Neri: 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. As promised, we have one more episode for you before the end of the year, and it's a good one. Our dear friend Michael Milstein is back with us to talk all things Gaza. Where do things stand now on the ground after over two months of ceasefire, just ahead of next week's expected meeting in Florida between Prime Minister Benjamin Tanyahu and President Donald Trump? And before, what many people expect will be a move to phase two of the Gaza ceasefire deal in the new year. Lots to discuss with Michael, who is of course a colonel in the IDF Reserves and the head of the Palestinian Studies Center at the Diane Center at Tel Aviv University. Michel was also previously the head of the Palestinian Arena in military intelligence here in Israel and an advisor to the IDF general responsible for the Palestinian territories. This will actually be, in actual fact, our last episode of the year. So we'll see you all in 2026. But before we get to Michael, we have to send our thoughts and prayers and condolences to all those killed and injured in the horrific terror attack in Sydney, Australia, eight days ago. We're recording this on Monday evening Tel Aviv time, so Hanukkah just ended here in Israel. I think the memory of the tragic Sydney attack on the first night of Hanukkah 2025 will be with us for a very, very long time. After the attack, I saw an image shared online, which went viral. Or went viral again, it's not a new image, far from it. You already know the one. It's a black and white picture of a menorah sitting on a windowsill of an apartment, and in the background across the street, you can see a Nazi flag flying above a building. Turns out the picture was taken during Hanukkah 1931 in the northern German city of Kiel. What I didn't know until last week, though, is what the taker of the picture, Rachel Rachel Posner, the wife of the local rabbi, had inscribed on the back of the picture, the actual physical picture for those youngins listening. The inscription went thusly: Death to Judah, so the flag says. Judah lives forever, so the light answers. That's what Rachel wrote on the back of the picture, an act of what I can only describe as lyrical defiance. I never knew that. I never knew about the inscription. I also never knew what the fate was of the taker of this famous picture. So one deep dive later, last week, I found out. Rachel Posner and her husband, Rabbi Akiva Posner, and their three children fled Germany in 1933 and made their way to mandatory Palestine, later on to become the future state of Israel. They, the Posners, thankfully got out and were saved. Unlike millions of others who weren't so fortunate. Now, I'm telling you all of this, not as a warning to come make Aliyah, far from it, believe me. But I was struck really by the second half of the story of this famous menorah picture and the Nazi flag that seldom gets told. I didn't know about it. The Posnards found sanctuary when needed in the Holy Land, in the future Jewish state, when one of the most civilized and modern European states, Germany, descended into madness. And also, by the way, when much of the rest of the world barred its doors to the Jews, who were desperate to find such sanctuary. So that, in a nutshell, is the promise and ideal of Israel and of Jewish self-determination, and yes, of Zionism. Not the caricature that some outside of Israel would have you believe, especially these days, and also some inside of Israel as well, who have taken Zionism and turned it into something unrecognizable. May the memories of all those lives needlessly stop short, and tragically should stop short in Sydney, Australia. Be a blessing. Let's get to Michael Bilstein. Hi Michael, welcome back to the podcast.

Michael: 4:21

Hi, Neri. Thank you for having me again.

Neri: 4:24

Uh it's really our pleasure, Michael, uh, because last time you were on was way back in August, and a lot of things have changed and perhaps may still change uh in the coming days and weeks. So I really wanted to focus on Gaza and to have you back on to talk mostly about Gaza, I think, uh especially before uh Bibi Netanyahu heads to Florida uh to meet with Donald Trump yet again early next week, uh, and per perhaps before what many people imagine to be phase two of the Gaza ceasefire deal. So a lot to talk about uh in this episode with you, Michel, and you're the perfect person to get into these issues with. But I wanted to actually take you back uh about two and a half months uh to look at the deal itself that ended the fighting in Gaza, at least for now. Things didn't look all that promising back in back in August when we were chatting. Uh it was uh imminent escalation. Really, uh there was an operation into Gaza City uh in September, but really Donald Trump uh put an end to all of it uh quite suddenly. So were you surprised, number one, by the deal itself? Uh, and then number two, with the fact that we've had more or less phase one almost completed uh in the past, say, two months.

Michael: 5:39

Yes. And you know, as you mentioned, uh uh Neri, actually uh two and a half months after uh the ceasefire started, we we actually understand better uh what happened and what actually happened behind the scenes uh regarding the uh the ceasefire. And um first of all, I must say that personally I was not surprised uh because of the uh the ceasefire and because of the agreement uh of Hamas uh to accept the ceasefire because um and I will speak about it immediately. I always say that if Hamas will get a very serious guarantees uh about the end of the war, Hamas will not have any problem to to promote uh a ceasefire. And you know, we must be frank enough, I think, Mary, to admit um or or to speak about two points. First of all, I do think that there is a gap uh regarding the Israeli narrative about the end of the war. You know, many people in Israel, mainly because of political considerations, they describe the end of the war as a result of uh Israeli uh uh military pressure, and that Hamas actually uh became more flexible because of this military pressure. And you know, this is the point when I say let's be frank with ourselves and let's let's let's uh uh speak in a very clear manner. Actually, until the end of the world, Hamas didn't wave a white flag, and Hamas didn't release any hostage uh uh except uh Idan Alexander, uh, which was a kind of a gesture uh to uh to Donald Trump, to President uh Trump.

