Introduction

Shanie 0:04

Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod. I'm Shinny Reichman, Director of Strategic Initiatives and IBF Atied, our Young Professionals program at Israel Policy Forum here in New York City. We have a great episode for you this week with Jacob Maggot, U.S. Bureau Chief at the Times of Israel and former West Bank correspondent, which will be relevant in the later portion of our conversation today. We'll be discussing the status of the ceasefire in Gaza and the latest developments in Trump's 20-point plan, including today's UN Security Council vote on a resolution endorsing Trump's plan, along with recent developments relating to the Palestinian Authority reform and West Bank settler violence. All right, let's get to Jacob Maggot. Welcome, Jacob. Thanks for joining us.

Jacob 0:48

Hi, Shane. Good to be with you.

Shanie 0:50

Great.

Gaza Ceasefire and the Yellow Line

Shanie 0:51

So we're going to cover a whole lot of things today. We're going to start with, usually on this podcast, we start with what's going on in Gaza, because that's usually top of mind for folks. But then we'll make our way to the United States, which is a lot more your domain and maybe touch on the West Bank as well. We are theoretically in a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, of course, with three remaining bodies of hostages still being held. Every day there's a new headline that makes me question to what extent there's a ceasefire going on. I keep saying there's one, but it doesn't always feel that way. So I'm wondering if you can make sense of some of that. Specifically thinking of the Hamas members being held in a tunnel or being stuck in a tunnel, the IDF indicating yesterday that they're ready to go back to war at a moment's notice. What's happening here? To what extent could we be confident that the ceasefire is going to hold?

Jacob 1:41

I guess I would liken the ceasefire in Gaza to the one that's been unfolding in Lebanon, which, if you recall, that was reached uh in November of last year. But we've since then seen near daily Israeli strikes against what it says are violations by Hezbolla trying to rearm, regroup in southern Lebanon. So you've seen these attacks actually even pick up in recent weeks as Israel argues that the Lebanese government has not done enough to maintain the ceasefire, which includes this idea of disarming Hezbollah, at least south of the Litani. So in Gaza, what we're seeing is increasing numbers of strikes as well by Israel or shootings by Israeli troops at people who they say are crossing what's called the yellow line, which is this new division that was created for the ceasefire, where Israel withdrew to roughly, I guess you could say, a line that cuts Gaza into half on eastern and western sides, and uh basically gives it in control of 53% of Gaza. This line, they're trying to make it clear by putting out yellow blocks, cement blocks that they paint with yellow paint uh across the strip. But there are areas it's not very clear. Um, and in cases there have been allegations that it had been civilians who accidentally approached the line and then were targeted by Israeli troops. And other times, as was the case we're recording on Monday, that there was two Palestinians who were trying to place suspicious objects, the um the IDF says, and that therefore they opened fire and killed them. Um and those kinds of incidents have been happening pretty regularly. Um you mentioned possibly on a daily basis, um, where the IDF is saying it's uh the ceasefire agreement actually allows it to respond to these kinds of threats, and that therefore there's no breakdown of the entire ceasefire. But yes, these are things that definitely I think lead people to have concerns about how how sustainable this is. Now, if you look at Lebanon, you could say, well, it it kind of has held for the most part. Um, but even there too, there's been um concerns, I think, in recent weeks about whether whether that is sustainable. The the head of Hezbollah, the Secretary General made a comment of saying that we're reaching a point where there's a red line and we can't accept this any longer. And maybe Hamas will say the same thing if these attacks continue on a daily basis.

Shanie 3:56

What about Hamas's side of the ceasefire? Are they also conducting attacks at the same time?

Jacob 4:01

I mean, so I mean, the allegations by Israel is that these are sometimes Hamas fighters that are um carrying out these attack or these encroachments near the yellow line, um, that that Israel is in control of, I guess it says the east side. So some of those fighters are actually pulled up on the Rafa side of the yellow line. Um, so in southern Gaza, there's believed to be between 100 and 200 Hamas fighters that are in this tunnel network under Rafah. And I guess you could say they just found themselves one morning on the Israeli side of the yellow line once the ceasefire was put in place. And there have been efforts to try and negotiate their safe passage to the Gaza through the de facto Hamas side of the yellow line because there are feelings or concerns in them in Washington that if you allow Israel to just go in and kill all these fighters, it could lead to the actual breakdown of the ceasefire. This wouldn't just be one or two, but a much broader bloodbath that the US wants to avoid.

Shanie 4:58

That's uh that's

Hamas Fighters Trapped in Rafah

Shanie 5:00

interesting to hear. I would say that the headlines surrounding Gaza shift from what's happening with Hamas, what's happening within Israel and the Israeli government, to the United States very quickly. Um, so the place where the United States gets involved here, which is I think URB, is around one deportation of 200 Hamas members from Gaza. I'd love to hear from you on that. And then we'll talk about what's going on at the UN and Trump's 20-point plan.

Jacob 5:26

Yeah. So I mean the the when we're talking about this deportation of guys, these two 100, 200 guys, and if we're talking about those who are holed up on the Rafa side of the of the of the of the Israeli side of the yellow line and Rafah, I think there's two options for their safe passage that the US is trying to negotiate. One is for them to just simply go to the Hamas side, and the other is for them to be sent to third countries. The condition that the US is is pushing Israel to accept is that they will allow for this safe passage either to Gaza or um elsewhere is that they give up their weapons. Um, and Israel for a lot for weeks, Prime Minister Netanyahu's office has said absolutely not. These are terrorists that we need to be able to take out. Um, maybe we can talk about sending it bringing them into Israeli custody, but the idea that we're just simply going to give them amnesty is not something that we're willing to agree to. And they've taken a hard line on that publicly. But I think given the pressure from the Trump administration, which views this as a model for what they're trying to do at a broader scale, because if you look at the 20-point Trump plan, it talks about granting amnesty to those Hamas members who are willing to give up their weapons and denounce violence. Um, so the the Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner are trying to use this Rafah example to as a model to what they can maybe do uh with the rest of Hamas fighters, because there's maybe 20,000 of them that they need to be dealt with. Um and Israel, I think, is being pushed to accept this model idea and um allow them safe passage. I think there Israel hopes that they would be getting granted to allowed to go to a third country. So far, they haven't found a third country that's willing to take in these fighters. Um there's you the typical names that come up are, I think, Islamist-controlled countries like Qatar or Muslim majority countries that might be willing to take them in. But so far that we haven't really seen that. I think that's an extension of broader apathy toward taking in Palestinians from Gaza around the world. Um, and all the more so those who have pretty radical paths where um this issue of migration is quite hot-bed. So I think it's going to be a heavy lift to get them into third countries. I think the more likely option would be safe passage to the other side of Gaza. Again, not something Israel's necessarily said so far that it's willing to do, but I do think the pressure is coming to bear. And I the what speaking to US and Israeli officials over the past few days, it seems like we're moving into that direction of an Israeli kind of walk back of all those threats that it would never allow this to take place. And if the given the US pressure on this, that they will, I think ultimately agree to some sort of compromise on this issue. Maybe it'll change in the in the coming days. But that was the direction that the winds were heading.

Shanie 8:05

As you said, in terms of countries wanting to accept this, they know this is sort of the tip of the iceberg. So they if it uh if they agree to take in 200 Hamas members, what does that mean for the thousands who might be granted amnesty at the end of this plan, right?

Jacob 8:17

Aaron Powell Yeah, that's a good point. I think uh people are thinking beyond just this one example.

Shanie 8:22

Uh but your assessment is that likely if Israel is to agree there will be a willing partner to accept these 200 Hamas members?

Jacob 8:30

I I think the what the officials I spoke with said the more likely scenario was safe passage to the Hamas side of the strip. Um obviously these things are fluid. Um I and I know that Israel wants to see them outside of Gaza. And given that they're going to be compromising to begin with by giving them safe passage and not killing all of them or taking all of them into custody, um, it's possible that Israel will get what it's wanted and and the US will have to find a third country to take these these uh Palestinians in. Um I think there are country quite a few countries out there, despite the comments that they make about the Palestinian issue, that do want to come into the Trump administration's good graces. And and this is a pretty easy way, relatively way to do that, given that we're only talking about 100 to 200 members.

Shanie 9:11

Mm-hmm. Okay. That makes sense. Let's

Trump's 20-Point Plan and the U.N. Security Council Vote

Shanie 9:14

circle back to the to the 20-point plan. Um, President Trump has presented as the UN Security Council. He's trying to get them to vote on it. Um it seems that there are a couple barriers to it passing, especially because of who's on the Security Council. Uh tell you more about this. What are the details? Remind us a little bit more about the plan and what some of the sticking points are and who are the countries that oppose it, who support it.

Jacob 9:35

Sure. So this 20-point plan was unveiled at the end of September by President Trump alongside Prime Minister Netanyahu in the White House. Um, and Prime Minister Netanyahu actually accepted it, um, verbally.

Shanie 9:49

Including the amnesty for Hamas members that's in it.

Jacob 9:52

Yeah, there's, I mean, there's an amnesty for Hamas, there's the potential. It says that if once the Palestinian reconstruction is underway and once the PA has completed its reform program, that maybe the stars will be settled for a Palestinian state uh to be eventually created. Uh, it's very murky about when that will happen, but it's in there. It talks about a political horizon for the Palestinians, it talks about at the very end that the US will facilitate negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Um, so things that we haven't necessarily seen come out from this Trump administration that's been wary to use the term two-state solution, um, at least in this term. Um, we're seeing that in this document. Um, and it goes in the first part, I guess the first five or six points focus on the initial ceasefire. Um, and then the rest is looking forward about how Gaza will be managed. So it talks about that there'll be this board of peace that will oversee, it will be run by President Trump and it will be overseeing the Palestinian technocratic government in Gaza, which will be unaffiliated to any of either Hamas or the PA. And they'll be basically tasked with creating makeshift ministries that run Gaza, and they're overseen by this Board of Peace that will include Tony Blair, the former uh UK prime minister, is named in this document, and other major world figures, possibly Palestinian or Arab ones as well. And then you'll have working alongside the Board of Peace and the technocratic government, this ISF, the International Stabilization Force, which will be made up of troops from countries around the world. And they will be tasked with maintaining um order in the strip, helping secure humanitarian aid, helping secure the borders, but critically also helping with the demilitarization of the strip and the concept of decommissioning weapons, meaning putting them away in a warehouse, uh away from the use of Hamas fighters, getting rid of terrorist infrastructure. So these are the kinds of things that Israel really wanted to see, and Trump made sure that they were in this plan, or at least you could say Jared Kushner and Steve Whitkoff in this case. Um, and that's all part of it, um, including things that Israel doesn't like, like the two-state solution uh references. Um, but Prime Minhao did verbally accept it uh in this in the White House press conference alongside President Trump. What was actually signed, though, um what by the parties by Israel and Hamas on October 9th was a document different. And that had to do just specifically with the ceasefire, the initial ceasefire, the hostage prisoner swap terms, the humanitarian aid provisions, and the initial IDF withdrawal or pullback to that yellow line. Um it doesn't get into any of the other points of the Trump plan, and actually the wording is different regarding the points that it does discuss. Um that's what was actually signed. Nobody actually did sign this 20-point plan. There were parties that, given, I think, some of the discomfort with some of the phrasings that didn't go far enough on Palestinian statehood, you saw countries come out and say that they welcome Trump's efforts. They wouldn't specifically endorse this plan. Um, but what one of the goals of this UN Security Council resolution that's supposed to be voted on later today is actually to basically enshrine the Trump plan into some sort of international legal status by making it uh a resolution. It's actually the whole text of the 20-point plan is an annex in this resolution that the US is trying to pass. And the goal of the resolution, yes, is to talk about the Trump plan is great, but specifically to say we want to create to give the international mandate, the legal framework that countries are asking for in order to in in in order to contribute troops to this ISF, this international security stabilization force. Um, because there's a concern that if this is just there's no clear framework for it, then it could be up to the whim of the parties in general that that are sending troops, or that Israel will have be able to have a lot of control of the US. But if it's a part of a UN structure, then countries might be more willing to cooperate with it. Um so that's what the Security Council resolution is aimed at um addressing. Um and it's the vote isn't supposed to be in several hours, and and the I diplomats I've spoken with on the council do feel like it's likely to pass. Question will be was whether actually you get countries to join the ISF once it's uh theoretically created.

Shanie 13:59

So Russia and China, they're they're both uh seem on board.

