Neri: 0:00

If you're a listener of Israel Policy Pod, you already know that the hardest questions about Israel and Jewish life don't come with simple answers. That's why I want to recommend a podcast I think you'll like. It's called Identity Crisis from the Shalom Hartman Institute. Each week, Hartman president and host, Yuda Kurtzer, brings moral rigor and genuine curiosity to conversations with guests like authors Sarah Horowitz and Dara Horn, Israeli political leaders like Irig Olan and Yossi Balin, and Israel Policy Forum's own chief policy officer Michael Koplow to wrestle seriously with the issues shaping this moment in Jewish life. What makes the identity crisis podcast stand out is that it doesn't rush to easy answers. Instead, it creates space for disagreement, complexity, and real moral debate about Israel, about power, responsibility, and the future of the Jewish people. If you're looking for a podcast featuring great conversations about the essential issues facing Jewish life, I highly recommend checking out Identity Crisis with Yehuda Kurtzer in the show notes or wherever you get your podcasts. Benjamin Atanyahu was back in Washington this week for another summit meeting with President Donald Trump. So I thought it would be a great opportunity to convene my own summit meeting this episode with Israel Policy Forum's very own chief policy officer, Michael Koplow, and our dear friend and former colleague, Shira Efron, a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation, and their distinguished Israel policy chair. We discussed the latest BB Trump meeting, the chances of a deal or war with Iran, next steps in Gaza, the growing Israeli hold on the West Bank, and much, much more. This was, as always, a terrific conversation with them both. And just a reminder, by way of housekeeping, we're now a video podcast, so do check us out on YouTube, and please subscribe and rate us. That always helps. With that, let's get to Michael and Shera. Hi, Michael. Hi, Shea. Welcome back to the podcast. Hi, guys.

Shira: 2:25

Hi, Mary. Hi, Michael. Good to see you.

Neri: 2:28

Uh, it's always good to see both of you. Uh, I should have said Happy New Year, since uh we haven't chatted at least publicly and on the record since uh December for our end of year awards show. So uh this is long overdue, but I think uh a good time to be talking, and there's a lot to discuss. Uh by the way, we're recording this late Wednesday night Tel Aviv time. Uh Bibi Netanyahu and Donald Trump just met at the White House. Uh it was their seventh meeting overall since Trump's uh re-inauguration. Is that a fair, fair term for it? Uh last January. So Bibi's sixth trip to the US. Uh both, I think, unprecedented numbers, uh, historic numbers, beautiful numbers if you are Bibi Netanyahu. Uh, I think by far, not only the most that a foreign leader has seen Trump, but maybe by far any foreign leader has seen an American president uh in his first year in office. But obviously the major focus tonight, uh and well, in the current moment is Iran. Uh so Michael, I wanted to get into it and let's start with you. Um, this latest BB Trump meeting just ended after three hours. Um, fair to say it was an odd one. No photo ops, right? No public remarks of any kind, which uh is fairly unheard of for Donald Trump. Uh only a post by the president on truth social just now hot off the presses. The basic gist of it being there was nothing definitive reached between the two leaders. Trump's preference is for negotiations and a deal. The Iranians need to be, and I quote, more reasonable and responsible than last year, uh, or else they'll likely be hit again. Uh for his part, Bibi Netanyahu put out a very laconic statement saying he, quote, affirmed Israel's security needs in the context of the negotiations and continue to coordinate closely with the US. All right. Michael, uh, your initial thoughts, again, hot off the presses. It just ended.

Michael: 4:24

My initial thoughts are that it it may be a good thing for Netanyahu that there were no press around and no press conference afterward and no Trump off the cuff. In these previous meetings, he's been blindsided uh a bunch of times by by that. Uh, you know, he was blindsided by the announcement of Iran negotiations the first time. He uh was blindsided by various things related to Gaza. So considering that I doubt that this meeting was as harmonious as the previous ones, because they seem to have a difference of opinion on Iran. They seem to have a difference of opinion on Gaza and progress in Gaza. You know, what one of the other things that Trump said in his uh his post-meeting Truth Social Post is we discussed the tremendous progress being made in Gaza. There is truly peace, and peace, of course, isn't all caps, in the Middle East. I I doubt that's how Netanyahu would describe those things. Uh he certainly doesn't seem to think that there is tremendous progress in Gaza. And I also don't think he seems to view what's going on as peace in the Middle East. So the sense before this meeting is that Bibi came here and he's looking to get Trump on his page on Iran, or at least convince Trump of things that Israel wants to see in a deal, or convince Trump uh that Iran's doings are more nefarious than than Trump sometimes talks about. So these two guys don't seem to ever be acrimonious. So I doubt there there was, you know, open fighting, but um I guess hard to hard to judge at the moment given that we didn't see anything in public. And you know, Trump issued a typical Trumpian statement, and Netanyahu basically said nothing. So we'll see in the days and weeks ahead, and I I think we'll judge really more by Iran and what happens there as to as to how this meeting went. I'm I I'm also curious if Netanyahu is now going to confirm that he'll be returning next week, not only for the APAC conference, but for the Board of Peace meeting, uh, because my guess is that Trump would like him there. Um but we'll find out.

Neri: 6:31

Some believe he's gonna go back to the Board of Peace meeting, uh, because there are various uh, shall we say, uh, other world leaders that are gonna be sharing that stage.

Michael: 6:40

Yeah, I get it. He hasn't doesn't want to be next to the the Kutries or the Turks. On the other hand, if in this meeting Trump said to him, I want you there, and you know, it also came out today before the meeting that Netanyahu officially signed the the documents for the Board of Peace, which is also uh I I don't I don't recall uh a cabinet vote or a or a Knesset vote. Um so this is this is wonderful Netanyahu just signed Israel up for this thing. No debate. You know? Yeah, no, no, no debate. That's how democracies that's how democracies are supposed to work, right? So uh I don't know, who who knows? My guess is that my guess is that Netanyahu wouldn't have necessarily wanted that out in public either, uh especially because he didn't sign it today. I think the you know the the date on it was what January 19th or January 20th, and it's only now coming out that he did this. So who knows? If Trump wants him there next week, he's gonna be there next week. That I'm pretty certain of.

Neri: 7:28

Well, eagle-eyed uh Michael Koplo. I did not see the the post date on the Board of Peace uh uh letter of uh participation by Bibi Netanyahu. Um again, we'll get into Gaza in just a moment. I wanted to keep our focus on on Iran, and uh yes, it this BB trip to DC was billed, at least in Israel, as uh an urgent visit, uh a fateful visit, a decisive visit on the Iran issue. Um, like you said, remains to be seen uh what actually comes out of it, but that's at least the the impression that was given on this end. Uh Shera, your initial thoughts to uh this now seventh meeting between the two leaders?

Shira: 8:08

I mean, I agree with Michael, very difficult, relatively cryptic uh statements. Um, the one from uh Trump being more positive, uh, and Bibi just saying he's you know maintaining the interest of the state of Israel. Um it was scheduled to be a one-hour meeting. It ended up being longer than three hours, I think. Yeah, about three hours. Um, not sure if it's good or bad. Um hard to see. I think many of us thought that Netanyahu would go to Washington and hear some tough things from Trump, and then it turns out that actually Netanyahu went into the room and completely changed Trump's mind. Um, so really who knows? And I think we'll be way smarter. I don't know if in the days and weeks ahead, probably even tomorrow or uh by the weekend, uh, on what was actually in that meeting. Thing is that it's very clearly from Netanyahu's perspective, the priority was uh Iran, right? The last, my understanding, at least from the way it's uh framed here, is that actually it was difficult. There's there's an extraordinary military coordination, right, with Israel being sent com. Israel knows every airplane, every maritime vessel that like sails around here on the whole diplomatic front. Um, there is less visibility uh to Israel despite coordination. So Whitkoff was here, I think, a week ago. Um and you know, there was a meeting there before the negotiations with Iran actually began. But since then, I mean, of course, you can do these things over the phone and secure a VC, but you know, when it's now with Trump uh has proven again and again that there's no substitute for FaceTime, right? So that was actually FaceTime meeting. Clearly, it's not, I mean, Trump said it. And again, I could be eating a hat in a couple of hours. Who knows what's gonna happen? But it's very clear that Trump is prioritizing a deal over a strike in Iran. Um, I don't think Netanyahu supports any deal. Uh, at this point, he doesn't believe that Iran would be flexible on the ballistic missiles and proxies and whatever you, right? Netanyahu really wants, and understand why, but but not supporting a deal and also not giving this regime a lifeline, which a deal will, right? A deal would give this regime a lifeline, maybe a short one, um, but but but a lifeline. And so this is clearly divergence of wills there. What happens? How does Iran play? And we are seeing that you know, the this armadama of use, right, the US posture in the Middle East is is only increasing. The the uh second aircraft carrier Bush is on the way to the region um now again. So there's very clearly like a credible military threat. We know how it ended last time. I'm not sure how it's gonna end today. On Gaza, on the Board of Peace, I mean, of course, it's known what is decided here in a vote and a cabinet. I mean, we're we're long past um standard best practices, decision-making processes. Um, that's that's not the issue. The the question with the Board of Peace is I I think it's mutual. I I think Netanyahu doesn't want to be there on the stage uh with some of these leaders, but I'm actually I'm pretty sure they don't want them hidden there either, right? Like for all these Arab leaders to be there with Netanyahu on stage, it's it's it's it's it's not good for them. Um and especially not with the images that we're seeing from the West Bank and this the West Bank decision that was happening now and Ramadan is gonna be around Ramadan, and who knows what provocation could be on Temple Mount, right? With Benvier, I mean, I so I think Trump wants Netanyahu like in. But if someone, if Arab leader is telling him, you know, we come, but it's complicated for us. I'm not as convinced that Netanyahu is under extreme pressure to come back for that photo op. Uh and AIPAC is a different story because I think, according to my understanding, he's still scheduled to come to A for AIPAC, but that may have changed. Um, it's all short trip because his wife and son are now in Israel.

Neri: 12:02

Yeah. Uh I mean, look, the board the Board of Peace issue, um, just as a tangent, but can you imagine another Israeli leader signing up for this uh international body that has as its goal, according to the UN resolution, Security Council resolution that set it up, a future Palestinian state? And how Bibi Netanyahu and the Israeli right would have reacted to, say, a Prime Minister Yay Lapid or a Prime Minister Bennett signing up to this uh initiative. Uh I'll pause at that for our listeners. You don't have to, you know, you don't have to know much about Israeli politics to know that the Israeli right would be marching in the streets uh as we speak tonight. But uh I'll just say, in terms of initial reactions to what just happened at the White House, I'm not that surprised by Trump's true social statement. Uh I think we all knew, and he said it publicly for weeks now, his preference is for a diplomatic solution. Uh he wants a deal with Iran. The question is, what kind of deal? Um he says they have to be reasonable. I think his definition of reasonable is uh probably very different than uh the the leaders in in Tehran, uh, which we'll get into in just a second. Uh and he also threatened them once again. And it's a very clear threat that he's made now for a month and a half almost. Uh a real military threat against uh against Iran, once again. So uh in terms of the substance of the statement, not that surprising, um, despite the fact that BB was there to perhaps change his mind. Um, it may have been a bit surprising that he didn't go into details as to what he wanted to see from the Iranians, like he has even last night on a Fox News interview where he said uh he wants uh the nuclear program involved included in the deal. He wants ballistic missiles in the deal. And then uh what did he say?

Michael: 13:48

No, no He also said that he also said that Netanyahu wants uh is in favor of a good deal.

Neri: 13:55

Yeah, and by the way, um we can maybe get into speculate as to what Israel's real position is, but then Yahu publicly has said, okay, I have these conditions for a deal, which are obviously maximalist conditions. Um, if Iran somehow were to meet those demands, I think BB would would accept that deal, right? Um limits on the ballistic missiles, limits on support for the various terror groups and proxies around the region, um, no enrichment inside Iran, uh moving out the highly enriched uranium. I mean, those were uh the positions that Yao put out last week. So it was just interesting to me that there were no there were no details.

Shira: 14:33

Don't you think like the sorry in a minute, but I I think I think in principle, like you're right, but I feel like the uh maximalist approach here on Iran became more maximalist. Like I think Netanyahu wants more on Iran. I think he wants a regime change.

Michael: 14:48

And and there's there's no question to me that Netanyahu's maximalist position is different from from what Trump views as his own maximalist position. Uh I don't know.

Neri: 14:56

I mean, I don't know what Trump's actual position is. It remains to be seen in the negotiations. But Shira, to your to your point, right, there's there's one option where they call it the kind of uh skinny uh deal with Iran, which is just the nuclear file, which Israel is uh adamantly against. And I think that's the reason why Netanyahu flew to Washington, right? Option one. Option two is um, well, uh nuclear uh missiles, maybe proxies, which is the more kind of maximalist uh deal uh that uh maybe uh would be acceptable to Israel, but maybe perhaps Trump's actual position, like he said last night in an interview and in other moments. Also Steve Woodkoff said it publicly a few weeks ago. The third option, which you hear more and more, at least in Israel, is the Iranian uh regime, the Islamic Republic, is so weak uh at this moment, this is a historic opportunity to actually topple it. And that any deal, no matter the conditions, that would actually give it some sanctions relief and economic an economic lifeline, uh, would be squandering that historic opportunity. And this is now the time to um press uh press the advantage. And that whether militarily or perhaps by not doing a deal and just waiting the Iranians out, uh you need to go for regime change for toppling the regime. I think those are that's something you hear more and more in Israel, right, Shira? Yeah.

Michael: 16:16

Um I don't think I don't think regime change is in the cards for the US, for what it's worth. Uh I mean, you know, Trump, of course, told the protesters now weeks ago that help is coming and it it still may be, but it certainly wasn't coming at the time. And then you've got J.D. Vance, who generally is a reliable guide and interpreter to what Trump is up to and what's going to happen. And J.D. Vance, I think it was just yesterday, said explicitly that the US is is interested in uh in a deal that will that will uh address the nuclear issue, but that if Iranians want regime change, they should do it themselves. But that's not the job for the United States.

Neri: 16:58

Uh and it's not surprising that J.D. Vance, out of all the senior Trump people, said that. He's uh I'd say the more isolationist wing of the Trump administration. Uh but again, that's a shift from what Trump was saying in the beginning of January, uh where when he was explicitly threatening the regime. Again, I said this last week with uh our colleague Cheny. Uh you know, uh if you want to get into Trump's head, good luck. But uh it it can change.

Michael: 17:24

It can change. But I I also think that you know he's now been in office for the second time for over a year, and he's used force a bunch of times. And leave aside what he says. Like if we just look at what he's done, whether it was uh Operation Midnight Hammer or the Venezuela operation, he's clearly not reticent about using force, but he also seems to want to use it quickly and and uh you know make a make a big show and and get out. So if assuming that, you know, if we if we can if we can predict based on uh on the past, if that's his preference, then we'll see strikes on Iran. And and by the way, I do think that there's going to be some sort of U.S. strike on Iran at some point in the next few months. But is it going to be a a long, drawn-out thing that doesn't stop until the regime is gone?

Neri: 18:11

That would surprise so we can get into the scenarios of what a military action would look like. I want to actually focus on the diplomacy because that's obviously Trump's initial preference. Uh as Shira mentioned, there was this initial round of talks last Friday in Oman. Uh Steve Whitkopf, Jared Kushner on one side, uh Iranian Foreign Minister Aragie Aragci uh on the other side. Um maybe they went well, maybe they didn't, nobody quite knows, but at least they were talking, right? And this was last Friday. Uh the sense is that there will be further rounds of talks. You know, given what we've just talked about for now, 15 minutes. Uh I mean, Michael, let's start with you. Is there scope for a deal? Uh, as they say, can the minimum that Iran gives up meet the maximum that Donald Trump will demand of them, whatever he chooses to demand of them?

Michael: 19:04

I think that depends on on whether he's willing to take a skinny deal and present it as uh you know a Nitzachan Bukhlat, a total victory. Um the Iran I there's there's no world to me in which the Iranians are going to give up their enriched uranium and agree not to enrich another gram of it to any percentage and give up all their ballistic missiles and agree to stop funding proxies. Uh I just don't think that's gonna happen. So and and not for nothing, but uh folks who know Iran well keep on telling me that the Iranian messaging is that they they won the 12-day exchange back in June because they got hit by the U.S. and Israel, and hey, they still have their uranium and they're still there, and uh the administration is not willing to talk to them. And you know, last week um they insulted Trump a bunch of times and sent a drone at uh at a U.S. warship and harassed US flagged oil tankers, and last second said, we're not coming to Istanbul, you have to come to Oman, which is symbolic because the previous nuclear negotiations under Obama were in Oman. And so, you know, doing that basically is an attempt to draw a straight line from those negotiations to these ones and say, hey, we're only negotiating over the nuclear program. So they're operating in in all sorts of ways where at least they're signaling that they're in good shape, and you know, so far there haven't been consequences for those things. So far. So I don't think they're gonna give up all that stuff so far. And so I don't think they're gonna they're gonna give up all that stuff. So it goes back to it's goes back to something you raised earlier. Is Trump willing to go for a skinny deal or not? I think that if he's willing to go for a skinny deal, which will absolutely drive Netanyahu and the Israelis crazy, then there's a possibility. Um, but I think that if if he's if he wants to go through all the issues and really limit what the Iranians are doing, then again, I I'm no I am no expert on Iranian domestic politics, but from from the way they're behaving and from folks who know Iran well, it doesn't seem like the Iranians are under so much stress, or at least they don't feel like they're under so much stress, that they would give up everything like that.

Shira: 21:19

There's always right a gap in sort of understanding Iran and viewing it as sort of transactional regime that just looks at like what are the costs now and what are and I think downplaying um the ideological nature and the choices that they make and the motivations. And I'm by no means Iranian expert, but I think there's an expectation they really have their backs against the wall right now, right? Um, with the protests, with international pressure, no one has patience for them. Uh all this, right, all the unprecedented um military posture uh uh in the region. Um a US president that has shown that he is not. Scared of using force, right? Like you have all that. And Israel that is not scared anymore. And still, we are not sure what choice they will make. And if they choose this time to say, okay, we have to, because summer is coming, and again, we're not going to have water. And it's going to be hard, all these domestic issues, and we have to find a way out. And we need a pause and we need some sort of an agreement to be flexible on these other issues or not. It's hard to believe that Iran would give up on everything or that it has to be done in a face-saving way, right? Um, which I don't know if Trump's negotiation team uh will do uh or not. But I do think there's fundamental right there's the gap between the US and in terms of like understanding Iran, but there's also a gap between what Israel. I really think Netanyahu doesn't want any deal. I think he wants to be the one uh signing sort of the uh you know the uh death uh death confidence certificate of the of the Iranian regime. I mean, I think that's that's what he wants his legacy to be. Um and therefore an agreement that was like when we were looking for a better deal, right, after JCPOA, um, I think at the moment this is not what he wants. Where it's gonna go, how it's gonna get, how this negotiation is gonna go with the Iranians, right? Who knows? Um, and and what's the window? Because maybe the Iranians feel like more emboldened now because they're saying, well, we got people off the hook, we all we have the countries in the region advocating on our behalf. We have Ramadan coming, we doubted the Saudis and the Meratis and all these other one flying things in the region for the next month, right? So we have time. I don't know if this is the calculation. I have no idea we can be waking up to sirens here in the middle of the night, right? So we have to be careful.

Neri: 23:43

Yeah.

Shira: 23:44

Um, but but it's probably what the the the way we see that Trump prefers a deal, I'm sure the Iranians see that also.

Neri: 23:52

So I'll touch on the uh just my own opinion about the Iranians and then and then the Americans side of this. Uh look, uh I think the Iranians, I think they understand their backs are against the wall. I think they understand their position is you know more difficult than it was, uh, but that they view the current moment as as existential for them. And that any uh any concession, especially on something like the missiles, uh, would be near impossible for them to agree to. And this is you know uh pretty much every credible Iran analyst worth their assault, it will tell you that yes, there may be room and scope for a deal on the nuclear program, uh, but that the missiles are really the the major stumbling block. And uh in terms of the Americans, I mean uh look, uh this is a very dangerous game, but um Donald Trump gave an interview literally last night and said nuclear program missiles and this and that. So uh he said it, right? And but then sometimes he says only the nuclear program. Uh so again, it depends on whether his negotiators, you know, Jared and Steve, uh will hold the line on uh nuclear and missiles. Um and I think look, uh nuclear is possible, nuclear plus all the other stuff, very, very difficult. And then we're getting into scenarios about you know the use of military force. Uh I'll just say that this isn't just you know Netanyahu perhaps making this pitch to Trump, but maybe others saying, look, um if it took the Israelis 12 days last June to do X amount of damage to Iran's nuclear program and missiles and whatnot, um, what can the US military and the Israeli military, really the Air Force, uh and not only do in uh six days to uh the nuclear program, the missiles, and whatever else they want to hit, uh right? And that yes, he doesn't want drawn out conflict and it's not gonna be um pretty all over the Middle East, but uh I don't know. The US military and the Israeli military are are fairly formidable. And maybe maybe the pitch to Trump is yes, there will be six difficult days of uh fighting, but on the other side of it, uh there won't be there there definitely won't be a nuclear program. Uh there will be very little left of their missile arsenal, and maybe it'll weaken the regime enough that they'll either uh teeter, maybe collapse, or they'll come to the table and negotiate with you, as he likes to say, uh reasonably and responsibly. Again, I'm not I'm not reporting this, uh but I could see that pitch being made to a president who doesn't like foreign entanglements. Uh I'll just leave it at that. Uh diplomacy, military option. I want to talk about uh the optics of it all. Um that the Israeli Prime Minister BB dashed off to DC uh very publicly to um well very publicly stiffen the spines of the Americans uh and that if there's no deal, uh and if Trump does pull the trigger like he just threatened to do, if there's no deal, um isn't there a danger here that there will be a lot of people in the US, and not just in the US, perceiving Israel to have dragged uh the US into uh a Middle East war? Uh Michael, is this uh is this not a danger, you know, in terms of the optics of the Iran issue and the Iran crisis?

Michael: 27:12

There's certainly a danger. I I don't think, frankly, that Nitanyahu cares about that, because the danger I don't think that he views the danger as falling on him, right? The the danger uh largely, if that happens, falls falls on on the pro-Israel community in the United States and and on American Jews. Um there's that. But but also Michael, hold on.

Neri: 27:37

Doesn't it also fall on Israel and Israel's kind of standing in the world, support for Israel? I mean, obviously they're not you know, we in Israel aren't gonna be, you know, we're not gonna bear the brunt of it immediately.

Michael: 27:47

But forget about Israel's standing forget about Israel standing in the world, right? Israel is is having a very difficult time in lots of places now anyway. I don't think that uh I don't think that in in Sweden this is gonna be the thing that you know pushes it, pushes it even more over the edge. Um but but also let's not forget that Trump has used plenty of hawkist rhetoric rhetoric toward Iran on his own. Um Trump has already participated in a bombing campaign against Iran back in June. Now, yes, that that was a bombing campaign that started as an Israeli campaign. But I guess the point is uh from Netanyahu's perspective, he may not view this as that much of a danger. Um, but of course the danger exists. Uh I mean, there's all there's a whole chorus of people here on now both sides of the aisle who view Israel as pushing the U.S. into all sorts of things, and you know, particularly on the Republican side, view the U.S. now as being enmeshed in the Middle East and and fighting Israel's wars for it in ways that are not in the U.S. interest. And of course, uh on the Democratic side, there's a lot of skepticism about war in Iran, no matter what. You know, forget about who's pushing it. And of course, Israel has all sorts of problems uh with Democrats in terms of in terms of military activity and human rights. So no, it's not it's not gonna be good, but I doubt that that's Netanyahu's top concern. I listen, I think that Netanyahu wants the U.S. to participate once again in a serious military action in Iran. That is his preference. And uh he's not gonna be deterred by the fact that it may end up looking bad for Israel. He's certainly not gonna be deterred by the fact that it may have real consequences for the Jewish community here in the United States. That's just not what he cares about.

Neri: 29:34

Yeah, I mean, fair point that Donald Trump started this uh cycle vis-a-vis Iran in the beginning of January during the uh the bloody uh domestic unrest in Iran. And um I thought about this, well, uh when when this visit by BB to DC was announced, uh you know, an Israeli prime minister can want uh to go have a meeting with the US President in Washington. The US President has to agree to accept and receive uh the Israeli Prime Minister, right? So it you know, uh Donald Trump is a big boy himself. Uh Shera, what do you think of of the optics of it all, Bibi, this kind of urgent, you know, visit and trip to DC that he pushed up, obviously?

Shira: 30:15

Yeah, I mean, obviously there are the voices in the US that think that Israel is dragging uh the US to fight to wars in the Middle East, right? And this whole like concept of Israel, uh and by the way, this is not only from uh people who are against Israel, right? But this whole concept of Israel's fighting by itself, for itself, after the last two years, it's it's eroded. Uh, and even Israel's supporters, right, has been uh a US um presence in the Middle East that is here largely, some of it is US interest, but a lot of it was was you know other interests that are primarily the interest of uh the US's number, you know, number one uh ally in in the region. Uh and we all benefited from this, right? I don't know if Netanyahu cares about the optics or not. I um we just chatted about it briefly. There was supposed to be uh he was supposed to be accompanied on the trip with a very senior Air Force officer, um Tischler, Brigadier General uh Tischler, who is uh, you know, um one star uh general, and he didn't show up. And this could be the reason that he didn't join the trip, is because of you know the optics of this, that this is too much. Uh bringing a military person to the meeting uh where they can uh basically showing convincing Trump that the Israeli Air Force can't do this if you just let them. Um but I but I but I don't know. But certainly this optics is uh the optics is there and uh will stay as and and you know we'll see, we'll see what happens, right? It's not just it's not just uh um it's not just Iran. Iran is sort of the big show, but there's there's also Gaza and basically Trump making himself the head of the custodianship of Gaza. Um and right, there are other things in the region. I think that's that's really interesting uh in the perspective that you know we kind of like policy wonks can go in and look at the national security strategy and national defense strategy, and we look at like the Middle East sections and they're like this short, and they're all like we brought a piece of the Middle East, and there's really no alignment between what's like in print and what actually the administration is doing in the Middle East, uh, clearly more than they have that they want to do, at least on paper. Um, I will just say another thing that you know, there's this sense of like Netanyahu is he knows how to to uh turn um Trump's mind. And um and I I don't know this whole concept of like Trump being beholden to Netanyahu. It's a different, we're in a different world now, right? It's not even first term, it's not even that the he Trump controls the Democrat the Republican Party so well. What's gonna happen if there's gonna be a deal that Israel doesn't want? Bibi's gonna be very limited in his tools. He can't obviously not gonna go to Congress, but it's not like you can go and talk to Lindsey Graham and convince him Lindsay Graham has been saying what he thinks uh online all the time. So uh Israel will have to accept uh whatever Trump decides here, um, I think. And we can we can just wait and see.

Michael: 33:21

Is there anyone is there anyone who still thinks that that Trump is beholden to Netanyahu?

Shira: 33:25

Is that like not that he's beholden to Nisanyahoo, but I think you know you always have like, oh, Bibi's gonna come to Washington and Trump is gonna tell him why did you do that or why did you do that? And or um and then somehow comes out of the meeting and BB gets um uh a safety net, right? There was like the first visit was uh helping them pass the budget effect effectively and stuff. So there is a sense that I'm sure it's not on um it's it's not based on nothing, right? That Netanyahu has uh a convincing power that is effective in the room, right? Um that I think is what people assume.

Michael: 34:02

I mean he's he's gotten safety nets, but he's also he's also been saddled with lots of things that he didn't want. Even two ceasefires that he didn't want. Whatever and and two two ceasefires, uh board of peace with people on it. He doesn't he doesn't like you know a Rafah crossing that is open and stamping stamping people with the the PA the PA uh stamp. I mean, he's gotten lots of things he doesn't.

Shira: 34:23

Yeah, I think people No, but he but they changed it. He changed it. The step is now the national welcome to the national committee of the governments of Gaza, and now they're changing it to local, and of course it's simple as don't mention me wrong, but also what does Bibi want? It's like we're just like king of the can down the road, we're just dragging time. He got him hostages back, and the first part of a deal that the fact the fact that Trump said we're into you, I know Mary, you're guiding us, we're not in Gaza yet. But they said, yeah, we're going into all those problematic parts from Bibi's perspective are in phase two. But effectively, nothing, nothing, nothing changed on the ground to indicate that we're phase two. So for Bibi's base and also for the rest of the Israelis, okay, he said phase two, but what has changed? There is nothing, even those technocrats are not in Gaza. So I agree with you. He's forced to get it, but he can say it's never gonna happen.

Michael: 35:14

So that by the way, uh like to me is gonna be another key to figuring out how this meeting went. If if the NCAG all of a sudden um shows up in Gaza the next the next week or two, uh my guess is that that will that will be uh byproduct of today's meeting, too. But we'll see.

Speaker: 35:33

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Neri: 36:30

Uh I love how Shera acknowledged my powers as the host and then just completely blew through that stoplight. Um the NCAG, by the way, for our listeners and viewers, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, the Palestinian Technocratic Committee that was set up as part of this phase two of the ceasefire, which I would have uh introduced to our to our listeners and viewers um if given a chance, but I'll do that now. Uh so basically, let's let's move on to Gaza, um, which was the other big issue on the agenda uh just now in Washington. Uh obviously, phase two of the Trump ceasefire has uh begun in earnest. Uh you know, this new Palestinian Technocratic Committee was formed, Board of Peace, the various uh executive boards of the Board of Peace, uh the Rafah Crossing, which connects uh Gaza to Egypt, was opened, I guess, somewhat last week. Um, we even had the first country, uh Indonesia, to announce that it would be willing to send troops to the uh International Peacekeeping Force uh that was going to be part of the ceasefire uh in Gaza. So uh just based on your pre prior comments, Shira, uh you don't think anything has really changed fundamentally on the ground over the past, say, week or two, as phase two has uh kind of begun and been launched. Is that a fair assessment?

Shira: 37:52

I mean, it's it's not assessment, it's a fact. Okay. Um nothing on the ground has changed uh effectively. The IDF has not withdrawn. Uh in fact, the yellow line is being moved further.

Neri: 38:06

Westward. Yeah, the yellow line. The yellow line is is the line that divides uh Gaza in half as part of the ceasefire. IDF controls half of Gaza, Hamas still controls the other half, less than half.

Shira: 38:18

Humanitarian aid goes at the same levels that it did before with the same relatively restrictions. I guess Israel approved uh school supplies. It's basically markers and sheets of paper. It's not like curriculum and school books. Um uh what else? Um you you have you don't have the ISF. I mentioned that the NCAG, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, a group of really, really excellent professional people that are supposed to be the alternative to Hamas. Um, they're still in Cairo. Uh there's a variety of reasons, and I'd I'd be, you know, Michael, it'd be great if they actually go in next week because this will indicate that something is changing on the ground, but they're still in you know in Gaza. And so effectively at the moment, nothing has changed. It doesn't mean that it cannot change. I think the first marker of change will be having them in Gaza, having them alive, right? That nothing actually happens to them. I'm sorry, the bar is pretty low. Uh, but then them actually uh able to provide some services. I'm, you know, Hamas uh said that they would be willing to pass on the civilian management of Gaza uh to NCAC. So something like that's gonna happen. And then when you have some sort of international stabilization security force taking over an area where the IDF is, I mean, we can see we can see changes on the ground that would mean that phase two is here. I think at the moment we're not seeing that. What we are seeing, I I I should say, it's not that we haven't seen uh, it's not that nothing changed. Things have changed a tiny bit, uh, but to the worse, because you have Hamas cementing its control even more right in the past two weeks. So we're not seeing uh reduced Hamas uh uh control. We're seeing we're doing seeing actually Hamas uh being uh uh reasserting its role as the de facto sovereign. We're seeing um ad hoc recovery efforts uh by Hamas that gives them legitimization. We're seeing more uh there's uh fixing, I don't know with what, but uh very ingenuous. But we're seeing uh roads being fixed uh in some parts of Gaza. We are seeing um some uh we're seeing some for smallholder sort of farming like community uh gardens. We're seeing uh there Hamas posted the the the final exams of uh the medicine medical school in University of Azhar. We're seeing some school children, it's like very uh big attempt to show Hamas to show that they are they are there and they're governing. Of course, they would do what it means, what they need to do when when the NCAG uh comes in, but but but the fact is that we we are still uh seeing we're seeing Hamas. Uh the ceasefire continues, but the fire does not cease for a day, even, or for an hour.

Neri: 41:06

Um But sure, let me ask So that's where we are. Let me ask you this uh before I I turn to Michael. You follow this very closely, closer than most, we'll we have to admit. Is the fact that not enough progress has been made, surely either the Palestinian Technocratic Committee or the High Representative um for Gaza, Nikolai uh Molodinov, who um oversees the NCAG, or the executive board that has Kushner and Whitkoff on it, or all these other various committees and bodies that are supposed to kind of shepherd the phase two, surely they see it as well. Surely they understand, because they said it publicly, that the they have to show quick wins for the to the Gazan people, right, as this kind of moves ahead to build credibility, to build legitimacy for this new governing structure for Gaza. So if this is all happening or not happening, rather, on the ground, um, aren't they seeing that?

Shira: 42:02

They are, and really it's not I'm I don't want to cast a blaming finger at anyone, right? They've created the structures, structures that are not, I mean, they're two boards and different things, but uh the the basic principle of of uh the transitional administration connected to the PA with international support and stuff. We wrote this and I don't know, it was first time in October on October 12, 2023. I mean, I think they got this these parts, right, Michael? We I have the briefing still from that. Um we we they got these parts fine. It's a very, very, very complex job and it takes time. And I think the expectation was not calibrated. It's like, oh, we have peace in the Middle East. Wait, it takes time. This NKC, they have to come in, they have to be able to deliver because if they come in and they can deliver, then what have we done? What can they realistically deliver when Hamas is still there and Israeli policy doesn't change? It's need to be on the humanitarian front. What are the issues? You know, it's it's very, very complex. They have to be secure. Um, they could be sitting in the what we call the the green zone. It's very complete, complicated. But the green zone is sort of the Israeli zone, but then they would look like an Israeli puppet and not don't have the legitimacy of the people. We know that Hamas has threatened Islam, one of the technocrats, like the security guy, they th threatened him and said he's a red line. So do they go in, but without him, he's supposed to head the security, the the the new police that will be trained. There's there are a lot of pieces, and I think the frustration for many of us who have been following this that I I don't I I think I and I do hope uh that this will happen, it will happen quickly in a way that they show that there's an alternative to Hamas. Right. Um the frustration is that we all knew it's gonna be a local police, right? Why at least selection vetting training hasn't started?

Neri: 43:57

Why wait two two plus two plus years, yeah.

Shira: 44:00

Yeah. I mean, that's the stuff that it's more like this the the the the original sin was like refusing to discuss this day after setting, right? That's the original sin because as you take down Hamas and we see the limit the limits of power here, you oh you always had to build something and we refuse to build this. Israel, right? There was like the clans and the militias, we see how this is going, which by the way creates a more complicated situation at the moment. So anyway, I'm I'm uh I think there are objective reasons uh why this has not happened at the moment. I do hope that this will be fast tracked. There's a meeting with the Board of Peace next week, they will raise some money. This is big to be a location. Hopefully, they're able to show something. Hopefully, here I'll just end with this. I will I do think the advantages that, on the one hand, the the those technocrats really, God bless them, that they took this job, the hardest job in the world. I don't think there's a player that genuinely wants them to succeed very much. I don't think the PA wants this because they see them as a competition, the Palestinian authority. They see this as a competition. Hamas obviously doesn't want them to succeed. They want to succeed just a little bit. Um, Israel, this government doesn't want them to succeed because then what it means in the end is dialogue, you know, Palestinian, right? The big questions. And but none of the players want to be blamed for failure. And this is very, very important. I don't think it's enough. I think for them to succeed, you really want all the other players to understand that their success is, you know, the NCAC success is their success. We're not there now. Uh this takes some will take some uplifting. Uh, but the fact that it's they can't actively sabotage it um is is is is is positive in my view.

Neri: 45:45

Okay. That's uh small comfort, but comfort uh of a sort nonetheless. Uh Michael.

Shira: 45:51

No, no, but they're also they're great people and professional.

Neri: 45:54

I'm not I'm not being I'm not being cynical or sarcastic. Uh the one thing they have going for them, as we found out an hour ago in Trump's Truth Social Post, is that he wants the US president, this US president, wants it to succeed. He said there is there is peace in the Middle East. So God help anybody who you know disabuses them of that notion. Uh Michael, sorry for the delay in getting back to you. Uh what do you make of the phase two now uh a few weeks in, optimistic, pessimistic, withholding judgment? And and like Shera said, you know, what are you looking for in terms of next steps?

Michael: 46:29

So I'm withholding judgment, but that last point you just mentioned, Nery, is the key. I'm not arguing that there's been huge progress on the grounds in Gaza. There obviously has not. Um yeah, like the NCAG is still stuck in Cairo, and until the Israelis agree to let them in, they're not getting in. But I think the point is that, as I've argued, Trump, Trump has made BB do a bunch of things that he hasn't wanted to do and to kind of you know sit sit on his hands um and watch a bunch of things happen that he didn't want to happen. And in this case, you have, even if even if it hasn't translated yet into real progress on the ground, we have all this architecture that Trump proposed in his 20-point plan, and we now see it starting to get put into place, right? I mean, there were people out there arguing that the NCAG was literally never going to be formed because Israel was vetoing all the members. There were people out there who argue that the Rafah Crossing was literally never going to open until Hamas was fully disarmed. And now, lo and behold, the Rafah Crossing is open. Uh, you know, there Jared Kushner went to went to Davos and you know, presented his presented his slideshow, which lots of lots of people made fun of. Um, and certainly it seems very unrealistic, but he's overseeing this process, and the timeline he put for for his his reconstruction and for there to be 100% employment in Gaza was three years. Okay. Now we can sit here and say, of course that's not going to happen, but I think the point is that the administration is putting all of these things into place to try to get success. And they clearly have an expectation that that people are going to comply, right? And we'll see who shows up for the Board of Peace meeting next week in in DC, but it certainly is happening. And yeah, Trump today, after his meeting with BB, where I'm sure BB went in and said, hey, you know, this was this was a great plan, great, great idea, but none of it's working. Trump still goes out there and uh tweets, for lack of, for lack of a better, for lack of a better verb, tweets, hey, there's you know, great, great progress in Gaza and peace in the Middle East. So yeah, the situation on the ground is not a whole lot different than it was, but these things are being put into place, and Trump is gonna keep on pushing and keep on insisting. And frankly, we've seen him literally create his own reality. That's that's how we have a ceasefire, right? Where he put out the 20-point plan and Netanyahu said, Oh, yeah, sure, I accept. And they went around telling everybody that it's not gonna matter because Hamas will say no. And then Hamas, you know, kind of said yes, kind of said no, and Trump said, Oh, great. Hamas says yes. We have we have a ceasefire, and and like shoved it down everybody's throats, you know, not least of all, Bibi Netanyahu. So um I'm not I'm not judging anything by by what things look like on the ground now. And I'm certainly not arguing that that one year from now or three years from now, this is this is all gonna be solved, and you know, Gaza is gonna be Jared Krishner's um venture capital utopia. But I'm I'm not willing to discount the fact that Trump has a lot of sway and he doesn't brook dissent very well, and he has made Netanyahu swallow a whole bunch of things, and I think that's gonna continue.

Neri: 49:28

If I didn't know any better, that sounded a bit a bit optimistic, Michael. Yeah.

Michael: 49:34

But Michael is right. I also think don't accuse me of optimism, Neri. That's that's fighting words. You have to stay on brand.

Shira: 49:41

But but it is correct, right? The fact is that we never thought, right, that Hamas will return all hostages and right, things, big things have happened here that we didn't think would happen. So um I I have no doubt that well we will see progress, right? I'm just saying, like in the last we haven't seen the progress since he announced uh phase two, but I have no doubt that we will see the progress. I think the progress is gonna be uh bumpy. And while, you know, there are all these presentations of having a data center in the middle of Gaza and skyscrapers, there are a lot of objective problems that that maybe there's there's gonna be a gap between this vision and what's happening on the ground. But there is, but there is right, there is uh there is hope for change. And I and I'm like Michael, I'm convinced the US administration is deeply involved in this, right? This is the signature uh uh foreign policy legacy. It's a big thing. No one's gonna mess this this uh party up. And also, if reports are correct, right? The New York Times just reported as a plan for uh starting with decommissioning of heavy arms. I don't know who in Hamas uh agreed to this and how is Hamas decision making at the moment uh is made, but I'm actually convinced that Hamas would um entertain an entry point into some sort of decommissioning, beginning the process, because right, they can they can do this to take a break. Um so and this is also a big deal if if they're able to get uh Hamas to agree uh against its uh agree temporarily to stop the armed resistance or action. And and we're we're far away from there at the moment, but but but things have things are happening um that are in the positive direction.

Michael: 51:26

Yeah. Yeah, I I agree on on that on the Hamas point. I'll also take this opportunity to uh to say that IPF's report on uh Hamas disarmament is coming out later today.

Neri: 51:37

So people think it out. Um very, very important issue that will arguably make or break this entire post-war Gaza uh situation. But um we'll leave that for for uh a different time and a different uh episode. Uh before we wrap up, uh we have to talk about the West Bank, which uh once again, uh as has been the case now for well, two plus years, uh gets short thrift, uh, given everything else going on, Gaza and Iran. Uh but earlier this week, uh the Israeli cabinet decided on a slew of unprecedented steps uh that taken together, I think it's fair to say, uh amount to even more de facto annexation by Israel uh of the West Bank, uh steps like making it easier for Israeli Jews to directly buy West Bank land, uh expanding Israeli civilian oversight into even Palestinian-controlled areas, area A and area B of the West Bank, um, and a lot more. Uh we don't have time to get into it all. But IPF came out with a uh rightfully very strong statement against all this, uh, saying taken together these steps, treat the West Bank as sovereign Israeli territory rather than territory subject to temporary military occupation or politically disputed territory, which I think uh was the entire point of this Israeli cabinet's decision. Uh, Michael, explain this to us in lay terms. Uh, how bad is it for everyone seeking to avoid a one-state reality here between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea? It's pretty bad.

Michael: 53:13

This government has done all sorts of ways to expand Israel's presence inside of the West Bank. And we've discussed many of these over the last three years. You know, everything from the retroactive legalization of illegal outposts to the explosion of illegal farms uh to just approving, approving quote unquote legal settlements, legal under Israeli law, um, at record pace. But what they're trying to do with this is really just bring everything more under civilian control and make what happens in the West Bank look more like what happens inside of Israel proper. It's to erase any distinction so that at some point, even talking about uh uh military occupation or military structures will strike people as ridiculous because things won't be any different in the West Bank than they are inside of Israel. So that's one. What actually has me even more concerned is the part about now claiming enforcement powers over Palestinian construction in areas A and B. Because that's new, right? IDF, the IDF operates under Oslo, the IDF can operate in area B, um, but it operates in area A all the time, right? Constantly, literally a permanent presence now in what used to be the Janine refugee camp. This is different. This is saying that Israel now has the power to demolish any Palestinian structures it wants anywhere in in areas A and B, places that under Oslo, Israel has no authority over in terms of construction and administrative issues. And Israel can do this with on these these vague guidelines, right? If anything threatens historical sites, if anything threatens archaeological sites, if anything poses environmental, right, environmental issues, which by the way, you know, Regavim, um the the NGO founded by Batalos Motric, um, which is one of the most hard-line NGOs, was founded on on this basis. The idea is that Regavim is concerned about the environment, and so it's constantly lobbying to demolish Palestinian homes and structures in area C on environmental grounds. So like this is literally the playbook that they've used in area C, and they're now taking it to areas A and B. And we all know what's coming. I mean, uh, you know, the the same way that construction for Palestinians in areas C is quite literally impossible. Um, we're gonna see Israel start to play all sorts of shenanigans in in areas A and B as well. So to me, that's the that's the bigger, that's the bigger issue here. And we had this strange episode a few weeks ago where folks in the Israeli government and folks here in the US were arguing in response to Trump saying repeatedly that Israel can't annex the West Bank, something, by the way, that he said again yesterday, um, that there's a distinction between the West Bank and Yuhudabishamron, Judea and Samaria, right? And the distinction that that people posited was Judean Samaria is Area C, you know, or settlements where you have Israelis, and uh the West Bank is areas A and B. And so anything that Israel doesn't Judea and Samaria, that's fine, right? That's that's sovereign Israeli territory, even though it's not, but even though you have uh Palestinians living in it and it's 60% of the West Bank. Correct. But that was the claim, right? Like treat areas C as one thing and treat areas A and B as something else. So when Trump warns about the West Bank, what he's saying is don't do anything in areas A and B. And now two days, three days before this Nyahoo comes to DC, um, the Israeli Security Cabinet literally votes to make that fictitious distinction even hollower than it was before. Uh and so I don't who knows if this came up in their meeting today, but I I really hope, given that uh given that the White House was asked for a comment about this uh on Monday and and they issued a comment in the name of an unnamed official. Uh, and then Trump was asked about it directly by Barak Ravid, I think, uh, yesterday, on Tuesday, and Trump responded directly and said, um, no West Bank annexation. I don't want to have to think about the West Bank right now. We've got enough going on. I I hope that somebody put this enough on Trump's radar that he asked Netanyahu about it.

Neri: 57:11

Yeah. Just by the way, for our listeners and viewers, um, area A, area B, area C, it's uh coming out of the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, it divided up the West Bank. So area A is basically the the major Palestinian population centers uh under, well, the Palestinian civilian control and ostensibly security control. Uh area B is kind of the outlying villages uh under Palestinian civilian control and uh Israeli still security control. And then area C, as we mentioned, is like 60% of the West Bank, and that's where the settlements are and full Israeli and uh military and uh civilian control. Shera, you uh have an article coming out soon, I believe, in Foreign Affairs magazine uh about the West Bank in particular and the real damage wrought by uh this Netanyahu government over the past three plus years uh in all aspects relating to the West Bank, uh especially in recent days. Um give us a sneak peek. What uh how do you see things in the West Bank, especially after the last three and a half years of of this Israeli government?

Shira: 58:17

Yeah, thank you. I mean, I agree with Michael, everything he said. I actually uh Foreign Affairs asked for a piece about the West Bank, I mean the West Bank about a month ago, and it just took time for me sort of to write it, and then all of a sudden it became an issue that people do talk about it a little bit, uh, although a week ago no one uh spoke about it at all. So it's a good hook. I agree with everything Michael said. I thought IPF statement was very good, and I think it's no coincidence that uh my analysis is very similar. I guess um this is clearly a departure from the usual stuff that we've seen, right? It also amounts to not just the de facto annexation we've been seeing, but also de jour according to some legal structures. But this is just another the latest development in what we've been seeing. Uh basically this uh Israeli government, if and I think it's this is the policy, right? Is um under the fog of war, uh, is completely um uh implementing Smotrit's manifesto from 2017, right? The decisive plan, basically, uh his vision, and he said it, and I give him utmost respect for at least saying what he wants. He said, you know, Palestinians here can live here as uh second-class uh residents, not even citizens, and if not, they're welcome to leave. Um and this is he's just turning this manifesto into a vision. Um, I've said it before, I think he's number one strategist in Israel. He has a vision, he articulates it, he's very good with the bureaucracy. Um, and so the changes that he's been doing, in addition to this, which by the way, again, the cabinet decided on it. Was there a vote? No vote, what's the process? No one knows. And this is this is a big right, it's not even like signing the Board of Peace. I mean, I think it's more fundamental that this this is a violation of bilateral agreements that Israel is committed to.

Neri: 1:00:08

It's a violation of Oslo. It's a violation of Oslo, it's a violation of the Hebron Accord. Uh, you know, these are real agreements that Israel signed as a country.

Shira: 1:00:17

Right. And no one knows how these things were decided on. But putting this aside and their implications on this uh strategic thing, I mean, what has been happening uh is not just the territorial sort of engineering that we're seeing in the West Bank, and it's very creative, right? Not just with the with the settlements uh construction, uh with those farms uh that are now, instead of counting settlers, they're counting uh what they call dunums, like territory kilometers that they take over with with measures to weaken the PA and the Palestinian Authority, bring it to collapse with withholding um funds from it. Some legal, legally funds, right? The the Martier payments, but other funds that actually Israel doesn't have the authority to withhold PA salaries to their employees in Gaza. There's some also um funds that the Palestinians are claiming that Israel is withholding um from the L and B crossing with uh Jordan. Um and so, and I'm not we haven't even spoken about the settler violence, right? Which has become a daily affair in the West Bank, uh threatening the lives uh of Palestinians. And I will say it's remarkable for the first time in uh, I think ever, um, according to Israeli security sources, the month of January had more Jewish terrorist attacks against Palestinians than Palestinian terrorist attacks against Jews, which is it's just telling. And of course, there's the severity of the of the act, the action act themselves, but the impunity with which they're treated, which is more concerning. So what we're seeing is a basket case of uh West Bank that is really tittering on the brink and how long it can survive. And I think I'll just I'll just end with that. I it's it's gonna be uh it is could undermine um President Trump's vision for Gaza because I think it was like 0.9 and 0.19 do speak about the Palestinian Authority returning to Gaza after reforms, but at this rate there will be nothing to reform, and we will have uh a much um more um many more um security assignments and burden on the Israeli taxpayers uh for dealing with this West Bank mess.

Neri: 1:02:34

Yep. Um, and it's a huge, huge mess uh on all the issues that you uh rightfully laid out, Shira. Um I do hope that either people in Washington or maybe people in the Middle East, maybe in certain Arab capitals, do bring this to the US President's attention and uh explain to him that the Israeli Prime Minister and the Israeli government are making him look like a fool. Because he said uh very clearly there will be no annexation. He very clearly has uh a broader plan for not just Gaza but the wider Middle East. Like he said, there's peace in the Middle East, and this is uh well undermining him directly. So uh ideally they explain that to him, and maybe um you know, maybe maybe Trump uh will focus his eye on on the West Bank and maybe uh halt a lot of this you know negative, very, very negative things that Israel is doing on the West Bank. Um with that, we have to leave it there. We've covered a lot of ground, uh, we've resolved all the issues, I'm happy to say. So uh there there won't be anything to talk about.

Shira: 1:03:37

Hopefully, uh exactly. Peace in the Middle East.

Neri: 1:03:41

Uh, you know, if if you write it in all caps, then it has to be true. That's the that's the fundamental lesson.

Michael: 1:03:47

Um that's that's what that's what that's what Hertzel said, right?

Neri: 1:03:51

Correct. Correct. Correct. Um great to see you both in this new year, and um, we won't make it another two months till uh you come back on you all. Okay, thanks again to Michael Coplo and Shira Efron, as always. Also, special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening and please subscribe and spread the word.