Neri: 7:18

The duel the duel is really American national that was taken down. Exactly the IDF soldier.

Michael: 7:24

I think it was uh five months ago. And by the way, Idan Alexander already joined uh uh he is really a heroin the IDF gang. Yeah, and it's really it's it's very impressive. And uh uh, you know, there is another another point that once again we need to be uh very frank about it. There is a gap between the declarations uh of both Donald Trump and Netanyahu about the end of the war and what happened on ground. Because, you know, I do remember how uh Hamas' response to the 20 uh points plan of Trump looked like. It was not a big yes, it was uh let's call it um very close to no. You know, Hamas didn't mention and still insist that they will not speak about uh disarmament of Gaza, of themselves. And uh it was from a Trump's point of view, it was enough. And it was uh uh the moment when he said, okay, it's enough, we will start uh uh the uh the agreement. And uh, you know, that's why I think that there is no big surprise. And of course, uh, if we really want to understand the uh reality in a very accurate manner, we cannot tell ourselves all kinds of fairy tales about how successful was the the campaign and that Hamas actually gave up. No, it was something else much more complicated. And you know, we we speak about another conceptual misconception that was created here in Israel. You know, many people, actually the majority here in Israel, um assessed that Hamas will never uh give up and will never release all the hostages. They will always keep the uh several hostages as uh as cards. And actually, we found out that Hamas released almost all the hostages. We still have uh uh one hostage uh one gwily, uh uh and and I think you know it's a kind of commitment. Uh it's about something that Israel must insist, but actually Hamas uh uh Hamas uh uh proved that you know they will not put any obstacle. And I I once again I I said before uh the agreement that I will not be surprised if Hamas will release all the hostages, and once again, only if they will got serious, strong guarantees about the end of the war and I assess Nelling that they got it. That they got it, right?

Neri: 10:00

Uh I think the Americans, via the Turks and the Qataris and the Egyptians, gave that guarantee to Hamas. Uh no doubt. No restart of the war. But on the issue of the deal, Michel, were you surprised that Israel was able to stay in 50% of the Gaza Strip, at least for the time being, that there the demand on Hamas's side wasn't for at least an almost full withdrawal?

Michael: 10:23

Yeah, you you know, this is, I think, you you know, when when we speak about uh achievements or points that uh Hamas uh uh showed uh flexibility, so we can say that uh here there was there was a kind of a change. But we must we must also be very accurate and once again very cautious. We describe uh this yellow line that uh actually split uh Gaza to two uh as a kind of a new Berlin war that will uh stay for for many years. And I'm not sure about it at all. You know, we spoke about phase two. I assess, I do not know for sure, but I assess that if President Trump is really eager and is really serious to promote phase two, maybe Israel will stand in front of pressure very soon to expand the withdrawal, and maybe we will find ourselves not in the yellow line, but in uh in the blue line, very close to the 67 borders. So many things that uh seem to us as strategic achievements uh more than two months ago, maybe they're actually a kind of provisional uh developments and maybe they will be changed very quickly.

Neri: 11:34

So we'll definitely get into what may happen next week at the Netanyahu Trump summit and what may or may not happen in the phase two, including potential further IDF withdrawal from Gaza. But reading between the lines, Michel, you're it's a veiled criticism of a lot of what we heard here in Israel, especially by say right-wing analysts and media commentators and even government officials saying, you know, we're agreeing to quote unquote stop the war for now, but but uh the deal allows us to stay in Gaza forever, but we can keep hitting Hamas uh whenever we want, uh, but et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. As in the deal uh was framed in a very positive light from the Israeli point of view, uh, including we just mentioned it offline. Uh a very prominent Netanyahu ally in the media said, Oh, there there will never be a phase two, so don't worry, yeah, right? This will this will be the status quo now uh forever. That's unlikely to be true.

Michael: 12:34

So uh Yeah, and I agree with you, Neri, and you know, I I I really think that there is uh a kind of uh fundamental problem here in Israel that we we cannot, or or it's it's very difficult for many of us to describe reality in the accurate uh in the accurate colors. And for example, if you will insist to um uh describe uh the end of the war as uh victory or achievement, you will not be able really to understand in a very accurate manner what is happening right now. You will not be able to uh promote very uh very uh accurate plans, and your whole strategy will be hollow. And you know, for example, you spoke about the end of the war. We must, for example, uh understand that the end of the war came uh almost immediately after the failed attack in Doha, in Qatar, and it was a result of this failed attack, and it was a result of American mass massive pressure on Israel to end the war. And you know, if we will still stick this uh uh um argument that uh the uh attack was wonderful and it was okay, no Hamas senior figure was killed in the attack, but it was very successful, and uh Qatar's uh uh impact in the Middle East now is much more limited, so you know it's a kind of an illusion, and we will never be able really to create uh to create a realistic strategy and to create a very fruitful, a very a very serious discourse between the government and the public here in Israel.

Neri: 14:17

Right, uh to level with the public, total victory, as the Prime Minister has been promising for for two years before the ceasefire uh was not achieved. And you you've been on this podcast enough over the past two years uh to explain how uh how decidedly unrealistic that uh bombastic.

Michael: 14:36

And you know, we we both remember, uh Neri, that we said that this term, total victory, it's something that you cannot really achieve. You know, it's not only a very uh tricky term, it's something that will really cause you uh a damage. And that's what happened, uh actually.

Neri: 14:54

Yeah, I mean it was useful for for this government politically to hold it out until uh it became uh non-operative when Donald Trump wanted to end the war before Hamas's you know complete destruction, complete uh demilitarization, all of that, which we'll touch touch on in just a second. Uh Michael, I'm curious to take us to the present. Uh so the ceasefire has been in place, like we said, for two and a half months. The IDF holds half of Gaza. Uh, this yellow line splits Gaza in half. The IDF sits on that line. Uh, one half of Gaza called uh the green zone, uh, unfortunately, by the Americans and others. Some call that new Gaza, that's Israeli held. Then you have the red zone, old Gaza, which is very much uh Hamas held and uh increasingly more so, I would say, since the ceasefire took effect. But I wanted to start with uh with the Israeli-held part of Gaza, New Gaza, uh the green zone. What have we been seeing now for the past two and a half months in terms of IDF activity? Uh obviously there are still ongoing Israeli strikes into Hamas-held territory. Um, give us a sense, really, what has been happening there before a potential phase two.

Michael: 16:05

Yeah. So, you know, actually, uh and I think that you you described it uh correct Nero. We are in a kind of a twilight zone. Between phase one, which was not really ended, and as we mentioned, it is still very important to make sure that Gangwili uh Gwili will return. And uh actually phase two um is in front of us, but we are not really inside, we are not getting into uh phase two. And uh actually, right now there are two kinds, or let's say two situations in Gaza, uh the Palestinian side and the Israeli side. And here we must speak about the data, the numbers behind the slogans and behind the terms. You know, when we speak about the Palestinian side, 47% of Gaza territory, in this of course, this is uh the territory that is being controlled by Hamas, actually 99.99% of the Palestinians they live there. Actually, all the Palestinians are under Hamas control, and they are also under Hamas uh uh capacity, capability to um shape their consciousness, their minds. And the rest 43 uh uh percent uh they are under Israeli uh the Israeli uh control uh 53 percent, sorry. Uh and actually we're speaking about almost an empty an empty uh land. I mean, several thousands of Palestinians living over there, all kinds of militias, gangs, uh clans, uh of course, uh collaborators with Israel and their families. And you know, if we were uh all these ideas of creating uh a Gaza which will uh look uh look like a Singapore, and the other one that will be a kind of Somalia of Mogadisho, this is a good plan, this is actually a kind of an illusion. Because right now uh there are two kinds of Gaza, but one is the real one, I mean under Hamas control, and the other one is a kind of provisional provisional land. And uh, as you mentioned, every day there are clashes, and every day, mainly uh nearby the yellow uh yellow line, uh IDF attacks um Hamas members or Hamas cells that uh the which uh actually trying to cross uh uh the line. So it's not a very stable ceasefire, and there is an attempt of Israel to shape the the um uh the rules of of the game right uh right now. For example, the uh killing of Ray Side, uh number two in a Hamas military wing uh two almost two weeks ago. Uh it was an attempt to show that Israel can commit in Gaza the same policy that we promote in Lebanon. I mean that we attack any kind of threat or or or uh a challenge that we will identify, even if if it's not a kind of a ticking bomb. So, you know, when I'm trying right now to focus on the Palestinian side, on Hamas side, and once again I think it's a very important uh point in we must say the truth, we must be frank, and we we must be very accurate. Yeah, in this territory, Hamas is the prominent player. Hamas is the one who rules, who manages this uh uh uh area, the public sphere, of course, all the all the places, all the sites where uh consciousness is being created. I mean, masks and media and schools, which are most of them are ruined, but Hamas actually reopened the education system and the universities, they are all held by Hamas, and there is a very Important effort that Hamas promotes to actually a kind of a reconstruction of the military wing. By the way, right side, he was killed. He was responsible for this effort. I mean, once again, to uh create units, to nominate new new um new commanders, to uh uh recruit new new members, and uh right now it's almost number one mission, number one target from a Hamas point of view. So uh, you know, two um two years and two months after this war started, right now, and it's very sad to say that, but uh we must uh admit that Hamas is the one who rules, who who controls the uh Palestinian side. Right.

Neri: 20:54

We have to be uh clear-eyed, and that's why we love to have you on, Michael. Um I wanted to unpack a few things there, just starting from the from the Israeli-held part of Gaza. So we see uh continued efforts to find and locate and destroy tunnels, still, like you said, two and a half two over two years after the war started. Still tunnels, by the way.

Michael: 21:16

You know, Larry, but by the way, you mentioned tunnels according to IDF. IDF reports right now, IDF destroyed only something between 40 to 45 percent of the tunnels in Gaza. Uh so you know we still have a lot of a lot of uh work in uh regarding this uh this issue in Gaza.

Neri: 21:37

No, it's uh it's truly mind mind-boggling the extent of what Hamas built there over what 17 years of rule. Um but the point is that this is kind of areas like Rafah, like Betchanoun, like Sajaya, which Israel has gone into multiple times over the past two years, and still tunnels are being found, tunnels are being blown up. So I think it's very important to kind of emphasize that for our listeners and viewers. But I'm curious why why the continued clashes on the yellow line between IDF and Hamas? I mean, what is what is Hamas trying to accomplish by getting near to the yellow line, by trying to cross the yellow line? How do you understand that as a military professional?

Michael: 22:18

So I I I I assess that there are two reasons or two uh two uh uh motives behind the Hamas uh Hamas uh uh efforts. First of all, um maybe uh they are trying, you know, to get back to all kind of uh military sites that they they still got in the in the pal in the Israeli uh side and to get out of them, you know, weapons if there there is a kind of uh weapon storage or uh a place that they know that they they uh they're there are still rockets or RPGs or or any kind of rifles, they want to get them out. And you know, we mentioned that Israel is trying to uh shape the rules of the game. So I think that Hamas also uh has an attempt uh to do that, and you know, for example, to determine to to uh to um make all kinds of violation or to promote all kinds of violations and to see what will be the Israeli response for that. And uh, you know, right now, and I'm quite satisfied that Israel is serious, is very serious about it. I mean, every time when when IDF uh or Shinbet uh recognize uh a kind of violation, uh uh, you know, uh crossing the yellow, uh the yellow line, of course, uh a plan to attack uh Israel by rockets or by any other means, and even uh weapon smuggling, Israel attacks. By the way, exactly like it like it is being done in Lebanon against uh Hezbollah.

Neri: 23:50

Right.

Michael: 23:51

And uh this is the right thing to do. The main question here, and uh, we saw what uh President Trump's uh response was uh after uh right side was killed, was a kind of uh you know, question mark about the future.

Neri: 24:05

The Americans weren't weren't too thrilled. Uh they weren't too thrilled about it.

Michael: 24:09

And and this is the main, you know, um it's a kind of a challenge and a kind of dilemma for Israel uh regarding the future. Will we be able? I mean, will Israel be able really to repeat this uh this uh attack of uh, for example, against senior figures in Hamas in the future? Will President Trump will permit Israel to promote uh such uh such a move? For example, if he will announce that uh phase two already started and we are in a kind of a new reality. I'm quite sure that uh you know um there must be a kind of a very uh very serious dialogue between Israel and the American administration about it uh before we will find ourselves in all kinds of uh very uh problematic situations uh when we will see Hamas getting stronger, we will see you know, you know, new headquarters, new commanders, new units, and we will not be able to attack them. And uh we actually will be uh weak we will witness uh a kind of uh recover or a kind of reconstruction of Hamas uh in uh in Gaza.

Neri: 25:18

So this brings you to my follow-up question about the present and also looking at the future, Mikhail. Look, uh Hamas crawled out of their tunnels, and like you said, they reasserted control and especially over the population and over the economy, over the schools and mosques, um, and they also went after any opponents and dissidents, and we saw very gruesome uh videos and images of people getting executed on the streets. So is there is there no pocket of resistance, opposition in in old Gaza or even new Gaza to Hamas rule? I mean, uh the uh the organization has been weakened over two two plus years of of fighting the IDF. But you're saying that you know they're they're I don't want to say back to back to business as usual, but uh they're reconstituting themselves.

Michael: 26:08

Yeah. And you know, uh I I will answer in a very, very short uh uh manner, uh Neri. No, Hamas today has no challenge, I mean no serious challenge, of course, not in the Palestinian side. And you mentioned all these brutal executions of uh, by the way, there they were not only collaborators, uh there were all kinds of uh clans and gangs that um uh dared to challenge Hamas during uh the war. They they uh were involved in looting uh humanitarian uh aid and they uh uh created all kinds of uh you know uh independent enclaves, mainly in Gaza City and Hamas, immediately after the cease uh fire started, they uh uh made it very clear. Everyone who is involved in such uh such uh uh uh th in such things, he will be executed. So right now we cannot speak about any kind of enemy, any kind of rival uh to Hamas in the Palestinian side. In the Israeli side, and right now, you know, at this point I will be very c I was very critical and and I will be very critical.

Neri: 27:18

Continue to be critical.

Michael: 27:19

You know, there yeah, you know, without criticism, we cannot really, once again, uh promote any kind of realistic uh policy. Uh about a year ago, Israel decided to promote a kind of project of supporting uh supporting clans, supporting gangs, supporting militias like the Abu Shabab in a Rafah area, and uh there was a kind of ideology behind this uh project that maybe they will be the uh alternative to Hamas, they will uh represent a kind of a new ideas, new ideology, much more moderate, and they will bring uh peaceful, calm, new, positive uh uh reality to um uh to Gaza. And you know, it's okay to to to uh cause a damage to your enemy, but you know, don't don't don't create illusions. All these gangs, or actually almost all these gangs, first of all, they are very weak. We speak about something between several hundreds to you know the maximum several thousands of uh of members. Uh I mean a lot of groups, they are not united. All of them are their their basic reputation in the Palestinian discourse in the Palestinian street is very negative as collaborators. Many of them were involved in criminal activities, many of them were involved in terror attacks against Israel. And you know, I really don't understand how in the Israeli decision uh making uh circles, we we we decided that yeah, we uh they will they will uh challenge uh uh Hamas. And you know, it shows I I think uh uh this is my assessment, uh Neri, it's a kind of a proof or reflection to two problems. First of all, is that we learn nothing from history, you know, in our own history, in the Israeli history, we had uh uh many many cases like uh the Abu Shabaab, I mean the uh the Falans in Lebanon and the South Lebanese army and the association of the villages in the West Bank, and you know, they all failed, they all collapsed. And and you know, uh it was not a surprise for someone who insisted to learn from history. And the second thing, you know, it seems that uh during the war, maybe the last year of the war, Israel actually or the Israeli policy relied on fantasies instead of realistic uh strategy. You know, the the issue with the clans, with the militias, was one of many fantasies uh uh in the Israeli uh strategy. We we are speaking also about the GHF, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, collapsed totally two minutes after the ceasefire started. Uh the um the uh belief that uh Trump's vision or or uh you know the original vision of Trump to uh evacuate all the Palestinians from Gaza and to create a kind of uh Mediterranean Riviera in Gaza. So there are many people in Israel who still believe that yeah, it's very likely to uh promote to implement this idea and a humanitarian city. And you know, I think very that in a deeper manner it showed or it's a kind of um a reflection of the fact that the basic failures, the roots of the failure of October the 7th was never investigated. I mean there was no commission of inquiry. And if you will not really understand what were the roots of the failure, we you will repeat the the these failures, you will copy them, and you will find yourself once again in new disasters. And I think that if you will uh check carefully and analyze the roots of these of the new failures, I mean the gangs and the militias and the GHF and the humanitarian city, you will see that uh many of them are exactly like the roots of October the 7th. I mean, the belief that you can engineer uh reality and that you can really um uh change the minds of uh people with uh uh by using uh uh money and economy. And you know, it really it it it shows that you didn't really improve your basic understanding about Hamas, about Gaza Street, about the Middle East.

Neri: 31:49

So that's both a very good and very bad transition to uh look ahead at the future.

Speaker : 31:58

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Neri: 32:55

Very curious. I mean, maybe you already gave the answer, but in terms of this US-led push to actually get phase two going, and everyone that I've spoken to, at least on the American side, is adamant that there will be a phase two, uh, whether in terms of governance, the establishment of a board of peace uh to help run Gaza, the raising of a multinational peacekeeping force, the uh ISF, the International Stabilization Force, that countries will volunteer troops and that it will be deployed also in January, um, reconstruction, Hamas disarmament, further IDF withdrawal. I mean, all of this uh according to the actual plan will be part of phase two.

Michael: 33:42

Now, that's right.

Neri: 33:44

Uh, you know, the Americans are are nothing if not uh big thinkers, and so they they remain optimistic. But in terms of our actual lived reality in the Middle East, Michael, I mean, you know, just your first initial thoughts about what the Americans want to do as part of phase two, are you um cautiously pessimistic? Are you very pessimistic? I mean, uh, you know, I'm shading, I'm shading your answer a little bit, but I want to get your your professional sense of okay, uh, in January we may see some movement towards something. Uh, will it work?

Michael: 34:19

So, you know, instead of being pessimistic or very pessimistic, I would try to be realistic. Okay. You know, the only one who will uh um decide if there will be phase two, uh, or if phase one ended and we are getting into phase two is Donald Trump. And we all already uh understood that um sometimes the you know the way that he uh he understands reality is quite different from the Israeli, uh from the Israeli way. I mean, right now there is I think that you cannot hide it, there is a gap between the Israeli and the American uh stand regarding uh the future of Gaza. Right now, the main uh the main uh willingness of Netanyahu is to return to war. I mean, if there was a kind of a green light uh from uh Donald Trump, I think that tomorrow, yesterday, he he would uh return to war, and maybe even uh as Smotlich, the the minister here in Israel or Bend Vir, they they uh still preach to occupy all Gaza, to to annex uh many many uh parts of Gaza. This is their basic wish. But on the other side, the Americans, I mean Donald Trump, he is eager to show an achievement, historical, strategic achievement. And for example, there were very uh a lot of gaps in this uh in this uh in this uh situation. We we mentioned before uh uh Neri that even after Hamas answered or uh uh sent their response to to uh Donald Trump and said we will never give up our weapons, Donald Trump said, It's enough for me, we will continue, we will promote the ceasefire. There were many other violations of the of this uh during the ceasefire. I mean, you know, three IDF soldiers were killed in in uh um clashes inside Gaza in Rafah area. And Donald Trump, I mean the president of the United States, said, no, it's uh it's not the end of the ceasefire. We will continue. There were several problems, but we will uh we will take uh take care uh of them. And right now I think that we here in Israel need to understand that once again the Americans are eager. I mean, the American administration is eager to promote phase two, even if there will be a lot of gaps and a lot of problems. For example, when we speak about the international forces that will be or that that are planned to be deployed in Gaza, so you know the the basic image was uh uh divisions and thousands of soldiers chasing after uh Hamas, getting into the tunnels, taking the weapons, killing them. No, it won't happen. Maybe there will be, you know, much more limited uh uh units. The main problem, by the way, uh is what if some of these units will be Turkish. You know, Turkey right now, Erdogan declares about it almost uh uh almost uh two or three months. He's ready to send his soldiers to Turkey, to Gaza. And you know, Netanyahu uh described this issue as a red line, but I didn't hear the American administration repeat this uh this Israeli uh uh argument. I mean, it's a kind of uh an open an open case, a kind of a question mark. Regarding the disarmament of Hamas, I think that this is you know the most uh complicated uh uh even an obstacle. Right now, and you know, you only need to hear what Hamas uh leaders uh say in on public. And they they declare in a very clear manner, we will never give up the weapons. And here there is a kind of uh a trick. I mean, the um all the uh uh those who are maybe affiliated with uh Hamas like Turkey and like uh like Qatar, but also Egypt, they are trying to find a compromise. They also want to to preserve the ceasefire, right? And they are trying to uh to create a kind of a new equation. We will not or I I heard uh several uh ministers of Turk of both Turkey, Qatar and Egypt uh last week, and they said, listen, it it's impossible to convince Hamas to to give up the weapons. It it won't happen. But we can convince them to uh give up the heavy weapons, i uh which means rockets, maybe drones, and by the way, they they almost don't have it anymore.

Neri: 38:56

Right.

Michael: 38:57

Uh and uh they will be able to keep the other weapons, uh rifles, pistols, uh grenades, and Hamas didn't say no. And I think that they will try to convince President Trump that this is a good answer, and this is the implementation of what you, President Trump, said. And uh there is another point, the third one, and this is the establishment of uh of a local uh government in in Gaza. And this this point is, you know, from Hamas' point of view, there is no problem at all. They already announced that they are ready uh to accept any kind of a new regime in Gaza, Palestinian one, of course, and they will not be a part of it of that. And you know, they they they they agree or they're ready to accept that only because one thing they assess that it's not a threat from uh from their point of view. I mean, they want to um uh uh establish uh the same model as Hezbollah in Lebanon. I mean a kind of a very weak uh uh formal government. And behind scenes, they will be able to preserve their impact, to preserve their weapons. And I think this is the uh the target that the Hamas want to promote.

Neri: 40:11

So a state within a state, a Hezbollah model. Uh, yes, uh I they've been saying for years, you know, they're willing to hand over the keys to Gaza to let someone else pay the pay the civil servants and keep the lights on, uh, let them focus on what they want to focus on. But I'm curious and pay. And pay and pay for everything. Right, right, right. I'm curious, Mikhail. Um, you know, so this Egyptian idea of uh going after the demilitarization and demobilized demobilization of the heavy weapons, right? Will that not be good enough for for both Israel and for you in terms of you know reaching the goal of disarmament, which you know, even the Americans, the ever-optimistic Americans, say, okay, it's a it's a precondition for for everything else that we want to do in Gaza, you know, real disarmament or at least demilitarization of Gaza, and there is a difference. So is this Egyptian and slash other idea uh not good enough? Or like you said, is it is it a trick?

Michael: 41:11

We we said actually since the beginning of the war, Neri, uh, that um you know we we always want to be realistic, and we actually we do understand that almost since the beginning of the war, Israel stands in front of a T-junction with only two options. The two are bad, and we need to to uh to choose the least worse alternative. And right now, there are two alternatives. First of all, to occupy all Gaza as a small rich and bank vir uh demand, and uh, you know, two months ago it was a kind of uh okay dilemma. Right now, when Donald Trump uh says one big no about this uh option, it's even risky. Uh I mean this option is very risky, and not only because of the the um uh uh all the uh the things or the damage that will cause to Israel from the uh economic, political, even the security uh points of view.

Neri: 42:11

To restarting the war and going in and reoccupying everything. And and as the Prime Minister here has said, uh you know, disarming Hamas uh either the easy way or the hard way. Uh so I think that's what he's alluding to, right? A renewed offensive to get the job done to achieve total victory.

Michael: 42:27

Absolutely. Uh maybe you will be able to implement this uh uh target of uh you know eradicating the governmental and the military capacities of Hamas, but you will pay such a heavy uh price. So I'm not sure it's uh it's it's really worth it. And the other option, and uh, you know, I'm full of question marks and I'll be I will be very cautious about and of course it's not the ideal, uh not kind of utopic solution, is to um accept uh phase two uh uh which will rely on the Egyptian ideas and uh uh uh you know of governmental of sorry uh a new government, which let's be uh honest, it would be a kind of cosmetic cover, uh and Hamas actually will be able to stay and to uh even to be powerful in in Gaza. But I think that at this point, after we described quite sad and negative situation, Israel needs to insist on four principles and to make sure that they they will be kept. First of all, the freedom of action. I mean that Israel, exactly like in Lebanon, will be able to attack any kind of uh threat, uh and and not only taking bombs. And uh I think that the killing of right side two weeks ago was a very good example for that. I think that Israel must insist, must, that uh many American forces will control Philadelphia Road, I mean the borderline between Gaza and uh and uh Sinai. You know, this was the gate that was used by Hamas to smuggle uh you know a huge arsenal of rockets and uh and other uh and other uh weapons. And you know, this was the measure, this was the the way that uh they enabled them to turn themselves to an army. Right. So I I think that you know we cannot speak, of course, not about uh uh Palestinian control over there, but on serious American control in Philadelphia road and in Rafah border crossing. I think there are two uh there are two vetoes that uh Israel must uh must uh keep. First of all, a veto regarding um any figure that uh will be nominated to the uh to the Palestinian government in Gaza, and that Israel will find and will will show that uh is uh affiliated with Hamas or maybe even a member of Hamas. And the other thing, I mean the other veto is regard is regarding the international forces. For example, we we mentioned the Turks, Israel must insist that Turkey will not be you will not see Turkish units, Turkish soldiers, Turkish uh uh weapons nearby the the Israeli uh Palestini the Israeli uh Palestinian border. I think it's it's a kind of a risk. And I think that if Israel will um promote a clever, flexible, realistic policy, of course, a dialogue, by the way, not only with the American administration, but also with Egypt, maybe Saudi Arabia. So maybe we can we can implement these four uh four principles. And you know, another thing uh Neri, I think that if Israel will uh accept this very complicated situation in Gaza, it will enable Israel to uh promote uh efforts uh regarding two other strategic threats. I mean Lebanon and Iran. You know, you cannot really uh uh promote uh three arenas and three conflicts in the same time and insist that you will uh you in in in every arena you will implement all the goals you want. Right now, I think that Israel needs to to make it into to uh uh prefer or to uh claim that yeah uh that that Iran right now is the f the is the first priority from its uh strategic point of view, and then Lebanon and then Gaza. But if we really want to focus and we really want that there will be a kind of uh international support and of course internal support of any future campaign, any future uh uh military effort in Iran and in Lebanon, so we must must promote much more clever policy regarding uh Gaza.

Neri: 47:08

Very, very interesting and and also a good point. You know, after two years of a multi-front war, you know, I don't know if it was sustainable a few months ago before the ceasefire, but to have it kind of be open-ended indefinitely, uh it seems seems like a lot to ask. Uh, although, you know, as as you know firsthand, and as uh I've I've heard as well, um, you know, I have uh friends who have been called up to reserves, whether in Gaza or in Syria. Still. So the war isn't over for them or their families. No.

Michael: 47:39

It seems to me, you know, I always describe it in Aries a kind of um a roller coaster here. I mean the life in Israel, like a roller coaster which never stops. You know, every day there is uh there is a new surprise, a new a new uh a new drama. So it seems that uh we're not in the uh we're even not close to the end of uh all these uh things. But once again, you know, and this is my personal opinion and Ari, it's better to be realistic and and sometimes to be very flexible than to be just and to uh you know to demand that in every place and in every time you will implement all the goals you want. As we saw, sometimes it's only illusions.

Neri: 48:26

Right. Uh only illusions, um and also sometimes uh purposefully put out there as illusions for public consumption, whether here in Israel or or in other places, in terms of what uh what's either happening on the ground or um what's been achieved. Um no need to expand on that. But uh I'm curious, Michael, in in the vetoes that you listed, there's one veto that we've heard consistently from this Israeli government about any future post-war arrangement for Gaza, and that's a veto over any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Um, do you see that continuing to be the case? Because, as you know, as uh maybe our listeners and viewers are also aware, the veto of the Israeli government over any PA role is a major impediment, major bottleneck for greater Arab involvement in, say, Reconstruction or the international peacekeeping force. Um, and yet so far Netanyahu seems to actually be holding to that line. Uh, do you see him bending at all?

Michael: 49:33

Uh you know, uh uh we must once again uh admit, uh Neri, that uh Israel and Netanyahu, they are not the ones who decide about uh about, for example, future involvement of the PA in Gaza. The one who really decides about it, and of course it will be a dialogue, and of course uh there will be a kind of uh uh discourse uh between the sides is Donald Trump. And you know, we learned during the last two months that sometimes uh President Trump uh is taking care about American interests, and uh there is, you know, the there were several people here in Israel who created the conceptual misconception, a new one, that uh Donald Trump will uh permit Israel to do everything. And we saw several times regarding the Palestinian uh issue that uh, for example, President Trump said one big no about the ideas of annexation uh in the in the West Bank. He also, when he um when he uh uh presented his uh 20 20 uh points plan in the UN Security Council, he spoke about Palestinian state. He spoke about paving the way Palestinian state. And you know, we see that there are several gaps, maybe by the way, growing gaps between the American administration and the relations between Washington and the Arab world and Israel. And I'm quite sure that uh, you know, as you mentioned, Netanyahu he said no to Hamas and no to Abbas, Abu Maz. Mahmoud Abbas, yeah. But yeah, but maybe, maybe President Trump will be convinced by the Saudis, by the Egyptians, that um a positive future scenario in Gaza must rely on the PA. And I think that it will be one big dilemma. And I think that you know, uh if President Trump will uh push this uh idea strong enough, I think that Israel will have to accept that. You know, maybe there will be all kind of uh I mean all kinds of um tricky ways to describe uh local government uh with uh with a symbolic relation to the PA or things like that. But finally, and you know, I think that it uh and personally, this is my opinion, it should be Israeli interest to to push the the PA to Gaza. I I I I'm I'm not naive. I I I really don't think uh that Abu Mazin is is um is capable to to solve all the problems of Gaza. By the way, he he barely controls the West Bank. But symbolically, it would be very good to uh promote such a new alternative in Gaza instead of the clans, instead of the militias, instead of the vacuum that many people in Israel spoke about, and of course uh it's better than uh Hamas.

Neri: 52:41

Yeah, uh I think you told me way back when, Michael, that essentially there are only two kinds of affiliations in Gaza. You're either Hamas or Fatah. Fatah is uh the the movement that controls the Palestinian Authority. Uh very few others. Yeah, the ruling party. Um, and very few others are independence. Uh and yes, it would solve a lot of diplomatic headaches in terms of post-war Gaza, but it would cause Netanyahu a lot of domestic political headaches. Uh, I think looking ahead to next month, I think the biggest challenges for Netanyahu in terms of his own political position here in Israel. Uh, number one, further withdrawal of the IDF, because he's promised uh a robust Israeli presence in Gaza near, you know, forever. And that may not that may not be the case, as we discussed before, and any role for the PA, because he's been adamant for two years, or over two years, that uh no Hamas and no Abbas. Uh on those two issues, I'm I'm gonna be watching what happens in Mar-a-Lago very closely uh early next week. Um, Michael, before we leave, I wanted to actually talk about the Lebanon front with you. Um we hear more and more chatter uh from here in Israel about the possible quote-unquote need to escalate uh attacks in Lebanon, uh, because the Lebanese army isn't getting the job done uh disarming his balah in Lebanon as part of uh the ceasefire deal that ended the war there uh back in November of 2024, um, and that Israel is willing to kind of escalate in Lebanon even at the risk of uh multiple days of say open warfare. So, uh how seriously do you assess this uh Israeli threat of doing more militarily in Lebanon and the threat of escalation really uh on the Northern Front after uh, you know, most of the attention of the past year has not been on Lebanon, it's been in Gaza and then in Iran, uh also to a certain degree in the West Bank. Uh so Lebanon kind of got lost in the shuffle for a year plus. Uh, is it going to make a comeback?

Michael: 54:43

Uh it's a very, very uh serious dilemma, and I'm I'm really concerned about what is happening in Lebanon, uh Nerdi. You know, first of all, I I think, and by the way, many Israelis think that uh the campaign in Leban uh against Hezbollah was the greatest strategic achievement of Israel during the war. I mean, Hezbollah was really number one enemy of Israel uh on the eve of October the 7th. And you know, it was this organization uh was almost smashed during the war. The military achievement was was really dramatic, and all the operations were really brilliant. And we need to preserve this uh this achievement. And uh we saw, I mean Israel uh witnessed during uh the the year uh since the uh the um ceasefire in Lebanon last uh November that uh although uh this organization, I mean Fisbalah, suffered really very, very severe damage, the this organization is trying to recover. He finds ways to get uh Iranian financial and military uh uh support. And I think that Israel cannot allow allow this uh this scenario, and of course cannot uh cannot wait for the Lebanese army. Uh it's one big disappointment, by the way. I mean, uh there were so many hopes that Joseph Aun, the new president and the new military and the new government and the American support, they will enable this uh this um uh entity, I mean the the government of Beirut to uh promote successful uh moves against Hezbollah, but you know, unfortunately they were all failed. I really hope that the diplomatic political efforts that are being promoted right now, mainly by the way, by the by the American administration, will uh succeed to uh promote I I I I I will I will explain explain what what is the target and what is the solution, I think, for the uh problem of Lebanon and to make sure that South Lebanon, between the river of Delitani and the border, the Israeli border, will be clean of Hezbollah, will be clean of military threats of uh Hezbollah. And I think that Israel needs to give the uh political, diplomatic effort a chance, uh maybe something will happen. Because you know, I don't think that Hezbollah right now really uh wants a dramatic uh uh or or broad uh escalation. But if not, and it if it will not succeed, I think that Israel will have no choice but to uh promote ground maneuver, limited one, uh, to uh to the uh places nearby the border, to South Lebanon, to make sure that all the places nearby the border they are clean of uh threats. And I think that in order to promote this dramatic move, we first of all must have a kind of uh internal legitimacy. And I'm quite sure that the Israeli public stands behind uh such a move, uh in contrary to Gaza.

Neri: 58:06

Right.

Michael: 58:06

And of course, we need international support and mainly American support, and uh we are getting back to Gaza. We will not be able to get such a support, and also, of course, the support that is needed uh in order to promote uh moves against Iran if we will still be very stubborn and we will stick in all kinds of um not very important uh issues regarding uh Gaza. So, you know, you need to maneuver and you need once again to prefer and to uh to um uh determine what are the first priority uh uh targets, arenas. And once again, I do think that Lebanon and Iran they are the most important right now, and only after that, Gaza, and of course, you know, we can speak after that about Syria and Yemen and even the West Bank. But uh, first of all, the two arenas that were left open, I mean Iran and Lebanon, we must make sure that we will not return to uh the same period like uh on the eve of October the 7th.

Neri: 59:17

So uh with that uh very sober assessment, uh we'll have to end it there, Michael. I think we could go for another half an hour just talking about Lebanon and and Iran like we did in Gaza, but but uh we'll save that for next time. This is the the uh last episode of of 2025. So uh, you know, we were all hoping for let's say a quieter and saner 2026. Sure, but uh we could only hope, I suppose.

Michael: 59:42

Let's hope.

Neri: 59:43

Let's hope. Uh so thank you as always, Michael, and uh we'll talk to you soon.

Michael: 59:46

Thank you once again for having me and everything.

Neri: 59:49

My pleasure. Take care. Okay, thanks again to Michael Milchin, as always, for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor, Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer, Ed. Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. To the season, as they say, so do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keeping a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about. Including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening and a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year upcoming to all those celebrating.