, um we saw them uh concerned with what's going on, expressing that concern to Washington, and gradually, maybe grudgingly, uh accepting a role in the morning after when the Biden administration was working on it. Uh but uh their impression was that the Biden administration was doing a great job uh in planning, uh, and a very poor one in execution, uh, primarily because it was not willing to do uh the one thing that eventually, in my judgment, uh broke the ice, which was the pressure uh on uh on Netanyahu. Um once Trump enters the White House, and I will not presume to talk about Trump from the American perspective, but I'll try from the original one. Um once he entered the White House, um, even before he entered the White House, uh he demonstrated uh what he can do. And he took the uh Biden plan and made it happen. The ceasefire in January, um, on the one hand. On the other hand, um he uh gave uh Netanyahu a pass uh when he broke that deal in March, six weeks later. Um so they were looking at the president that can make it happen. Um, but the question is, will he? Um and when they were discussing uh how to pressure him, they reached the conclusion that you don't press President uh uh Trump, you tempt him. And you tempt him uh by uh providing him the setting for a win by doing yourself, by volunteering to do much of the heavy lifting. Uh that coupled with his threat from the original perspective of the uh Gaza Riviera and uh removing two million uh Gazans out of the strip and so on, gave birth uh to the Egyptian initiative that was embraced by the Arab League in March. And even more so and more uh ambitious, uh the Saudi French initiative uh of July that was uh endorsed by 142 countries at the UN uh in September. Uh so they were uh signaling to him uh that they are willing to do much of the heavy lifting, they are willing to come into Gaza, they are willing to shoulder responsibility to Gaza, provided certain conditions are met. Now, all that uh got a boost, a very dramatic boost, with the Israeli strike on Qatar. And uh suddenly all those countries uh were watching Israel becoming the original bully, um uh striking Qatar with Qatar with impunity. Qatar, an ally of the United States with an American major American base there. Um and uh if Qatar can be uh targeted, uh so can anyone anyone else. Um and that gave yet another boost to their willingness uh to shoulder responsibility uh and do the heavy lifting and tempt the president uh to go for the for the real deal. So I think that uh uh from from uh an Arab regional perspective, uh that was the makings of the of the Trump uh effect. Uh just one word on from an Israeli perspective, the Trump effect. Uh and I think it started with Zelensky. Uh that is to say, um uh Prime Minister Netanyahu uh prided himself uh of having uh played with American presidents, successive American presidents, uh unscarred. Um and I think that the Zelensky uh incident uh sent a certain message to him. Uh his eyes, of course, are on the elections in Israel next year. Early next year, later next year, but next year. Um and for that to happen, he cannot afford uh to have the greatest friend Israel has ever had, uh, according to him, uh, stand up and say uh Netanyahu blew it. Netanyahu uh is intransigent, Netanyahu is not uh is dragging the war uh for his own purpose. He couldn't afford that. Um so uh between you know bookended between Zelensky and Netanyahu apologies to the Qataris, uh also in the same uh Oval Office, was the transformation of Netanyahu in terms of appreciating uh that he cannot play Trump.

SPEAKER_01: 13:51

Rachel, I want to turn to you. What what are the what are what are the issues, what are the questions that are sitting with you right now that you think we should be asking, and and what are the developments that you think we should be looking for in the days, uh if not weeks to come?

SPEAKER_00: 14:06

Thanks, David. Well, Neri and Nimrod both both alluded to a lot of these things, and particularly the fact that as far as we know, all that's been agreed is the initial phase of this deal. So hopefully we see everything go without a hitch between now. And President Trump said recently, either Monday or Tuesday, we're gonna see the hostages released. Hopefully, we see all of that come to fruition without any hangups or holdups or anybody playing messy games. But then ostensibly, even harder work begins to figure out the details. Neri outlined all the different pieces of this deal that haven't yet been agreed. And the 20-point plan, which I've said before was more like 20 principles, has uh some really meaty meaty principles in there that are gonna be both very difficult to figure out uh what they look like, but even more difficult to figure out in practice. Who's responsible for governance of Gaza? Who is this international board that is going to govern Gaza, be led by President Trump, include Tony Blair? Who else is gonna be on that board? What Palestinians are gonna be on that board? What does a PA reform plan look like? And who is in the lead? Who is financing any of this? How do they go about the reconstruction of Gaza? What is the plan for surging humanitarian aid look like? And how do we ensure that it's not just food, but also shelter and other basic humanitarian needs? Uh, what does the security perimeter look like for Israel? And then what is the long-term plan for Gaza and for the pathway to a credible, or I think it was phrased a credible pathway to a Palestinian state that was mentioned in that 19th point, if I remember correctly. None of these have yet to be addressed. Uh, and as far as we know, the details have not been matched to the principles. Additionally, from what we've seen over the last 10 months, President Trump does not tend to pay attention to any one thing for very long. So, right now, there's tremendous momentum behind him and behind this plan. And remarkably, pretty much the entire world is pushing, has been pushing for this to happen. Everyone praised the plan, supported it, even though it's not really perfect for anyone. Uh, but who's gonna keep his eye on the ball? Is he gonna keep attentive to this? Is it gonna be the weight of the US president that's driving the process forward to figure out these details? Is it gonna be the regional Arab states that Nimrod was talking about, who are both taking an active role in the planning, but also the implementation? And uh, what role for the Europeans who arguably have more facility with some of the details that are required to go about developing plans to match these principles, uh, and who's gonna pay for it? Um, and I would guess that whatever the answers to those questions are, it's gonna be a different US role than we've seen in the past, where traditionally diplomacy around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, around even the Abraham Accords initially, um, were led by the United States. And it was the United States pulling the parties to the table, the United States putting paper on the table. I'm not sure this American administration is gonna be the ones doing either of those things. So who will? Who's gonna be in the lead for this process?

SPEAKER_01: 17:18

Uh Michael, I want to come around to you. And um I I kind of have two questions for you, Michael. One is is is what is your take on, frankly, what Rachel just mentioned, which is um Trump did succeed, but can he sustain momentum going forward? And the second is of course, our questions are already flooding in about what this means for the Israeli coalition and for Israeli politics. And I wonder, Michael, if you could help us uh help touch on what you're watching in terms of the fallout on the Israeli side as well.

SPEAKER_04: 17:50

Sure. So on the first, I agree with Rachel. The the hard part is gonna come after Monday or Tuesday when the hostages come home, and then everybody has to pivot to the next thing. And getting the hostages back and getting the end of the war, though those are for President Trump the big accomplishments. You know, I think he said he even said something earlier today about you know that that's gonna happen, and then we'll we'll see what comes after that. So it's not just about keeping his attention focused, it's keeping everybody's attention focused and marshaling all the different actors that now have to come to bear on making sure that Gaza doesn't just go back to what it was before. And that's definitely a difficult task when you have so many spoilers out there. You know, Hamas is gonna want to paint this as a victory, and they're presumably going to, and hopefully going to give up all the hostages in a few days. And so the only way for them to paint this as a victory is to wreck the next phase. The same goes on the Israeli side, where Itamar Ben Grim Batalas Motrich are going to vote against this deal in the cabinet today, and they too don't want to see an end to the war and the pullout of the IDF from Gaza. So keeping on top of all of the various actors that are going to try and make sure that the next phase doesn't get off the ground is going to be difficult. And as Rachel said, we're talking about administration that doesn't deal with these things in a traditional manner, doesn't have the same type of foreign policy process, doesn't have the same type of apparatus for follow-through, quite frankly. And President Trump got this done basically through through brute force, right? He he wanted it done. And so he put a plan out there, knowing that it was a plan that had things that both sides had categorically ruled out. After after Arab Arab states approved it, he then allowed the Israelis to come in and just change it. And when the Arab states objected, he told them he didn't care. He was gonna he was gonna put it out anyway. When Hamas responded with a qualified, very qualified yes, and Netanyahu wanted to paint it as a rejection, Trump just said, no, I'm gonna, I'm gonna paint it as a yes. So he was able to bulldoze everybody to get to this first phase. That's gonna be a lot harder after this first phase. And um, I hope he's successful, but uh and you know, let's let's not mince words. This first phase is a huge accomplishment. People have been trying to get this now for two years and it wasn't done, including President Trump himself, who I think probably could have forced this through in March when Israel decided that it didn't want to move to the next phase of the of the January ceasefire. But he decided now is the time, and he absolutely deserves all the credit for it, uh including sending Steve Woodkoff and Jared Kushner to literally sit in the Israeli cabinet meeting uh today to make sure it gets approved. But after after this phase, bulldozing everybody into the next the next thing and the next thing will be harder. And so um he's gonna have to show an inordinate degree of focus that I don't think we've seen from him up until this point, and not just him, from his administration. On the question of Israeli politics, so it seems as if Smutrich and Ben Vier are going to jump through all sorts of hoops to not leave the coalition. But it's hard for me to see how early elections at this point don't happen. Uh if if they don't happen, there still has to be an election a year from now. And there's certainly a world in which the government can keep things going for another year, and then it it falls based on the uh based on the mandatory timetable. But you still have all these issues out there. You still have Smotrich and Bangvir who are not happy, you still have the Khari Diem, the ultra-Orthodox, who want their draft exemption, and I don't think they're getting it. And you also have the fact that Netanyahu at this point, he he he knows the numbers. They're they're not going to magically recover for him so much that he's that he is going to win the next election outright. He's got to siphon off of just a few seats so that he can push the current opposition block to 60 or under without any Arab parties. Because if he does that, then he can try to force a deadlock. So he's only got to peel off a couple of seats to do that. And waiting a year isn't the way to do that. The way to do that is, in my to my mind, to take this deal and to run on it and say, hey, look, I got the hostages back. And guess what? The IDF is still in Gaza. And guess what? The Palestinian Authority still has no real role. And guess what? We're not really gonna enter into any sort of peace process with the Palestinians. And if he runs on that, he probably, I shouldn't say probably, he maybe can get another one or two seats back to his coalition from right-wingers who have lost their patience with him and try to force a deadlock. So I think his best bet is to try to get to early elections. You know, Nimrod said um early next year or later next year, I'd be betting on early next year, and hope that that this deal and the way that he portrays it and all the ways that he's gonna try to make sure it doesn't move to the next phases, run on that and see if that's enough to get him his deadlock.

SPEAKER_01: 23:19

And can he can he do that without uh running afield of Trump's ire? If Trump actually wants to see this this advanced, I guess is is will be the the question.

SPEAKER_04: 23:30

Yeah, that that's the question. And I I think this is in Netanyahu's favor in some ways because it's not just about Trump's attention span, it's about the fact that the next phases do require more sustained engagement than just putting out uh 20, effectively 20 bullet points and telling everybody that they have to say yes. Uh and he and uh some of his associates are very practiced at running circles around American administrations and playing out the clock and kicking the can down the road. And uh I wouldn't bet against him being able to do that.

SPEAKER_01: 24:05

Neri, I did want to ask there's a number of questions in the chat about the terms of the uh hostage release deal or the Palestinian prisoners to be released. Um, questions about who are these uh prisoners, what do we know about the plan for the release, and and what has been the reaction response thus far inside Israel um to those uh to to to that planned uh aspect of this deal.

SPEAKER_03: 24:31

So it it won't go over uh that well publicly once the names of like the really heavier uh life termers are gonna come out. Although I suspect, again, we don't we don't know because it hasn't been made public yet. Some of the higher profile individuals will not be part of this deal. Uh but you are still gonna get a sizable number of um Marwan Burgundy will not be part of the deal. Marwan Bargudy will not be part of the deal. Um a few others will not be part of the deal, but some by definition will have to be part of the deal. Um again, it hasn't been made public, uh, but uh it's it's a price that most of the Israeli public is willing to pay. Perhaps not uh Smotrich and Benvir themselves, but uh a large majority of the Israeli public. So that's part of the 250 uh, shall we say, heavier Palestinian prisoners that are set to be released. Uh according to the terms of the deal, by the way, uh they're either going to be released to Gaza or exiled outside of Israel and not to the West Bank. Uh that's uh a significant point in and of itself. And then the rest of uh the 1700 Palestinian prisoners slash detainees to be released are uh again by definition those Gazans who were picked up off the battlefield of Gaza, but after October 7th, i.e. no one that actually took part in the October 7th massacre, uh i.e. not no Nukaba uh terrorists, and that's also a significant point. Uh and those 1700 will be released back to Gaza. Um and that's uh I believe a few hundred Palestinian um uh the bodies of Palestinian uh prisoners also uh will be released, uh, but not the Sinwar brothers, uh to the best of my information. So again, that's that's the price Israel will have to pay initially in this first stage of of the deal. Um again, not Israel's most favorite uh uh action to take, but a price most of this country is willing to uh to pay uh to get the hostages home.

SPEAKER_01: 26:28

So uh uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring in uh Ben Liebwood said asked a question, which uh he wrote, it remains shocking to me that Hamas would return all hostages in one tranche and eliminate one of their two sources of leverage and power, the other being their weapons. Um, you know, I guess the question is if Hamas is not getting these high profile uh prisoners released and um they are removing their leverage, what changed in their calculation? Um what actually made them uh make this decision um to ultimately release the hostages?

SPEAKER_02: 27:05

From everything we heard, um what used to be uh the number one priority uh of Hamas uh under Sinwar um in this kind of uh situation was uh releasing uh hostages. I'm sorry, uh uh prisoners freeing uh Palestinian prisoners. Uh there was a story of how committed he was to those who stayed in in prison when he was uh uh uh sent to Gaza after 23 years in Israeli prison. Um from what we hear over the last uh weeks, maybe even months, uh since he's gone, um, the importance of that uh factor uh is somewhat uh lesser, and organizational survival uh is far more important. And for that to happen, um they insisted on guarantees, and we all heard about it. Uh we don't have the uh uh language or format of what guarantees they got, but even within uh the uh uh Trump 20 points and an adjacent document that we all saw uh uh recently, uh they have some of the uh guarantees that they need. Uh one guarantee that they need is that if they go in exile, if they decide to leave uh Gaza, uh they get immunity. And they got that uh when the US committed uh uh to Qatar that it will not be attacked again, and when Israel undertook not to attack again. So Qatar is now a safe haven, uh a foolproof safe haven uh for uh Gaza terrorists, um, assuming uh they are not involved in active uh violence. Uh so that's one. The the second is end of war. Um and from everything we heard, uh they received American guarantees signed, uh, as well as from Qatar, Egypt, and uh, and Turkey. Uh that that's it, that's the end of war. Now Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey is nice, uh, but you US uh is is far more uh significant. Um so I think that what changed was that Hamas military capabilities have been so degraded, uh its military formations have been uh demolished a year ago. Uh its leadership uh disappeared, was killed. Uh first, second, and third layer. Uh and those remaining uh are not the kind of powerful leadership uh figures. Uh, the ganking up of the Arab world, and it was not just uh the Three countries that we keep mentioning Egypt, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. But also Saudi Arabia is there, and the UAE is there, and Jordan is there. It's a very powerful Arab consensus. And apparently they reached the conclusion that that's the best they can get.

SPEAKER_01: 30:21

What is the expectation around Hamas disarmament? I mean, clearly there's a lot of skepticism that we're actually going to see a process that leads to full disarmament. I know the Hamas response to uh the deal made clear references to their continued continued role in the future of the Palestinian politics and the Palestinian National Project, which I, of course, is not what the Israelis want to hear or or or accept, let alone uh uh, of course, BB has been opposed to the Palestinian authorities return. Um, so Nimrod, how how do you uh expect this process to play out in a way that would be uh in any way uh acceptable?

SPEAKER_02: 31:02

Well, assuming that the uh um the uh consensus of pessimism about phase two uh in this room uh proven is proven uh overstated, and phase two does get uh uh what uh launched. Uh there was a lot of work done uh primarily by Egypt, uh, but uh Egypt was the driver, but there were quite a few passengers uh in the Arab world uh that developed a two-phase approach uh to uh Hamas disarmament. Uh in phase one, um uh the weapons are to be uh assembled uh in uh deposits in Gaza under the supervision of the so-called Arab-Palestinian uh force that is supposed to uh run security, uh law and order, uh in the strip in the interim phase. Um in phase two, uh those weapons are to be exported to Egypt, uh never to come back. Um according to uh those involved, uh the Hamas public uh posture on this um is not the private posture on this, uh, and that uh they have Hamas consent, that if all else works in terms of the morning after, the day after uh management, uh then uh Hamas uh will not resist uh uh giving up its strategic weapons. Um to the question of whether it is uh confined uh to rockets and missiles and uh RPGs, or does it also include the individual Klachnikov? They didn't go into those uh details, or at least they have not shared it uh with with thir with others. Uh but uh the the principle is there and it found expression in the Saudi French initiative, um which calls for Hamas disarmament, uh as well as uh the Trump uh 20 points.

SPEAKER_01: 33:14

Um Rachel, we we have a lot of questions about whether this will enable the resumption of regional diplomacy, Israel Saudi normalization, and the like. But I wonder if you could speak how, you know, what if any impact does this have on what has been happening between Israel and Lebanon, between Israel and Syria, between Israel and Saudi, the sort of the wider regional picture and the ability for the United States to engage in diplomacy? Because as Donald Trump outlined in the last couple of days, this is not a hostage ceasefire deal, this is peace in the Middle East, as he described. This is uh this is uh everything. Um what is your take on the regional opportunities?

SPEAKER_00: 33:54

Yeah, I think he described it as the greatest day in civilization. I think Neri gave a nod to it in his opening too. Uh we may have a few months to years to decades until we see uh peace in all of our time, but here's to hoping it moves fast. I think for President Trump, he certainly wants to continue moving on to what we've long heard are his sort of grander ambitions of expanding the Abraham Accords. The Abraham Accords were his legacy, they were his sort of diplomatic baby. Um, and in my assessment, one of the elements that really led to the recent momentum to get to his 20-point plan and to bring everyone around the current process was uh seeing a real threat to the Abraham Accords when Israel was about to vote on formal formally annexing the West Bank and the UAE came out and said, hey, this will not only threaten the expansion of the Abraham Accords, but it could threaten current agreements. And then Saudi Arabia amplified that. Um, then the strikes, the Israeli strikes in Doha led to even greater unity among the Gulf states around finding a common way forward. Uh, one of the things that's been remarkable to me over the past two years, and particularly over the past year, have been that the conversation about Israel's Saudi normalization has remained on the table. Despite the war in Gaza, despite the horrendous things that have happened not only on October 7th, but over the past six months and the humanitarian crisis. Nimrod talked about the challenge that uh Arab leaders, and particularly in the Gulf, have had with their populace, the Arab street, sort of suddenly seeing images of starving Gazans, of dying children, of sort of the horrors that have transpired in Gaza, uh, causing real domestic challenges. And I think there is a common understanding that ultimately greater regional integration, Israel's further integration diplomatically, economically, in addition to militarily, but a lot of that has already been happening. That will only lead to greater stability. And there is a real interest in regional stability for the sake of their own domestic agendas. Even more remarkable of the last six months has been the processes that have begun with Syria and Lebanon. And on all three of these arenas, there is real opening at the moment, but I think it's going to take time. And President Trump even seemed to understand when he spoke from uh, was it Riyadh, Dubai? I don't remember on his golf trip exactly where he was, but he said, I still hope to see Saudi Israel normalization happen, but I understand the Saudis will need it to happen in their own time. Also, remarkably, we're not even a year into his administration. So he still has time. He still has time to get this deal, this initial deal done, bring an end to the war, and then begin the path toward uh broader regional integration, whether it's Saudi Israel normalization uh uh before the end of his term, or some sort of Syria-Israel demilitarization, detente, diplomatic agreement that comes sooner. And in Lebanon, there really is a new government for the first time in years, who are genuinely interested in not only reclaiming their country from Hezbollah, but seemingly open to a diplomatic process with Israel. None of this, I think, can begin in earnest until the war in Gaza really comes to an end. So hopefully we'll see this latest initial deal come to fruition on Monday. And then along with everything else we've discussed, some of this regional diplomacy can commence again. But there too, I think it's just the beginning of reopening those conversations, and it's still going to take a little time to see where they go.

SPEAKER_01: 37:42

Just to follow up, Rachel, we had one question in from Michael Rothstein the simple question can Iran spoil the Trump deal?

SPEAKER_00: 37:50

Iran can spoil anything if they want to. I don't think I neither think and I hope that we will not see them spoil this initial phase. Um just as the region wants to see the war in Gaza end, nobody wants to see another war with Iran. The Gulf states uh have developed their own diplomatic relationships with Iran, nobody wants to see a nuclear Iran, but even less getting the construct wrong, even more, nobody wants to see another round of war with Iran. So I think between the general interest in stability and the real diminished capabilities of their proxies, there's not a ton they can do to spoil the deal in the near term. That doesn't mean that they can't reconstitute capabilities in the medium term and figure out a way to spoil whatever comes next in the forthcoming uh phases of this process.

SPEAKER_01: 38:45

Yeah. So, uh Michael, the last two years um of this war um has had a profound impact on the nature of the US Israel relationship, the views of Israel inside the United States. Now that hopefully we are seeing this come to a sustainable end and the release of hostages and beginning to rebuild from this uh chapter, what are you watching in terms of the trajectory and the trends and the future of US-Israel relations?

SPEAKER_04: 39:17

US Israel relations are going to shift. There's there's no question to me about that. It there we're seeing it on too many different vectors. Whether you look at elected officials, where in the Democratic Party, it's pretty much now mainstream to be in favor of some sort of restriction on security assistance to Israel. If you look at the Republican Party, uh, not as much the politicians, but the influencers, for lack of a better word, who are really driving MAGA culture, Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon and Candace Owens and uh and and a whole host of others. The relationship with Israel is is is being questioned. And when you look at US public opinion, in some ways that's actually, I think, the the maybe the most impactful in the long term because we now see polls and it's not just one, it's it's now pretty much any organization that does this, where for the first time in the history of polling, people sympathize with Palestinians more than they sympathize with Israelis. For the first time in the history of the polling, majorities of Americans want to end all assistance to Israel, not place restrictions on it, but but end it. We see pluralities of Americans who think that Israel is purposely killing civilians in Gaza. We see pluralities of Americans, and in one poll, actually, a majority of Americans who believe that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. These are not numbers that are just going to stop with the end of the war. People now have imprinted on their in their minds a view of what Israel is and how it behaves and its value or lack of value to the United States. So the relationship is going to shift. And I think it's going to be really critical for policymakers to understand the ways in which it's going to shift and get ahead of it. Because insisting, as many have in the past, that the relationship is absolutely unshakable and unbreakable, I don't think that that's true anymore. And relying on some of the old talking points uh about Israel itself is also not going to work. And just assuming that there's going to be another 10-year MOU with$3.8 billion a year or more to Israel without it causing a huge fight again in both parties, I don't think that that's a realistic assumption either. So everybody's going to have to recalibrate. And particularly for American Jewish organizations, including ours, that support a strong U.S. Israel relationship and um want to see this relationship continue at a high level, recognizing the importance of it to both sides. And also want to see a secure Jewish democratic Israel, leaving aside the particulars of US Israel relations, um, American Jewish organizations are gonna have to really think long and hard about how they make the case for Israel and to not take things for granted that they always took for granted, such as rock solid American popular support almost no matter what Israel does.

SPEAKER_01: 42:43

Yeah, the end of the war does not necessarily mean to end to the the trends that we've seen.

SPEAKER_04: 42:48

No.

SPEAKER_01: 42:48

Um Neri, I did want to ask you this we've talked a lot about Gaza, but there's nothing, as far as I understand, about the West Bank. I'm curious how the PA has been responding and if we should anticipate, um, as has been in the past, um, Netanyahu making arrangements with far-right coalition partners to agree to um one set of policies and essentially uh uh be compensated with developments, whether that be settlements or or the like on the West Bank. I'm curious if we have anything uh afoot of that nature or or what you're watching in that arena.

SPEAKER_03: 43:26

Sure. I mean, obviously all focus for a long time now has been on Gaza, but the West Bank um, you know, equally important and not getting enough attention. Uh look, the Palestinian Authority and President uh Ahmud Abbas, Abu Mazin, is is playing ball like like every other country in the region and came out in support of the agreement and uh ceasefire and enter the war. Uh and that's all well and good. I think they will have to calibrate their own steps in the coming weeks and months uh about what they need to do to put themselves in the best position to play an active role in in post-war Gaza um if if if and when we get to it. Uh i.e. uh genuine reforms uh that they committed to, by the way, irrespective of this uh Gaza deal brokered by Trump, but even as commitments to the French and the Saudis as part of the overall push uh a few weeks ago, uh who remembers now, uh for recognition of Palestinian statehood. Uh that's all steps that Abu Mazan committed to. Uh we got word a few days ago, and I conferred it to be true, that they they've started, shall we say, an internal Fatah reform process, uh bringing in people that were uh kicked out and physically and politically exiled, bringing them back into the fold, uh that could in future perhaps play a role uh in in the Gaza Strip. I think that's all for the good. Uh I think uh promised elections for next year I think would go a long way, uh, not only in bolstering the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, but perhaps even uh working to hold elections in Gaza as well, uh, and trying to coalesce uh the Palestinian Authority um across both territories. That's again irrespective really of Israel and its own policies. Uh to your second question, David, I expect the worst. I expect the worst. Um tried and true Netanyahu formula, uh divide and rule, literally kind of divide uh the West Bank from Gaza. Uh if you're kind of propping up Gaza on some level, you're putting down the West Bank on another level. Uh and really people like Betzel Smotrich um have done a lot of uh negative things on the West Bank, uh especially under cover of the overall Gaza war. Uh again, I don't I don't expect that to to stop uh tomorrow if there's a stop in the Gaza war. Uh the only thing that may kind of slow it down or halt it uh is Smotric and Benvere actually leaving the government, the government being toppled, uh heading to snap elections, and in future, uh a different uh Israeli government. Again, we can all hope. Uh and by the way, going back to what Michael laid out uh previously, I I also think that early elections in the first quarter of 2026 is a more likely scenario than not. Um I think Netanyahu took that into account when he was uh, let's say, pushed and prodded by Trump into this agreement. Uh the difference between say March when he restarted the war and now, uh many things, but A, he didn't bomb Iran just yet. Um he hadn't yet taken over the vast, vast majority of the Gaza Strip, uh, either to stay there or to give it back. Um and he wasn't entering an election year anyway. Right. We're we've already entered into an election year in Israel, and so he has a lot less to lose in terms of uh heading into elections. Uh, and he always likes to choose the timing and the the issues that he goes into an election with. Uh and so there are worse things to do than uh uh kind of tout your achievements on the battlefield over the past two years and get all the hostages back, and oh, by the way, uh have the most powerful man uh in the world uh you know, giving a speech in the Knesset, touting how great your diplomatic and political prowess is, which is likely to happen on Sunday.

SPEAKER_01: 47:07

All very good points. Um, I want to bring in a question from Howard Lafranchi, one of Neri's old colleagues at Christian Science Monitor, uh, for for Nimrod, which comes back to this question of disarmament, which is how to get around, as he describes, the chicken and egg dilemma of Hamas needing to disarm uh and the guarantees that Hamas wants first that Israel will not restart the war.

SPEAKER_02: 47:32

Look, if we want to be optimistic and and assume for a minute uh that uh phase two of the plan uh gets going. Um much work has been done. Um I will even backtrack a bit. Uh much of what we hear in the Saudi um uh French plan, uh in the Trump 20 plans, uh in the previously Egyptian plan, uh all draw on very thorough staff work that was done on the subject uh during the last year of the Biden administration. Um and a lot of work was done uh on uh on uh DDR uh as well as on all other elements uh of the plan to the point of even the real-time communication deconflicting uh the terms of engagement of the uh Israeli phasing out and the third party force phasing in. How do you prevent uh friction? And how what does it mean that you respect Israel's right of self-defer defense when Israel is out and someone else is in? Yeah, all this was worked out.

SPEAKER_01: 48:47

No, sorry, I was just gonna jump in to explain DDR to the audience.

SPEAKER_02: 48:51

Um it's uh uh decommissioning uh of weapons and and how do you uh integrate um former Hamas uh employees uh into the new structure so you don't have end up uh in a uh Iraqi situation uh where people were left with no uh source of income and ended up with ISIS.

SPEAKER_01: 49:17

I apologize.

SPEAKER_02: 49:18

Um yeah. Um so uh the the the the um and and uh on top of it, I'm sorry I forgot, forgot to mention it earlier, a lot of work was done uh uh by the uh um uh Tony Blair team, um, and the plan that they have uh put together also draws on previous work done by others. Um so the the mechanics of it uh and the politics of it uh will work um should the two parties play ball. Um if indeed we're gonna have uh forces uh from uh five uh six Arab countries plus Indonesia, uh Italy and France just announced that they are willing to contribute their forces to it. Um if you're gonna have the billions of dollars from the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Qataris and the others, uh if all that mechanism of uh of a um uh Palestinian um indigenous um governance by experts uh overseen by uh the World Peace uh Institute uh chaired by uh President Trump and uh managed by uh Tony Blair. If all that comes to fruition, um I think that uh squaring uh uh the uh commitment of Israeli, Israel, uh Israel will have less incentive uh to uh resume the war, uh and uh and Hamas will have little option uh but uh to accept. Uh but uh I don't want to say that this is in fantasy land, uh, because we saw uh President Trump uh within a week uh like a powerful uh particles accelerator uh forcing everybody uh to move at the hypersonic speed and produce an agreement that most of us assumed was unreachable. So who knows?

SPEAKER_01: 51:30

I'm actually curious, Rachel, your take on this as well, because you have this experience working at the Pentagon and uh post uh Iraq and ISIS challenge and and and recovering uh territory that has really been decimated and thinking about um how do you recover from these zones of conflict. What are the sort of lessons learned that should be brought into in this conversation?

SPEAKER_00: 51:57

There are a lot of comparisons, but a whole lot more differences. Um I think the first one is it takes time and it takes sustained attention, and it takes a whole lot of actors committing to continue growing in the same direction for quite a while. Uh in the case of Iraq, you had the UN at the center in a way that is different from now. And there were entities, uh, including particularly the UN, that followed very standard procedures of sort of how do you go from conflict status to reconstruction? There's an initial stabilization phase, then there's sort of the, you know, how do you get people to a point where they can live day to day with the basic, basic needs, and then the infrastructure enough that you can reconstitute your life in the medium term, and then sort of what does the economy look like in all of those things. Um disarmament is even harder. Uh I won't add to or um Nimro knows far more than I do about that process and also what's been done in the context of Hamas, they all need to be coordinated and there has to be a governing structure. Uh, in the case of Iraq, the United States and the entire counter-ISIS coalition was working with the central government. Having a central governing structure in Gaza, whether it's initially this international board institute of world peace, what Nimrod described, what I described earlier, or some other entity will be critical to ensure that any process put forward, whether humanitarian disarmament, just fulfilling people's basic needs, actually gets stood up and then sustained. You have the added challenge in the case of Gaza that is ensuring Israel's security and the safety and stability not only for Gaza, but for whatever constitutes the border zone, the demilitarization zone, the no man's land between uh Israel and Gaza. And Gaza is not a very big place. So the layered challenges are tremendous. I think uh an initial indicator will be who are the countries, not only who pledge to contribute to this effort, but then who follow through, whether it's with material, with personnel, with money, so that each of these layers can get um established and then sustained.

SPEAKER_01: 54:22

Michael, uh, we're gonna give you the last word. What uh what's what's on your mind as we go into this momentous weekend?

SPEAKER_04: 54:33

So um I'm I I'm slightly, very slightly, uh optimistic that we'll get to some part of phase two. I I don't think we're gonna see the 20-point plan, you know, exactly as envisioned and laid out. But I'm, as I said, slightly optimistic that things are not just going to get completely stalled after phase one. And the thing on my mind is if it if it gets a little bit down the road and then it stalls, and it becomes clear that Hamas still retains power in Gaza, and there's no international stabilization force that's actually going to be stood up, and Gaza basically turns into a low-grade civil war between Hamas and Kans. What's the follow-through going to be at that point? Is are the US and and other actors in the international community going to kind of stand back and watch and say, okay, well, you know, at least this is better than what we had before. Um, is Israel going to going to stick to its new doctrine, which is it sees any threat and it and it rushes in? Um, or is it also going to sit back? What's going to be the impact of a different government, which I think, you know, a year, a year from now there probably will be. Um so looking at the deal and seeing how it gets implemented, I think is important. But uh the the more interesting and and may end up being more relevant question to me is how do all these actors respond if phase two doesn't start or breaks down? Is everybody gonna have a see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil type thing? Or are people going to actually have the have the wherewithal to actively jump in and try to do something about it?

SPEAKER_01: 56:25

Yeah. Thank you, Michael, Rachel, Neri, and Nimrod. And thank you, everyone, for joining us. Uh, we encourage you to tune in to Israel Policy Pod, of course, the podcast that Neri uh hosts uh each and every week, um with conversations with news makers and opinion shapers, and of course, Michael's weekly Kapla column each uh Thursday. Uh I, for one, am excited to travel uh next week to Israel and see both Neri and Nimrod uh uh on this uh momentous week. Uh thank you all again for joining us. Um we encourage you to uh follow us on social media and consider supporting Israel Policy and Forum's work um at Israelpolicyforum.org slash uh support. Um thank you very much, and we look forward to meeting on uh uh future days with the same level of hope uh that we will see better days to come. This is indeed a momentous moment, um, which we will celebrate even as we recognize the significant pitfalls ahead with the additional phases of this deal. And we will um be thinking of our friends and colleagues in Israel in the days to come in anticipation for uh the release of those hostages. Thank you all once again, and thanks, thanks, team.