Neri: 1:08

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We'll be talking Iran this week with one of the best Iran experts in Israel, believe me, Dr. Raz Zibet. Raz is the director of the Iran and Shiat Access Program at the Institute for National Security Studies here in Tel Aviv and was previously, for over two decades, an Iran watcher in Israeli military intelligence. Raz holds a PhD from Tel Aviv University and is the author of the Hebrew language book Iran from Within, State and Society in the Islamic Republic. I was really curious to get Raz's take on the ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran, the chances for diplomacy actually succeeding, what the regime in Tehran is actually thinking these days, and well, what a war could actually look like. This was a fantastic and illuminating conversation. A must-listen, if you will. Some housekeeping before we get started. First, a reminder, we're now a video podcast, so do check us out on YouTube and please subscribe and rate us that always helps. Second, Israel Policy Forum has a new report out titled Disarming Hamas, a Framework for Lasting Security, authored by IPF senior policy analyst Dan Rotem and Seline Touboul, the co-CEO of the Economic Cooperation Foundation, and a close friend as well. So do check out that report on that critically important topic on IPF's website. And finally, and most importantly, Ramadan Karim to all of our many listeners all over the world who are celebrating this upcoming month. You know who you are. With that, let's get to Raz Ziburt. Hi Raz, welcome to Digital Policy Pod.

SPEAKER_02: 3:10

Hi Mary.

Neri: 3:11

Thank you for having me. Uh it's really my pleasure, Raz, uh, and a long time coming. Uh I've been wanting to have you on for a while, given all the Iran-related news uh, well, in recent weeks and recent months and in recent years. So we're really happy to have you on uh to discuss what I hope will be uh well, what's happening inside the minds of Iranian leaders and maybe Iranian uh lay people, uh, especially these days. Uh and it's really fair to say a long-running crisis uh that's coming to a head or will likely come to a head in one way or another in the coming uh days or potentially weeks. Uh I'd love to get your thoughts about that. Uh um and just FYI for our viewers and listeners. We're recording this on Wednesday afternoon uh Tel Aviv time. Uh yesterday we had the second round of talks uh take place in Geneva, Switzerland, between Iran uh and the U.S. teams. Uh the US team is led by Jared Kushner and Steve Woodkoff. Um fair to say there were certain positive statements uh uh by the Iranians as well as the Omani mediator uh coming out of the talks afterwards late yesterday. Uh but the Americans, I think it's fair to say, were a bit more uh restrained, a bit more cautious uh uh in what they were putting out there publicly, uh especially uh Vice President J.D. Vance, uh, who said the Iranians were, quote, not yet acknowledging the US's red lines. So, Raz, given uh yesterday's talks in Geneva, the second round, uh, first question to you, what did you make of the talks uh and the public comments afterwards? Um talks only really lasted about three hours, right?

SPEAKER_02: 4:47

Yeah, it uh it was several hours uh talk. Uh look, you know, um when I heard or when I uh read the more optimistic uh conclusions by the Iranians and the Omani's, I I couldn't forget uh some of the tweets and uh comments made by the Iranians themselves uh days before the 12-day war in June. Uh so of course uh we have to take into consideration the fact that they have uh their own uh interests to show some some progress made. But you know, even if uh they were right and there was some progress made in Geneva, I don't I don't think that uh this progress um has the potential by itself to prevent a military strike. Um the reports yesterday were that the Iranians are going to return to table to the table uh in two weeks. I'm I'm not sure if uh President Trump, if the Americans have uh so much um uh tolerance uh to wait until then. And uh, you know, even if even if there is a third round of talk in in two weeks, uh we should not assume that uh this by itself will lead to uh breakthrough in the talks between Iran and the United States. And therefore I think that uh, at least for now, it seems that um the likelihood of uh military strike seems uh much uh much higher than the um than the potential uh understanding between Iran and the United States. And and I I think that the main reason for that is uh not just the total mistrust between Tehran and the Trump administration, which of course goes uh goes back years uh uh years long, but but uh and not just because of the gaps between the positions of the US and Tehran, but also because Iran and and the United States, in my view, have uh totally different uh perspectives uh concerning each other. And we can of course elaborate on on that, but I would just say that uh in my view, the Iranians um it's not that the Iran is not concerned with the possibility of uh US military strike, they they're certainly very much concerned with that, and they they would uh possibly uh agree to some kind of concessions to to avoid military confrontation with the United States. But I do think that uh at least Supreme Leader Khamenei, and there might be some divisions uh in Tehran uh itself, uh, but Khamenei I think uh uh holds the view that um if if he agrees uh to everything which uh the Trump administration is asking him to do, this would actually uh weaken the Islamic Republic even further and will just pave the way for uh full capitulation, which would make Iran much more vulnerable. And perhaps it's only a matter of time until either Israel or the United States will use this uh vulnerability uh to strike Iran in order to uh to reach the ultimate goal, which has always been, according to Khamenei, uh a regime change in in Tehran.

Neri: 8:07

Right. So uh I want to get into the Supreme Leader's mind uh in just a moment, uh, trust me. Uh but it sounds like uh your initial assessment is that he's looking at it either, you know, either I die tomorrow or I die next week, but either way, I'm going to die if I actually uh meet the conditions put forward by the Americans and potentially the Israelis.

