Neri: 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Crazy and tempestuous times are here again, specifically vis-a-vis Iran. And to help us make sense of how all this looks from Israel, we're joined once again this week by my good friend Jakov Lapin, a military and strategic affairs analyst and a veteran defense correspondent here in Israel. Jakov and I discussed where we stand at present in the US-Iran crisis, what President Donald Trump is or is not liable to do, and whether Israel is indeed ready for another round or more with Iran if it comes down to it. It was a terrific conversation as always, attempting to cut through the rapid-fire news cycle and, well, general hysteria on this end and in other places as well, about a looming US-Iran war and maybe beyond. But first, a few thoughts from me. So we're recording this on Tuesday afternoon Tel Aviv time, uh, in case something happens between now and when this podcast goes up, which, uh, judging by the pace of world events, could happen, but hopefully not. It's a fluid situation, as the professionals like to say. Especially so the middle of last week, when a U.S. strike on Iran was reportedly and apparently fairly imminent, uh, in particular late Wednesday and overnight into Thursday, when things looked quite imminent. But that night, uh, as all of us in this business were still monitoring the situation and in touch with various sources, and in general on hide and alert, a soccer game or a football game for some was played here in Tel Aviv. Hipool Tel Aviv versus Maccabi Tel Aviv, the Tel Aviv Derby, uh in a State Cup round of 16 match at Bloomfield Stadium in Jaffa, right here in Tel Aviv. So there I was working, uh so to speak, from my couch Wednesday night with the game on TV, uh, please don't tell my bosses. And a colleague in Europe uh sent a message asking whether it was true, as they had heard, that Israel had suddenly closed down its entire airspace, which would have been an ominous sign. So I replied back that the airspace uh over Israel was definitely still open, uh, that 30,000 people were currently watching a soccer match in an open air stadium in Tel Aviv that night. Uh, and in general, the IDF Home Front Command had issued no new instructions or restrictions on the public. Uh, fine. But uh then I got to thinking a bit more as I sat there on my couch watching this match, and trust me, working as well. Uh the people of Iran were on the streets courageously and bloodily confronting a theocratic regime with the internet blocked out, as we know, and the entire country over there preparing for, well, likely war with the US, while on the other side of the Middle East, a soccer game was being held where you had Jews and Arabs and Africans and European players uh all on the pitch at the same time, where you had women and girls in the stands watching. Uh yes, it was mostly young men, but definitely some women and girls as well in the stands in Bloomfield. Uh, and where you also had a transgender referee overseeing all of it. It's true. Sapir Berman is her name. Uh, I'm not kidding when I say that she was world-class, absolutely a world-class referee uh in how she managed all the players and coaches in a very high-profile and very high-pressure environment. Uh, probably the biggest match in Israeli soccer, Israeli football, uh, and also in the decisions that she made on the pitch. Uh, at one point she sent off one of Maccabi's star players, uh, and no one could or did argue her decision because it was the right decision. So, uh, what does this all mean? Uh, other than the fact that I want to turn Israel policy pod into a part-time football or soccer pod, but uh I'm not allowed to do that. So here we are. But honestly, and all kidding aside, what does it all mean? Uh, I'm not entirely sure, but it's not nothing. Uh it's easy to criticize Israel, uh, and believe me, we do it on this podcast every week for things like how the conflict with the Palestinians is handled, for the great dysfunction, shall we say, of this current Israeli government, for really a million and one things uh every day of every week, but we should also not lose sight of this country's many, many positive facets and positive attributes. Uh obviously, this is just one soccer batch played last week in Tel Aviv, but coming as it did in the middle of the crisis with Iran, it was hard not to draw some comparisons. Uh in Israel, we have, for instance, 24-7 electricity and clean running water and a functioning, if not booming, economy, even after two years of war. Uh, and we have women's rights and LGBTQ rights and a lot of other things that they currently don't have in places like Iran. And it was also hard not to think, uh, again, as I was sitting on my couch last Wednesday night, of what this country, Israel, uh, would look like if the far right and ultra-orthodox had even more power than they already do. Uh, and also what Israel could look like if the forces of moderation and liberalism and democracy are able somehow to regain power. And also, on a more ominous note, the implications for this country if they can't. So, with all that said, let's get to Yaakov Labin. Hi, Yaakov. Welcome back to the podcast. Hi, Neri, it's great to be with you again. Uh, it's really my pleasure to have you back on, Yaakov. It's uh it's been too long, but I thought this week was uh especially important and relevant uh to get your expertise uh and really to give our viewers and listeners basically uh informed on-the-ground perspective from here in Israel about what the Iran crisis looks like uh and what we may be looking at maybe in a few days, maybe in a few weeks, uh depending on what happens, which we'll get into the various scenarios. I'm sure you have been in the same situation as I have, Yaakov, in the past few days and weeks since the crisis in Iran erupted. Uh, every friend, family member, pedicurist, accountant, taxi driver, whoever, uh asked me one question and one question only. You know, is there gonna be another war? Uh, should we get the safe rooms of Ahmadim ready? Uh, and you know, I try to hedge my answer because uh, well, last year I was wrong. And uh, so I don't want to, you know, give people uh the impression either way. But I'm sure uh you asked the same question uh as I do, so we'll probably get into that, you know, the answer or potential answer in just a moment. But I wanted to actually start here with the state of play uh of where we're at at the moment, and we're recording this Tuesday afternoon uh again, Tel Aviv time. The Iranian protests are now into their fourth week. But according to basically all reports that we've seen in recent days, the regime in Tehran has brutally and bloodily uh suppressed and repressed the protests. Uh, and I think it's fair to say they've lost some steam. Uh and on the flip side, uh, the U.S. is streaming major forces uh into the region. Uh, it doesn't quite seem like Donald Trump or his administration uh are backing down just yet. So, first question to you, Yaakov, uh, where do you see things uh as we stand today?

Yaakov: 7:58

Well, it's a very strange situation because um this is the first time I can remember, probably in since the second Gulf War, where the outcome of our security situation is not in the hands of the Israeli government. The Israeli government can have an influence, it can uh put forward its perspective and its interests, but the decisions are being made in Washington, D.C. They're being made by President Trump and his team. And so when we're trying to figure out what's going to happen, what we're really asking is what is President Trump going to do? And for some of us, that takes us out of our comfort zone, you know, if we're used to analyzing uh even Hamas or uh the Israeli decision-making process, the the you know, perspectives between the Israeli defense establishment and the Israeli cabinet and Prime Minister Netanyahu, all of that is kind of going to the side right now, and we're asking what President Trump is going to do. So I have forced myself to um try and get into President Trump's mind and to look at the various considerations. And look, I think you know, if we want to make an educated guess, let's look at what's happened, right? We we saw very uh um intense and aggressive statements by President Trump at the outbreak of this crisis. He drew a red line, which the Iranian regime obviously crossed when it began massacring and mass murdering its own civilians. And so President Trump, you know, was it looked like he was gonna launch B-2 strikes from the U.S. mainland. Then something caused him to press hold, to press the pause button. What is that thing? So we've got hints. But I would say the first thing is is the Pentagon itself probably telling him, and CENCOM and the U.S. military telling him, look, if you want to enter into a confrontation with Iran, you've got to look at all the contingencies. They still have, this is uh according to some public estimates, the Iranians still have about between one-third to 50% of their original missile arsenal that they had before their war with Israel. And the estimates were that they had around 3,000 uh give or take missiles going into that war back in June of 2025. So let's give it a rough estimate of uh around 1,500 missiles. It could be more, it could be less. And according to the estimates, Israel destroyed two-thirds of their missile launchers during this war. The missile launchers are just as important as the missiles themselves. If you don't have enough missile launchers, that's a serious bottleneck. So even with one-third of their launchers and anywhere between 1,000 to 1,500 missiles, this means that the Iranians can rain down a lot of firepower on American bases in the Middle East, and if they so choose, they can also direct some of that fire at Israel. So I think the contingency was the Pentagon was saying, look, we have to cover our bases, we need better air defenses, we need better proximate, close, near, near uh uh uh offensive capabilities. We need to move Kerras strike groups into the region. And I think that that caused President Trump to press the pause button, and we're seeing uh the Abraham Lincoln Kerr strike group with its jets, with its missile ships, uh, and the submarine moving towards Iran. I think they're about four days away from the latest estimates from when we're talking. Now we've got the Ford group uh uh uh reportedly moving in the direction. So a lot of hardware. This is gonna boost American offensive and defense capabilities. And I'm sure that regionally uh Iran's neighbors told Trump, uh, what is the point of this strike? Are you aiming to topple the regime? Because if you are, it's gonna take more than B-2s, and even then it's not clear that it's gonna happen. So, what's the point of the strike? And the uh Israeli government, there were reports, you saw them as well as I did, saying some said, some said that the Israeli government that Netanyahu said hold off temporarily so that we can get our defenses in order, and some said don't do it. Now, we don't know really what was said. I'm gonna be humble here. We don't know the real conversation behind closed doors, but it seems safe to say that Israel said, hold on, let's let let's make sure that we're maximally prepared uh in terms of our air defenses and in terms of American air defenses, which were an important supplement during the June war. We can go into the details if you're interested in that, into the technicalities of what the Americans can do in terms of helping us with our air defenses. So what we're seeing, you know, are the chess pieces moving into position, and we're seeing uh Trump basically uh going along with this uh very good advice to Wade to make sure that all the contingencies are planned for. That's on the sort of military and regional front. Then there's the uh political question, right? Um, you know, I did try to get into Trump's head, and I think the fact that he is fearful of being seen as a sort of second Obama, even though already his intervention in Iran back in June, his intervention in Venezuela, I don't think he's gonna be seen that way, but he's made a you know a threat, and the Iranians walked all over He issued a red line.

Neri: 13:09

He issued a red line just like Obama. Syria.

Yaakov: 13:11

Yeah, chemical weapons, exactly. And so I think that in itself is pushing him to uh uh uh not walk away from this. And the last thing I'll say is that I think that there are, you asked about scenarios, so I think that there are still multiple scenarios. One of them, behind the scenes, even though it seems unlikely, but you can't rule it out, is that the Iranians are being given a chance to uh enter into a sort of sweeping dramatic deal, new diplomatic nuclear deal. They'd be called upon to uh freeze their missile production and support for proxies. Uh and who knows how how Khamenae is going to respond to that? Who you know, who knows? When he's got this firepower heading his way, even though it seems unlikely, maybe he will try to uh uh de-escalate by pretending to go along with that. Um and and the last thing I will say is this is something I've told many Israelis, I don't think it's obvious that even if the U.S. strikes Iran, I don't think it's obvious that Iran is going to try and pull us into this conflict. The Iranians have tasted uh Israel's air superiority, intelligence superiority. They were stunned by these capabilities. They found themselves in an utterly inferior uh situation. And since then, I believe that the gap has only grown. Their air defenses have not been rebuilt. Iran's oil and gas fields are very vulnerable. Very, very vulnerable uh to strikes by Israel if if that you know comes to pass. So I think there are good reasons to believe that Iran won't rush to drag Israel into this, but everything else, I think all bets are off at this stage. Very unpredictable phase we're going into.

Neri: 14:48

Very unpredictable because uh, well, we're trying to get into the head of Donald Trump, and uh that's been uh near impossible uh not only over the past year, but uh in his first term. Uh we'll get into the Israel of it all uh in just a moment, believe me. Uh, but I wanted to stay on this issue of the current state of play and what uh the coming days may see in terms of what Trump does uh or doesn't do. We should, by the way, mention just in terms of what's happened, you know, I think the death toll inside Iran is officially at least 4,000, but it's likely much, much, much, much higher. So it's thousands of people killed in mere days of protests, uh, not a small thing. Uh and then, like you said, uh the US is amassing forces, they're giving the commander-in-chief more options and better options, uh, not only for the attack, but also maybe for the blowback. Uh but uh let's play it out. Okay. Uh one track you know, after the US is uh set up is to coerce Iran into sweepy negotiations, and there are a long list of very serious demands uh that I think have been issued uh publicly even by the US. Uh I don't know. The Iran experts I speak to think it's highly unlikely the Islamic Republic will will agree to those demands. But again, you never know, um, especially now they're they're in a corner. That's one track. The other track, if negotiations and diplomacy don't work, military option. What do you what do you reckon? Again, trying to get into Trump's head and the head of U.S. military planners, uh, what do you think they're gonna hit if they pull the trigger?

Yaakov: 16:24

So if the decision to go for a military attack uh occurs, you know, as always, the military will present a menu of options uh to the president, starting from a minimal strike, which is supposed to sort of punish the regime. And, you know, then you would see, I guess you would see strikes on missile sites and the IRGC bases. And I'm sure that, you know, in any configuration you would see strikes on the besieged, the internal repressive militia, that has, by the way, approximately two million members by the last count. Uh, and and perhaps uh, you know, even going after uh energy targets as well to punish the Iranian economy. And you could go all the way up to a you know massive strike of thousands of targets. This is the maximal end of the spectrum, where uh you know the Iranian leadership, and not only Ayatollah Khamenae, but the heads of the IRGC and uh the uh head of the Kutz force and the uh you know military leadership of Iran as well as the Ayatollahs and the political leadership could all be targeted uh with these kinds of strikes, even if they're deep underground. We already saw in June that that that won't necessarily defend them. So there's a full spectrum of strikes. And I think that the the question that Trump has got to answer at this stage is what is the goal? What is the is the objective of the strikes? If it's to punish, then he's gonna go for a minimal uh on on the uh you know more modest side of the menu. And he, if he's going to try and do something as ambitious as regime change, then I would expect him to go for the maximum uh uh option here. And that means a sustained campaign, thousands of targets, uh, and and all of that would be aimed at basically lifting the lid off of the repressive mechanism in Iran and allowing the millions of Iranians uh to topple their regime. The problem with the with the maximum option is one, of course, there's no guarantee it's gonna work. And in fact, I don't know of any case in history where airstrikes have led to regime change. I just don't know when and where this has ever happened. And the second the second problem is that the opposition in Iran is largely unarmed. You know, you've got the Kurds who are armed, uh, and the Velushis, but the the critical mass of people, uh, we saw what happened. They went out into the streets and they were massacred because they had no weapons in their hands. So even with these airstrikes, is that going to be enough? These are huge unknowns. And and the last thing you know I would say in terms of the scenarios is the Iranians will be able to fire missiles. They have underground missile launchers. Their capabilities are not as great as they were during the June War. They're definitely reduced. But I think President Trump will also be asked: do you want to get into a missile war with Iran that could go on for weeks? Uh, how is that going to be perceived by your MAGA isolationist wing? I think you know, that's why this there are so many uh factors in this decision. So it's very hard to predict where this is gonna go. Um, but regime change is not uh is not a hit and run, you know, one button-stop maneuver. Nobody knows how to do it. Really, nobody knows how to do it. So very, very uncertain.

Neri: 19:43

Yeah, definitely uncertain. Um, and the the question you posed earlier, someone, a friend of mine also posed it to me. You know, has there been an example in history where an air campaign, an air war has actually led to regime change? Uh, like you said, I can't remember one. I mean, maybe uh Bosnia, I mean Yugoslavia in the nineties, but that wasn't one-to-one, right? It was in the context of uh I think the Kosovo war and you know, the the failure and defeat in that war led to protests back in Belgrade, which eventually led to the fall of the Milosevic regime. Um the the the objectives of of the US-led NATO campaign from the air back then was to halt the uh the external war.

Yaakov: 20:28

Exactly. Which is a much more realistic goal.

Neri: 20:32

Yeah, and it's uh it's also a a much more realistic ask of a regime. Um because you can coerce a regime to stop a war of aggression. Uh that's been done. But you can't uh coerce a regime from the air to what, give up power? Difficult, difficult to say. But you know, in terms of let's say the more maximalist scenario, the more maximalist military option, uh targeting the supreme leader, uh Ali Khamanei, the top of the Islamic Republic. I mean, what what comes after? Uh because I've heard concerns on the Israeli side that what may come after, you know, not not that it'll necessarily be worse, but that you could end up with a definitely a hardline regime still, even if the supreme leader is taken out.

Yaakov: 21:22

You could end up with a hardline regime, especially if the IRGC fills the vacuum. If the ayatollahs step back and the IRGC fills the vacuum, I don't think we would see a big change. I mean, the IRGC is running the foreign policy in so many ways anyway. Um and you know, from from an Israeli perspective, uh as long as it's either the uh you know hardline ayatollahs or the IRGC military, this alliance between them based on uh you know the uh valayat al-Fahi, the rule of the Islamic jury prudence, which is the whole ideological foundation for this Islamist regime, this is what enables their obsessive uh ideological uh uh campaign to destroy us, to destroy the state of Israel, to invest vast amounts of resources in that effort. And you know, the main question we'd be asking here in Israel is after this campaign, will we see a different regime or not? It's really kind of binary in that in that manner. I don't think that there is anything in the middle. It's either going to survive and continue, or uh it's going to uh be replaced with something uh, you know, which would if that happens, if the regime actually does fall, you know, it's worth noting that this is, of course, the ultimate game changer. It's hard to imagine a more dramatic, positive development for Israeli security than the downfall of the regime. This would leave Hamas, which is already surrounded in the Gaza Strip, basically on its own, uh relying on Qatar, but you know, in terms of the Iranian support, which has been crucial uh for building up its military terrorist capabilities, not only in Gaza, also in the West Bank. Uh, Hezbollah would be utterly displayed. Yeah, it would I I think though that would mark the beginning of the end of Hezbollah if they lose their state sponsor, and they're already being sort of surrounded by the Sunni al-Shawa regime, by Israel to the south. They're already in trouble. So if they lose their their chief state sponsor, both Hamas and Hezbollah, I think, will be facing existential trouble. And for Israel, it would really enable, I think, a new a new dawn, a new horizon. So there's no question that we all want to see this regime fall as soon as possible the head of the octopus. But I think that um the question is, will these airstrikes do it? It's not a science. This is the thing. Nobody can turn around and tell us and give us an answer. Um but w what we do know is that I think what I look for in terms of regime change is something on the ground in the country, in the in the territory. In this case, I would look at the Iranian army, because the Iranian army uh has always played second fiddle to the IRGC in terms of resources, uh, and the IRGC, you know, just like its actual name, the the Republican Guard Corps, they're the elite military organization which not only controls um really something like 40% of the uh Iranian economy, they're they're absolutely monopolizing resources, they also have the best uh missiles, the best military technology, and the Iranian army is very deliberately um discriminated against and kept in second place in order to prevent just this scenario, the scenario of a coup. So we know that uh the regime has also, you know, on a on a regular basis conducted purges of the Iranian army leadership to make sure that they're ideologically on board with the so-called revolutionary ideals, but I'm not sure that that's enough. I think that the Iranian army is more connected to the people, and I think that some of them are facing bigger dilemmas. So if we see significant numbers of Iranian army soldiers and officers turn their guns, as you know, uh is so often said here, uh Ifuqane, that's the telltale sign. That's what we'd be looking for. Then I think the regime is has reached the end. But we're not there.

Neri: 25:14

Right. So a couple things for our listeners, uh, IRGC, uh the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, essentially the the Praetorian Guard, right, uh the guarantor of the revolution uh in the Islamic Republic's minds. Uh that's separate, it's a separate military force than the Iranian army, which uh I think probably is still viewed with some suspicion because it predates uh the 1979 Islamic revolution. Uh and yeah, you're looking for fissures and breaking breakages inside the elite and inside the uh the military and security organs of of the state. Uh again, we have limited visibility into Iran just because uh of the internet blackout. Uh, I'm sure there are uh various people here and elsewhere that are uh that are working on that. Um but it's also worth mentioning that uh again, according to certain reports, you know, some of the protesters that have been on the streets in recent weeks courageously uh may have been armed. I don't know who they were, I don't know who armed them, uh, but there are reports that there were like armed clashes with uh Iranian security forces. So that's that's an interesting wrinkle if the protesters on the streets actually do have some capabilities.

Yaakov: 26:32

Yeah, although I mean it seems, and again, as you say, the visibility is low, but it seems that those would be the exceptions to the rule because you know when you see them when you see the security forces spraying the crowds with fire, and in footage after footage, nobody's firing back, it looks like the armed members are are few and far between. And and by the way, Neri, I just wanted to throw one last scenario into the works, which is you know, I think what sparked this entire wave of instability is the Iranian economy, the free fall and crash of the Iranian economy, right? We're talking about uh the real, the hyperinflation, the lack of tap water, uh basic goods are out of reach. This is what this was the flame that started all of this. And so I think one another option worth considering is the idea of of um of an oil um embargo enforced uh by the US Navy um targeting uh Iran's oil exports, because most of that money, most of the regime's money comes from selling its oil, 90% of it, to China. This is how the regime pays for its proxy wars, its missile programs, its internal repressive uh systems. And if that if that gets choked off, then that would place the regime under existential threat. The regime would correctly interpret that as an act of war and would likely respond to that in a military manner. But I think that that would be an interesting move that's worth also worth taking into consideration. And I wouldn't be surprised if it was put on that menu as well uh in the White House.

Neri: 28:04

So this is actually a great point. So one track is uh well the coercion we've seen by the US, but also you know, engaging in diplomacy to try to get this this big deal um obviously on much better terms than previous diplomatic bouts. That's one scenario. Second scenario, um Trump uh launches airstrikes and missile strikes against something inside Iran, TBD, uh, as we just discussed. And the third one, and you and you do hear it from uh from some Iran experts, it's like, look, the risk of uh military action right now uh is high and it may not get the job done right in terms of uh getting the result you want, which is actually a regime change and well a different future for the Iranian people and a different foreign policy by uh whatever governments in Tehran. Um but given the real structural problems, especially economic, but not only, also political, of the Islamic Republic, uh maybe just wait, wait them out. And like you said, uh a blockade, uh, you know, gun this gunboat diplomacy that we've seen uh in in other parts of the world, and time is your friend here. And maybe maybe that's uh maybe that's a tool. Uh like you said, it shouldn't shouldn't be taken off the menu.

Yaakov: 29:20

Um not at all. I I I happen to think it might be the most attractive tool um in terms of actually getting the job done. Um so you know, any you you obviously we're all guessing here, we're all speculating, but I'm sure that the tool has been put on the table. Um, I think that it can be very effective. Choking off their their oil exports to China would cause them just as much damage as any military strike. So uh I'm sure that uh by the way, this would obviously have big ripple effects on the global energy market. So I'm not sure that uh that option is so attractive. The US, even though it's a net exporter of oil, they would still feel that the with the prices going up globally. You know, it's one market.

Neri: 30:01

So Yes. Uh look, um, it would have massive implications for the global energy market. It would have massive implications for US-China relations because China likes to import its discounted Iranian oil. Um but then you could also say you could also say that invading Greenland would have massive effects on the global economy and transatlantic relations and the future of NATO and all of that. And and yet uh as of Tuesday afternoon Tel Aviv time, uh, you know, it's the biggest story today. Right. Um so uh, you know, yeah, in theory he he Donald Trump cares about the global energy market, but in practice, I don't know. I mean you know, the markets have been spooked today by uh potential US European, I don't even want to say like war, but a rupture. Uh which which seemed uh I saw this headline, this is apropos of nothing. So the headline, uh Denmark deploys troops to Greenland as tensions rise with the US. And I looked at that headline in in my own newspaper and I was like, this is this would be this would be like make-believe on The Simpsons.

Yaakov: 31:09

This is an episode of the Black Mirror.

Neri: 31:12

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That that uh the Danes are deploying, you know, 15 more soldiers to Greenland to protect against the you know the U.S. Marine Corps invading. Um but but and yet here we are.

Speaker 1: 31:26

Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure, Jewish, democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic U.S. policy towards the conflict, U.S. Israel relations, and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary, and convenient programs that engage and educate leaders across the political and eliminational generational spectrum. Real professionals initiative, IPF community works to eliminate the discourse among the next generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at Israelpolicyforum.org and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes.

Neri: 32:23

Okay, back to uh back to our business. Um let's take the scenario of military action by Trump. Let's say diplomacy doesn't work and Trump does not want to just wait them out, so he wants to do something, especially because he's um how did I put it to you the other day? You know, his thumbs uh on social media have written a check that the US military uh could not cash last week. But maybe the US military can cash that check uh in the coming days or this weekend maybe or next week. So he he hits something in Iran, the Iranians, I assume, will need to respond. Now we played it out a little bit. You think it's more likely that they go target U.S. bases in various Gulf states and not Israel? Is that is that a fair assessment?

Yaakov: 33:13

Yeah, I think that that's the more likely response because uh again, the Iranians have tasted Israeli capabilities, and you know, not only have they just gotten over the biggest threat to their internal rule since 79, now they've got you know U.S. military power. If you think about it rationally, why would they need us in the mix after everything that the Iranians have absorbed from Israel in June of this year and in previous air strikes? I mean, there's no doubt in their mind that they are not ready uh for a war with Israel. But we also have to be humble here again, because the Iranians are a wounded animal. This regime is a wounded animal, and wounded animals don't always respond uh in the way that we would expect. So, of course, you know, Israel has to factor in the contingency of Iranian missile strikes uh against Israel. The Iranians are also happy to blame everything on Israel, on the Mussad, as well as the US and the CIA. So firing missiles at Israel could sort of serve their narrative, their domestic narrative, that they are punishing those who fomented the regime, uh the protest against the regime to begin with. So it's very hard to get into their heads, and of course the job of the IDF is to plan for every contingency and to assume the worst-case scenario. Um so we are seeing definitely, you know, for weeks, the Israeli system, the defense system has been at its very highest level of alert. The focus is obviously on air defenses. We know that the Aero 3, the batteries, uh are on high alert. These uh are the systems, which, by the way, fire uh interceptors into space. Uh, and the interceptors release uh their own sort of kill vehicle that runs into the Iranian ballistic missiles in space. It's it's absolutely incredible technology. This is a system that Israel just recently sold to Germany. Uh Germany is relying on the system to defend itself against Russian ballistic missiles. Um, this is a system that's going to be frontline of any new confrontation with Iran. Uh, and uh, you know, it's fair to assume that there's gonna be a fast tracking of Aero 3 uh interceptors, Aero 2 is still in the mix as well, that operates in the uh upper atmosphere. Um so air defenses, very, very important. And I'm sure that uh Israel has also asked the U.S., what can you do, the U.S., to help supplement our air defenses? Back in June, we saw that the THAAD batteries here in Israel fired approximately a little more than 80 missiles uh interceptors, which is very important. And we also had the uh the Aegis uh uh system, which is ship-based, uh, which could be on board some of these ships, and they fire uh what's called SM interceptors uh from those ships, and they also help. So uh I'm sure that uh those preparations are are all happening.

Neri: 36:05

Yeah, and those Aegis, Aegis? How is it?

Yaakov: 36:08

Yeah, yeah, Aegis. I always say the G without, but yeah, you're right. Aegis. Yeah.

Neri: 36:13

Yeah. So they were off the coast of of uh basically Tel Aviv uh during the June, the June war, and they were operational. Um but this brings me to to my real question for you in terms of you know, is Israel ready for another round or worse with with Iran? We did see reports last week, we did see reports last week uh that, again, by the way, coming from US officials, not Israeli officials, that part of the reason why Netanyahu asked Trump to postpone or wait with any attack on Iran was because, again, according to the reports, Israeli air defenses were not yet ready to deal with another route with Iran. What did what did you make of those reports?

Yaakov: 36:55

Look, we know it's not a secret that after the June war, uh the interceptors, both Israeli and American, uh had run through uh, you know, a good chunk of the stockpile, but that doesn't mean that it they ran dry, not at all. Uh Israel still has enough interceptors to be able to deal with uh a new confrontation with Iran, and uh it's mass-producing them, it's absolutely mass-producing them. And you know, there were recent contracts between the Israeli Defense Ministry and IAI, which makes the Aero 3 to get more production lines up and running. So this is an arms race. Now, let's throw into the mix that not only does Israel have enough air defenses and it's working to replenish stockpiles, but the Iranians have next to no active air defenses. So if they attack Israel, uh most of their missiles will be intercepted. I'm very confident in that. Um, and almost none of the Israeli counter-strikes will be intercepted by Iran, which is what what would make such a move by Iran so incredibly foolish from a military perspective, because Israel would then basically have an open check, uh, and I'm sure that President Trump wouldn't object either, to strike any target in Iran. The thing is that even despite this superior uh uh advantage point, Israel doesn't want to get into a war with Iran at this time. I think that's obvious because the last war was Yes, I I look, I I think that Israel does not want to get into a war with Iran at this time uh because it doesn't have any assurances that this war would lead to regime change. Now, there are there are debates in Israel. There it's not a single view, and I've heard you know former members of the defense establishment argue it both ways. Some say, look, it's worth you know absorbing hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles if this will result in regime change. And I think that that's a fair calculation. But then you've got the other side of the equation saying, who's promising us regime change? We could absorb hundreds of ballistic missiles, some of them will get through air defenses just like they did in June. We could suffer casualties, and the regime is still standing. So what did we achieve? And it's this is this is a legitimate debate. Um so but I I think my my view is of course Israel doesn't want to get into a war with Iran now uh because the objectives are unclear. If you look at the objectives in June, they were crystal clear. They were to roll back the nuclear threat, roll back the missile program, which was considered an existential threat in its own right, uh, and to eliminate, you know, the uh members of the Iranian nuclear scientific and military uh elite communities, and to harm the very Iranian officers who were activating Kizbalah and Hamas. Those are crystal clear war goals. And once they were achieved, Israel disengaged, and so did Iran. So here, what's the goal, right? And and and the Iranians could start pacing themselves. Like we could end up in a situation where they're firing a few missiles every day. That's enough to completely disrupt our routine. Um and uh again, there would there wouldn't be a clear goal here. So I think the lack of a clear objective goal. Is what's creating a real debate in Israel about whether it's worth our while getting dragged into this now or not. It depends who you ask. I I personally think that if the Americans go for a maximum, if if they do go for an attack, it has to be a maximum attack. I don't personally understand the logic of a symbolic attack, an attack to punish the regime. I don't think that's going to change anything. I don't think it would be worth the risk, uh, not to Israel, not to US personnel in the Middle East. I think that if the Americans decide on military action, it ha it has to be the maximum action. If it's the maximum action, if if thousands of targets are are hit, and that creates the real chance of a shakeup, we still don't know if that would work, but that at least could be justified uh as risking a larger conflict in the Middle East. If it's just a symbolic strike, I personally don't really understand the logic of it.

Neri: 40:58

So again, not to rehash the previous the previous debate. I mean, surely there's uh some middle ground between kind of the maximalist uh strike package by the US and a symbolic strike. So you could maybe go after I don't know, IRGC command and control that are jamming up the internet. You go after headquarters of the more repressive security organs like the besiege inside Iran, maybe some missiles just to, you know, for good for good measure while you're while you're there. Um that wouldn't be necessarily thousands of targets or even decapitation and and kind of leadership targeting, but it wouldn't just be symbolic.

Yaakov: 41:39

If you're going after decapitation and leadership targeting, the Iranians are going to respond full force, right? They're not going to they're not going to uh uh do a minimal minimal response. And so if we if it stops there, what has been achieved? The the regime would survive. That's why I fail to understand uh any option except the maximal option. Uh because the the minimal option won't result in regime change, obviously. The intermediate option also will not result in regime change, but could risk uh you know a lengthy missile war. But the maximum option at least stands a chance at regime change. So if they're going to do military option, I think it has to be the maximum option or not at all.

Neri: 42:23

So basically, you know, if anything's worth doing, it's worth doing right. You know, Imkval Azkval, if you're if you're already doing it, you may as well do it in in Hebrew parlance.

Yaakov: 42:33

Yeah, and if you're putting, you know, also your allies at risk of Iranian missile retaliation, right, uh, including us and the other, and we all want to see this regime fall, at least it should be for a maneuver that stands a chance at creating a domino effect that would lead to the regime's downfall. Otherwise, I think it's it would be uh a basically symbolism, high-risk symbolism, with no clear long-term strategic objective.

Neri: 42:59

And from I mean, two questions from the Israeli point of view. Okay, let's say the Iranians do fire on Israel. Um and as we've heard from the Prime Minister and the IDF chief of staff uh in, I think just the past day, the Israeli response will be how do they put it, uh, overwhelming and you know, with force that Iran has not experienced yet. Uh what do you think that would look like in in military terms? I.e., how different would it be from what Israel did last June?

Yaakov: 43:30

I think uh, you know, if we enter that situation, first of all, there would be an opportunity to target the new missile production activities that Israel has detected in Iran. Um let's break that down for a second. The Iranians are trying to revive both uh liquid fuel missile production and solid fuel. Solid fuel is much more important to the Iranians because the solid fuel uh can be basically fired uh with without much advance warning. So if you've got solid fuel missiles, they're easily and quickly uh fueled up compared to the liquid missile uh uh fuel missile. And that means that it's easier to get volleys off the ground without being detected, without leaving an intelligence fingerprint. So the Iranians have tried to get hold of planetary mixers from China. Uh planetary mixers are those very rare machines, very expensive machines that know how to mix up uh and create solid fuel for solid fuel missiles. And there have been reports of American interceptions of those uh Chinese shipments of planetary mixers to Iran. So that's a very interesting shadow war that has been raging, and I think it's fair to assume that Israel is is heavily tracking that as well, if if not directly involved. Um, so uh that's one one part of it. And the other part are the liquid missiles, which do require a long, a long fueling process before it. So it's easier to spot that from satellites, uh using intelligence, it's easier to spot those preparations, and it's easier to preempt those kinds of attacks. So all of that infrastructure, I think, would be definitely uh uh struck by Israel if the Iranians strike. Uh they there has been some attempts to you know just dig into the uh nuclear sites that were hit back in June, uh, you know, Natans uh and and our and uh Isfahan. Um so I think that there are you know those sites, there might be more strikes on those sites, even though they have not at all been rejuvenated. And I think you know the real sort of um uh wild card here are the Iranian oil fields and the natural gas fields, because there were some limited strikes on those back in June, hardly noticed in all the you know mayhem of the war, but the the strikes occurred. And I interpreted those strikes at the time as a warning to the Iranians saying, look, we're going to disengage when we uh achieve our objectives, that's the Israeli message. But if you continue to fire missiles, your energy infrastructure is up next on the target list. And I think that very much helped convince the Iranians to disengage when Israel did. And so if the Iranians uh uh launch missiles at Israel again, if this regime does that again, I wouldn't be surprised if Israel does target the uh Iranian energy um fields. But I have to qualify that and say that this is purely my own speculation. It's based on no conversations with anybody at all. Um really. This is just something that, you know, as as as a uh as a chess player, it seems like a very uh clear threat to make. Um because it's it's the atom, it's it's the the throat of the regime. This is their lifeline, this is their oxygen. So I would expect it to be on the target list.

Neri: 46:51

So the aggregators listening to this will say uh the headline will be you know, Israel threatens to target Iranian energy infrastructure if another round breaks out. It hasn't.

Yaakov: 47:05

It hasn't threatened to do that, but but but let's listen to the music that it the you know, the tone that we are hearing, what overwhelming uh force, and the Iranians uh will experience things they haven't experienced before. What could that be? And and here I am speculating that look, we have a precedent for this, right? I mean, the uh the Israeli Air Force struck Houthie oil terminals time and again during that, during the conflict with the Houthis. And I think that that was also an experiment to see how much that harms the Houthis terror regime, and it did harm them, it very much harmed them. Uh their income, their ability to use that income to translate it into building a war machine. These are legitimate military targets. Oh, absolutely, absolutely. It it harmed their their income and their infrastructure, and it's not something they can rebuild overnight. It's not something they can rebuild overnight.

Neri: 47:54

So infrastructure um of that sort, yes. Uh especially in a country like Iran. Uh it's not Yemen under the Houthis, it's not North Korea. I mean, as we're seeing now, uh there are you know economic and political pressures uh explode out and millions are on the streets. Exactly. Yaqov, uh the big question on many people's minds when they look at Israel and its readiness for the war dates back to last June's war. And there's a narrative out there that you know, on day 10 or 11 or 12 of that war, that Iranian missiles increasingly were getting through Israel's vaunted air defenses, including the R03 and others, uh, and that it was Israel who was actually very happy to call it a day and and wind up that that operation, that war. What is your understanding of how effective Iranian uh Israeli rather uh air defenses were in the later stages of last June's war? Um because it has become uh an issue of conversation and a topic of debate.

Yaakov: 49:04

Look, I think that uh the idea that uh Israel was happy to end the war because of um Iranian missile attacks um is is a distortion. I think the Iranians were the ones that were happy to end the war. Because when when we look at the last days of that conflict, we had a situation again where Israel was striking 100% of the targets that it intended to strike, and the Iranians were striking a small percentage. I'm not gonna throw out an exact number. I have a number in my head, but it's a it's a small number, it's it's less than 10 uh of the targets that they were hoping uh to strike as a percentage. So when you imagine in a boxing match where one boxer is landing literally every blow, every punch that he's throwing, and the other is is landing less than 10%, and the rest are blocked. Uh who in their right mind would want to stay in the ring? Not the Iranians, and and I think that uh that that was the real situation. Now, look, in terms of air defense, you know, these are sensitive topics, so there's a limit to what we can discuss. But I think, you know, we can say that um, you know, as a rule of thumb, in any air defense uh uh campaign, you always have to prioritize. You're dealing with resources that are not infinite. So we did see Israel pace itself. We saw that certain areas received high priority, we saw that uh it was very important for Israel to tar uh to guard uh its very key strategic sites. Um, you know, these are these are very, very sensitive considerations, and and we are dealing with limited resources. But uh I will say that um Israel's air defense uh resilience uh absolutely proved itself, I think, during this war. There are certain things that we can't talk about necessarily, but Israel found many ways of dealing with Iranian ballistic missile attacks. By the way, the Iranian cruise missile and drone threat was almost completely neutralized during this war, so that that really failed. And yes, listen, the Iranians have built very sophisticated ballistic missiles, some of them uh hypersonic, some of them maneuvering, some of them had basically cluster, cluster type, not not mass cluster, but uh warheads that divided themselves uh in the upper atmosphere if they weren't hit in time. This is an arms race. Uh absolutely is an arms race. Uh and uh, you know, the Iranians gave it their best shot in terms of their engineering and military capabilities. I think that uh, you know, it's something like 85% of the Iranian ballistic missiles were intercepted by Israel's air defenses. And I think that statistic in and of itself tells us a lot about what we need to know. That's not even including the American assistance that Israel received during the war.

Neri: 51:46

Right. Uh 85%, I think it's the official number from the IDF is 86% uh interception rate. Uh, and what do they fire you know over 550 missiles? So we can we can do the math. Um obviously there are places in Israel that were hit that we can't talk about and that were not publicized. Uh and there was how shall I frame this? There was both a narrative and an objective truth that in the later stages of the war, like you alluded to, the Iranians may have been using slightly more sophisticated missiles, and they were firing it in slightly different ways. Uh that was a difference from the heavier salvos uh in the earlier stages of the war.

Yaakov: 52:36

Their fire, their the intensity of their volleys uh 100% decreased. We saw that they went from very large salvos, steadily decreasing because their launchers were being taken offline and the missile missiles themselves. So they were under huge pressure. Um and let's not forget that the opening strike also took out a very large number of their launchers and their their underground missile bases, which they were convinced were immune uh from the Israeli Air Force, were not immune and were struck quite effectively during that war as well.

Neri: 53:08

Yeah, well, just like uh Hezbollah chief Hassan Asralah and others that were hiding in various bunkers all across the Middle East uh proved to be not immune even to Israeli capabilities. Um but I guess my my point is that uh the Iranians did shift something in the later stages of the war. Um they did get through, and now there's a debate over the reasons for that and the continued effectiveness of Israeli defenses. I think your position on this issue is is very clear, Yaakov. I tend to agree with you, uh, but we just have to kind of be be fair and put that out there because um well, other people think that uh the last few days of the war were uh I think more difficult than we remember. You know, obviously there were missiles that got through and they were, you know, very um tragic.

Yaakov: 53:59

We had about uh 40 to 50 impacts in urban areas during this war. Yeah.

Neri: 54:04

Yeah.

Yaakov: 54:04

That's out of 550 missiles that were launched.

Neri: 54:07

Yeah, yeah. Uh so again, um I don't think it was like the Israeli air defenses were ineffective the last two or three days, but that's uh the impression some people.

Yaakov: 54:18

Yeah, not at all. If they were ineffective, then our city centers would not I mean they sustained heavy, heavy damage sites, no question about it. Things that we've never experienced uh since 48. But uh it would have looked a lot worse if the air defenses were not effective. That I can assure anybody who has any doubt about that.

Neri: 54:37

So that this is the this is the crux of it in the in the final point on this issue. Um you couldn't hide it.

Yaakov: 54:43

Exactly. Exactly.

Neri: 54:45

So you know, X number of Iranian ballistic missiles are incoming, you know, Y number impacted, and and you know, again, there were places that weren't publicized, but um how should we put it? Uh it's not like the Israeli Air Force was not functioning.

Yaakov: 55:00

Yeah, and also there, there's you know, there's also there was also an Iranian PsyOps campaign, which was designed to make it look like you know, we were on our knees and they wanted to send that message to demoralize Israel, to uh rally their own base. This is war propaganda. They often did things like they took images of an Iranian ballistic missile, uh, let's say the engine, after it had already been intercepted, and the engine just comes down or breaks up into pieces, and they said, Oh, look, this is a great strike against the runway, and it's and it's pieces of an Iranian missile that are on fire falling. So there was a lot of fake news during this war as well. Um, and uh it's all too easy uh in such a you know information warfare environment to run after lots of uh misleading information. Uh the Iranians are are a huge threat, but there's no need to make that threat even bigger than what it was. Uh at the end of the day, the Israeli air defense systems, in my view, uh performed in an outstanding manner considering the scope of the threat. And uh there's good reason why uh NATO, Germany are eyeing these systems, buying these systems, standing in line really to buy them because they work and they work very well.

Neri: 56:10

Yes, indeed. Um I think that's a good place to to end our conversation, Yaqov. I think we covered everything given the uh continued uncertainties uh and what Donald Trump may may or may not do uh maybe soon. But uh thank you very much for your insights. Uh let's hope for the best, both for I think the Iranian people and also, well, closer to home. Uh and I agree with you, the sentiment, I mean, maybe you know, the last kind of thought, uh, it is a very historic juncture, not only for the Middle East, but for the world. Um Absolutely. If the Islamic Republic is is really uh, if not on its way out, then at a major inflection point.

Yaakov: 56:58

Definitely. And I think it'll never be the same again, no matter what happens from here, because you know, you you can't massacre this number of people of your own people and and r retain any form of uh domestic legitimacy. So whatever happens, I don't think that uh the regime will ever be the same again, if it even survives.

Neri: 57:15

Right. Uh, and that's on top of its real kind of structural economic problems and structural political problems. Um we can only we can only hope uh you know, maybe we'll be doing this podcast uh from Tehran next year, next next January.

Yaakov: 57:31

That would be amazing. There used to be you know two to three flights a week from Tel Aviv to Tehran until 1979. So we can only dream of uh of that coming back and meeting with the wonderful Iranian people who I who I meet uh you know when I travel to London, and the overwhelming sentiment is uh peace with Israel, re-establishing normalcy, having a normal country. That's all these people want.

Neri: 57:54

I mean, it it really like uh the thought crossed my mind you know throughout this this crisis. I mean, uh Iran could be just one of the most beautiful, most wonderful, most prosperous countries in the world. But it's been run into the ground. It's been run into the ground by a theocracy.

Yaakov: 58:13

100%. Its potential is is is incredible. The Persian culture, um, you know, the this is a very educated, ancient civilization uh being held back by uh you know medieval uh fundamentalists who hopefully will be in the in the garbage can of history sooner rather than later. That would be uh a real a real message of hope for millions of us, Jews, Persians, Arabs who want uh a better future, everybody in the region who uh is not in the throes of this fundamental uh ideology.

Neri: 58:44

Absolutely. Um and uh, you know, like we to bring it all full circle, it really depends what uh it's going on in Donald Trump's mind. Uh I don't know if he said it verbatim, but you know, basically it's a test of whether when he comes and says, you know, this aggression will not stand, whether he actually follows through on that threat.

Yaakov: 59:03

Yep. And we'll find out soon, I think.

Neri: 59:06

All right. Take care, Yaakov. Talk soon.

Yaakov: 59:09

You too.

Neri: 59:09

Okay, thanks again to Yakov Lapin, as always, for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor, Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening and please, please subscribe and spread the word.