Jacob 14:04

So Russia did try to put forward a alternative resolution on Friday that kind of momentarily derailed the effort and it got more into detail about the need for a two-state solution and Palestinian statehood. Um, but it was quashed pretty quickly. There's enough uh US pressure on these on various countries involved. Um and the fact that the US also doesn't have the very tense relationship that it had with Russia during the Biden administration, I think these countries are less and China is uh a little bit different of a story, but also is seen as likely on board. What's possible is that you could see countries abstain, like uh Russia, like China, or Algeria, which has leads the Arab group in the Security Council and definitely more hostile to Israel. But as far as an actual veto, at least currently, I think the the idea is to bring this to a vote because they feel that the US feels that it has enough uh support for it to pass. Um, it won't be unanimous, um, but there won't be any vetoes from the permanent Security Council members that would uh prevent it from actually going through. That's at the moment we're talking at uh nine at 10:30 a.m. on on for on uh Monday.

Shanie 15:09

So I guess we'll see if we're right on that. But I'm curious who would be part of this international stabilization force? Who are the who are the countries that seem willing or seem like they could be pressured by Trump if uh into being willing partners?

Jacob 15:22

Yeah, I think if you if you listen to President Trump, everyone's wants to be a part of this and wants to be involved in the demilitarization of Hamas. That's not a good thing.

Shanie 15:30

Yes, everyone, everyone's willing to send troops to Gaza. That's what I that's what I'm hearing everyone.

Jacob 15:36

Um so I think there had been initial hope, especially from Israel, that those who would be involved in it would be countries like Saudi Arabia or the UAE. But but Arab countries and or Egypt as well have been much more adamant about conditioning their involvement on a PA role and also on this not being a demilitarization effort, that they want this to be a peacekeeping force, not a peace-enforcing course uh um force. And therefore, when there's talk in this resolution about demilitarization, even though the resolution doesn't mention Hamas by name, which was something that was always criticized, the Biden administration would used to criticize uh resolutions that didn't mention Hamas, it still goes further than a lot of these countries are comfortable with. And therefore, I don't see countries like the UAE or the Egypt or um uh Saudi Arabia sending troops here. What the names that have come up have been Muslim-majority countries like Azerbaijan, Indonesia. Indonesia has been the most vocal and the only one publicly to say that they want to send troops, but even in their case, they're talking about it being a peacekeeping force that helps secure aid, helps secure borders, helps with law and order, but doesn't get into this idea of getting into kinetic um combat with Hamas. I think what the US is trying to do is negotiate some sort of disarmament deal, an amnesty deal with Hamas so that they don't actually need to um go into combat with the ISF. That's going to be a very heavy lift. I mean, Steve Whitkoff talks about that during this very historic meeting he held with uh Khalil al-Haya and Jared Kushner at the hour, the final hours of the negotiations on October 9th, that Hamas told him that they're willing to disarm. That would be the first time ever that Hamas has said that, but maybe they did in this meeting, and maybe that's why one of the reasons this deal was able to be um brought across the finish line. Um so they think that this is something they're simply agreed to. Publicly, Hamas has said over and over again, and they even came out a few hours ago against this Security Council resolution because this notion of uh disarmament is not something they agree with. This notion of sending international forces is not something they support. They just wanted to be Palestinian forces there. So I think it there's likely going to be issues with this over this issue of disarmament, but not enough to derail, I think, the the passing of the resolution at least. Um I think you could see still countries maybe um ultimately willing to send troops, but again, the idea that they're going to go further and actually um try to steal away weapons from Hamas seems like a little bit more difficult of a task for them to bear.

Shanie 18:01

Sure. I remember over a year ago Jordan and Egypt mentioning boots in the ground, but it was in a very specific context, and a lot of this hinges on the Palestinian authorities' involvement, which is a great segue for us.

Speaker 1 18:31

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Shanie 19:09

A

PA Reform and Martyr Payments

Shanie 19:10

lot of the future of Gaza relies on having a legitimate Palestinian leadership. And most of these countries, I would say every country besides those who support Hamas and the Israeli government, basically looks at the Palestinian Authority as being a requirement for taking over Gaza at one point or another. That hinges on a lot of reforms to make them legitimate, not just to all of the other countries, not just to the United States, not just to Israel, not just to the European Union and the UN, but also to Palestinians themselves. So thinking about how do they gain credibility with their own people, which has a lot to do with corruption and authoritarianism. And then, of course, incitement uh incitement of violence and terrorism, which is top of mind for the US and Israel in particular. Um, and at Israel Policy Forum, we've released a report specifically on PA reform, what we think is necessary, that I'll I'll link in the show notes. Um, but I I'd like to ask you where we are at on this because there's been a lack of clarity around martyr payments in sp in particular, which is something that I've been thinking and talking about for 10 years in the community, our Jewish community has been really concerned about for a very long time. There were reports months ago of Abbas saying that he was ending martyr payments, payments to the families of terrorists. Um, but there's uh there seems to have been a lack of clarity that he's requested the State Department to come certify that it's been finished. The State Department has not yet uh responded to this request, it seems. So tell me where that is now and also name you recently reported, I think last week, about exactly this about Abbas firing a finance minister for continuing to pay for slice over. But tell us about that.

Jacob 20:43

Yeah, definitely an issue that's uh lingers throughout the, I think, Israeli-Palestinian discourse for quite a bit of time, at least in the West. Um, and I think it was something that the Biden administration tried very hard to get the PA to scrap this martyr payment system. It's it's dubbed by critics as pay to slay because it conditions these stipends these welfare payments to prisoners based off of the length of their sentence. Um, and so that's seen as incentivizing attacks on Israelis, given that the more harsh your your sentence, the more money you're likely to get from the PA in these stipends that they come in every month. Um, so the Biden administration tried, and I think they did make a lot of progress. And basically the PA agreed in principle to roll out a reform that would basically condition the payments instead on the length of service that are actually on someone's socioeconomic status. And there would be all these different criteria that they would have to meet in order to receive payments on a monthly welfare payments on a monthly basis. So basically turning it into a proper welfare program. Um the the PA, I think, due to their frustration with the Biden administration, decided to hold off on announcing it and waited until President Trump was in office, feeling that a lot of countries were doing this, giving that, feeling like they are giving President Trump a gift and doing it on his behalf rather than doing it before he enters office. Um there was initial excitement, I would say, from the US, and they called it a big win when President Abbas signed this decree in February. So it wasn't just reports. He actually signed a decree that canceled the old system and put in place a new one that I just talked about in terms of properly uh adjudicated welfare payments. The US said that we welcome this as a big win for Trump. Um, but then shortly after, I think there were more hardliners within the Trump administration that said, wait, we want to see how this actually plays out. And we don't trust just what we're hearing or seeing in this uh decree. We want to actually see this new system in full uh flux. Um, so the US has been largely ignoring this issue for the past uh six months or so since the decree came out. Um, as you mentioned, the U.S. the PA tried to get the U.S. to come and certify that the new system is in place. I mean, there's also it wants the goal of this for the PA standpoint is not just uh international legitimacy, but there's also laws in the books in the U.S. that as a result of the old system, it uh it uh has triggered what's called the Taylor Force Act, um, which was passed during the Trump administration that prevents direct payments to the PA from the U.S. as long as this old system of pay to slay is still on the books. Um they're hoping is once the U.S. certifies that it's not the case anymore, that then they can start to receive, if not funding from the U.S. government to the PA directly, there are other more roundabout ways to go about getting that um aid that are that will be easier to obtain once uh Taylor Force is found to no longer be triggered uh by the PA. Um so there's been months of the U the PA trying to implement this new system. They've rebranded an office that's called the basically the Institution for Empowerment um to head and be in charge of these welfare payments. Abbas put one of his main allies, Ahmed Majdalani, in charge of the in charge of this new body or this old new body. And they've been slowly taking in applications from Palestinians who are interested in this new welfare program. Um, but they haven't really had the the money to actually send payments out since they've finally set up the new program because the PA is so cash-strapped. Um the PA has been supposed to be receiving monthly payments, tax revenues, or I guess uh sorry, income, the Israel collects taxes on the PA's behalf uh and as as a part of the Oslo program. It's not a the PA is in a full state. Um and as a result, the Israel does this this job for it, and then those those taxes are transferred um to the PA each month, and it makes up like 60% of their budget. So it's a major part of how they're able to function. And without those funds, because Batsal Smotrich is responsible, the far the finance minister of Israel, who's not a big fan of the PA, has called for their collapse, um, is is in charge of these payments. He's actually been withholding them for several months since I think even June. Um and then even before that, there were months he was going without sending these payments um any and he reducts from them, arguing that some of that has to do with the payments that Israel makes to the that the PA makes to the prisoners. Um, but bottom line, the PA has not been getting a lot of this money and has been in a real financial crisis and has not been able to make these welfare payments. In recent months, they've gotten some extra help and they've finally are in a place where they think they are in the that they're able to start sending up welfare payments. And some people did get um their their stipends through this new system. However, uh what ended up happening, and this is why the finance minister was fired, is that some people, um actually, some prisoners and even prisoners who are newly uh sent to prison in Israel actually managed to receive the payments through the old mechanism. Um and this was flagged by an internal review that was ordered by folks who are, I think, back channels involved in these efforts. Um, and the review found this uh discrepancy. And because the finance minister is the one to sign off on these payments to the through the old system, I think he was the head that fell in this case. Um and and Abbas announced his firing last week. He didn't give a reason. So we were actually the ones that reported about what had actually gone on. Um, and then on Sunday, the PA kind of hinted at what was happening a little bit more detailed publicly with a statement saying that from now on and and even until now, all welfare payments have to come through this new empowerment body. Um, it cannot come through any other um sort of government office. I think the PA is trying to do a little bit of damage control. Uh when I reported on this last week, they argue that actually what Abbas did demonstrates that he's serious about this. Um, but it also shows that they're definitely under a lot of pressure from some of these prisoners' families who have been receiving um these allocations for quite some time. And for them to be just cut off, um, which is likely what will happen unless they qualify under the new criteria, um, is something that they're not obviously going to uh simply take lying down. And I would expect uh if the system is fully implemented, that we will see um a degree of protests against Abu Mazin and against the PA for this reform.

Shanie 26:58

Just to clarify, in terms of the new system that's in place, would it be similar to the way in the United States, if you were a murderer, you go to prison, your family, if they have need, still gets money. They're not getting money because you're a murderer, but the wife and children of a murderer are still going to be eligible for food stamps and whatever other welfare programs the country offers.

Jacob 27:18

Exactly. I would I wouldn't say I'm an expert in a welfare system in the US, but but yes, that is the idea that the way that the PAs explain uh this new reform, that that's they're trying to bring it in line with international standards.

Shanie 27:30

And there's some some sort of cycle here in terms of the lack of cash, right? Because they don't have cash to in to change their system necessarily. And on the other hand, Israel and the United States are withholding funds because they have not yet changed the system. So there's some kind of who's going to blink first here, maybe, but how they're going. Yeah, Tommy.

Jacob 27:50

Yeah, I think that the yes, Israel is using that sometimes as a reason for why it's withholding some of these funds, but it also I think Smolitch has is been determined to weaken the PA in any way he can. And he's done that through various steps as finance minister, which is a really, really key position for at giving him the tools to do so. Sometimes he's he's faulted the PA for the decisions by other countries to recognize a Palestinian state. Obviously, the PA is in contact with some of these countries, but it's the UK or or or France that made those decisions to um to recognize a Palestinian state. But Smolchitch decided in response to punish the PA by using that as an excuse to withhold these funds over the summer when those announcements were starting to be previewed. Um so the PA is really kind of taking it from all sides.

Shanie 28:35

Aaron Powell In addition to potentially likely, I don't know how to ostensibly uh winding down pay for slayer ending martyr payments. Um, are there any other is there any other evidence of reform in the Palestinian Authority that we should be looking at?

Jacob 28:49

I think uh just a couple days ago, President Abbas talked about that he had been in in contacts with UNESCO to try to bring the education system of the PA in line with international standards. This is something he also talked about in his UN speech. There was a conference just before the UN General Assembly about a two-state solution that was co-sponsored by Saudi Arabia and France. And Abu Mazin listed out the reforms that he's already taken and the reforms that he plans to take. So education reform, another one that I think holds a lot of credence in the international community due to fears that they've that there might be some amounts of incitement in the Palestinian education system. So his contacts with UNESCO would obviously be helping to address that. I think for Palestinians, though, the main thing they want to see is elections, uh, given that they haven't been held um since 2006-2007. And uh Abbas has promised them at times, has scheduled them and then canceled them. At this point, he's now on record saying he'll allow them within a year of the end of the war. So now we're currently in election year theoretically for the Palestinian Authority. Um, and I think there's going to be a lot of pressure internally for that to be that that pledge to be met. But obviously it brings about a whole can of worms. In terms of whether that could risk again empowering Hamas or other or other more hardline figures that are not as moderate relatively as Abbas is.

Settler Violence in the West Bank

Shanie 30:09

So let's look to the area that the PA actually controls and the West Bank. You used to cover settler violence and the West Bank in general as part of your beat. Tell me what's going on there. Are things heating up? Is there more or less terrorism from Palestinians against Israelis and vice versa? What are we seeing here?

Jacob 30:25

I think the what we've been reporting a lot about in the Times of Israel over the past month or so has been the settler by settler attacks against Palestinians that have been taking place during the olive harvest, which is an annual season that is really critical for the Palestinian economy, given that the olive harvest, I think it makes up a major part of kind of Palestinian businesses. It's one thing that they are able to maintain despite a lot of the limits of on movements throughout the West Bank that they've had to endure over the past two years. We're talking about like over a thousand checkpoints that have been put up due to concerns for Israeli security and the security of Israeli settlers. But with every year, I think you see a tax uh uptick during the harvest, but with the really the explosive, the explosion of outposts over the past two years since October 7th, there's I think dozens, if not over a hundred new outposts, and many of them are kind of farming outposts, which are basically the goal of them is to take over, to protect, as the way Israeli settlers say it, is to protect as much land in the West Bank as possible and prevent uh Palestinian incursion. But oftentimes it leads to simply their goal is to intimidate nearby settlers to even to even put push back or or limit their activity outside of their villages, not going towards the lands that they're trying to cultivate with these olive trees. Um and we've seen really near-daily attacks during the harvest. It was pretty much near-daily before, but I would say the the expansion expansiveness of these attacks has really been notable. Um there was one last week that involved over 100 people. There was this mass arson attack near Tulkarim where lots of buildings were and property was destroyed, several people were injured. Um, and the Israel, Israel is coming under more and more fire from even allies for the lack of uh actual enforcement on these attacks. Um we saw on Sunday Prime Minister Tinyao weigh in on this for the first time after really months, if not longer, of silence on this issue, um, saying that Israel will deal with it, but insisting that they're not a representative of the settler population. These are just a small minority. They're people coming from the outside and they're trying to give settlements and the settlement movement a bad name, but we'll make sure that everyone is dealt fairly under the law. The proof is whether or not they're actually arrests being carried out, and they're very, very limited. I think in the case of the uh mass attack near Tulkaram, there were four people initially detained by the IDF and passed over to the police, but then after police interrogations, three of them were released. So only one person out of over a hundred, and that's pretty standard. I mean, it's it's standard for nobody to be arrested, arrested. Um, what I often point to is this wild um reality right now, where the head, or I guess he's the former head of the police's West Bank Division, um, he is under investigation for ignoring settler violence in order to curry favor in the eyes of Itamar Bengvir, who's the minister in charge of police. Um the way he felt that he needed to uh act in order to ensure a promotion and save face with Bengvir was to ignore um settler violence. That's kind of the orders that they're taking from above, it seems. Um and he was put it under on leave as the investigation was ongoing. And he's actually even allowed to return to the force. I think he's given a new position for the time being. But the fact that he's even allowed to return, despite the allegations against him, is quite uh, I would say, damning. Um, but that's kind of the level of seriousness with which I would say this government has been taking this issue. Um, it's possible given that the U.S. has now weighed in a little bit. Secretary of State Marco Rubio did talk about the issue when he was asked and said, well, we're not, we'd hope it doesn't cause the Gaza ceasefire to fall apart. And we don't think it will, but of course we're a little bit uh we don't want to see those kinds of attacks happen. Um but he made a point of just praising Isaac Herzog, the president, and the IDF uh commanders who have condemned the phenomenon. Um so I don't wouldn't say there's massive concern. The Trump on his first day of office um canceled those sanctions that the Biden administration had put in place a year earlier against uh some of these violent settler extremists who have been involved in these attacks. Um I think the approach from the U.S. has been not to focus as much on this issue as the previous administration did.

Shanie 34:30

But obviously the Trump administration's deeply invested in the future of Gaza, a little bit less concerned with the with the West Bank. Would you say these issues are linked, though? Is there potential with what happens in the West Bank to influence what the future of Gaza?

Jacob 34:43

That's that was the question that Rubio was given last week when um when he was specifically raised the when the reporter asked him about the West Bank violence, he's like, Do you think this could uh harm the ceasefire? I I think there's always concern that the violence in the West Bank bubbles over, but but for a long time that hasn't happened. Um and those who have been constantly uh spreading alarm about the potential for a third intifada or just uh um mass violence uh at a larger scale that we haven't seen, that that hasn't proven to play out. Um, but obviously the the some of these ingredients are there. I mean, the fact that these attacks have been happening uh so regularly with near impunity, um, the fact that the Palestinian economy is so hobbled given the amount of checkpoints that prevent um freedom of movement, given the that you have all these hundreds of thousands of workers um from the that from these ra from from the PA that aren't able to work in Israel because of security concerns since October 7th, those work permits have stopped. And then the public employees for the PA that haven't been able to get paid due to the withholding of of the Palestinian tax uh monies that haven't gone in. Um so there are really uh challenging conditions that the PA is dealing with. Um it's trying to continue operating, um, and it's actually to a degree is continuing its security um coordination with Israel despite all that. Um, but no, these are not like the the ripe conditions for I think more uh calmer 10 uh times in the West Bank.

Shanie 36:08

Jacob, I was just wondering about this. I'm curious if you have an answer for me. There used to be pre-10-7 thousands and thousands of Palestinians illegally gunning into Israel every day for work purposes through gaps in the security barrier. Is that still happening or has there been like a huge crackdown on the gaps in the fence?

Jacob 36:26

Israel's tried cracking down on it, um, but it's still happening to a smaller scale. And it's also Israel still continuing to allow it at a smaller scale because they do feel like it's important for certain um businesses that they they that they allow this. Um Israel's trying to look elsewhere and assigned contracts with uh countries from the Far East to send foreign workers to replace some of these Palestinians. But um I think that's the preferred from the security establishment is trying to kill two birds with one stone, is that we allow this and it actually helps with our economy because it's cheaper labor and it also stabilize the Palestinian economy because it gives people jobs. Um, but obviously with the current political climate in Israel and after October 7th, the security climate, there's more pushback on that. Ironically, one of the few places where Palestinian workers have been allowed to continue uh working um has been in actually in the settlements, um, maybe in industrial zones, but because some of the legal, um given that the military is more in charge there and they're able to get around some of the politics behind this, that they've been actually quietly been allowing in some settlement areas, um, usually away from civilians, but still that's been happening quietly over the past uh couple of years, whereas it hasn't really been happening at that kind of scale inside the green line.

Shanie 37:36

Amazing. Okay, Jacobs,

What's to Come This Week

Shanie 37:38

what should we looking at for the next week? We'll be figuring out what's going on in the Secure UN Security Council, anything else we should be keeping our eye on?

Jacob 37:45

Yeah, Security Council vote. I think then we'll start seeing about talk about who will actually join this ISF, if the US can really cobble together anyone. I think we'll also see whether or not there's a solution to these fighters that are held up in Rafah under Rafah, whether they are going to actually be granted safe passage. Um, and of course, with this meeting that we have this week um between Mohammed bin Salman and President Trump in the White House, I'm sure there'll be uh uptick in the in and speculation about uh normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia that could happen tomorrow. I would probably maybe taper some of that expectation a bit. I think the PA, the Saudis are still going to insist on some sort of um pathway to a two-state solution that I don't think this Israeli government is willing to offer. Um, but um we'll have to see. Wonderful. Thanks so much for joining us, Jacob. Thanks for having me.

Shanie 38:36

Okay, thanks again to Jacob Maggot for his generous time and insights. This podcast was produced by Jacob Gilman and edited by Tracy Levy with additional support from Eden Jesselson. So special thanks to them and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a tax-deductible donation to Israel Policy Forum so that we can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening.