Neri: 0:05

Shalom, and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We're back to regular programming after the holidays, as it were, as it's called here in Israel. And a bit of news happened over the past couple of weeks during the holidays. Not sure if any of you heard, but I'm kidding, of course. All the living hostages are thankfully, thankfully back home as of last week. The Gaza War has been stopped, if not ended altogether, and we're now looking at an ambitious, US-led post-war project for Gaza. Our good friend Amos Harel, the defense analyst and correspondent at Haaretz, is back with us to help us make sense of what just happened and what may yet happen on the Gaza front. Ceasefire and all. This was as always a terrific conversation with Amos. Uh, but if you want to catch up on how exactly we got here, do check out the webinars I recorded with my IPF colleagues in recent weeks, available on both YouTube and on this podcast feed. Finally, just for awareness, we're recording this episode on Monday evening Tel Aviv time, October 20th, just in case anything crazy happens between now and when this episode goes up. But just to give you a frame of reference of how quickly things here have unfolded, and that brought us to this place that we're currently at, uh talking about a ceasefire, talking about the hostages, at least the living ones, all being back home. Uh, but of course, there are still uh deceased hostages still in captivity in Gaza, and everyone is waiting for them to be returned as well. But really, uh a remarkable change of fortune uh in a very short period of time. And just as a reminder for this frame of reference, uh we had the strike in Qatar against Hamas political leadership uh in early September. Uh and then we had the launch of the IDF's ground offensive into Gaza City on September 16th. So just over a month ago, things seemed, if anything, like they were just escalating, and the prospect of a deal, well, extremely remote, to say the least. Uh but then September 29th, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is invited to the White House. Uh, by the way, right after the UN meetings in New York, those happened too, uh, in case we forgot. But Netanyahu is invited to the White House on September 29th, where President Donald Trump unveils his 20-point plan to end the Gaza War. Ten days later, October 9th, the deal is finalized in Shar al-Sheikh, Egypt. And then a day later, just a day later, the ceasefire goes into effect. Uh, where we got to a situation last Monday, October 13th, the hostages all came home. Well, at least the living ones, but they all walked out of Gaza. All that happened last Monday. Wow. So a real roller coaster of emotion, two years of war concluded, for now at least, in a positive way for everyone, in basically two weeks or so. Unreal. Truly unreal. So forgive me if I don't have any grand statements or sweeping conclusions to make sense of all of this just yet. It's all a bit surreal and all a bit sudden, as I got into it with Amos. But for many of us here in Israel, uh, I'm sure definitely for everyone in Gaza as well, and all across the Middle East, there's a real sense of relief that hopefully tomorrow will be better than yesterday. For much of the past two years, it was very, very difficult to believe that would be the case. So, with all that said, let's get to Amos Harel. Hi, Amos, welcome back to the podcast. Hi, Neri. Uh, it's really great to see you, Amos. Uh, a lot to discuss this week in this episode. Really, I think it's fair to say, momentous days here in Israel. Uh, finally, happy days here in Israel, uh, after last week and the return of all the living hostages to Israel and back home to their families. Uh, we'll get into all the details of the Trump-brokered Gaza ceasefire plan and its prospects for success. Trust me, we'll get into all the details uh in just a second. But almost I wanted to start on a more personal note. Uh, we've been in touch now uh throughout the course of the war, uh, whether on the podcast or offline. Uh so really two years of constant communications through this very difficult period uh in Israeli history. So I'm curious, how did you feel last Monday as both an Israeli and shall we say, especially uh a media professional, uh a military analyst professional? What was going through your mind uh last week when the hostage came home and and seemingly the war came to an end?

Amos: 4:55

Well, I would assume just like almost any other Israeli, happy, elated, almost euphoric. Uh this didn't seem to be in the cards uh during the last few months. I did write constantly that once uh President Trump got involved, uh this could happen, but I didn't believe it would actually happen until uh very much uh into the the current uh negotiations. Of course, the point where it all changed uh had to do with the Israeli attack on in Qatar against uh the Hamas uh negotiation team on uh uh September 9th. Uh once that happened, uh things uh moved uh quite quickly. It was very, very clear that President Trump um made it his um top um issue on the agenda and that he wanted this uh to be over with. We now know more after that uh 60 minutes uh program with uh Kushner and Whitkoff, but it's it was I think it was evident for quite a few weeks that things are going to improve. But the fact that they have been able to both bring back all 20 live hostages and uh put an end to the war for the meantime is is quite impressive. Then on a personal level, you feel a lot of relief. I was worried about a lot of uh people I care about who were still uh uh in either fighting in Gaza or troubled by the Gaza events. And then there's something almost instrumental, which is I'm writing a book uh about the war, and I I needed uh a place to end this. And since this happened almost on the second anniversary of the war, it seems quite fitting to when I finally get to to to finish my book uh to put this as um as a possible ending. And it's um, I wouldn't say on a happy or light note, but it's of course much better uh than the uh other alternatives. And as you know, I was uh like many others, I was quite depressed with the situation for a long time.

Neri: 6:47

Yes, uh I know that personally, and also on this podcast. Uh you didn't mince any words uh during your many appearances over the past two weeks. Uh and especially, you know, reading your columns really uh since the summer. Uh you said A, that this war was just grinding on to no uh apparent real end state that was positive for Israel, clearly, and especially for the hostages and all those uh fighting still in Gaza. Uh and then two, you you kept saying uh if Trump wants to, he could end it tomorrow. Which he which he almost literally did. He almost ended it uh I don't want to say overnight, but it took him about two weeks to to end this entire two-year campaign. Um almost instrumentally, uh I I feel I feel what you're saying. Uh last week was a very busy day professionally uh when the hostages came out, but um it was uh it was well it was all worth it. Uh and to be in Hostage Square and and with all the Israelis, it was uh it was a very um very moving, very moving day, and uh like I said, some some good news for a change. Uh by the way, Amos, um, do you believe, as Kushner and Witkoff said in the 60 Minutes interview that aired yesterday, that they didn't have any uh idea that Israel was going to strike in Qatar? Do you believe them when they say that?

Amos: 8:03

When it comes to Kushner and Witkoff, yes. Trump knew something. There was some kind of a conversation earlier on between Trump and Netanyahu. Um Netanyahu uh uh did update him uh somewhat vaguely about the possibility of attack. But the way Whitkoff uh described it uh on uh the Mead uh conference in in Washington about a month ago, um that was at the last minute. And while they were trying to check what has happened, and they talked uh to the Qataris, uh the Israeli strike already um uh happened. So they didn't have enough time uh to to stop it the way they did with the last strike in Iran uh this June. Uh and I think it changed the course of events because finally uh uh I think the president was fed up uh with the prime minister. Uh Whitkoff and and uh and uh Kushnary alluded to a sense of uh even betrayal um the Americans uh felt after that. They felt that this wasn't even serving the Israeli interest, and this is when finally uh Trump got involved. And of course, as we said in the past, Trump is a force of nature. The same kind of energy was also used to apply pressure on the other side in his name. And it worked. The Qataris were on board, the Turks were on board, the Egyptians. Not that everything would be smooth from now on, but it is going to change the region. And then again, on that uh personal, emotional note, even yesterday, I was driving through from Jerusalem back to the Tel Aviv area uh yesterday afternoon, and somehow uh the um Waze navigation program took me through App, took me through Mefacelezion, and I had no idea what was going on there. Mefacel Zion is a suburb of Jerusalem. There were thousands of people on the streets celebrating with Israeli flags and so on, because Al-Khanabukut, one of the hostages, was coming home from the hospital. And that was amazing to see. It was a sort of uh final personal note uh regarding the the last two years' events. Of course, uh we know already because of the incident uh um on Sunday that things could go very wrong very quickly. This is not necessarily the end of the Gaza story or the end. Um we're still not sure if this is in fact the end of the Gaza war. And yet the possibility is there, and it seems even a likely scenario. And the longer this ceasefire holds, there's a better chance that things would uh remain calm for a bit, although as as as you mentioned, you know, things are quite volatile still.

Neri: 10:36

So uh it's a good transition. I want to get into the details of uh the ceasefire and its prospects for holding and the first stage of the ceasefire, second stage of the ceasefire. Uh, but just as an aside, uh yesterday I I had a meeting in the Kiria, uh IDF military headquarters in Tel Aviv. And for the past two years, you've had these massive banners on uh Menachim Beggin Road outside the Kiria entrance. Uh, you know, bring back the hostages, bring them home, all the pictures, all the images. Uh, and they were nowhere to be found anymore, thankfully. Uh, most of them. And uh the ones that were still up, uh, a lot of them were old ones. So the uh the individual.

Amos: 11:13

We shouldn't mention, of course, Neri, uh not like uh um uh what happened in the Knesset uh during uh Trump's uh speech, that there are still hostages, uh dead hostages, bodies uh that remain there. 16 uh um Israeli hostages are still kept. Those bodies are kept in Gaza as we speak, and that remains uh quite uh a thorny issue. And yet there's a difference between that and uh the fear, the concern for the live hostages. The fact that there are no live Israelis currently in Gaza is uh is quite a big deal.

Neri: 11:48

Yeah, quite a big deal. And uh as you as you mentioned earlier, it's it's almost a weird feeling after two years not to have any live hostages in in the Gaza Strip uh that you're either personally worried about or nationally worried about uh and and their families protesting on the streets. Um so without uh further ado, and by the way, we'll definitely get into um the deceased hostages still being held hostage and captive in in Gaza, um, but the ceasefire. So uh the first phase was agreed about 10 days ago uh in Shal Masheikh, Egypt. Uh just for our listeners, I'm sure they all know, but uh it called for the release of all 48 remaining hostages, 20 living, uh 28 uh no longer living, uh, and like you said, almost 16 uh remain, although uh we're recording this Monday evening Tel Aviv time, so there may be um a another body coming out uh tonight, so our listeners will be a bit smarter. Uh and in return, Israel had to release uh almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, uh 250 of which uh were convicted terrorists uh and some very uh not nice individuals. Um also a partial Israeli withdrawal from uh population centers, so Israel pulled back a little bit to the so-called yellow line. Um Amos uh we're now just over a week in. And like you said, we had a a mini escalation yesterday, Sunday. Uh two Israeli soldiers were killed in Rafah in southern Gaza. Israel launched uh uh waves of airstrikes uh across Gaza Strip. Um but overall before this weekend it seemed like things were fairly uh working. Uh is that fair to say?

Amos: 13:26

Uh yes, I think so.

Neri: 13:28

Okay. And uh you know, after this weekend, would do you think the prospects of the ceasefire, at least a first age holding, is uh is better or worse?

Amos: 13:37

So it it's interesting. Uh first of all, the the events, uh the event itself, the incident. Uh it happened on the Israeli uh side, so to speak, of Gaza Strip, inside Gaza Strip, of course, but it's part of the uh territories that Israel still holds on to uh according to the agreement, which is uh more or less 53% uh of the region. And apparently um a Hamas unit or Hamas cell was left behind in one of those uh underground compounds in one of those tunnels. Uh an Israeli uh unit was there with bulldozers trying to locate a tunnel and destroy it. And a few uh Hamas fighters came out, uh launched uh RPG uh rockets and uh uh used uh open sniper fire on the Israeli soldiers. Uh two died, one of them a major, a company commander, another of them a soldier, both of them from the same city of uh Modiin, and uh three others were uh injured. So this is significant, but on the other hand, it doesn't really um uh uh prove uh that there was a chain of command working there. That actually Hamas headquarters told those people uh to fight the Israelis. There could be one explanation is that they were stuck. They knew that Israel was that the IDF was about to destroy that tunnel, and they uh prepared to come out fighting them to die there. Uh the other possibility is that they are actually disconnected from their chain of command and that they didn't even know um that ceasefire uh had been approved. Uh, think of the stories about Japanese soldiers comparing the situation, but fighting in the jungles uh in Southeast Asia after World War II uh was over. It could happen. Even in Gaza, uh which is of course much more uh densely populated and so on, but we do know that some of those Hamas uh cells or terrorists are are not uh in direct contact with their uh commanders anymore. So when Trump is saying on Air Force One that he's uh still looking for explanations, but it doesn't seem as if they were acting um according to Hamas leadership orders, he he may be right. Um some people would tell you this is an illusion, this is all Hamas's plans and so on. I'm not so sure. So this is the reality on the ground as far as we can understand it. The second stage um of this issue is uh uh what the Israeli response is, and for perhaps more importantly, what the Americans are saying. Now Israel responded, it was, you know, it seemed to be a breach of the agreement. Uh, the agreement is already unpopular among some people on the right wing, and and some uh Netanyahu is uh receiving some criticism from the right wing of his government regarding that, so he needed to appear tough. Um and uh there was, I would assume there was public support for some kind of uh reaction. And Israel bombed uh all kinds of uh Hamas sites, and there were uh quite a few casualties on the Palestinian side and so on. But when Israel threatened to close uh the border crossings, uh this is when Trump said no. And we know that uh Vice President uh Vance is coming in here and Whitkoff is coming here as well. Apparently, uh the Americans are trying to babysit Netanyahu through this. They're trying to force Israel uh to implement the agreement, however vague uh it seems to be. And for the time being, Trump is not letting uh Netanyahu off so easily. He's he's trying to push forward the agreement that's more important to him than a singular incident. So we'll have to see how this evolves. If there are more incidents, one more casualties on the Israeli side, more criticism uh from the right wing, then things could um uh break down. But for the time being, the the agreement, as vague as it is, uh still holds, and this is where we are right now as we speak.

Neri: 17:27

This is why I love having you on Amos, because you cut right to the chase, and I've been asked for two straight days uh what happened in Rafah and whether Hamas orchestrated the attack or not. Uh, and I think you you explained it very well. Should we be surprised or alarmed that a year and a half after the IDF entered Rafah and really what we thought cleared out most of the area, that there are still Hamas fighters there, Hamas tunnels?

Amos: 17:52

No, not really, because uh first of all, this is the type of guerrilla warfare that's going on. You don't need an army for the Palestinian side to fight it. As long as there are cells or units acting uh underground, and this could be five teenagers with uh some weapons, uh, then the war uh continues uh to some extent. And then specifically regarding Rafah, it's true that uh the area has been um uh searched over and over again, but we do know that there are still remaining underground compounds there. So uh every now and then there were incidents. About a month ago, um uh an Israeli uh Jeep exploded when uh um the um it it's uh um the the Palestinians operated uh IED, uh which led to the death of uh four Israeli officers. So it's not the first time. Not constant fighting going on, but we will see similar isolated incidents um around the Gaza Strip and especially um east of the so-called yellow line, meaning in the areas that the IDF controls. Because as I've mentioned, there are still some Hamas terrorists uh stuck there. And um, I would assume that this isn't finally over yet. The real question, of course, is how Israel is going to deal with that and how strict the United States is going to be regarding Israeli reaction. Uh, for the time being, it seems that uh the president is invested in moving forward with the deal. That's the most important thing to him. I haven't seen him, we haven't seen him clash with Netanyahu over this, but the words are very, very clear. This is what Trump has been saying since his visit to Israel. Last week, what he said essentially in the speech, never mind the the the his uh the fact that he asked uh President Herzog for pardon for Netanyahu and the fact that he praised himself as usual and so on. The important message was the war is over, Israel won this, get over it. That was more or less uh the message. I think he remains on message, which is uh sometimes uh not that clear with Trump. Uh for the time being, this is uh where we are, and it's very, very clear that it's Trump calling the shots. It's nobody else. Uh, you know, there are all kinds of attempts uh to rearrange the narrative. We see Ron Delmer in uh invested in that, we see Amit Segal's uh reporting. Uh, Amit is always very, very close to what Netanyahu and Dermer are thinking. That's the best way to understand their line of thought regarding that. But they're the way they're phrasing it is as if that the Israeli influence brought on everything, as if the uh Qatari strike was a sort of a minor incident, and it is as if um uh Jerusalem and Washington were always very, very close. That's only true to a point. I think the president got angry at the Prime Minister after uh the Qatari attack, and I think since then the hierarchy was pretty uh clear. It was Trump uh saying what will happen, and it was Netanyahu, in spite of what he's saying domestically, actually obeying orders from Netanyahu.

Neri: 20:53

From Trump from Trump, yes. Um that's very, very clear. Uh especially Amos, the other um major point and also a point of difference between the US and Israel with regard to this first phase of the ceasefire is how quickly Hamas is actually returning the deceased hostages, their bodies to Israel. And so last week uh there was kind of this drip-drip by Hamas of um uh deceased hostages coming back, and Israel uh was not happy with the pace, and either privately or publicly said that Hamas could be doing more. Uh, and yet Trump's uh advisors uh made it very clear that they were okay with the pace and that Hamas was making what they said was a good faith effort to uh return to find first and then return all the deceased hostages. Uh what do you think from your vantage point? Uh is Hamas doing enough? Could it be doing more?

Amos: 21:46

The truth was probably somewhere uh in the middle. In the beginning, it was quite evident that Hamas was uh back to its old tricks, playing all kinds of psychological games against the Israeli uh public, announcing that it didn't have information of more bodies and so on. And that was clear that this wasn't the reality. Uh so we're now down to 16. I would assume uh in a positive scenario, we could um bring that number down to somewhere around somewhere between four and eight bodies, and then it gets uh difficult because look, uh the um uh strip has been through an earthquake for the last, a constant earthquake for the last two years. And it's it's pretty evident that some bodies got lost in the rubble. Uh that's true for many, many, uh probably quite a few thousand Palestinians, both uh civilians and uh Hamas terrorists, and it could be true for some of the bodies of our hostages. It's true that that was a priority for Hamas because Hamas saw them as assets and knew that they were assets, uh, bargaining chips in the negotiations. Um, and yet in some cases, the actual Hamas militants who buried the bodies were killed themselves. So uh there could be a question, or um, and there could be some incidents in which Hamas doesn't have whom to ask about the whereabouts of the bodies, and that could be uh where all as Israelis were all familiar with the Ron Alad uh tragedy, a navigator who's uh um uh uh who was caught by uh Amal and then Kizbalah in uh 86 uh in uh Lebanon, his body was lost, he's presumed to have died somewhere in the late 80s or early 90s, and his body was never discovered in spite of efforts by the Iranians and Kizbalah and so on. So there could be some few uh Ronalad cases in the long run. And if we go back to history, Israeli history, mostly with Egypt, uh wars in the Sinai wars and uh the war uh after the 73 war uh in the west side of the Suez Canal and so on, there are still missing Israelis missing in action uh there. Not as much as Americans after Vietnam, but there are cases that haven't been solved. I'm afraid that this would be the case uh here as well, but the numbers could uh the number of 16 could be cut by uh half, more or less, and this is what Israel is expecting uh to do. Nobody here trusts Hamas completely, but it seems that there is an effort right now because Hamas is invested in this. They want um uh more, they want the borders to be open, they want more uh aid uh coming in, they need Israel to withdraw. They assume that once they deliver most of the bodies, the Americans would apply pressure on Netanyahu to withdraw from some of the IDF's positions. So this is where it's heading. I should also note I mentioned uh earlier, um, according to the um to the agreement, Israel controls 53% of the of the strip. In reality, it um I would assume that it's around 40 percent. Because in fact, uh what the IDF did was uh withdraw to positions which were uh more to the east uh than was agreed upon because of the uh geo geography of the region. There's uh the the Gaza Strip is quite flat, but there's uh um you may remember that there's um um uh a sort of uh um um a group of uh small hilltops, uh which is somewhere between Sderoth on one side and Betchanun on on the other. It's called uh uh theim, the the the 70 hilltops because it's uh 70 meters uh above uh sea level. The highest point in Gaza Strip is Ali Muntal, which is uh 90 uh meters. That's it. So the the idea prefers to be around that area also because there's a less um um uh buildings or destroyed buildings in that area, so there's less friction with the civilian population now coming back to their original homes. Uh so what they do is they they um withdrawn, they have withdrawn a little bit and they control the area with fire and observation posts and uh so on. But it's quite clear that uh from the Trump administration's perspective, uh, they expect more uh withdrawals from the the IDF pretty soon, and that's going to be uh difficult, I think, for Netanyahu to sell uh for to his uh voters, especially if uh some kind of fighting continues.

Speaker: 26:20

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Neri: 27:17

So we'll get into uh now the second phase of the deal and potential future IDF withdrawals. Uh, but almost um what you just said, I'm sure the Prime Minister's office is not going to be happy because he for him it was very important to tell the public here that the IDF remained in the majority of the Gaza Strip. Yes, we're still in most of the Gaza Strip. That's what he wanted to say. Uh but you're saying in in actuality it might be numbers are flexible, as you know.

Amos: 27:42

In uh in our current reality, numbers are always flexible, but that's a reality as far as I know from uh military sources, and they should know.

Neri: 27:51

They should know, and uh, I mean, not just numbers are uh open to interpretation here. I think the reality of uh well, everything, but especially over the past two years, is open to to interpretation. Uh, as we're we're finding out in real time here, they want to uh rename the war. Uh the war of well, they actually did officially rename the war, I think, today in the cabinet. The war of redemption, uh as opposed to Is it redemption?

Amos: 28:16

Is that the translation? So the official translation? So I've spent redemption is geolah, no, no?

Neri: 28:21

So Amos, I've spent more time than I care to admit uh try asking many people about what the exact translation is, and you're right.

Amos: 28:29

Uh it should be redemption is more of a religious term, I think.

Neri: 28:32

Yeah. So that's exactly it. So officially, uh I mean, literally, it should be the war of revival or the war of rebirth, because in Hebrew it's the war of t kuma. But uh according, and I've checked according to the Prime Minister's office, uh, official translation and the government press office, uh, the official translation is the war of redemption.

Amos: 28:51

So Bob Marley must be turning in his grave listening to that, but okay.

Neri: 28:56

Yes. Uh Bob Bob Marley, and also, you know, um, who is being redeemed here? Is it uh the the nation of Israel or is it Bibi Netanyahu?

Amos: 29:05

Mostly Netanyahu, I think. He's doing better than the nation of Israel currently, but that's another matter.

Neri: 29:10

Yes, more uh yes. Um we won't get into politics just yet.

Amos: 29:14

Seems more lively, yeah.

Neri: 29:16

Yeah, uh as someone told me uh last week after the deal and the Hashes came back, uh Netanyahu is is on a roll. Literally, the he's on he's on the wave.

Amos: 29:26

And and when you talk to people from the center left in Israel, I'm sure you had the same experience in the last week. Almost everybody's sure that Netanyahu is going to win the new the next election. So it's done with, he's done and dusted, he's won this all over again. But we've heard that uh being said after the Iran uh war, which seemed to have ended in a victory, and it turned out that it was a slight uh bump, and then things got back to to where they were before. And I I think the the outcome, the judgment is not, the verdict is not out yet. We'll have to see what the actual outcome is before. Or we understand what the public uh reaction, the the electorate's uh reaction to the war is.

Neri: 30:05

Yes, uh there's still plenty of time, uh, and still many new actors, I think, that will enter the fray uh that could change the electoral map. But almost this is supposed to be a positive uh episode, so we don't want to dwell on domestic politics and future elections. Uh I want to dwell on uh the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire deal as uh brokered by Trump. Um the first phase arguably was the easier part, kind of putting a stop or a halt to the war, uh convincing Hamas to release the hostages, you know, convincing Netanyahu to withdraw partially and all of that that we just discussed. But uh phase two has pretty much everything else uh in terms of post-war Gaza, um security, Hamas's disarmament, uh, you know, if not full IDF withdrawal, then nearly full IDF withdrawal back to the buffer zone, uh, a new international Palestinian governance system for the strip. Uh and there's more, trust me, there's more. Um each each thing is uh is a world in its own right, but I wanted to focus with you on uh the security issue, which I think is A the most important, and B, I think will be the most immediate issue, uh, and the prospects of this what they call the International Stabilization Force, the ISF, uh actually deploying to the Gaza Strip. So, first, what can you tell us about the ISF so far, who will take part, and what you imagine their mandate will be, because from what I understand it's still uh unclear.

Amos: 31:33

It's very uh improvised for the time being. And as usual in this region, and as usual with the Trump administration, uh there's a gap between the intentions and the promises and what actually uh occurs in reality, at least for the for the time being. And things uh, you know, Rabin said at the time uh that there are no holy uh dates in the Middle East, and nothing is sacred about the uh dates in the Middle East, and that's true here as well. Things take uh time. Uh, you know, that old joke about what is bukkha uh tomorrow in Arabic. It's like manyana, only not that urgent. So this is uh this is true for uh for uh Israelis as well. Things take their time, and it's hard to analyze in advance and to assume what the timeline would actually be. The problem, of course, is uh if it doesn't succeed, things could uh collapse quite quickly. So we're not we don't have all the time in the world. But I'm not sure that the uh Trump team has this figured out yet. There are all kinds of uh um vague commitments made by Arab states, made by the Turks, made by the Qataris, made by Egypt, the Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and so on. But who's actually going to provide boots on the ground? The most serious are actually the Americans. Uh, we've seen uh hundreds of American soldiers and all kinds of uh subcontractors arriving already at Bengurion Airport, then going to an Israeli base in the south and so on. But I don't think that these would actually be soldiers uh maintaining the peace, so to speak, or uh I'm not sure there will be American boots on the ground physically in Gaza. They are going to be the coordinators, people who would work the same thing that's happening to an extent in Lebanon after the war with uh Gizbalah there. We still need the foot soldiers. Uh is Indonesia going to volunteer? There have been hints regarding that. Uh will there the you know the the the biggest workforce and the most available, of course, are the Egyptians who are close by, millions of them. It it's not uh too uh risky, I think, or not too um costly for a Sisi to decide to send some a few thousand uh soldiers or policemen or even in uh civilian clothes to Gaza. And yet it's risky from a strategic perspective. Does he want them in the line of fire if Israel's there? Uh what happens if Israel discovers uh uh somebody producing rockets inside Gaza and there are Egyptian soldiers nearby? So there are there's a lot that could go wrong, even if everybody has good intentions, and that's that's this part isn't isn't even uh completely true. So we'll have to see. I'm told that although they hope that it would take weeks, it's more likely uh to take uh months. And again, these are for the time being, these are ideas put on paper. Uh this is not about facts on the ground uh yet. And the problem remains, of course, uh the fact that there's no vacuum, that Hamas is already working. And something that I probably should have mentioned earlier: the fact that Hamas is regaining control all through the Gaza Strip. It's not about civilian control anymore. They hardly deal with that. You see already contractors from Turkey, from Egypt, and so on already working in the strip uh to find bodies under the rubble and so on. Uh, but when it comes to sheer military force or police force, Hamas is there already. And we've seen executions, we've seen bloodshed, we've seen public executions with families and kids uh watching. We've seen them fighting and uh and killing, murdering uh clan members uh in the southern Gaza Strip and Gaza City as well, the Dulmush family, the Abu Shab clan, and so on. So Hamas is already, I don't know if it's stage three or stage four, but Hamas is already uh moving forward with its own plans. And it will be uh interesting uh to see whether this could be the plan could be implemented, considering where Hamas is right now.

Neri: 35:33

Yes, uh they came out very quickly after the ceasefire and reasserted control uh on the streets and felt quite secure doing that. Felt quite secure. Um and uh I think uh your your colleague uh Yanev uh from Haaretz had uh a very interesting report last week where he said, you know, he interviewed IDF forces uh still inside the Gaza Strip, you know, manning the the yellow line, and like just a few kilometers away, we're actually watching Hamas fighters running around executing people, and we can't do anything.

Amos: 36:05

Uh there were some uh old Sabal Shatila vibes around uh to some of us who are old enough to remember events from uh Lebanon uh one. Yeah, this could uh a lot could go wrong here.

Neri: 36:17

And um, I mean, I don't want to say a lot could go wrong in in this regard, in this question almost, but from the Israeli point of view, uh there is concern that a foreign armed force inside the Gaza Strip will constrain IDF future freedom of action, no? I mean, it's the first time that I know of that Israel has allowed a foreign armed force into the Palestinian territories.

Amos: 36:41

It has allowed on principle, we haven't seen that uh happen yet. Correct. Um again, a lot of people, mostly uh the the anti-uh Netanyahu crowd, were saying for a long time, all we need to do is get this deal done with, uh, we get the hostages back, and then we can deal with Hamas anytime we want. That's not the reality. The reality is that once we're uh once we sign the deal, we're committed to it, and there's the Trump agenda which defeats uh Trumps everything else. Uh pardon my pun. But uh this is where uh where it's uh where it's going. It's Trump making the decisions, his goal or targets are quite clear, and Netanyahu is trying to stay out of the way. Uh, there could be uh some kind of friction uh later on, but for the time being, they're been signaling the link uh quite clearly where they want things uh to develop. And we'll we'll see what uh uh evolves during uh Vice President uh Vance's uh visit. But it's a it's a big deal. It's a big deal. I I don't think Netanyahu, and Netanyahu again in his speech at the Knesset today, he said that the personal relationship between him and Trump was the best ever between an Israeli uh prime minister and an American president. That's true, I think, but it's true to a point. There comes a point where Trump could act differently. And Netanyahu, I I think uh Netanyahu is a keen observer of uh Trump. He he knows exactly where he's at with the president, and he'll be uh sure not to cross his uh path, not to make him too angry uh over this. In spite of all this uh look at the difference. There are two forgive me for uh for uh uh charging in with this, but uh two to um two issues uh there. One, that the gap, the huge gap between what Netanyahu said would be in the agreement and actually what happened, what Netanyahu defined as Israeli goals in Gaza two months ago and what actually transpired. And the second is the absolute cynicism. We're used to Netanyahu being a cynic regarding these matters, but the absolute cynicism of his uh ultra-right wing uh messianic partners, Benkville and Smolvic, look, I assume that's right for you, that's correct about you as well. But for a year I've been writing that the main reason for Netanyahu not signing a final deal regarding the release of all the hostages was his fear that Benkvir and Smolvich would leave the government and that his coalition would collapse. That was more important than the ideological matters for Netanyahu. And then an agreement was signed, and poof, nothing happens about these guys. They're in, but they're out. They're not part, they didn't vote, they voted against the deal, and yet they don't feel any kind of responsibility, neither for the deal or towards their voters. They did not leave office, which is absolutely amazing. I couldn't have imagined something like this even a month ago. I assumed that he would sign the deal, that um he would get some support of the Knesset vote from uh uh Lapido Gans, and that would be it. But uh, you know, Small Twitch and Bankfield don't even bother to pretend that they care about this.

Neri: 39:48

No, uh they don't bother to pretend, at least for not right now. And and yes, all of us uh because it was it was accurate that Netanyahu didn't want to quote unquote end the war because he was afraid he would lose his government because Ben Virginia was a very good thing.

Amos: 40:02

But maybe maybe it wasn't that accurate. Maybe he knew all along that we wouldn't that they he just didn't want the deal at that time, and he assumed that it would could it could, you know, that he could actually achieve more on the battlefield than he actually did until Netanyahu, until Trump forced his hand. It's also a possibility, I think, in retrospect, not that I saw it uh in real uh time.

Neri: 40:22

It's it's a it's a very good question, Amos. Um it's like the the age-old question with regard to Netanyahu. Um, does he not want to move forward on X or Y diplomatic path because of his domestic politics, or he's using the domestic politics as an excuse not to move forward on a certain diplomatic path? Um we've known him to do that in the past.

Amos: 40:43

I've I've wasted I've wasted uh inches of newspaper and hours of debates, mostly with Aluf Ben uh Ha'arit's editor-in-chief, uh who always believes that Netanyahu has a long-term plan. Well, my sense is that in many cases uh the prime minister is improvising. I I think survival is is more important than anything else.

Neri: 41:03

Yeah, I think uh I agree with you, Amos, and um I won't get into the whole story, but someone uh uh close to Netanyahu told me uh last month that uh what really changed was um the battlefield successes that he felt he accrued, say over the past year, whether in Lebanon, um he takes credit for Syria, obviously Iran this past summer.

Amos: 41:22

But what about Gaza? Is Gaza success? That's another matter.

Neri: 41:26

Look, uh I what we just said, they they're changing the war, the name of the war, to the to the war of redemption. It should be the war of October 7th. I don't know.

Amos: 41:33

And it cannot be a war of redemption with the redemption if it's not a success. So the proof is there already.

Neri: 41:39

Of course. But uh you know, look, uh brass tax in terms of Bengal and Smojic, they're probably biding their time. And they're gonna wait to see what happens with the first phase of the deal. And if there's movement toward the second phase, and we're really entering an election year, they may use it as an excuse to differentiate themselves from that. Yeah, but almost this isn't this is not why we wanted you on. We can talk politics with with literally everyone else in this country. We want you on to talk military affairs. Um the the real question on everyone's mind, and the last question with regard to the second phase of the deal, okay, given the uncertainty with regard to both the international peacekeeping force, and also, by the way, we didn't even talk about the potential future Palestinian force, maybe. Uh, and given the uncertainty with regard to IDF future operations and presentation. How do you define it? Um, how will you actually disarm Hamas? Right? Who will actually go ahead and do it? Is it diplomatic pressure, political pressure, armed force that will get them to disarm?

Amos: 42:42

Well, this is this is still the fog of war. We don't know how this is going to transpire. Um it's interesting to note that during the discussions they tried to make the uh distinction between offensive weapons and weapons for uh defense or uh self-protection or whatever. Uh now, how much of its uh so-called strategic weapons does Hamas have left? We know they have all kinds of bombs, explosives, and so on. They have some uh anti-tank uh relatively primitive anti-tank weapons such as uh rocket-propelled uh grenades, what we call RPGs, some sniper uh uh rifles, and so on. But what about rockets? You remember in the beginning of the war, rockets were uh launched towards Sel Aviv almost on a daily basis. Later on, still shot at Beersheba, Ashkelon, Ashdod, and so on. Uh just recently, during the the latest operations just before the war ended, uh there were a couple of times where they launched uh Qassam rockets, which are the primitive um short-range rockets towards the OTEF, the Gaza envelope uh communities. But that's more or less it. So, how much of the actual offensive weapons do they have? Probably they have some hidden, but uh it may be less of an issue if the Trump administration decides to limit the discussion to offensive weapons and not weapons of uh self-protection. On the other hand, we see that the fact that they have uh their fighters around and that they're willing to use weapons is enough. They're you know the the the sheer numbers are higher than anybody else, and the clans have, and so on. And we've seen them executing their enemies by the dozens, if not the hundreds, already. So they still remain a danger, perhaps not that much for Israel. There's a lot of discussion in Israel. If we withdraw, is there an imminent danger of another October 7th? I think not. I think that right now it's not uh a clear and present danger, not in the present time. It could happen again if we neglect again to watch what is happening there and to prepare ourselves. But it will probably take years before they actually regain their offensive uh uh capabilities. So it's a matter of definition and how much uh Trump is going to go forward with that. Of course, it's it's quite clear that the president wants a big deal, a bigger deal, having to do with the Gulf states, uh possible uh business deals, technology, weapons, perhaps normalization between Israel and some of these states, and so on. Um and there's a possibility that he won't let facts get in the way. We've seen him do that in Iran, on Iran as well. Think of Trump announcing time and time again that the Iranian nuclear plan has been obliterated. That's not the real truth. It's it's more as usual, the reality is more complicated than that. Uh, there has been significant damage. It probably pushed the Iranians back, but you can't say that the nuclear project is over. And yet Trump says that because he's Trump. He's allowed to say whatever he wants. And I fear that this could be the reality regarding Hamas as well, that he could be uh ignoring the facts happening on the ground completely, and that could be problematic for Israel.

Neri: 46:00

Oh, good points. Amos. Um in our remaining time, I wanted to shift slightly away from Gaza. Uh, last two questions, uh if I may. You mentioned Iran. Uh and last time we spoke, by the way, literally, I think it was the day or the day after the 12-day war ended in June. So four months ago, uh, it seems like a lifetime ago, but it was just four months ago. Uh you probably get the same questions that I do, walking around uh Tel Aviv and other parts of Israel. People ask me about Iran, whether there's going to be another round with Iran uh soon, i.e., imminently. Uh that's the the mood music in certain quarters here, at least publicly. Uh do you think that's a real threat? Do you think that's credible? Not immediately.

Amos: 46:47

I think the main reason for that becoming an issue discussed by Israelis or feared by Israelis is, of course, the statements uh made by an opposition leader, a Viktor Libelman, who is a former defense minister, who kept warning on this in the last month or so. It wasn't really clear what he was warning about, but people are remain in fear of this because by the end of the war it was quite clear that the possible damage could be much more significant. That although we succeeded in the beginning, we were having problems with our uh um uh weapons intercepting systems, uh, we needed American help and so on. And some of the damage in the last uh Iranian attacks uh became quite devastating in Tel Aviv, in Belshiva, and uh and and so on. Uh that was uh people fear that more than they feared a lot of uh the other stuff that uh went on. Uh I'm not sure, I don't I don't think that the as far as we know right now, I I have no knowledge of Iran trying to reignite the nuclear uh plan um in a significant way right now. Uh the problems are uh there are other problems. One is the attitude, the fact that we're not really negotiating the promises of revenge in the long run. It's quite clear that they would seek some kind of retaliation against Israel. And there's also the ballistic missile program. Because remember, one of the arguments Netanyahu used uh regarding his decision to strike was not only the nuclear plan, it was the fact that they were moving forward very, very quickly with the ballistic missile plan, that they were uh attempting to produce 8,000 uh missiles that could uh that have long enough range to reach Israel within three years, and therefore we needed to take out those capabilities. How successful were we on that? We never received information. And since the Iranians found a way around our defensive system in the end, not much, but there was some kind of penetration and some kind of damage. In the long run, how worrying uh is that? So these are the issues that I think could be bothering. It's perhaps not immediate, but it could be there could be a frightening scenario in which things uh uh suddenly escalate. Having said all that, I think Israel had the upper hand and the Iranians are very uh although Khamenae said the exact opposite uh today, right? The Iranians are very anybody who's who knows something in Tehran knows exactly what has happened. Uh so that's uh uh that's uh um uh a possibility, that's uh uh uh uh a bigger issue. And in the long run, there could be um uh some some kind of um escalation, whether it's about their relationship with the West, whether it's about the the future of their nuclear project and so on. I don't think it's immediate, uh, but it could it could turn after October 7th, we can't rule out any uh any uh worst case uh scenario and things are it's not done. It's not done yet. And uh one thing I I I should mention as well is all that talk about regime change, or nothing nothing happened uh with that, and Israel still sometimes threatens a Iran with that. I think it was an absolute failure, the discussion regarding that never materialized into something also an issue in the long run.

Neri: 49:59

So uh yes, I I agree with uh that assessment. I I try to calm people down and say, you know, if there's another round, it won't be immediate because uh I think Iran, like you said, also understands that they took a major hit. Um and you know, Trump's showed this past summer that he's willing to get involved directly.

Amos: 50:19

Yeah, the last time the Trump next time is the Trump next time is anybody's guess.

Neri: 50:24

Yes. Uh well, Trump tomorrow is anybody's guess. Um Amos, uh final question to you, and more of a retrospective question looking back at the last two years, uh, and let's leave aside the terrible, terrible day of October 7th. But was there one event or mission or operation undertaken by by Israel that uh truly surprised even even you, even Amos Khalil? Uh where you said to yourself, voila, I I didn't actually know that we we could pull that off over the past two years?

Amos: 50:53

Uh there were two. First of all, I was uh the uh um quite a terrible surprise was October 7th itself. Uh we were caught off guard and we talked about that constantly. Uh the uh the the the result of that was of course uh horrific. There were two operations which were impressive in my view. One of it one of it the the first one, I can't say it's just PR, just a gimmick or a toy, as some uh people have uh uh defined it, but the pager operation, a joint operation by Mossad and the IDF was quite impressive. The fact that people have been planning that uh uh for for years, for more than a decade, and the fact that it was in the end it was implemented so successfully, and the fact that it actually depressed uh Nasrala. Nasrallah's son spoke after his death and said that his father was in deep depression in the last 10 days of his life, which are the days between uh the attack, the Pager operation, and his uh death. And this is apparently because he actually saw people being injured and perhaps killed around him from those Israeli beepers. So that's that's impressive. The fact that we could plan something like this, that we could mislead them in such a way is is is uh is is quite uh amazing. Although had they watched more carefully uh the wire, for instance, on American TV, perhaps uh uh the Iranians at Khizbal could have been more careful about that. It's all about the beavers, yeah. I'm somehow um uh encouraged if I when I assume that perhaps some Israeli um uh agents got their ideas from American TV. It gives me, I don't know, a particular joy to think about that. But I I suspect that this has to do uh with reality as well. Uh and the second thing, of course, is uh the the Iranian strike, not the strike itself, but the fact that they've reached uh air superiority in Iran. And this was something that they've struggled with for more than a decade. And they had all kinds of ideas, but it was never tested, of course, and it seemed quite far-fetched uh when I talked to people before. And then I was, I think I told you that last time I was caught off guard and outside of the country uh as the war started. So uh the Israeli attack uh started the first day evening, I was still in Oslo, and then I flew to Milano and was uh stuck in Milan uh uh for a few days before finally arriving home uh through Cyprus. Uh but when on Saturday morning I was walking the streets and the Italian streets while listening on my airports to uh um um uh a briefing by a senior Air Force general telling us how they managed to uh what he called pave the way to Tehran and control the Tehran skies, that was quite amazing. To realize that our guys had the actual knowledge and the brains and then the the the capability to actually uh um to to implement such a plan was quite amazing. It's you know it doesn't it doesn't wipe out the memories, the terrible memories of October 7th, uh, but it is impressive. And I think that if you're uh a foreign um uh intelligence analyst, whether you're in Washington or in Tehran, you take note of all that. You say, okay, the Israelis messed very, very badly. They messed up on October 7th, they shouldn't have uh um um, you know, they should have uh underestimated the yeah, yeah, they should have uh treated Hamas differently, they should have realized how uh Hamas how dangerous Hamas was, and yet that's not uh when you see that uh there's again, it it doesn't it doesn't wipe out the memories, but it's it's good to know that we have the ability as well. And we'll we'll probably need unfortunately we'll need those abilities again. So the fact that there are thinking people who have or planning such uh and capable of actually doing such stuff, uh for me as an Israeli, it's uh it's an impressive uh it's it's it's it's not only interesting, it's important and impressive.

Neri: 54:53

It absolutely is. Uh Amos, we'll have to leave it there. Uh till next time. By the way, we'll read all about these these events and even more events uh in your upcoming book once you finish it, I'm sure.

Amos: 55:04

Thanks for the plug-in.

Neri: 55:06

We'll we'll plug it again, don't worry. And you know, we we spent an hour together. We didn't even talk about the football match yesterday, Liverpool versus Manchester United.

Amos: 55:14

Try not to mention that.

Neri: 55:15

I wanted to keep this uh a positive uh podcast for you as well. Um but I'll I'll uh I'll celebrate uh inside off offline. Uh Amos, talk to you soon. Thank you again. Thank you. Okay, thanks again to Amos Harel as always for his generous time and insights. Also, special thanks to our producers, Jacob Gilman and Eden Jesselson, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening.