SPEAKER_01: 0:05

Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod. I'm your host, Shiny Reichman, the Director of Strategic Initiatives and of IPF ATEED here at Israel Policy Forum. I'm joined by Nari Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor with Israel Policy Forum. Welcome, Nari.

Neri: 0:19

Hi, Shani. Good to be back with you after a couple of months.

SPEAKER_01: 0:22

Yeah, it's good to chat with you. So much has happened since we last spoke in November. We luckily will not cover all of that, but we will start by looking at the negotiations between the US and Iran. Where are they going? And what happens if they go nowhere? And of course, the fabulous news of the last remaining hostage returning from Gaza, the body of Ran Mvili, and what that means for Israeli society and at a policy level to have his body returning home, closing this horrific chapter for Israel and the diaspora. Then we'll move on to developments in the Gaza Strip when it comes to the Rafah crossing and looking to phase two of Trump's plan. And then we'll talk about my hometown in New York City to discuss how things are looking one month into the Mamdani administration. How's that sound, Neri?

Neri: 1:05

Sounds very comprehensive, Shani. A lot of things to discuss both of the past week and in recent days, and then uh also in the coming days and perhaps in the coming weeks. So yeah, uh around the horn. And uh I'm looking forward to hearing how things are on your side of the world, because I spend way too much time thinking about things and obsessing about things on my side of the world, uh, what may happen, as I'm sure you're aware.

SPEAKER_01: 1:31

Well, we we could have said this anytime in the last few weeks and months, but right now Trump and Khameni are threatening each other again. And things are moving pretty quickly, even in the last few hours. So, what's the latest in terms of negotiations between the two? And what's the likelihood of a shakeup this week? Because of course, Israel will be the usual recipient if there are any Iranian strikes. So it will affect you how things go here.

Neri: 1:53

Uh, it's most certainly will. Uh, and we can kind of get into uh what may happen in, you know, it the Israel of it all, uh and the Israel uh input of it all. But look, uh, as I'm sure our listeners and viewers know, because we've uh discussed this at length since early January, uh, when Nasan Rafadi was on right after the domestic protests and turmoil uh erupted in Iran, and he gave a very good analysis of how he got here and what was happening inside Iran. And then I think about two weeks ago, we had my friend Yaakov Lapin on to discuss more the kind of military security side of it. It was also when uh Trump continued threatening uh the Islamic Republic in Iran to stop shooting its own people on the streets. Uh, they didn't quite listen. But uh, as of now, the protests have been quashed, unfortunately. The regime seems to have uh kind of shot its way out of the domestic turmoil, uh, and yet Donald Trump's threats have continued. And as we all know, and as I discussed with Yaakov two weeks ago, there's been this growing buildup of US military force all across the Middle East. So you we've seen on a kind of almost daily basis or every few days, uh F-15 squadrons being moved into the region, uh, air defenses, heavy bombers, obviously a U.S. carrier strike group, the Lincoln, uh, has now uh finally reached uh the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf and is sitting uh off the coast of Iran. So really, this military buildup by the Trump administration, combined with continued threats, by the way, not only by the Americans, but also by the Iranians, that if a strike does happen, then it won't be a limited response by Iran, uh fine. So threat, counter-threat, military buildup. Uh, and as of at least yesterday, we thought there would be uh negotiations being held on Friday in Turkey. So basically, the way it all started is that there was uh this domestic turmoil in Iran. If we kind of zoom out a little bit, Donald Trump got angry at it, threatened the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic didn't quite heed those threats. But what started as really kind of uh Donald Trump, I don't want to say obsession, but a focus on what was happening inside Iran, has now uh expanded to once again Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile program, uh its support for various kind of terrorist groups and militias and proxies all across the region. And now it may have kind of come back down to the Iranian nuclear program, which ostensibly is what they're going to discuss first on Friday in Turkey in these negotiations. That's essentially kind of the zoom out of how we've gotten here really over the past month. Obviously, there was not only a sense, but a real possibility that uh a few weeks ago Donald Trump was seriously considering launching strikes on Iran when I don't want to say the protests were at their peak, but there were still some unrest on the streets of Iran. That actually didn't happen for all we know. And I think it's pretty good information. He kind of backed down at the last minute. So everyone here in Israel, uh, trust me, was convinced that there would be uh strikes by the Americans last weekend, or two weekends ago, rather. Also, this weekend, uh, there was uh also very uh strong awareness, shall we say, about a potential strike. That obviously did not happen. So now we're looking at the diplomatic track, and really it was all it seemed to be set for Friday. Uh Steve Woodkoff is Trump's uh envoy for pretty much uh everything is here right now.

SPEAKER_01: 5:21

He's a busy guy, isn't he?

Neri: 5:22

He's a very busy guy. Um kind of a tangent, but someone made the point, I think, online earlier today, where never in US diplomatic history has one person been responsible for negotiating. Uh Steve Woodkoff is here, and he just finished meeting with uh Bibi Netanyahu and senior Israeli military officials um over Gaza, but obviously primarily over Iran. So he's responsible for Gaza. He's gonna negotiate Iran with the Iranians on Friday. And in between, he's set to travel to the United Arab Emirates to broker, hopefully, an agreement and a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. So the point was that never in US diplomatic history has uh one person been tasked with mediating three very, very difficult conflicts in a matter of whatever, four days. So best of luck to uh to Steve. But uh I digress. The talks were set for Friday, uh, and we should mention that the Qataris, the Turks, and the Egyptians actually, we thought succeeded in brokering these talks. But really, over the past few hours, reports came out that the Iranians may be balking, that they may not want to hold a talks in uh Istanbul, they want to move it to Oman. Uh, they don't want all of these various Arab and Muslim countries to be around the table. So again, our listeners will be a lot smarter than we are. Uh hopefully those talks proceed, but that's essentially where we are in terms of the state of play. You know, again, we kind of zoomed out initially and kind of explained what's been happening here literally on a on an hourly basis. Uh, it does seem that the Trump administration wants to at least try for a diplomatic agreement.

SPEAKER_01: 6:59

Aaron Powell Well, what would a deal between Iran and the United States actually look like? Noting that there is a version of a deal that satisfies Donald Trump's concerns, but doesn't satisfy the Israeli side of the equation.

Neri: 7:10

So you pose a very good question. Uh look, there are two main players, and then there's also, again, kind of the Israel position, which which I'll get into, but you have three problems here in terms of negotiation. Number one, the Iranians say they only want to discuss the nuclear file, right? It's because it's quite convenient for them to leave out the missiles and the support for the proxies. And so the thinking is from the people I talk to that a deal on the nuclear program is actually potentially doable, not least because a lot of the nuclear program has already been destroyed. So, you know, there's less there's less of the Iranians to kind of you know, for the Iranians to cling to uh coming after last year's uh 12-day war with uh uh with Israel and also the US and the B-2 bombers. So that's kind of the Iranian position. We don't want to talk about anything, we're not willing to talk about anything other than the nuclear program. Fine. The Americans, like I said, started off with all kinds of demands, even public demands by Trump and also especially by Steve Whitkoff. Uh it's unclear to us whether those demands are going to be raised if the talks happen on Friday. And so that we have to we have to kind of see, wait and see. And then the third issue is uh the Israeli position. And it's not just an Israeli position, it's uh other kind of more hardline uh analysts and people in Washington and Hawks as we call them. Their position is, and I've was told this uh this morning, and by the way, we should mention we're recording this uh Tuesday evening Tel Aviv time, you know, in case anything changes, it's not our fault. It's just how time works. It's linear, it moves forward, not uh not backwards, and doesn't stand still. But the issue really is that, you know, I heard this this morning, Israel wants all of it, right? And I know this for a fact. Bibi Netanyahu, when you met with Steve Woodkoff earlier today, said Israel's position is, you know, there should be zero uranium enrichment allowed by the Iranians. Um, the Iranians have to give up kind of this uh 400 kilos of highly enriched uranium that are probably buried underground somewhere after last June's war. They want it kind of shipped out of the country. They want uh this is a big one, they want the Iranians to limit production of their ballistic missile arsenal, and they also want Iran to stop funding and supporting the various proxies across the region. Those are maximalist demands that no Iran analyst worth their salt thinks that you know this regime in Tehran will be able to uh to agree to. So you kind of already see the gaps, right? And fundamentally, uh amongst these various kinds of positions and players, only one thing really matters, and that's what Donald Trump wants, right? Uh and it's not unique to Donald Trump, although Donald Trump is a unique president, but it ultimately always comes down to one person sitting in the White House and making a decision. Uh and by the way, that was true for President Biden uh during the Gaza War. Um ultimately his even senior officials and other people in the administration could have certain positions, could give certain pieces of advice, but ultimately it comes down to what one person wants. Far be it from me to get into Donald Trump's head. But this is really the kind of maddening situation where every conversation anyone here in Israel has or has been having for almost a month is really, oh, well, Donald Trump, because he gave that ultimatum a month ago about the domestic turmoil in Iran, won't back down uh and that this is a red line, uh, and that he'll, you know, he'll demand, you know, nothing less than Iran's capitulation. Uh, maybe. And there are other people who try to get into Trump's mind and say, well, Trump doesn't like military entanglements. He ran against them, obviously, um, his entire political career over the past, what, 10 plus years? Um, he likes quick, decisive military actions. This is likely to get messy if we take the Iranians at their word. Um, it'll likely be quite big. Uh, it's not gonna be a snatch and grab job like uh against Maduro in Venezuela or even the B-2 bombers last June. Um, so he kind of should take that into consideration. And those people, that argument trying to get into Trump's head, they say, well, uh, he's gonna go for a deal. You know, the Iranians just need to give him kind of this this victory at the negotiating table, uh, the art of the deal, and he'll be placated by that. Um, but no one really knows for sure. And then kind of complicating matters is that earlier today, even the last few hours, the Iranians have been doing things that, shall we say, are uh have not been um quite productive. So not only reportedly making these demands about the actual negotiations that were so set to take place on Friday, moving the location, changing the kind of the outer envelope in terms of who's around the table, but uh they flew a drone too close to a US aircraft carrier in the Gulf. So it was shot down by F-35, seen as posing a threat to the carrier. And then a few hours later, the Iranians, perhaps in retaliation, tried to stop a US Navy tanker in the Persian Gulf. Now, again, uh, will Trump, you know, will we finish this podcast and will we see a tweet by Trump? Maybe. Or maybe he'll ignore it. But again, nobody knows, right? You know, are there still going to be negotiations? Uh nobody knows. So uh we'll be hopefully a lot smarter after Friday, either way. And uh so this is kind of the the fluid situation that we're in. And uh trust me, um, me and everyone else have been trying to figure out what may happen, what may not happen, are negotiations gonna work, are they not? But the bottom line is that people aren't, how shall I put this? People aren't that confident that if they get, if and when they get around a table, wherever it might be, the minimum Iran can give the Americans will not meet kind of the maximum request made by the Trump administration. That is uh the crux of the art of the deal remains to be seen.

SPEAKER_01: 13:02

Moving back to our Israel focus, the body of Ron Ghvili finally returned home. And there was a sense that nothing can move forward in Israel until the last hostage returns. And now that he has, where do we actually go from here? What is the feeling in Israel now that there are no remaining hostages or bodies in captivity in Gaza for the first time in many, many years?

Neri: 13:22

So it was um a very positive day uh last Monday when news came that uh the the IDF had actually found Ran Kvili's body um on the outskirts of Gaza City in this uh cemetery. Let me just say, Shiny, it wasn't a given that he would be found. Um I kind of maybe hinted at it in previous episodes, but uh the for a long time his body had just disappeared. And very few people that I talked to were confident that it he could be found. And yet they they did find him, you know, eventually, which which is amazing for for him, you know, his family, his loved ones, and and really uh all of Israel. So yeah, they you know, not the sense that the war is over, but a real sense of closure that uh after 800 and plus days since uh October 7th, uh and really by the way, going back 14 years, it's the first time in 14 years that there isn't an Israeli hostage in Hamas captivity since well 2014. So that's 12 years. Yeah. So 12 years. Uh and that's that's not a small thing, um, even before October 7th, even before this mass kind of hostage taking. So there was a real sense of closure, a real sense of happiness for the Gvili family, because the guy was a real hero, uh, policeman who was uh recovering from shoulder surgery, so he was uh not on duty. Um he was at home recovering, and he of his own volition chose to head down to southern Israel, to the Gaza envelope to fight and defend the Kibutzim and Mosheavim down there and uh and fell, you know, in the line of duty, even though he wasn't officially on duty. So that was a big thing. And then, you know, I mean the war since last October, you know, for practical purposes, has has kind of ended. There's a ceasefire, obviously, even though there's still clashes and troops inside Gaza and around Gaza, but the real kind of lingering issue for most Israelis was the hostages. And, you know, uh dozens of them, both living and dead, were returned quite quite quickly after the October ceasefire. Uh but Ghan Gvili was was still there in uh in every public statement by every you know, hostage who had returned, by a relative of a hostage member who had returned, to say nothing of Ghvili's family, and public officials, you know, mentioned the fact that yes, uh, we're still waiting for one more hostage to to come home. So it was uh it was a good day, and it was interesting too, you know, if we want to get kind of into the politics of it, right? So that evening when Gvili's uh remains were identified and brought back to Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu gave a press conference. This kind of, you know, Netanyahu likes to give press conferences when when he has good news to report, when he has uh positive news to take credit for. So he got up there and uh, you know, yes, he he did bring all the hostages back home. That is on a technical level correct. Uh, and yet, right, you know, the vast majority of the hostages were were taken on his watch due to uh October 7th. His government was in power on October 7th, no matter how much he tries to kind of ignore that or deflect from that responsibility, which he hasn't taken. And, you know, opposition to Netanyahu and critics, you know, in the public realm said, you know, yes, uh, you brought all the hostages home, but uh over 40 of them were taken alive and came back in body bags, right? And a lot of them could have been brought back earlier and would have been alive. Uh and this comes to the crux of it, you know, could Netanyahu have agreed to ceasefire and hostage deals earlier, and not just when he was forced to by, well, primarily Donald Trump last January and then last October. So it's all well and good for the prime minister to get up and take credit for, you know, uh bringing all the hostages home. But all of us who have been kind of dealing with this and following this uh closely for over two years knows that uh left to his own devices, left to his own coalition partners, uh it's unlikely Netanyahu would have agreed to those ceasefire deals when he did, uh, even though they by an overwhelming margin were the reasons the vast majority of uh hostages came back alive. So uh that's just kind of the the politics of it all. Uh and then kind of the second interesting political tidbit, Netanyahu attended Rangvili's funeral the next day in Meitar, uh down south. And that's the first time Netanyahu has attended anyone's funeral. Any hostage, any fallen soldier the first time. It's likely because A, the last hostage, so it's uh positive news, right? It's a closure that we were talking about. Uh, and B, the Gvili family uh seemed to be more supportive of Netanyahu and the government than perhaps other hostage families and the families of fallen soldiers. So he likely felt a bit more comfortable uh going there. And um, yeah, so that happened. So yes, uh Angvili is home, the this kind of terrible, terrible chapter in Israeli, and not just Israeli, right? Israeli, Jewish, and I'd say world history is is over, thankfully. Uh, and now we're we're left with um, I guess it's post-war Gaza, but I guess mid-sease fire Gaza and what comes next.

SPEAKER_00: 18:44

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SPEAKER_01: 19:43

What about the Rafah Border Crossing? That's meant to be reopened now that we're in phase two of the ceasefire, but I know there are some obstacles to its reopening, and of course it's critical for freedom of movement for Palestinians and for medical care.

Neri: 19:55

So, yes, I will get to the Rafah Crossing, which opened uh yesterday, Monday, uh, officially for the movement of Palestinians into and out of Gaza. So that's the border crossing that connects Gaza to Egypt, Egyptian Sinai, and it was the main border crossing, pedestrian border crossing uh before the war for Palestinians in Gaza to get in and out of the strip. It's mostly been closed for the past year and a half since the IDF took Rafah and southern Gaza in May of uh 2024. Uh and it was opened during last January's ceasefire for a few weeks and then and then closed. So now it's open, uh, and that's all for the good. And that's just part of the beginning of phase two of the ceasefire. So uh the American team led by Jared Kushner and Steve Woodkoff uh officially announced the beginning of phase two in recent weeks, and this is kind of the the official start. Obviously, before the Rafah crossing was opened on Monday, there was the announcement of uh the Board of Peace, chaired by Donald J. Trump, and then the executive board underneath it, uh, that Jared Kushner, Steve Whitkoff, uh Tony Blair, and others are part of. And then in this kind of Russian doll underneath the executive board, there's the high representative for the Gaza Strip, uh, led by former UN envoy Nikolai Mladonov, uh, a good guy, very capable, used to serve here in Jerusalem on behalf of the UN, uh, again, kind of brokering, I don't want to say peace, but uh, you know, various ceasefires and diplomatic arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, quite effectively uh at the time. So he's now the high representative for Gaza and the representative of for the executive board vis-a-vis the fourth level of this new kind of governance scheme for Gaza, which is the Palestinian Technocrat Committee. Uh, effectively a new government for the Gaza Strip, uh, officially called the uh National Committee for the Administration uh of Gaza, NCAG, 14 member body uh filled with various kind of Palestinian technocrats. Non-Hamas, I'd say close to the Palestinian Authority, and we can maybe get into the semantics of it all. But basically, this is the new kind of governing structure of Gaza. So it's part of the movement into phase two, and especially given Rangvili's return, which paved the way for things like the reopening of the Rafa Crossing, as I mentioned. Ideally, now we're going to be seeing other steps taken by this new essentially government for Gaza, like kind of increased aid, increased kind of housing, prefab housing units, you know, increased kind of health assistance, you know, clinics and the like. And really, you know, the idea is that they're going to start taking over the Gazan, uh Gaza civil service away from Hamas. And that, by the way, Hamas is agreed to in their kind of beneficence. Uh, they're like, okay, uh, we're at least uh in theory and officially gonna hand over civilian affairs in the Gaza Strip to this new Gazan government that was created by um, well, chaperoned and shepherded by the by the Americans, by the Trump administration, who really kind of own this issue now. Uh let's let's look not mince words. So uh when you say, you know, Netanyahu dragging his feet, maybe somewhat, but uh really uh there's only so much he can do because uh, well, the president's son-in-law is kind of leading leading the charge. And uh, you know, you don't want to get on the bad side, um, not of Jared, I imagine, but of the father-in-law, as we all know. So, really, the idea is that this kind of starts a process where this new government for the Gaza Strip starts taking over the civil service. I think, you know, teachers, nurses, hospitals facilitates the entry of more aid, more humanitarian goods and the like. In theory, facilitates don't more donor funding, right? Because we're now in a different stage of the ceasefire, um, remains to be seen if foreign donors kind of show up. And then the big issue, really, and the issue on everyone's mind is okay, what happens to Hamas's guns, which is also part of the second phase of the ceasefire. And also, are we gonna see an actual kind of international peacekeeping force, what they call an international stabilization force, the ISF, that will go in and kind of, I don't want to say disarm Hamas because they're not gonna disarm Hamas, but kind of monitor the ceasefire and facilitate better security and law and order. So that's essentially what we're looking at, uh, big picture. But, you know, it's very easy to kind of be cynical and pessimistic about the chances of this kind of scheme working out in with various levels and various uh boards and committees uh that you know, I do this for a living, so I kind of have to understand and follow it. But uh, you know, I've had to explain this to various people, you know, civilians, lay people, you know, how how this thing actually works. And, you know, so wait, Jared Kushner is gonna be running Gaza. And I was like, well, not officially, but yes. But then they have this Bulgarian diplomat, Mladonov, who's gonna oversee the Palestinians that are now responsible for running Gaza and kind of taking it away from Hamas. And then they asked me, you know, are these new, these new Palestinians, are they Palestinian authority? I was like, well, no, not officially, but but kind of. So again, very messy, but like I said, it's very easy to kind of poo-poo it and be cynical. But this is the only game in town. So they are moving forward. The uh Trump administration wants to see this succeed, but it'll take a lot of time, money, effort, and patience. Uh, it's not gonna, you know, you're not gonna rebuild or well, definitely not rebuild, but undo kind of two and a half years of war that Hamas brought on this peace small piece of land, just devastation overnight. And so I, you know, you have to wish them the best of luck. And, you know, even in the best of circumstances, which these are not, uh, it's gonna be a very difficult job. But I think, you know, initially they're gonna try to show the Palestinian public in in Gaza that they can deliver. So what they call like quick wins kind of improve the situation and then try to build, build off of that. But yeah, the the big issue really is, you know, can they get Hamas disarm? How will that work? You know, there are various ideas floating around. I mean, that should hopefully happen or begin to happen uh in the coming weeks, months.

SPEAKER_01: 26:18

What does it actually look like to reopen the Rafah crossing when you have Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, the US, Egypt, all these different parties involved and trying to navigate the different needs of each one?

Neri: 26:30

So, yeah, it's a bit complicated. Effectively, the IDF still controls southern Gaza, right? The Rafah governorate. So basically, the the southern frontier of Gaza bordering Egypt, still IDF controlled territory. But then you have this border crossing between Gaza and Egypt that has now been reopened for people from Gaza to leave and then Gazans from the outside coming back in. The actual crossing is going to be manned by um, how shall I put this, Shiny, Palestinian security officials, obviously not Hamas, but officially uh that are kind of affiliated, but not officially, with the Palestinian Authority, right? So they're not really officially Palestinian Authority security personnel, even though they are, shall we say, loosely affiliated with them. And the semantics, uh, for the reasons for the semantics will become very clear to everyone in just a second. And on top of that, you have um uh European Union border monitors also at the checkpoint monitoring things. Uh again, what they actually will do remains to be seen. This is, by the way, a legacy of 21 years ago when the Israel first withdrew from the Gaza Strip, and they had this um whole kind of system in place, again, for monitoring the comings and goings between Gaza and Egypt, uh, that lasted uh about as long as Palestinian Authority control over Gaza, which was not very long before Hamas, as we all know, took over in a violent coup uh in 2007. So again, uh these European monitors uh have been kind of hanging around here in Israel in one form or another for 21 years, and now they are they have been deployed once again. So hopefully this time the mission is more successful. But obviously, kind of a bit away from the actual crossing inside Gaza, you have uh IDF and also Shinbet kind of internal security monitoring who's coming and going. Um, Israel is provided kind of a list and has to agree uh to the comings and goings in and out of Gaza, as do the Egyptians on their side, which is also a closed military zone now for many years. So again, it's tightly controlled, the border crossing, it's only for people, not goods, but it should hopefully ease a lot of the kind of day-to-day suffering on a real level of people in Gaza needing to get out, especially for medical treatment, and also the suffering of people on the outside of Gaza that really want to get in and go back either to see loved ones or to go back to property, or because, well, living in kind of exile uh in Egypt, while obviously safer than being in Gaza may not be all that easy either if you can't work and you're running out of money. So there are obviously like reasons for people to both go in and go out. So it's a big deal for Gazans, it's a big deal for the new kind of government of Gaza led by these 14 technocrats. So that's why it was a point of emphasis in the negotiations, in the ceasefire, uh especially now, and uh why hopefully it will it will work. But again, there was this big uh brouhaha, you know, if we go back to Israeli politics, domestic politics. So there was a big bruhaha here in Israel because, well, you reopened the Rafah crossing, but Hamas is still, you know, still exists, right? So, you know, short of total victory, now the Netanyahu government reopened the Rafah crossing after it made kind of the Rafah crossing and the frontier between Gaza and Egypt this kind of existential Israeli concern previous years to, you know, for various reasons having to do with Netanyahu's um domestic position and ongoing ceasefire talks. We don't need to kind of belie belabor that point. I think you and I talked about it at the time at the time. Uh so that was uh not a cap in Netanyahu's feather, just domestically, that this was allowed to reopen, even though Netanyahu agreed.

SPEAKER_01: 30:10

Feather in his cap.

Neri: 30:12

But not a not a feather in his cap. So a negative, a negative feather. He has negative feathers in a cap that he doesn't wear. But again, it's it's it's the you know, it's kind of the domestic politics of in Israel of the Gaza ceasefire, fine. But then uh last night, some sharp-eyed reporters and analysts, um, I don't know who first noticed it. Um it's an open open debate, but basically on social media, on Twitter, you had this kind of groundswell of reports saying that the new Technocratic Committee for Gaza, the NCAG, um, had changed its logo. So basically, uh, it had one logo when it was created two weeks ago, and then yesterday it changed its logo. And the logo is strikingly similar to the crest with this uh kind of left-facing eagle of the Palestinian Authority. And you can imagine what the reaction was uh inside Israel. Oh, look, the Palestinian Authority is back in Gaza. Netanyahu, US Prime Minister, have been promising for two plus years, no Hamas, no PA. But the PA, you know, look, the Technocratic Committee is, you know, a lot of these former or you know affiliated guys to the PA. You have PA security at the Rafah border crossing, and now they have, God forbid, the same logo. So uh Netanyahu, late last night, late Monday night, his office issued a statement. Um, believe me, they don't react this quickly to actual things that happen here unless it serves their interest. So they realized it was a political problem and they tried to kind of um put out that fire. It remains unclear who who approved, you know, whose idea it was to change the logo. I'm I'm still trying to figure that out. Uh and Netanyahu said, you know, we didn't agree to this logo. It wasn't what, it wasn't what was presented to us, you know, a few weeks ago. They again vowed the Palestini Authority will not go back into Gaza. Um, fine, they can say whatever they want for public consumption here in Israel, but the reality on the ground is the same as it was on October 8th, 2023, Shiny. And what you and I have discussed, what our colleagues Michael Koplau and Shir Efron have discussed ad nauseum, um, the day after the war, whenever will come, uh you know, you don't have many options to choose from in terms of a non-Hamas administration for Gaza. So if it's not Hamas and Nanyahu refuses to countenance the Palestinian Authority, then they have to create this new entity that is, you know, quasi Palestinian Authority. Um, again, I think these there's obviously a substance to it, but it's mostly semantics because uh ultimately these people need to kind of deliver and succeed on their own terms. They'll obviously have to get by it and cooperate with the Palestinian Authority that sits in Ramallah and the West Bank. Um, and obviously they will have to try to the best of their abilities to kind of shunt Hamas to the side and undermine them both politically, economically, and probably most importantly, militarily in security terms. And that will be the real test.

SPEAKER_01: 33:13

So can we move now to my side of the ocean?

Neri: 33:16

Please, please. Um, you know, between Iran and Gaza and Baby Netanyahu, uh, please save me by by talking about your neck of the woods. But I am curious, Shani, because all kidding aside, last time we spoke, you remember what day it was, right? It was literally election day in New York City. I was in New York City. Uh the results I think were kind of preordained.

SPEAKER_01: 33:41

Yeah, I think we already knew. Luckily, we predicted the right way. It's always tough when you have to record the morning of an election, but I think it was pretty clear already who was going to win.

Neri: 33:51

And let me tell you, that night I went to my favorite burger place in the East Village. And uh it was fairly empty, but they obviously had the TV on and I was sitting at the bar having this uh amazing burger. And it was, you know, a small kind of watch party for the election results. And everyone there, because it's the East Village, uh, obviously was very happy with the results. Uh, but then, you know, I got to talking to the bartender and the various other people at the bar, and they asked me, you know, where where are you coming in from? Because I told them, oh, I used to come here a lot. This is my favorite burger place in the whole city. Uh I said, Oh, I'm in from Tel Aviv. And the look, the look on their faces was was priceless. They're like, oh. I was like, no, don't worry, you know, I'm uh I'm not one, you know, to to pass judgment, you know, uh, et cetera, et cetera. I, you know, I obviously told them I I I personally wouldn't vote for Mamdani. But then they they very patiently explained to me why they voted for Mamdani. I was like, okay, okay. But I'm very curious, uh, three months in uh well, after the election day and one month after Mamdani was was sworn in, what is life like in in New York City?

SPEAKER_01: 34:57

Sure. Um, well, of course, anti-Semitism is the first thing on all of our minds. Although I will remind folks, as I'm sure they reminded you, those people at the pizza at the burger shop, that most New Yorkers are not voting for the mayor based on his Israel views. And that's okay. That that makes sense for the majority of New Yorkers. But of course, this is Israel policy pod, so that's what we will focus on and how it influences the Jewish community. One of the first things he did was revoke, I think the words revoke, all of Eric Adams's executive orders. And that included one that enshrined the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism, okay, um, without replacing it with something else. So what does that mean? There isn't a working definition of anti-Semitism to guide anti-Semitism task forces and the and the like. Now, many will say, and this is true, that most types of hatred don't have definitions. You don't have to outline what is what does anti-black racism look like, what does Islamophobia look like? Those aren't actually outlined anywhere generally. Um, but of course, when it comes to anti-Semitism, there's a lot of contradictory opinions, a lot of controversy around what anti-Semitism is. You know, where do anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism intersect? Is it always? Is it never? Is it somewhere in between? Um, what types of anti-Zionism are problematic, what are not? Or are they inherently problematic, anti-Semitic, right? These are the kind of questions being asked by a lot of institutions and a lot of Jewish community leaders and a lot of politicians. Um, and so many in our community feel that there should be some kind of definition. Um, Eric Adams had one and now there isn't one. So we'll just name that as a piece of this conversation that's happening here.

Neri: 36:35

And that's what that's like a symbolic move by Mamdani for the American Jewish community or uh, you know, people living in New York, or is it substance like has a substance to it?

SPEAKER_01: 36:44

I would venture to guess if you spoke to him about the IRA definition, he would not endorse it. There are other definitions of anti-Semitism out there. Um and there there are two other prominent ones. It'll be interesting to see if he endorses one. From most people I've spoken to think that he will just leave it sort of open-ended because it's too controversial to pick one or the other. I would venture to guess that Mamdani would not support the IRA definition of anti-Semitism if prompted. Most people in his political camp are pretty resistant to it. But him removing the definition was in the context of revoking all of Eric Adams' executive orders. I think it was about 20 of them. So I think two of them connected to anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism, but most of them did not have to do with our community. Of course, that's what we're going to focus on. I'll add that there is an office to combat anti-Semitism that Eric Adams created. It's run by Rabbi Moshe Davis, and it's still, he did not close that office. It seems he plans to keep it open, which is great. Moshe is still running it as of right now, although it's been reported that Mamdani is interviewing candidates to lead it for his administration. I think it's important to say that the names that have been thrown out to run the anti-Semitism unit or the anti-Semitism office are progressive, definitely more progressive than Eric Adams would have chosen, but they're not anti-Israel. They're not anti-Zionists. I haven't seen anyone listed who's who's super radical, who the community would be in total opposition to. So I think that's important to say, although he hasn't, as of yet, actually selected a new lead.

Neri: 38:17

Okay. And this whole thing that we see, especially from far away in terms of um protests outside synagogues, you know, anti-Israel, anti-Zionist protests. Um, is that still an issue? Because I know, I mean, it was like what, his first week on the job or something like that?

SPEAKER_01: 38:34

Yeah, it's definitely still an issue. We definitely see a lot of folks worrying about that. The New York City Council has been proposing there's some really practical types of legislation that you can use to address that. So Julie Menon is the speaker of the New York City Council, and she's viewed as being a lot more moderate than Mamdani on these sorts of things. They the New York City Council launched an anti-Semitism task force specifically for this. NYPD uh released their from their hate crimes unit that anti-Semitic incidents accounted for 57% of reported hate crimes in 2025. And uh about 10% of New Yorkers are Jewish.

Neri: 39:09

Yep.

SPEAKER_01: 39:10

And I believe New Yorkers were New York Jews were the targets of more hate crimes than any other group combined. So it's clearly an issue that's on every politician's mind in New York, or at least it should be. And the task force is being run out of the Jewish caucus, it's bipartisan. Um, one of their initiatives is to try to get a longer perimeter, about 100 feet, around synagogues, and it would apply to mosques and churches too, to sort of limit the scale of the protests and get them a little bit further away from the institutions. Um, but of course, the protesters argue that this is a violation of constitutional rights, freedom of assembly, right to protest. And so Mamdani, I don't think that he's actually made a decision on this yet. He can sort of decide if he wants to go forward or shut it down. But I think that that's a really practical way that they can keep us safer, that the state and the city can keep us safer. And I know Kathy Hokel, the governor, also is in favor of having a longer perimeter because you have people really standing right outside or or um right around the corner from synagogues, harassing people. And some of them are really, really radical. I would say it it moves from anti-Israel to being, you know, pro-violence, pro-terrorism. Some of them can be very, very extreme. Um, so it is really scary.

Neri: 40:21

I can, well, I can only imagine. Well, I can't imagine it, but I can only imagine because I'm uh no longer there. And I guess, you know, just final question uh in terms of Mamdani and then maybe big picture American American Jewry writ large. Is it been a better month than expected? It was it's been about what you expected, worse than you expected?

SPEAKER_01: 40:42

I didn't expect very much to change in the near term and not much has. The American Jews I speak to are not talking about it as much as I would expect, unless they're in the political sphere, but I don't see people as stressed out. There was a lot of anxiety leading up to the election. Now that he's in office, I'm not hearing about it so much. I think a lot of people have this wait and see approach, even from the pretty pro-Israel camp. A lot of folks are telling me, yeah, I guess we'll see what happens on this front or that front. But it's uh it's top of mind for folks. It's still top of mind. I think who he chooses to lead in the anti-Semitism office, if he selects someone new, uh, will have a big impact on how folks are feeling.

Neri: 41:21

Okay.

SPEAKER_01: 41:21

But it but it is important to note that this New York City Council is sort of a counterweight to him in some ways. Uh so there are very there are a lot of Jewish legislators at the city council level, at the state level. There are a lot of a lot of people who support the Jewish community. And so I think that it's not as though Omdani can run everything out of the city without any restrictions.

Neri: 41:41

Right. Some would say uh it's very difficult to run anything out of the city, given given his dependence on uh the state and also the federal government. Uh so again, that it was always going to be a tough, a tough job.

SPEAKER_01: 41:52

Yeah.

Neri: 41:53

But uh hopefully he succeeds for the city and hopefully he succeeds for his Jewish constituency as well.

SPEAKER_01: 41:57

Yeah. See.

Neri: 41:58

Shanee, great to see you as always.

SPEAKER_01: 42:00

Great to see you too, Nary.

Neri: 42:02

I hope that uh by the time this podcast goes up, that we're not in the middle of a new uh Middle Eastern war. But uh, like like we always say, our listeners and viewers will be a lot smarter. And let us hope that uh they do actually meet on Friday and try to hash out a diplomatic solution, uh, even though, well, A, it depends what kind of diplomatic solution we're talking about. Uh, and then B, for many people, any diplomatic solution at this point in time, given the weakness of the Islamic Republic, would be um the wrong approach to take. Uh, I think it's fair to say that a lot of people here in Israel view it as a historic moment for the US andor Israel, or the US and Israel, to actually push them uh over the edge, over there uh in Tehran. I don't know what that would look like. I don't know if it's gonna work. It's highly dangerous for everyone, so we shall see.

SPEAKER_01: 42:53

Good luck to us all.

Neri: 42:54

Thanks, Janine.

SPEAKER_01: 42:55

Bye, Neri.