SPEAKER_02: 8:29

But I'm curious- you know, just uh interrupting you, uh I I don't think he really cares about himself.

Neri: 8:36

I mean, uh I think it's metaphorically dying. The regime.

SPEAKER_02: 8:40

Yeah, exactly. The regime. I mean, if if if he has to choose between uh um dying as a martyr, as a shahid, or dying um as a weak, uh uh humiliated leader, it's very clear uh what his option is going to do to be. If if of course uh he has to he can choose. But what what he's mostly concerned with or interested in is to make sure that the regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, um is um is uh continues to to live, uh even if he himself um doesn't survive.

Neri: 9:16

Right. And also we have to uh remind uh our viewers and listeners, he's already what 86 years old. So uh he has a lot less to lose than maybe uh someone much younger. But again, we'll get to him in in just a moment. Uh in terms of the talks yesterday, Raz, do we do we know what they actually discussed in those uh couple of hours? I mean, was it strictly the nuclear file? Was it other issues like ballistic missiles, like proxies? I mean, uh the sense from Iran experts, like proper experts as yourself and and others, is that there may be scope for a deal on the nuclear issues, but getting the other stuff included in any kind of deal would be very difficult.

SPEAKER_02: 9:58

Right. Uh look, I assume that the Americans uh might have uh uh tried to raise the the other issues as well, the uh the ballistic missiles and the proxies. But but I think that one of the things which is uh very clear to me is that uh there is no room from for any flexibility on the Iranian side concerning uh any other issue rather than the nuclear issue. And so I I my guess is that uh uh even if the Americans were trying to put the other issues, um most importantly the ballistic missiles, on the table, the reaction they they they probably got is uh no way. We're not going to discuss the only deterrence uh capacity we have. Uh and by the way, I I uh if I were an Iranian, I would certainly agree with that. I mean, uh we are uh talking uh after more than two, two and a half years since the October uh war in Gaza, the regional war. Um the network of proxies is uh weaker than ever. It's it's certainly not out, but it's down. Uh the main element or the main component of this uh network of proxies, uh Hezbollah, is uh is actually a shadow of the Hezbollah we knew for many, many years. So Iran knows very very well that it can't use Hezbollah as a deterrence uh against Israel. Uh the nuclear file, um, although I certainly don't agree that the nuclear program was obliterated, but certainly the 12-day war managed to degrade very significantly uh Iran's uh nuclear uh program. And so the only uh the only tool which the Iranians still have to deter Israel, not just Israel, of course, Israel and its uh its rivals in in the region, and also to retaliate in case of a military intervention against Iran, is their ballistic missiles. They it's not that they have a very efficient, to say the least, air force they can they can use. So we so it's it's it's it's very clear that um most of the talks, at least from the Iranian point of view, uh, were to discuss the nuclear the nuclear issue and and actually the the involvements by uh the director general of uh IEEE, uh Rafael Gorosi, in uh in Switzerland, uh can also be served as uh as an indication that uh uh the concept that the talks were mostly about the nuclear issue.

Neri: 12:25

Right. And uh just a reminder, IAEA is the uh uh UN nuclear watchdog, uh which is supposed to uh inspect and verify uh things like Iran's nuclear program. Um and just a final question, uh, about uh the talks yesterday. Um it sounds to me like you're uh, shall we say, less skeptical or less convinced that uh a week or two more will be given ahead of any third round. In other words, we we at least initially thought that uh okay, they met for the second time, even if briefly, uh, and that there may be a potential third round in two weeks when Iran has to come back and and answer a few questions or put forward uh a proposal of its own to to the American team. You you're not that confident there will there potentially could be a third round.

SPEAKER_02: 13:16

My sense is that uh Trump and his uh and the American administration has uh reached a conclusion, or perhaps is very clear uh close to reach a conclusion that uh this is decision time. I mean, uh Trump actually made a decision uh last month to to strike Iran. Uh it was very, very close to that. And then he was convinced that uh the the military presence, the US military presence a few weeks ago was uh um uh was not was not uh unefficient. Uh and it wasn't enough to use this uh military presence in order to achieve any kind of objectives uh regarding Iran. The situation today is much uh is much different. Uh we know the the um uh the very extended uh military presence uh of the United States in the region, and that certainly provides uh Trump with uh room to maneuver and to make uh different decisions concerning what he wants to do in Iran. And I just don't get the sense that um uh he's ready to give the Iranians uh uh weeks or certainly not months in order to make a decision. I mean, uh the prospects for reaching uh uh a very good uh deal from the US point of view seems very, very slim. I mean, uh it's it's either that the Iranians uh will not be able or will will not willing be willing to make the concessions uh Trump uh demands them to do, or that they will demand uh a much more significant sanctions relief, which I'm not sure Trump is ready to give them. Uh and again, it goes back to what I said before about the different uh perspectives, because from the US perspective, my my sense is that um he he the the Americans have reached the conclusion that the Iranian regime and the Islamic Republic is uh facing its uh weakest uh phase since 1979, since the Islamic Republic uh revolution, and it's it this is the the right time to demand uh Iran to I would say full capitulate to what the Americans are are actually demanding. And if the even if the Iranians are ready to give some concessions, then the only thing the Americans should give them in return is just not to strike them. Uh and and this is not the perspective shared by by the Iranian leadership. So so again, I I think that it's becoming more and more obvious, not just in Israel, but also in in DC, that um uh even if we have uh one or two um uh talks, uh rounds of talks with Iran, uh it it it probably will not be able to reach uh a very um significant uh desired uh understanding or treaty between uh agreement between Israel between Iran and and the United States.

Neri: 16:14

And uh we also saw, well, really over the past 24 hours, um, dozens of additional American fighter jets and refuelers and the like moving uh well eastward towards the Middle East. Uh quite quite striking for uh all those kind of open source analysts that attract these kinds of things. Uh we should also remember the uh Gerald Ford, uh another uh US uh aircraft carrier strike group is is on its way uh and could potentially arrive in the region in uh uh the coming days, uh we imagine. So that's uh the American military buildup is is uh continuing and it's uh seems fairly um uh uh both uh robust and and quite threatening, uh right. It doesn't necessarily look like a bluff. Uh but Raz, um I wanted to get your sense about the Iranian uh side of the equation, uh, because also yesterday uh on Tuesday before the talks in Geneva, uh we saw the Iranians hold their own military drill uh in the Strait of Hormuz. Uh this is uh the narrow and strategic choke point that connects the Persian Gulf to uh the Gulf of Oman and the wider ocean, uh very, very important piece of uh naval real estate. So they held a big military drill, uh big show of force there yesterday before the talk. Uh and we also saw uh defiant rhetoric by uh various Iranian leaders, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, um who even directly threatened uh a U.S. aircraft carrier uh publicly in a speech. So uh you very much uh focus on uh oftentimes the Iranian decision making and and what they're looking at. I mean, how do you explain uh these uh these threats, this show of force by Iran? Um I don't want to ask if they're crazy, but what's the logic behind doing this, especially before you're about to head into a room to negotiate with Jared Kushner and Steve Budkov?

SPEAKER_02: 18:08

Well, I I think the logic is very clear. The the Iranians understand that uh the US uh and President Trump himself uh are quite reluctant to be engaged in a military strike against Iran, uh that the US that the US administration realize that there is a big difference between Venezuela and and Iran. And uh they would assume, and I'm not sure that they are mistaken, that uh uh Trump, even if he uh if he decides to go on a military strike, what you would like to see is a very swift, um as uh uh less risky as possible, umxpensive as much as possible, and certainly not a military strike which would uh uh uh have the potential of uh of causing uh not just damage but also also cause uh casualties uh within uh US forces in the region. So the Iranians are aware of that, and and and therefore uh their main uh objectives right now uh through their threats, including the threat made by Supreme Leader Khamenei, that any kind of war with the United States will uh will become a regional war. And all the drills we we've seen in the Persian Gulf aim to relay this message. Uh if uh you should know, the Americans, that uh there is nothing like a swift, easy, unexpensive, unrisky uh military strike against Iran. If you strike Iran, uh you take the uh the risk that it will evolve very quickly into a very major, extensive regional escalation uh circle, uh, probably with uh not just damage caused to URLs in the region, but also might uh cause casualties uh among uh US soldiers in the region. And and I think that they still still believe that uh those kinds of threats and drills might be uh successful in uh convincing Trump that the risk of uh choosing the military option uh is uh is just too um um too high for him to make. And and that might encourage Trump to decide and to give uh diplomacy a chance. But but again, I I'm not sure if that's the way uh Trump is looking at uh things currently.

Neri: 20:30

Right. So it's uh it's a form of deterrence. Uh they're trying to push back against the uh US military buildup and against Trump's uh Trump's own coercion or attempts to coerce uh Iran. Let me ask this slightly differently, Raz. Do you think the Iranians, including the Supreme Leader, actually believe uh their threats? Or do you actually uh think they believe that they can cause this kind of damage to US forces, they can successfully shut down and close the Strait of Hormuz, uh that they can successfully ignite the entire region?

SPEAKER_02: 21:05

I I'm not sure if they're uh if they think that they can shut uh the Hormuz Straits, for example. Uh I think they assume that this would be uh um a step too far, which would uh make the Americans and perhaps not just the Americans uh interfere in a way which uh won't allow the Iranians to continue with that. But I certainly believe that the Iranians are uh are thinking that they have the capability uh to complicate things uh for the Americans and uh to make it to make any kind of confrontation much longer, uh much more expensive, uh much more uh bloody. And this by itself could uh um could convince the Americans to to accept uh a ceasefire as as uh um um as as as as fast as they can. I mean they um you know if even after the 12-day war, um what the Iranians were telling not just themselves but uh but uh to everyone uh they wanted to listen, is that we actually won the war because the the the Israelis and the Americans fought against us for 12 days, and at the end of the day, we despite the surprise, despite the few hours of uh initial attack by by Israel, uh killing the top generals and the uh 10 to 20 nuclear scientists, we managed to recover very quickly. Uh, and and at the end of the day, we managed to fight both uh the United States and Israel and to survive, which is perhaps the most important uh point. So, from the Iranian point of view, if they can just uh survive, if they can just uh prolong the war until the Americans reach the conclusion as they reached in uh in Yemen after a few weeks of uh military confrontation against the Houthis, that it's uh it's just uh uh not worth uh not worth the the the the all the resources uh and the casualties that by itself might be uh considered as a as a victory by the Iranians and and that's what what they what they aim to achieve.

Neri: 23:15

Right. So almost uh despite Iran being you know a proper country and a nation state it's almost asymmetric warfare. You raise the cost enough to the US and perhaps Israel or others to shorten the war as much as possible.

SPEAKER_02: 23:30

Yeah and at the end of the day. Exactly and at the end at the end of the day if uh if they manage to present uh the Iranian regime surviving this attack even if without uh Supreme Little Khamini and if they uh uh go back uh after the war and say we we survived this war we still have uh our nuclear program we still have our ballistic missiles we will recover uh all the damage caused by the Americans this by itself could be certainly considered as a as a kind of a victory uh perhaps not uh in in US or Israeli eyes but uh but from their perspective uh that that might be considered as a as a as a victory right uh we'll we'll get back to that uh potential scenario in in in just a second uh I wanted to take a step back and zoom out a little bit uh to uh well end of December uh uh almost two months ago when this uh crisis uh began uh inside Iran uh and really as you mentioned earlier uh really the most severe crisis for the Islamic Republic and uh maybe its uh entire 47 uh year history uh put this in context for us if you could I mean uh uh not only why this crisis happened, I mean we kind of have a sense that it was primarily uh economic at least initially but uh how the Islamic Republic views this current moment uh given if correct that this is the most severe uh crisis point uh in its entire history yeah and I mean even before the the brutal um uh suppression of this uh of those protests uh I would argue that it was the um um the weakest point of the Islamic Republic and uh and that's not just because of it's it was not because of the number of the protesters in the streets or or um or it's um uh or the fact that it was it was uh in more than in a few hundreds of towns and cities all over Iran but it was just six months after the Islamic regime itself said um look uh actually during the war during the 12-day war we managed to mobilize uh to rally uh the the Iranian population around the flag and then just six months uh afterwards we see another wave of of protests now if if we look uh at what happened in Iran since the end of uh uh 20 uh seventeen we've seen um that the the um the time between uh different waves of protests in Iran becomes shorter and shorter and the waves of protest become uh more violent uh more uh spread over Iran more radical uh it's not like you know people try to at the beginning try to to compare um the recent wave of protest to the so-called green movement of uh 2009 after the uh after the the reformists uh argued in Iran that uh Ahmadinejad uh should not have the presidential elections and the elections were uh reached uh but but there was a very big difference between 2009 and what we what we've seen in in recent years because back in 2009 uh it was not about regime change in Iran the main the demand my made by the majority of the protesters back then was to have another round of elections and to to try and repair the Islamic Republic from from within the reformists were were always in favor of uh I would say uh evolutionary changes rather than revolutionary changes and what you see since the end of 2017 and then again in uh in the during the gasoline uh protest of uh november december uh 2019 and then of course during the Maasa Aminese protest in 223 we've seen more and more protesters in the streets which actually uh come against the the existence of the Islamic Republic so uh uh and that happened again in in November in in December 2025 uh to January 2026 or even even before uh thousands or tens of thousands were were killed by the regime it posed another uh very important challenge and and perhaps the the the most uh problematic issue from from the point of view of the regime is that I think that for the first time they also understood like most of the Iranian people that uh there is no solution to any of the problems which encourage uh hundreds of thousands or millions of Iranians going to the streets. I mean the the Islamic Republic certainly suffers uh for many years now uh from from two major crises one is a crisis of legitimacy meaning that the majority of the Iranian people has lost any uh any hope that uh the Islamic Republic can redeem itself and so they uh they actually want some kind of of regime change and this the the second issue is of course the economic crisis uh alongside of course the collapse of the of the uh um shortages of water and and and the electricity and there are just no solutions which the Islamic Republic and the Islamic uh uh authorities can can provide and that has actually become even worse after after the suppression of of of the of the protests because the economic crisis is even worse than before both before because of the internet shutdown uh and the fact that many businesses in Iran uh were forced uh to to shut down and the legitimacy crisis today in Iran is uh of course of course much much much worse than it used to be due to this uh brutal murderous uh uh suppression of of the uprising so I I would say that the bottom line is that even if you look at what's going on within the reformist movement today in Iran uh at least some of the leaders of the reformists Mir Hussein Mousavi or Mehdi Karoubi uh actually demand today that the Supreme Leader Khamenei will will step down because they understand that there is no no way to redeem or to recover as long as he is there and as long as there are no free elections and a free uh and a new referendum uh to decide on the future of of Iran.

Neri: 30:00

And just on that point, Raz, is it fair to say that uh the Supreme Leader and the the current regime are not entertaining such uh shall we say reform steps?

SPEAKER_02: 30:11

Of course not uh we we we've seen we've seen the Supreme Leader Khamini opposing uh even the even the the proposals made by the reformists uh several years ago uh for several gradual reforms i mean in in some incidents he was ready to um to to make some concessions for example uh uh he was not against the decision made by the SNSC the Supreme National Security Council a year ago uh not to implement the this uh new proposal bill uh to uh increase the sanctions on women without uh hijab so we had to retreat over those tactical issues but at the end of the day even when the Islamic Republic under Khamenei had to make decisions to open up a little bit and to to deliver at least some of the demands uh made by the Iranian uh population it was usually uh too little too late and uh at the end of the day we we cannot expect an 87 or 86 year old uh revolutionary like Khamini who is still very much obsessed with this uh revolutionary ideology uh to make the the necessary concessions in order to try and bridge this growing gap between the Iranian population mostly the second and third generations of the Islamic Republic and and and the regime and uh and and therefore I I have uh already reached the conclusion that as long as Khamani is is intact as long as he's there uh nothing is going to change and so uh we all have have to hope that at some point he he's going to be removed uh that way or another.

Neri: 31:52

Very interesting and uh the uh the example or precedent that Khamani has from his uh his mentor and the original founder of the Islamic Republic Khomene where he famously or infamously said that he had to drink the poison chalice and agree to a ceasefire with Iraq uh in the late 80s after eight years of war there's no scenario where this supreme leader Khamani uh agrees to uh to drink some kind of poison chalice or in his mind has he has he already drunk it in the past and uh it it wasn't worth it?

SPEAKER_02: 32:27

So he he he is ready to make some concessions I mean uh he he was ready to make uh significant concessions back in 2013 to 15 when he uh first um uh gave the instruction or gave his uh willingness to negotiate with the Great Satan with the United States which was a taboo in Iran for many many years and to uh um and to um um um to to make some concessions over Iran's nuclear program but uh I I think that uh President Trump's decision in 2018 to to withdraw from the JCPOA in a way strengthened his uh narrative and his belief that uh no matter what he does at the end of the day the United States uh should not be trusted and that even if he uh if even if he's ready to make some concessions uh tactical concessions this will not change uh the the US administration uh uh determination to pave the way for uh for regime change and and therefore I I I do think and it goes back to what what we discussed before that from the perspective of Harmony if he has to choose between taking the risk of another military confrontation with the United States and taking the risk of uh giving up uh his entire arsenal of uh of missiles and and nuclear capabilities uh it's very clear to me that uh he will take the risk of a military confrontation with the United States because it's it's uh it's not a question of uh whether to drink the the chalice of poison but uh uh which poison he has to drink uh and uh and I and I think that at the end of the day he he he rather chooses uh to to drink uh a poison which uh would not be considered as uh his final uh uh capitulation to to the United States at this point.

SPEAKER_00: 34:20

Yeah so um roll the dice take his chances with the war uh as opposed to any kind of concessions that he may view as existential uh for for the regime Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community our mission is to build support for a secure Jewish democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict advancing pragmatic U.S. policy towards the conflict US-Israel relations and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders we promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts develop analysis and commentary and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political denominational and generational spectrums our Young Professionals initiative ITF 18 works to elevate the discourse among next generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work visit us online at Israelpolicyforum.org and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis please make a tax deductible gift today at IPf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes Rod, final two questions about the the domestic situation in in Iran uh number one, I mean what what's happening there at the moment?

SPEAKER_02: 35:41

We're now they're marking the the 40 day uh mourning period for for all those people thousands of people that were killed uh during the the protests uh in early January um I mean is the country functioning uh is the internet open uh what what's happening in Iran at the moment even on the brink of say a potential new war the country is uh functioning but I would I would use uh one of the descriptions of one Iranian sociologist who recently described the Iranian society as a traumatized society and uh yeah there were some reports what what might happen in the 40th uh day of uh of the protest in Iran and whether we will see the resumption of uh of protests in the streets and and I I personally uh thought that uh while a trigger a new trigger uh which could uh encourage millions or thousands of or uh hundreds of thousands of Iranians back to the street is uh could happen any day uh it doesn't have to be on the 40th uh uh anniversary I I would say that at least for now the the very extensive uh security uh environment in Iran and the very intense presence of uh security forces in different parts of of Iran make it very difficult for the Iranians to to go back to the streets. So yes so yesterday we had some some reports about um sporadic incidents in the mostly in the western parts of of Iran where uh ceremonies turned into uh a place for uh raising some slogans uh against uh against Khomeini and some clashes between the security forces and and the uh and and the population but but that doesn't seem to me right now that uh uh we that that uh uh we we we are we are at the uh at the verge of uh the resumption of of uh of uh the protests in Iran that that might happen in the future we have to of course to ask ourselves the question whether a US strike on Iran might actually encourage uh the resumption of of those protests in Iran it's very difficult to predict but uh but even if it doesn't uh I think it's only a matter of of uh uh of of when uh such a trigger will will appear because as I said that the the basic problems the Islamic Republic are facing uh have actually uh become uh even worse and so uh it's not a matter of if but when but uh we we should not count on the on the on on uh on specific time when we should uh we should uh expect uh the Iranians to go back to the streets because we have to be very honest the la the la last time they they did that a few weeks ago they were butchered by the security forces in Iran so it's going to be very very difficult to convince them to go back to the streets unless they really think and believe that there is a kind of horizon uh for uh for a real change in in Iran otherwise I'm not sure if if they will risk their lives again so you beat me to my final question just on this issue of uh the internal or domestic situation in Iran uh to the best of your knowledge analysis and understanding how how widespread was the the murders the butchering the crackdown by the Iranian uh regime and the security forces on uh on the protesters uh we've seen estimates from thousands to tens of thousands uh what what do you think actually happened there look it's it's very clear that it was the worst uh suppression since the establishment of the of the Islamic Republic I mean uh the number of uh protesters were killed by the security forces during uh I would say less than 24 hours is bigger than the number of uh Iranian protesters who were killed in the entire revolutionary year between the beginning of the Islamic revolution in uh in January uh 78 and uh the victory of the Islamic uh uh revolution in February 79. So it's very clear that it was uh very uh very brutal whether it was 10,000 or 15,000 or uh or 2000 uh I I'm not sure if it's uh if it's that important well it's it's very important of course to know but uh even if it's uh it's uh more like uh 10,000 rather than 30,000 it's still a very brutal uh suppression which which again provides another uh indication that the Islamic regime uh has no other alternative but to fight for its life i mean this is not the case of uh of the Egyptian army for example which was uh uh which was uh willing and uh capable of uh making the transition from Mubarak to Mursi and then to Sisi. The security forces in Iran, mostly the besieged and the revolutionary gods are very much committed uh to the regime not just because of ideological reasons but because they know that uh they're dependent on the regime and if the regime collapses it's very possible that they will be hanged uh by by the new government in in Iran or or will be butchered themselves by by the many angry uh Iranians who will uh seek revenge for what they did for so many years. So in my view they will just uh fight until the last drop of blood uh of the protesters of course not not themselves right um very interesting point in in comparison to say uh a national army like in egypt or maybe other uh dictatorships where potentially they can split switch sides and and often you know oftentimes in in the past in the past have sided with the people yeah now that that doesn't mean that uh under no circumstances we cannot see some cracks in divisions and perhaps uh defections from from some parts of the revolutionary guards or the basis or the uh law enforcement forces but I think that uh perhaps the only scenario which I can predict can uh I can see that we will see a major division or cracks within the leadership or the higher ecolum of the revolutionary guards I'm not talking about the the bottom simple policemen or basic members who can always uh uh defect but when I when I speak about the the the high ranks of the revolutionary guard or the basic the only scenario which I can see uh some kinds of division is if they reach the conclusion under very severe circumstances that they have to choose between the survival of the regime including themselves and the so and the survival of the supreme leader if they have to choose between Khomenei and their own interests and their own survival that might uh make a change but as long as that's that doesn't happen uh I don't see any any scenario of which uh we can we we will see some kind of uh coup d'etat uh taking place in Tehran right um and by the way Raz just for our listeners and viewers the bastige is basically what the the popular militia of the Revolutionary Guards yeah yeah okay um I got that I got that right I I used my my writing history uh of course um okay uh Raz let's get down to brass tax the tacklists as I say here uh the severe consequences that you uh that you alluded to if the negotiations go nowhere uh uh and diplomacy fails and we actually get a war if Donald Trump uh chooses to uh to press a trigger or uh press the button as somebody who who knows Iran and the system there quite well what do you think would be the most significant targets for the US and or Israel uh to hit uh in any kind of future uh confrontation um i.e.

Neri: 43:36

you know centers of gravity leadership military um that would actually make a difference uh especially compared to last year where uh for Israel it it was uh you know despite uh uh certain other you know public comments by certain Israeli leaders to the contrary it wasn't geared towards regime change and it was very much geared towards you know the nuclear program the missiles and various other kind of military systems last year.

SPEAKER_02: 44:00

Yeah the the circumstances are totally different. Uh while the Iranians um thought that uh one of the main objectives of Israel back then in the 12-day war was to topple the Iranian regime that was certainly not the case the Israeli objectives uh were mostly to degrade Iran's uh nuclear program and Iran's ballistic missiles capacities yes on the way uh Israel also tried to uh uh undermine uh to weaken the Iranian regime uh we all remember the the attacks against uh several headquarters of the revolutionary guards uh the the attack on on Avin prison in in Tehran but that was uh I would say very sporadic and uh it was certainly not part of the main uh goal of of the war this time uh I would assume that uh one of the main objectives uh by the Americans would be to undermine the regime and I'm I'm I'm uh particularly using this term and not uh regime change because uh I I I hope that uh the Americans understand That it's going to be almost impossible to change the regime in Iran just through an aerial military strike. At the end of the day, if you want to have a real regime change in Iran, you have to depend on millions of Iranians who will take part in this kind of change. But if they only want to undermine the regime or to have some kind of a change from within the regime, meaning that Supreme Leader Khamenei is out and someone else is going to take his position, this is certainly a possibility through a very extensive, precise decapitation campaign, which could be just like Israel did in the first few hours of the 12-day war, but more extensive, including the political leadership of Iran, if of course they manage to do that. So that would be my guess as one of the priorities of the United States. Now, of course, in addition, they will have to take care of the missiles, the ballistic missiles' capacities. This is, by the way, one of the Israeli concerns that the priority of the United States would be to first try and deal with those short-range missiles and the naval capabilities of the Iranians, which could pose a threat to the US forces in the region, perhaps to Iran's neighbors in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In that case, we might see some participation by Israel in order to have some kind of division between the Israeli campaign, which would put as a main priority degrading and targeting the ballistic missiles directed at Israel, and the US priorities which could be otherwise. In addition to that, I would assume that the Americans will try to hit any targets which could degrade and weaken the Iranian potential, not just to retaliate uh after the military strike, but also to uh suppress a future uh protest movement if that erupts in the future, by, for example, uh targeting uh more uh IRGC, law enforcement forces, besieged headquarters all over Iran, uh, that might also be on the table.

Neri: 47:32

Right, very interesting. Um, you've said it a couple of times over the past what we've been talking now for 45 minutes. Uh removal of the Supreme Leader, if the Supreme Leader leaves, uh now decapitation attempts. Do you really think that if it came to it, uh at least in American eyes, that removal one way or the other of the current Iranian leadership would be a central objective of any campaign?

SPEAKER_02: 47:57

Yes, and and and I have to be honest with you, if if you'd asked me um a few years ago, do you think that uh uh the killing of Khamenei is uh is a good idea? I would probably say no because he's uh old enough and uh we don't we didn't want to make him um a shahid uh because it might uh it might have uh uh had uh consequences not just inside Iran but within uh uh Iran's proxies, uh, who considered themselves as uh as pupils uh of Supreme Lader Khameni. We all remember that uh Hassan Asrala, the the late leader of Hezbollah, uh always considered himself as uh um uh he always considered Supreme Lader Khamani as his uh what is called in Persian Marjay Takhlid, the source of emulation. Uh um and he was the representative of Khameni in Lebanon. But I think that uh today, and especially after the 12-day war, when we we, despite all the military achievements uh reached by Israel and the United States, we are still facing with the same Iran, with the same uh problems Iran is posing uh on the regional issue, on the missiles uh capacities, on the nuclear issue, despite the degradation of those uh capacities. And I think one of the main conclusions is that as long as Harmony is there, uh nothing is going to change. And if the in the past, I I personally thought that uh um uh we we could actually be in a in an even worse situation if, for example, the revolutionary gods take control and the Islamic Republic might turn into some kind of authoritarian regime uh led by the revolutionary gods. Today I think that almost any kind of a change, even if it's not a revolutionary change, even if it's not the evolution of the Islamic Republic into a kind of uh, I don't know, Sweden, uh pro-Western liberal secular democracy, even if it's just uh um initial change from within the regime, I think it can certainly open up new uh new opportunities, which is very which are very difficult to predict right now. And uh while the revolutionary gods are certainly not my cup of tea, uh but but even the revolutionary gods or some of the revolutionary gods, because uh as you know, this is not a monolithic uh organization, and there might be different factions within this organization, but uh I would say that uh if if you take one uh one general, what one top general serving at the RGC and make him the next supreme leader, uh he might not be as moderate as we wish him to be, but he might be less obsessed with this uh revolutionary ideology compared to Khamenei, and he might be more pragmatic and more willing to prioritize uh Iran's domestic problems over other issues. So I don't um I don't think that we should expect any kind of uh uh new leadership in Iran to desert Iran's ambitions when it comes to its uh regional ambitions or its uh nuclear program or its uh ballistic missiles program. But I think that if if we have uh even a slight change of of the focus by the by the Iranians, uh this might open up uh new uh new opportunities to to which could be used um to to make things better in the Middle East.

Neri: 51:27

So this is almost not counterintuitive, but it's a different, a very different scenario uh than what you hear in some quarters where okay, uh Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is old and stubborn uh and obviously uh uh uh clinging on to this uh you know old revolutionary idea, but uh um he's someone that at least uh we may be able to uh to do business with uh uh and to cut a deal with, whereas uh the unnamed and yet unknown uh IRGC Revolutionary Guard General may be even more extreme uh than the Supreme Leader. You're saying that uh actually uh the Supreme Leader is not showing any flexibility and that this uh future unknown general could actually be a lot more pragmatic.

SPEAKER_02: 52:09

Uh I think that the the that Supreme Leader Khamani has turned into a um a kind of a bottleneck. Uh as long as he's there, nothing is going to change. And I can also say that while in the past uh most assessments were that Supreme Lud Khameni uh was at least uh very cautious, I'm I'm not sure that he's as cautious as as he used to be. I mean, uh we all remember Iran's decision to strike the Saudi uh oil fields in uh back in uh September 2019, and then of course the Iranian decision to strike Israel in April 2024. Of course, we can give a very good explanation why they they made the decision after the Israeli decision to strike the diplomatic consulate uh in in Damascus and killing uh the revolutionary guard general. But but still, it was a very risky decision to be made by by Khamenei. And then, of course, the second uh decision to to strike Israel in October 2024. And now I I think when when you see the the um the policy, but both domestic policy, as we saw in in the recent brutal uh suppression of the protest in Iran, but also the foreign policy, it's very clear that he's unable or unwilling to make the decisions which uh which could pave the way for any kind of uh uh I wouldn't even say rapprochement between uh Iran and the United States, but any kind of uh stable uh kind of settlement between the two states. Uh, Iran, and and we saw that after the 12-day war, there was a very interesting debate going on inside Iran, between the so-called uh pragmatic reformist elements inside Iran and the more hard-line conservative uh factions inside Iran, what to do next? And and uh some of the pragmatic elements, circles inside Iran, were actually uh saying we we should uh make some kind of change. We should prioritize our domestic uh uh problems uh over uh, for example, supporting Hezbollah and uh and and uh and uh giving all that uh all those billions of dollars to support our proxies in in the region. And at the end of the day, uh Iran hasn't changed its policy. I mean, if you look uh just on one example, Iran's support to Hezbollah, we've just recently again uh learned that since the ceasefire reach between Israel and Hezbollah in July 2024, Iran has already delivered one billion dollar support, or almost one billion dollar support to Hezbollah, despite all the problems inside Iran, despite all the uh constraints and the limitations and the pressures on both Iran and Hezbollah. And the main reason for that is that the Iranian leadership under Khamani is unwilling to make any any real uh shifts in its policy. And so some some kind of change I think is uh uh is going to is is uh required in order to try and get this uh uh this uh declining force of the Islamic Republic uh out of its uh current uh position and and have some kind of change.

Neri: 55:16

Very, very well put, Raz. Um final question to you before uh before I let you go. And it's uh it's a near impossible one to answer, but I uh I'll pose it anyway. Uh uh okay, let's say there is a war, and let's say that scenario that you sketched out in terms of uh decapitation, the supreme leader uh um remove the leadership uh is different in Tehran. What does the day after actually uh actually look like? Uh will the uh not even the Islamic Republic, will Iran uh hold together? Will the policies shift and change? Uh will they come to the table and as Donald Trump likes to say, uh uh negotiate more reasonably with America? I mean what what scenario are we looking at the day after, the famous day after? Any kind of war?

SPEAKER_02: 56:00

Yeah, it's a very difficult question to to answer. I I I would I would try to assess that the more likely scenario, in my view, uh, especially if Supreme Leader Khamenei is gone, but if he's still there, nothing is going to change, or almost nothing is going to change. But if if he's gone, then there is a possibility that we will see some kind of change from within the regime. My sense is that uh uh even if there is a new Supreme Leader, and that might happen, the the assembly of experts, uh this council uh consisted of 88 clerics who has the possibility to choose a new leader, might convene and choose one of the clerics as uh as successor. But I think that it's more likely that we will see Iran or the Islamic Republic of Iran moving forward to some kind of constitutional change, uh which would perhaps change the dynamics between the Supreme Leader as we know him since 1989, since the last constitutional change after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Uh, we might see, for example, um a more uh a weaker supreme leader and a stronger uh president coming from within the ranks of the revolutionary gods, and that might be this kind of evolution from the Islamic Republic as a religious uh theropracy ruled by the Wali Faqi, the uh the high-ranking uh uh cleric, to a more uh military uh kind of uh of uh governmental uh model. Uh that's that's that's uh one option. Uh hopefully it will be a kind of a transition uh until uh a more uh democratic free elections or referendum are uh carried out by by uh by Iran, which might allow different players uh who were uh out of decision making in uh in the many years of the Islamic Republic, uh they might go back and play a role in the new Iran. But um I'm not sure if it's going to take uh I think it might take uh um quite a long time until we see um uh stabilization of the situation. There are those who are very much concerned with the possibility that uh after the regime is gone, we might see Iran uh deteriorating into a chaos or civil war, and perhaps we will see uh uh some separatist tendencies in the in the regions populated by ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds or the Balut or the Arabs. Uh it can happen, I can't rule it out. But I think that unlike Libya or unlike uh Syria or Yemen, Iran has actually preserved more or less its uh territorial integrity since the beginning of the 16th century. So I'm I'm not sure we should expect uh any kind of uh uh civil war. But yes, the Iranian society today, uh today I think is uh uh even more uh uh polarized than it used to be in the past, and we might see some some uh um uh period of time of uh of uh domestic uh instability.

Neri: 59:16

Raz. You didn't disappoint. That was uh a terrific nearly hour. Uh really, really interesting. And uh you know, we'll have to wait and see what the coming days and weeks uh bring. But reading not only just between the lines, but also explicitly from what you said. Uh this will come to a head one way or the other uh very soon. Uh so uh so on the other side of a war, we'll have you back to assess what's actually happening in Iran.

SPEAKER_02: 59:40

Good. Thank you. It was a pleasure.

Neri: 59:43

Okay, thanks again to Raz Simmet for his generous time and insight. Uh also a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor, Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Ian Jesson, as always. And to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work, do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum to keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. And once again, Ramadan Kareem for all those celebrate.