Neri: 1:03

Uh if you're a listener of Israel Policy Pod, you already know that the hardest questions about Israel and Jewish life don't come with simple answers. That's why I want to recommend a podcast I think you'll like. It's called Identity Crisis from the Shalom Hartman Institute. Each week, Harbin president and host, Yuida Kurtzer, brings moral rigor and genuine curiosity to conversations with guests like author Sarah Hurwitz and Dara Horn, Israeli political leaders like Gil Golan and Yossi Balin, and Israel Policy Forum's own chief policy officer, Michael Koplow, to wrestle seriously with the issues shaping this moment in Jewish life. What makes identity crisis stand out is that it doesn't rush to easy answers. Instead, it creates space for disagreement, complexity, and real moral debate about Israel, about power, responsibility, and the future of the Jewish people. If you're looking for a podcast featuring great conversations about the essential issues facing Jewish life, I highly recommend checking out Identity Crisis with the Huda Kurtzer wherever you get your podcasts. With all eyes still on Iran this week, we'll be tacking back this episode to the other big issue of recent days: Gaza. And specifically the inaugural meeting last week in Washington of Donald Trump's Board of Peace, which is responsible for leading post-war policy in and for the Gaza Strip. To help us make sense of what happened at the meeting and where we may be headed in Gaza, I'm delighted to be joined by two of my colleagues, Rachel Brandenburg, IPF's Washington Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst, and a former U.S. government official, and Dan Rotep, also a senior policy analyst here at IPF, and a longtime expert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I was really curious to get Rachel and Dan's takes on how this, uh, well, it's fair to say, unorthodox Board of Peace summit went, what the big takeaways were in terms of post-war policy, and whether all of it, or even some of it, can and will work. And at the end, okay, we did talk a little bit about Iran. Just FYI, we're recording this Tuesday evening Tel Aviv time, just in case anything happens between now and when this episode goes up, especially on the Iran front. With that, let's get to Rachel and Dan. Hi Rachel, hi Dan. Welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.

Rachel: 3:45

Thanks, Neri. Glad to be here.

Neri: 3:46

Likewise. Uh well, I'm very thrilled that you both are on. Uh Dan, you may not remember, but you were on a few years ago, uh, before you officially came on board here at IPF uh just recently. Uh and Rachel, I think this is your maiden voyage uh on the podcast. So uh it's very exciting for us. Hopefully it's exciting for you as well.

Rachel: 4:08

Absolutely.

Neri: 4:09

Great, great. Um, so as mentioned, we'll uh mostly be talking about Gaza's episode with some uh Iran stuff at the end. Uh hopefully that bit stays relevant by the time this episode goes up. Uh otherwise, you know, we'll just cut it. Uh we'll have other things to talk about, uh Iran related. If if that piece if that bit is cut, believe me. But this episode, I really wanted to focus on what happened last Thursday in Washington. Uh, this historic, weird, ambitious, grandiose, call it what you will, choose your adjective. Uh, this first meeting of Donald J. Trump's Board of Peace, tasked with running and rebuilding post-war Gaza. Just as a table for our listeners and viewers, uh, the summit brought together some 50 countries, uh, over half of whom officially joined this Board of Peace. Uh, Donald Trump is the chair of the board, naturally. Uh, they were there to raise money, to raise international peacekeeping forces, to lay out what they believe needs to be done on a whole host of policy issues related to Gaza, from disarmament to reconstruction to governance, and more. Believe me, there's a lot more. Uh, and it's also important just to note that there were a host of speakers uh that were at the summit, that were involved in the planning of post-war Gaza, uh, especially those individuals that serve not only on the Board of Peace, but the Board of Peace's executive board, people like Jared Kushner, Steve Whitkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, former UN envoy Nikolai Mladenov, who is now the high representative for Gaza, as well as Dr. Ali Shat, uh, who is now the head of this new Palestinian technocratic government for Gaza. So uh, with all that said, Rachel, I want to start with you. Uh, what were your initial uh thoughts, reflections on what we actually saw transpire uh in DC last Thursday?

Rachel: 6:00

Thanks, Neri. Um, I am not sure if you said pomp and circumstance, but that was definitely there. Uh, a lot of fanfare. And on some level, it looked pretty much like another government official coalition meeting, right? It was um a lot of senior representatives of different governments coming together for a joint purpose. So I certainly give the president, I give President Trump credit for building this Board of Peace, getting the countries on board that he did, having kind of this inaugural kickoff on a personal professional level. It was uh fascinating and painful to see it held in the U.S. Institute of Peace Building, which on one hand would have been built for exactly this purpose. On the other hand, President Trump and his administration basically slashed and cut um all staff from almost a year ago. So uh there's a part of me that's thinking about how much better this could be if the U.S. Institute of Peace were still there to serve its function and not just serve as a beautiful event hall. But that aside.

Neri: 7:01

Right. And they renamed this event hall the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace.

Rachel: 7:06

That's right. That's right.

Neri: 7:07

Naturally.

Rachel: 7:08

Naturally, as as everything in DC may be by the time this administration is over. Um, but the meeting itself was interesting. I thought once we got past President Trump talking, and President Trump sort of ranted in a lot of different directions as he tended to do, many of the statements and many of the pledges were the types of things you'd want to hear. Some of them were pretty standard, you know, thanks for being here. I support this effort, I support this mission. Some of the others were more unique, like having a number of private sector individuals talking about bringing a digital economy to Gaza, rebuilding Gaza in a way that sounds both fantastical and beautiful. I think what will be important and most interesting to see is what comes out of this. I, when I was at the Department of Defense, I was part of building the counter-ISIS coalition. And we held lots of meetings where lots of countries at very senior levels pledged lots of things. The proof ends up in the pudding. How much of those pledges are actually delivered? How much of the something like $7 billion was it that were pledged actually come through? How many of the countries that said that they will send forces to the international security forces actually show up? And what do they do and what are they capable of? So um, you know, it was an interesting beginning. I think a lot of fanfare. Now uh we'll have to see what comes next.

Neri: 8:27

Very well put. Fantastical and beautiful. Uh, I like that in terms of what Gaza could be, what they laid out and all those PowerPoint slides and projections. And we'll get into the various details of what they put forward uh in just a minute. Uh Dan, what were your initial reactions from this uh what three and a half hour, four-hour event last Thursday?

Dan: 8:47

Yeah, so building off of that, of uh what Rachel laid out, I think this event basically symbolizes the maxing out of this very grand international architecture, right? Outside of Gaza. So everything is now in place. Some is still being constructed, but at least the foundation is there. So you have this Board of Peace, you have the executive board, actually, two executive boards, but we won't like dive deep into that. But certainly the executive board of the people who are working it, led by the four people that you mentioned. Maybe we can deconstruct that in in a bit. The focus on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, and henceforth known as NCAG. The Technocratic Committee. Yes. Uh, with Dr. Ali Shah uh represented there at the event, which was good to see. The focus on Palestinian police, pledges for the ISF. I don't think the uh uh the extent to which like was actually focused at the um event itself, but it's you know it's rolling to a certain extent. So everything outside of Gaza is basically coming together-ish. The real test is can all this external construct now actually move reality in Gaza? And so far it's been lacking. Maybe we'll talk about it more. NCAG is stuck in Cairo, uh, unable to get into Gaza, unclear where in Gaza, unclear the capacity that it will have. Palestinian police is only now so very belatedly being recruited. The ISF mandate is shifting as we look at it. So all that is really, for me, was a well-put effort, culminated in this event. And now, how can it actually deploy on the ground in Gaza?

Rachel: 10:45

Can I add one additional thought, also?

Dan: 10:47

Of course.

Rachel: 10:48

You know, I talked about what did happen and what we did see, but not what we didn't. And I think it's important to remember what countries were represented and what countries weren't. And most of our Western European allies and partners are not part of the Board of Peace. I presume because maybe they don't take it seriously. They want to wait and see, also because President Trump's foreign policy initiatives aren't in a vacuum. So you can't just look at what he's doing with respect to the Board of Peace in Gaza. There's also Greenland, there's also Russia, there's also the diplomacy with Iran, there's so many other factors. Uh, and not only will it be important to see, like Dan just said, what happens on the ground in Gaza and how much of this translates to reality, but also how much they're able to bridge some of the gaps between what the United States is trying to do in one part of the world and another part of the world, and the relations they have to what partners are willing to work with us in which ways.

Neri: 11:37

Right. So that's an important point. Uh, our traditional allies, especially from Western Europe, uh also Canada and the like, uh, did not join the Board of Peace. Uh, I think there were some European observers in the room, but not officially part of the board. Um, and yeah, I mean, obviously this was all kind of was launched last month, pretty much at the height of the tensions between the US and Europe over Greenland. Um, I think the Europeans also have uh major reservations about uh the quasi-private paradigm uh of this kind of new board uh being raised, not just for Gaza, right? That Trump has said uh it may have ambitions beyond Gaza, which uh again is also very, very ambitious. So the idea is that he may want to replace the UN, uh which the Europeans obviously do not do not want to see happen. Uh and yeah, I think my my biggest takeaway, uh, and I watched it all the way through live the first time, and I watched uh a lot of bits and pieces of it uh yesterday as well for this podcast and for my general work. Look, I think it was all just a bit weird, right? Uh Trump kicked things off with this kind of 45-minute, it wasn't even a speech, it was like open mic night at the Apollo, where he had a prepared speech, uh, which was fine, laying out various kind of issues related to Gaza, but he interjected it with uh, like I said, these kind of running, running monologues about various leaders in attendance, their names, uh, you know, how Bahrain could could buy uh a lot of things because it had a lot of money, and the I think the Uzbek leader's uh name was difficult. I mean, again, uh that wasn't really the the important part of the uh of the event, but uh just Trump kind of unplugged, kicking things off, and all of them sitting on the stage cheering and clapping and and laughing because they had to, right? So I think the the psychopancy of not just the event, but also the motivation of all these countries and leaders to join the Board of Peace was very much front and center. Uh that's just in terms of the style, the substance. Look, I I was struck by a few comments made by Trump and other senior officials, things like Donald Trump saying the war in Gaza is over. Full stop, right? Uh I don't know if that was met by a lot of nodding heads in Israel, or especially uh in the Israeli government. Marco Rubio, as well as Jared Kushner, basically said, we have to get this right. There is no plan B for Gaza. Plan B is going back to war. Right. So basically, success or failure is not an option. And they they very much want to see this succeed. Uh, whether it can, we'll we'll get into it uh later on, I'm sure. So things like that, I think, were in terms of the actual substance of their comments, we're were striking, kind of big picture, their vision, big picture for for what they want to see, uh leaving aside the the details of of what they actually plan to implement on the ground. So um, yes, uh Donald Trump's uh eccentricities on the one hand, uh, as well as their very ambitious plans for post-war Gaza, and they very much view it as post-war Gaza, which which I think was was important uh to emphasize.

Rachel: 14:51

Yeah, I would say also on style, it's certainly Donald Trump's eccentricities. Also, um, things like the number of times he mentioned beautiful women from the stage or made homophobic responses, reaction or homophobic comments, uh, has become part of his style that I think a lot of us sort of laugh, smile, and nod uncomfortably at. But it's really quite inappropriate. Uh, and to see it normalized on that stage in Washington, D.C. was um cringy.

Neri: 15:19

To say the least, also, uh, I think correct me if I'm wrong, I think every world leader and official on the stage was a man. Except for the MC. Well, Caroline Leavitt, the the White House spokesperson, um, I think Susie Wiles was also on stage. She uh the White House Chief of Staff, she's part of the executive board for Gaza. Um but yeah, I think very, very few women are are involved, very few women uh involved kind of in the team running Gaza policy at the moment. Um so yeah, uh very good point uh and and really worth emphasizing, Rachel. Um the last thing I'll say in terms of just big picture ideas or kind of uh well what we actually saw happen last Thursday, how little Israel was not only just mentioned, but also the the impact of Israel kind of with regard to Thursday and just in general, in terms of the Board of Peace. Prime Minister Netanyahu sent his foreign minister, Gidon Sao, to sit there, one of several dozen world leaders. Gidon Sar did speak towards the end, you know, there were these kind of interjections after the Board of Peace officials spoke and laid out what uh what they've done and what they're planning to do. But he was one of just several dozen, uh, and he gave you know pretty predictable speech in terms of the need for uh Hamas's disarmament, uh demilitarizing Gaza, uh de-radicalization of the Gaza Strip. So kind of the the red lines and the bottom lines uh as Israel saw it, and then kind of they just went on to the next speaker.

Rachel: 16:50

He was also practically forgotten by special envoy Whitkop.

Neri: 16:54

So so that's a so that's a thing, right? I was just gonna say, uh Whitkoff, he also gave remarks, appropriate, like you know, standing on stage, not just sitting as far as the the kind of world leader interjections. And almost as an afterthought, he's like, Oh, yes, by the way, thank you to Israel for kind of playing ball with all of this. And he name-checked Bibi Netanyahu, and he also name checked Ron Dermer, uh, but not even Gidon Tsar, who was sitting right behind him. Uh, thank you for coming. Nothing, nothing of the sort. So it was almost an afterthought by Steve Whitkoff. And uh, I don't think anyone else name-checked Gidon Tsar who was sitting there.

Dan: 17:29

That's fine. Israel's stock is not riding high at the moment in regard to Gaza. That's okay. You guys are focused on, you know, the wrong things uh when it comes to these guys go, you know, fast and hard and they pivot quickly. You're talking about the US officials. Yes, mainly. But it's orchestrated around them. You know, this coming off of the wonderful speech, in my perspective. I'm sure Rachel has a different perspective and eager to hear that of Marco Rubio's speech in the Munich conference, sort of like resetting attitudes at least in Europe. I think these guys, you know, they move fast and they make mistakes and they don't abide by traditional, you know, diplomatic rule books. Sometimes this is to their credit, sometimes this is to their detriment, and remains to be seen about Gaza.

Rachel: 18:22

I think so much of what we see from them is it's a startup mentality, right? You try new things, you fail fast, you move on. And for the all of the institutions that have been created around Gaza and this vision for where Gaza could end up if Trump's 20-point plan comes to fruition, the Gaza part of it, it almost requires Israel to just not get in the way. You don't necessarily need Israel to be an active participant in the rebuilding and the reconstruction and the institution building, you need them to not be obstructionist. And right now, the Israeli government is somewhat or at least trying to be, somewhat obstructionist on many levels. And so when we think about traditional diplomacy and that Israel is such a core part of peace and stability and eventual resolution between Israelis and Palestinians and Israelis and the Arab world, and sort of Trump's broader vision of a region of an integrated Middle East where the Abraham Accords are expanded, right? The region is stable, secure, all of these wonderful things. That vision requires Israel to play an active part. For what they're talking about in Gaza, I don't know, it's uh I'm I'm um being a little bit controversial, but you you don't even necessarily need Israel to be active.

Neri: 19:35

So you need Israel to be an enabler. Uh, but to your point, Rachel, it's the first time in the history of post-1967 occupation or Israeli takeover of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and also East Jerusalem, that this piece of territory, Gaza in this case, has been internationalized, right? Heavily, heavily internationalized, where you have this international board led by Americans, but not only, that are dictating terms to an Israeli government. And that's new. Right. Also, you know, we'll talk about it. The introduction of a you know international peacekeeping force uh into the Palestinian territories has never been done, you know, in terms of an armed, potentially armed international peacekeeping force. You know, one thing that was very evident last Thursday was the high esteem uh held by Trump administration officials, including the president himself, of Turkey and Qatar, who will play a prominent role, if not on the ground, then definitely behind the scenes in terms of what happens in Gaza, uh, which is arguably the reason why Bibi Netanyahu did not want to show up. He didn't want to be filmed on stage with uh Turkish and Qatari officials. That's why he sent his foreign minister to Washington. Uh Dan, you wanted to interject?

Dan: 20:48

No, not really, not on this one. Uh except for maybe to say that this is a to the extent that Israel doesn't want Qatar and Turkey involved, right? It's self-inflicting. When you stiff arm the PA and veto any substantive mention of a political context, political horizon, then you just leave the floor open to the only two actors that don't condition their involvement on the PA and on a political horizon. And these are Qatar and Turkey. And so uh Israel could have played this significantly different throughout the war and as we transition to post-conflict diplomacy. But uh by now you see the UAE and to an even greater extent Saudi, you know, stepping back and not wanting to be involved uh in this construct to the extent that I think we would like them to be.

Neri: 21:45

Yeah, I mean Saudi definitely. I think the UAE is uh is heavily involved um on the humanitarian level on the humanitarian level. Um for various reasons. Um but no, I think your point is valid. Uh by the way, the PA is the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Uh Israel, well, Israel, Bibi Netanyahu has refused to allow it any kind of foothold in in the Gaza Strip, even though uh a big part of the new Tectrokatic Committee are former Palestinian Authority officials. And anyway, uh we don't need to get into the weeds of it, but uh yes, it's it's a major both practical issue on the ground in Gaza and also a major diplomatic issue and a roadblock and has been for over two years.

Rachel: 22:25

It's also among so many areas where President Trump has sort of smiled and nodded smiled and nodded at Prime Minister Netanyahu's objection and moved on, right? So when they first announced the 20-point plan, everyone had agreed to it. There was a press conference where they stood side by side, and President Trump said something to the effect of, you know, peace has arrived. This is the greatest day in modern civilization for the Middle East. We have all these points that are going to bring my vision for Gaza to fruition. And you see very clearly in those points that it has a role for the PA. And then Prime Minister Netanyahu stood right next to him. And after he said that, said, Yes, President Trump, thank you so much. Much, we're on board, but the PA will never be returned to Gaza. And so part of the art of the 20 points, in my opinion, was that it was vague enough to let everybody sort of hold their nose and say, okay, I'll come along. But I think what we've seen repeatedly from this American president, which makes him unique in so many ways, is that he's not deferential to the Israeli prime minister. He's not saying, oh, this is hard for you. Okay, I won't push. He is pushing and he's pulling and he's just sort of proceeding with whatever steps he and his team think are necessary for Gaza. Again, I question how realistic they are and how feasible it will be for all of these things to come to fruition. But I think so far we've seen from President Trump that he's not letting Prime Minister Netanyahu's preferences get in the way, which is also a really different dynamic for an American president and an Israeli prime minister, particularly on this issue.

Neri: 23:55

I think that's true overall. It's been true for, well, since October and the ceasefire. I don't think left to his own devices, BB Netanyahu would have would have agreed to that deal. To my mind, it's an open question how much Trump and Trump's people, like Kushner and Whitkoff, actually push Netanyahu on specific issues that they want to see happen inside Gaza. It remains to be seen. But um I think the the issue of uh of Israel agreeing or not agreeing, um, that's one thing. To their, I don't want to say to Israel's credit, but at least a mark in Israel's column coming out of Thursday is a talk of Palestinian statehood or even reunification of Gaza and the West Bank, very rarely mentioned. Even by Dr. Ali Shat, the new head of the Palestinian Technocratic Committee, the new essentially the new head of this transitional government for Gaza, didn't even talk about setting a horizon for reunification, statehood. I think he was very much cautioned against uh, well, going there, shall we say?

Dan: 24:58

Right. He's at the mercy of Israel on the one hand and Hamas on the other hand. You know, the only two actors on the ground that can cast their veto on any meaningful progress, and especially on the plight of the NCAG. So good for him for you know navigating that wisely for the time being.

Rachel: 25:16

Yeah, I think everyone's treading carefully, from the Saudis, the Amratis to the NCAG, and to some extent, President Trump's team, even if not him, right? They they kind of are figuring out what the red slide red lines are and they're trying to walk a delicate balance between overstepping and just keeping things moving in the right direction.

Neri: 25:34

Correct. All right. Let's get uh without further ado, uh 25 minutes into this podcast, let's get into the the various details of of what they actually said and what they plan on doing. Um so first and foremost, uh money, donations, financing. They announced that $7 billion were raised, or at least pledged, from a host of primarily Muslim and Arab states that were taking part uh in the Board of Peace and the event last week. And then $10 billion were donated, quote unquote, uh by President Trump himself. Uh these figures were more than what we thought would be announced uh ahead of Thursday's meeting by a magnitude of maybe three. So a substantial amount of money at least was uh thrown around in terms of dollar figures. But Rachel, do we think that this money will actually materialize?

Rachel: 26:29

I'm skeptical, to say the least. Um, you know, on one hand, having a World Bank fund set up is a good step in the right direction, but we've seen President Trump in many different scenarios try to rely on private funds, not public funds. And so I honestly was questioned when I heard that, and I haven't seen anything any further detail yet. But is this coming from Trump's family funds? Is this coming from tax fund taxpayer dollars? I mean, it seems absolutely incredulous to me that there are 10 billion taxpayer, US taxpayer dollars that are not only available for this purpose, but Congress would approve, be appropriated for this purpose. So you can find lots of money kind of in the couch cushions of the Department of Defense budget, for example, but not to this magnitude. So I find it hard to believe that the US dollars will materialize, not to mention Trump's own political challenges of explaining to the American people why this much money is being spent on Gaza when there are so many other challenges at home to spend plenty of dollars on. The international funds, I feel similarly. I mean, we saw the Saudi crown prince come to the United States and pledge something like a trillion dollars of investment, right? And then at the same time, he's seeking investment into his own country because the Saudi economy is not all that well off for a number of reasons. So I think it's pretty easy to pledge. Um, it's really hard to follow through. And that's not too dissimilar from other administrations. There's tin cupping that's had to go on for almost any international effort where the United States has sought funding for sort of a joint effort. And I um I'll just say I'm skeptical.

Neri: 28:09

Right. And Dan, uh, we've seen donor conferences for Gaza in the past, especially and most famously after the 2014 Israel Hamas war. Uh, not all of that money that was uh raised, quote unquote, and pledged actually materialized, right?

Dan: 28:27

Yes, of course. Uh not just for Gaza. I think the Kerry Initiative had this conference in Jordan. I think $4 billion were pledged there or envisioned there. Obviously, uh Trump's 2020 plan started with an economic conference in Bahrain in Manama, if I'm not mistaken. Um, right. Yes, $50 billion obviously of investment than were envisioned. The Palestinian area, you know, has a long history of attention and pledges, but very little has materialized. Shameless plug for the dire financial situation, some of it self-inflicted, but some of it a victim of this conflict and uh Israeli policy of withholding uh tax revenue clearance. So the dire straits of the PA and currently NCAG in Gaza or Cairo, waiting to enter. Gaza also doesn't have anything in their bank account. It was interesting to see the World Bank uh representative there, sort of like throwing its credibility and uh almost owning, I think, the fund that needs to be established. Remains to be seen how much uh traction that gets.

Neri: 29:41

The World Bank head was was there and he spoke uh and he, like you said, vouched for the uh the transparency and the best practices and the accounting of whatever money will be actually raised and actually materialized for Gaza. Some reporting that me and my colleagues have done uh led us to well, publish the fact that the World Bank Fund may not be the only fund and the only banker for Gaza. There may be another another bank account and another banker uh that may be utilized for various initiatives. Uh remains to be seen also how this works uh in practice. The second big issue, sorry, Rachel.

Rachel: 30:21

I was just gonna add, um, I think one of the other challenges with people donating to this effort, or with countries donating to this effort, is nobody wants to throw a bunch of money or resources at an area that's just gonna be raised to the ground again. So any fund, any fundraising, any of the progress on the more tangible sort of facts on the ground type things needs to be coupled with a political horizon. So there's some sense that this is going to lead to stability and not just rebuild things for Israel to then destroy them again in the next war. And as you pointed out, there was not really talk of a political horizon in the statements made. I think hearing that there's a channel for the PA to be involved somehow and the NCAG, right? We're seeing signs of at least trying to create some linkages between the Palestinian Authority and this what's what's being built for Gaza. But I expect a lot of pledges turning to real dollars will also depend on there being some sense that this isn't just good money or good resources being thrown after, you know, a temporary solution until the next war.

Neri: 31:26

Yes. And so one of the big things coming out of last Thursday was um, I think the disconnect many people had between the immediate immediate term policies and what they're actually going to do on the ground, and this longer term vision, right? So the longer term vision is um, I mean, grandiose is one word for it, ambitious is another. Uh some people I've spoken to said it was obscene, right? Just given the harsh, harsh reality right now after two years of war uh on the ground in Gaza. So you had this kind of uh FIFA was there for whatever reason. So the head of FIFA uh Infantino was there, and um he also spoke and they showed uh a video, uh, an AI generated video by FIFA of uh what they plan to do uh for Gaza, which which is great, but like soccer pitches and a $50 million national stadium in Gaza is not exactly an immediate need, to say the least. And so you look at that and you say, okay, well, that would be nice um in future, but then leaving aside uh AI generated images of um soccer fields next to rubble, which which was actually in the video, you also had uh ideas put out by various members of the executive board who spoke like an airport for Gaza, like a seaport, like rail travel. You know, one of them, one of the people who spoke said, you know, um, the coastline of Gaza was uh had value of $50 billion and had space to build 200 hotels. Okay. I mean, great. They want to turn it into the new uh Gaza Riviera, literally, which we we've heard now for you know over a year. But like, okay, that's nice maybe as a long-term optimistic vision. But what what are you gonna do on the ground now in the coming year? I think that was a disconnect for for many people. I don't know. I mean, in terms of immediate needs, you know, Ali Shat spoke about it, right? He had several things that he wanted to see to see done, which which again were were more practical. And uh what did he say? He said basically we need to be disciplined and prioritization matters, right? So what do you think actually matters in terms of immediate priorities? Uh which they may have raised last Thursday or not.

Dan: 33:44

Their their priorities, I think, are clear, uh, and they would be anybody's priorities. Priority number one is security, at least enough to allow for humanitarian aid to start transitioning into what's professionally known as early recovery efforts. Uh, I think NCAG has in its mind a list of early wins, deliverables, uh, that will also give it legitimacy. And with it, the initiation of civil governance, you know, beyond the humanitarian vector. Uh, on that, they need to rely heavily on Hamas handing over knowledge and lists, maybe civilian personnel, one that are vetted and not ideologically, you know, entrusted with uh the Hamas jihadist ideology. But these are his priorities as far as you know the reconstruction and the longer-term vision for Gaza, that's all fine as far as slides are concerned. But his his challenges are very acute in here, starting with entering Gaza. Right.

Rachel: 34:55

I think also, I mean, the um, well, I want to make a plug for the work that Dan, you and Celine did on disarmament, which is a huge part of progress. But I'll talk about that in a moment, Nary. Yeah, I think part of what is so difficult to see this Gaza Riviera vet vision come to fruit fruition is because it's so divorced from reality on the ground. And there's almost a human dimension missing. Like I think about the things that they describe, and it's very much like you know, the UAE has built islands. There are resorts and casinos and things that are being invested in parts of the Gulf that you would have never imagined 50 years ago. But that doesn't sort of the dimensions on the ground, the conflict surrounding it, the politics surrounding it, the devastation that people are living in, like the reality is divorced from those AI-generated images and thinking about what Dan just described as the early stage recovery, without which the reality just gets worse. And if you sort of the next level above the political institutions, employment, education, if you can't get some of that in place, then Hamas just reconstitutes control fully. They end up setting up the schools, right? It's sort of you rewind the tape two and a half years, and we're back where we were politically, maybe with a much worse humanitarian situation. So this crawl, walk, run approach to put a different terminology on sort of the um traditional humanitarian assistance to stabilization requirements, I think is missing. They're just like they're at run, right? They're talking about the the airplane, I mean, the airports and the ports and $50 million stadiums without taking a minute to at least tell us what they've done on the details. I think we know that they haven't quite figured out the details. Um, but that acknowledgement and that gap is not something that we've seen them able to really figure out how to bridge in what we've heard and seen so far, I think.

Neri: 36:52

I think that was the biggest disconnect that people had, you know, leaving aside Trump's 45-minute uh open mic night uh or open mic afternoon in in DC. I think that was people's biggest, biggest issue. And again, some of them did talk about well, the need to introduce uh temporary housing to restore basic services, water, electricity, health, to remove rubble, to remove unexploded ordinances, um, you know, tens of millions of tons of both. So they name checked it, uh, and yet again, okay, that should be your first port of call and not uh a slide deck showing me uh the new kind of uh you know AI hub for Gaza.

Rachel: 37:35

Right. And some of these things maybe they're working on behind the scenes, like you know, and here Israel also needs to play a non-obstructionist role with respect to things like dual-use materials and letting shelter in more than tents and right.

Neri: 37:49

And I mean Gaza has used to have an airport. It was built in the late 1990s, and then it was bombed in the beginning of the second dafada at the turn of the century, when an Israeli-Palestinian war broke out. Uh so it's not like uh some of the idea some of these ideas are are are new. Uh Shimon Paris, but not just Paris, obviously talked about turning Gaza into Singapore after Israel withdrew uh in the disengagement of 2005, and we all know uh how that ended up. So uh yeah. More maybe reality-based slide decks and less uh utopian slide decks.

Dan: 38:24

I I will note that you two and me with you, right, were lacking maybe some political imagination in the sense that they have a built-in work assumption that is very challenging, and that is that Hamas had already agreed to disarm. Now it's just a matter of how to sink it into this process and step away from governance. So if that happens, according to their logic, things can move fast and much faster than us three here can imagine.

Speaker: 38:58

Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure, Jewish, democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic U.S. policy towards the conflict, U.S. Israel relations, and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary, and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political, denominational, and generational spectrums. Our Young Professionals initiative, IPFATEED, works to elevate the discourse among next generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at Israelpolicyforum.org and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes.

Neri: 39:55

And so that was brings us to the next big topic, and it's arguably the most important topic, like you like you alluded to, Dan, arguably a precondition for anything, which is both the security environment inside Gaza and disarmament. So just starting with the security topic and the issue, um, yes, they want to introduce two uh new forces into Gaza to be responsible for security. Uh this international peacekeeping force called the uh well, International Stabilization Force, ISF, for Gaza. Uh they announced that five countries had committed thousands of troops already, uh Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Albania, and Kosovo. Uh all, by the way, Muslim states, which which is interesting. Uh not exactly um military powerhouses, but uh again, I don't think beggars can be choosers, and there weren't uh there weren't many countries kind of lining up, especially not countries in the immediate vicinity, like Saudi and UAE in Egypt, to send their troops into Gaza. Uh, but they did get, to their credit, they did get five countries to sign up, and at least Indonesia is willing to send thousands of troops. And the second force that they want to introduce is a new Palestinian police force set to be trained by Egypt and Jordan. Uh Ali Shah said that he wants to deploy 5,000 new officers into Gaza uh in the next 60 days. Now, uh as somebody who uh once upon a time wrote a book, small book, but a book about the PA security forces, I went back earlier today and checked how long uh those forces, again, for the West Bank were trained for by the US and other international partners. 19 weeks. 19 week training course. And they're talking and thinking about introducing a new security force, Palestinian security force for Gaza in 60 days. Um by the way, uh after two years of war and 20 years of Hamas rule. Uh so again, I don't even want to call it ambitious, I don't think it's achievable. But this is the plan. This is what he said publicly. So just in terms of these two new security forces, I mean, Rachel, what do you what do you think? Is this progress of a sort or still unformed, unclear what they're gonna be doing?

Rachel: 42:12

Um, can I choose both?

Neri: 42:14

Sure.

Rachel: 42:15

I think certainly progress to say that and when I I believe it was Nikolai Mladenov who said as of the date, you know, as of today uh during the Border Peace meeting, so as of last week, the PA security forces, I'm sorry, the PA police force training was starting.

Neri: 42:27

Uh, and they had He said no, not that the training, this is an important distinction. He said 2,000 people had volunteered to join the force that morning, which I think they just signed up, but somebody needs to vet them. The Israel Shinbet, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt.

Rachel: 42:43

Yes, someone needs to vet them, someone needs to train them. There is there is a lot that needs to be done before you can send a force into Gaza, as you said, amidst, I'd say, hostile territory. I don't think Hamas is going to give up their weapons or give up their um their turf easily. And the devil's in the details for any of this planning. I mean, the U.S. knows how to train forces. I also heard an American official not that long ago say the U.S. is not going to be training forces in the Middle East. That's not what we do anymore. So who's doing the training? Who's going to be leading the force? And with respect to the international security forces, what are they sending? Are they sending people who are going to be trainers? Are they going to be sending um monitors? Are they, you know, I think the terms of all of these things are still quite unclear. And you don't need everybody who shows up for an international stabilization force to be well-trained, capable officers, but you need at least a good chunk of them. And how well-trained and capable the forces that have been volunteered are, even if they do show up, I think is an open question. Um, so it this sort of seems to me like another one of the announcements that sounds great in practice. I mean, in principle, but seems far from realistic in practice.

Dan: 44:08

I have a slightly different take on this. First of all, as far as the ISF is concerned, I think the original thought of those who drafted the 20-point plan was that it will actually lead disarmament and demilitarization of the strip. The the exact phrasing in the 20-point plan was a notch less than LEED, but the intent was still there. It will assist, I think, the you know, the demilitarization of the strip and and whatnot. I think over time there's been a learning curve, right? That whoever was willing to send uh contribute forces is not willing for them to take the lead on disarmament. Uh, and I think the the the mandate now and the um you know the objectives are to do stuff such as secure assist and secure humanitarian efforts. And at most, uh I'm sorry, also assisting training. The Palestinian police and finally maybe supervise a decommissioning effort that somebody else would lead. So be present around there. As for the Palestinian forces, I think first of all, the focus now is on civil police. Civil police, the main challenge of the civil police, and I heard that tens of thousands of Palestinians have applied online to be part of this police. Obviously, they need to be vetted and selected, selected and vetted, or maybe vetted and selected, or selected, then vetted, then selected again. And ultimately go training in Egypt and Jordan and then come back. But their objective will also not be confront with tactical gear and go, you know, find your way in anywhere that Hamas is.

Neri: 46:01

To go fight Hamas or confront them in the alleyways of Hamas.

Dan: 46:14

In the most troubled way, uh originally, and then you know, maybe help secure NCAG, its offices, its early recovery efforts, and the inception of civil governance there. Ultimately, and this goes Neri, I think, beyond what is discussed now. If you want to really uh disarm Hamas and decommission them, you will need to dig in and bring in more able forces than civil police. You can take a, you know, uh you can copy some stuff that is being done in the West Bank, where the PA is mobilized against Hamas, uh, maybe not to the extent that Gaza require is required or required in Gaza, uh, but intelligence capabilities, other more robust, above police level capabilities like the NSF, the National Security Force in the West Bank, and also support by uh regional countries that can extend legitimacy and political backing. So all that remains to be seen. The focus right now is on civil police.

Neri: 47:22

So that's a fair point, then. They are focused on civil police, which is a, I guess, in theory, uh, an easier lift, especially if they're not actually the ones meant to confront or disarm Hamas. They're responsible for public spaces uh as an extension or arm of the NCAG of this new transitional uh government. I uh there has been a shift that that has taken place, which is that, like you said, initially the idea was for the ISF to be the lead, right? This international force coming in from the outside to be the lead uh on the ground. Uh and in public comments in recent weeks by uh various Board of Peace officials, the emphasis is now on the Palestinian force that they want to raise, which I think is probably the right approach, uh, but it takes time and a lot of effort to train a reasonably efficient and professional force uh and not 60 days.

Rachel: 48:15

It also presumes that Hamas who are currently policing the streets are willing to just see cede that responsibility. And I think there's um either it's a firefight or a handover, and to reach a handover, there has to be some negotiation involved.

Neri: 48:30

Yeah, which brings us to Dan's uh wonderful report. Uh by the way, in classic Palestinian political fashion, Rachel, uh it can be both. They can negotiate and then fire on the streets for sure. For sure. That's usually how it's done. Um Dan, uh you and our dear friend Celine Touboul uh put out a report for IPF last week titled Disarming Hamas, a framework for lasting security. What was the main thesis pitch that you guys made in the report in terms of how to get this thing done uh successfully? Uh, because as we mentioned, right, the one precondition echoed uh time and time again last Thursday, and really synthesis fire came into effect last October is uh Hamas needs to disarm for anything to actually work.

Dan: 49:14

Yes. So uh I'm sure in the show notes you can find a link to the full report. I'll give the uh super abbreviated version here. The report basically lays out three theories of the case on how to disarm Hamas that are right now on the table, you know, in various parts of the you know, interested parties. The first one was basically resuming war, what we called you know coercive military uh effort. The second one is a non-kinetic pressure, meaning building off of the division of Gaza right now, somewhere between you know 55, 45, held by Israel, in which you know you keep squeezing Hamas, but not in a kinetic fashion, not by uh necessarily firing at them, but by other means, uh, hoping that that will lead ultimately to disarmament. And the third version or approach that we outline is um what's known as a DDR process. DDR standing for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias. It's the most complex one, and and maybe I'll turn to that in 30 seconds. I'll just note that we analyzed each and every one of these approaches on their own and against each other, with basically uh noting that um the resumption of war may might yield uh some early achievements in further degrading and disarming uh Hamas, but ultimately it is the least durable one because it faces both legitimacy challenges and throws out the window any prospects of, you know, it, you know, and obviously the war resumes, nothing in the Israeli, in the greater Israeli-Palestinian context, and certainly nothing regionally, but even more threatening is the fact that it actually needs full Israeli occupation of the strip um and uh you know a risk of insurgency and and other threats. It's is it is unstable almost by definition. The non-kinetic pressure will probably uh enjoy a bit more legitimacy uh as the you know Trump was able to get all regional actors and actually the entire international community behind the idea that Hamas needs to surrender its weapons, uh, or to disarm, I should say. But you know, the effect uh will be a difficult for people uh in Gaza with the situation right now effectively being codified. Uh, but more than that, it will not reach the threshold of disarmament that that are the objective. Finally, um, actually the 20-point plan was written uh as a DDR plan, as a you know, a plan based on Hamas consent, not because it wakes up one morning and decides to forego its arm, but because there's a set of incentive. It's basic cost-benefit analysis regarding holding arms is changed. And and the 20-point plan draws heavily on the Northern Ireland case, using actually the same operational language of decommissioning and putting weapons beyond use, and the process basically disarmed the IRA over there. And there are other cases around the world, from Colombia to the Philippines, uh, that have been have seen some success in disarming militias. I'll I'll I'll really uh ultimately that is uh the one that offers the prospects for most success and most uh durability, but it is the hardest to put to pull off because DDR is not merely a technical fix of who goes to the front, who collects the weapons, who verifies and monitors. More than that, it is political intervention. All the cases from around the world of DDR, of a militia sort of willingly or by agreement surrendering weapons was done in a political context. Um, right. And here, this is very lacking. Uh or uh, if we if we'll think about it, the more we can point to a political horizon and a political context that will surround the disarmament effort, the more ambitious it can get. But right now, obviously, that is uh a very missing piece of this effort.

Neri: 53:42

So when you say political horizon in a political context or envelope within which you conduct DDR, is it two-state solution? Is it some role for the Palestinian Authority? Is it regional states intervening heavily on this issue? I mean, all of the above?

Dan: 54:00

All of the above, absolutely. You really need to have all these stages coming in together in a way that Palestinians can frame, Hamas specifically, and Palestinians at large, can frame disarmament in the context of an internal Palestinian reordering of sovereignty, if you would, rather than capitulation to Israel and surrendering of that. Ultimately, you want, and this is also in the Kushner slides, you need one authority, one gun, one law uh in Gaza, a monopoly over the use of force. Um, and that can only happen as Palestinians pursue reconciliation, integration, uh, the reunification of uh Gaza and the West Bank, and ultimately on the way to statehood. The more ambitious that is, the more set the political conditions are for disarmament to unfold more broadly and for whatever militias there are to integrate ultimately into a you know a unified Palestinian uh force. Without that, then it becomes uh very difficult.

Neri: 55:06

And just final question about the report then, kind of on the on the level below the overall framework conceptually uh and in terms of policy, is there a sense that okay, in terms of DDR, you go after the heavy weapons first? Heavy weapons, rockets, uh rocket pillow grenades, terror tunnels, and and you know, heavy infrastructure and the like, and then you kind of move from that to what?

Dan: 55:31

Yes, uh so all or most DDR cases around the world, all of them I think, you know, have been processes, right? In Northern Ireland, it took, I believe, between eight and ten years for the IRA to ultimately surrender uh all its well, surrender again, a bad term, but to to hand over uh or put beyond use or decommission.

Neri: 55:50

I don't know. Um people are people are throwing around the word capitulate uh a lot these days.

Dan: 55:55

Yes, no, obviously from Israel's perspective, this also needs to be a symbolic surrender of Hamas as almost a precondition for movement. But that's not how you get militias to uh uh lay down their arms. Right. So, but yes, the uh right now the vision of you know those orchestrating this, somewhere around you know, the executive board, I believe, is that you focus first on really the offensive weapons, rockets, rocket manufacturing facilities, tunnels, etc. And only later will you get to try and deal with uh personal weapons or anything RPG and and below.

Neri: 56:35

Okay, that's an important point. Um, Rachel, on this hugely important and complicated issue of disarmament. I mean, we all agree that Dan and Celine's report was uh was a beautiful report, uh, very thorough. Um, but what do you what do you think in terms of the issue itself and the prospect for it to actually get off the ground?

Rachel: 56:55

Um I mean, I I say not jokingly, I do think Dan and Celine's report was the the best one out there so far in its analysis of not only the options, but a clear-eyed approach to a way forward. As Dan said, it's really hard. And all of the stars have to align on so many of the things we've talked about, not only with respect to a political horizon and there being a viable alternative political institution for the Palestinians and the NCAG coming in and there being a force to disarm Hamas, but also the set of incentives for people. You know, there's some ideological, or there's some Hamas who are ideologic ideological and won't want to give up their weapons no matter what. And so they're gonna have to be wrestled out of their hands. There are others who probably just want a livelihood and a job and might go to the highest bidder if there was an alternative that was not carrying arms and, you know, wearing the proverbial Hamas badge. We don't know what those are yet. I don't think we've seen that set of, as Dan calls them, preconditions. Sort of there are so many pieces that need to be put in place. And the time horizon or the window of opportunity here, I think, is relatively short, or the table needs to be reset because with every passing day, Hamas is reconstituting themselves and consolidating their own control and are the only gun to use the I don't mean the only physical gun, but like they're the only power. And as long as Israel continues to conduct the mostly aerial light ground operations, right? The counterterrorism type operations that they are continuing to conduct amidst the ceasefire, there still is this external force that is challenging and harming the lives of your everyday Gazans. So it's sort of a choice of two, two bad options right now, and we have to see the third better one emerge in order for any of the things that Dan has talked about to take hold. That said, you know, we've come up with a long list of things that are really hard, and yet the Trump team is trying. So maybe uh maybe there's reason to hope.

Neri: 59:02

They are trying. Uh, they are optimistic. Uh, they said last Thursday, I think it was uh Nikolai Mladenov said that, you know, one of the things in terms of immediate action items is we're gonna start negotiations with the armed factions, with Hamas and Islamic jihad and the and the like inside Gaza in terms of this process of disarmament. Uh but again, like we've been talking about for now almost an hour, uh, it has to go hand in hand with all the other things that the new civilian government in Gaza is trying to do, the regional international environment. Uh I mean, again, you can start negotiations with Hamas, but you know, what's actually happening on the ground? Both incentives and disincentives um for these groups. Uh it'll be a heavy, heavy lift. Uh, I don't think I'm speaking out of school when I say that uh Israel is wholly unconvinced and pessimistic it will ever work. But uh the Trump people, and by the way, not just the Trump people, it's the Board of Peace in all these countries, including by the way, Qatar and Turkey and Egypt and the UAE and others, uh, who are going to try to convince Hamas uh to start down this path. But um remains to be seen. I'm sure we'll have a lot of time to to discuss it in in the months ahead. Uh the last issue I wanted to uh uh raise, and it's uh a big one, and it's the one on everyone's minds, uh Iran. So uh again, just a reminder, we're recording this Tuesday evening Tel Aviv time. Uh I mean, President Trump is giving a State of the Union address uh in just a few hours. Uh Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is supposed to be here at Israel Wednesday and into Thursday. Uh and then on Thursday, Whitkop and Kushner are supposed to go to Geneva once again for this third round of negotiations with the Iranians. Um so is that essentially the the calendar for the coming for the coming days until the weekend? Uh and again, if something happens before then, we may just have to cut the this bit. But if the listeners and viewers are are actually watching and listening to us, then it means war has not erupted just yet. But I mean, first question uh to you, Rachel. I mean, how confident are we that I don't know, there's still scope for for diplomacy, that we could actually get, I don't know, want to say a deal, but to stave off a conflict. Um in other words, what do you think will happen?

Rachel: 1:01:20

Which is the question you could flip a coin on any given day and you have that much chance of being right. Um, you know, relative to the Gaza situation we've been talking about, where I think one of the Trump team's advantages is that they're willing and able to think creatively and try things and switch directions and all the sort of the flexibility that we've acknowledged. In the case of Iran, there's not all that much creative, like there aren't that many creative options. I think Trump has walked himself out on a ledge where, you know, some weeks ago when the protesters were in the street in Iran, he said, don't worry, help is on the way. And then there was this assumption that he would do something. And then I think Israel has different interests in further degrading Iran's nuclear program, further degrading their ballistic missile capabilities. And so, somewhere in there, in the conversation between Trump and Netanyahu and their respective teams, we've ended up back in negotiations with almost half of America's deployable military assets in the Middle East pointed at Iran. So it sort of feels like the Trump team is negotiating with a gun to the Iranian's head, literally, that many guns pointed at the country, ready to take off. But I don't think we've seen anything to suggest that Trump actually necessarily wants to strike. He's said himself, you know, if there's a deal, I'll take a deal. But if not, you know, you're gonna be sorry, which is relatively standard in the type of negotiation we've seen him do on any number of issues. It's like push, push, push, bully until you get what you want. But in this case, I think it's such a technical, complicated set of issues. And you have a regime who is not just gonna walk out the door with a tail behind their legs. They're not just gonna say, okay, we'll capitulate and give you everything you want. I think they um are crafty. And I'm not sure that the level of um command over the details and the history and the technicalities on the Trump team matches the Iranian team. So I worry that even if they're able to get a deal, it's not gonna be a very good deal. It'll be a deal good enough for President Trump to say, hey, I struck a deal, I ended their nuclear program, which by the way, he said he did in July. So there's had to be some rhetorical backtracking of actually, we didn't obliterate it. There's more to get rid of. And I don't think whatever deal that Americans are able to get is gonna be sufficient for the Israelis. So you may end up with a situation where Trump is touting this deal that Netanyahu says, hold on, that is not what we signed up for and not what's good enough. I could also see a scenario where you get close enough to a deal that Trump is able to say, this isn't good enough. We're gonna walk away and conduct limited strikes and therefore goes after Trump's nuclear program and not everything else, or Trump's nuclear, I'm sorry, Iran's nuclear program, Iran's nuclear program and not everything else, or Iran's nuclear program and symbolistic missile capabilities and hopes that it is as limited a contain and contained a situation as was the case in July. But I think we're far past that. And I I my concern is if Trump strikes anything, the potential for this to spiral out of control uh is extremely high. And I am not confident that the current American government either can handle another regional war or um is skilled enough to walk us back if things do start to escalate.

Neri: 1:04:53

Dan, uh you live here like I do. Uh this has been uh the worst national sport over the past two months. You know, when is the war coming? Is it this weekend? What's happening? I mean, just complete domination of not just the media, but every conversation. Quite tedious, in fact. But uh what's your your best analysis and best guess as to where we're headed on the Iran front?

Dan: 1:05:17

I think we're headed into a clash. I hope not. I hope this can be resolved diplomatically, but I don't think it can. Interestingly, I think Trump is slightly a victim of its own success. Uh I think he I believe resolved eight conflicts, most of which I know very little about. But uh, at least on Gaza, you know, a 20-point plan and and especially you know, the captive release, partial withdrawal, uh, and you know, humanitarian and uh uh humanitarian aid and the end at least of that war. Maybe war will resume or or a new war will break out in Gaza, but at least that phase has ended at least at least in Trump's mind. But phase one was you know, the sides were very ripe for it. Both Israel and Hamas for different reasons, we won't analyze them here, were ready. But now, both in Gaza and in Iran, Trump is running into non-negotiables, right? Protected values for all intents or purposes, you know, enrichment and missiles, and to a certain extent, proxies are protected values of the regime there. Existential for the Iranian regime. Absolutely. But I mean, uh but they're more than just like, you know, pieces on a board of some geostrategic or grand strategy thing. Protected values dive deeply to the core of your identity, and they are non-negotiables. Same thing with the arms of Hamas and the same thing with what Israel perceives as its own security interest on its immediate borders, including in Gaza. And over there, Trump is now wrestling, and Steve Whitkoff, uh, God bless him. For all his excellent work thus far, actually verbalized it, I think, a couple of days ago, that when he says that Trump doesn't understand how, or the president doesn't understand how the Iranians are not capitulating faced with all the weapons that Rachel just uh laid out uh to them.

Neri: 1:07:21

He he gave voice to the surprise in the American mind. How come these guys are not actually not just capitulating, but why not why aren't we getting more from them at the negotiation?

Dan: 1:07:30

Because they don't know something are non-negotiables, and you have to work hard in order to reinterpret right what it means when people hold some truth to be, you know, so fundamental. Uh self-evident. Yes, absolutely. To them.

Rachel: 1:07:48

I think there's also you have multiple different interests at the same negotiating table. And not only, I I really like Dan your um description of these non-negotiables for the regime, and then you have the Iranian people who have been terrorized by their own government for the past many years, but particularly over the last few months. And you have a fairly vocal Iranian diaspora, at least in the United States, saying, please, president, you have to attack, you have to get rid of this regime. You have the president who probably wants to hit their nuclear program, maybe the ballistic missile program, like wants to show something for everything he's said and done so far. You have the Israelis who, in my assessment, want to go whole hog and take out the regime. And the deal that is being negotiated right now is somehow supposed to satisfy all of these things. And then Trump has his own political dynamics at home, where there's one element of the Republican Party who's saying, go after Iran, they're the root of all international evil. Another who's saying, why are you focusing your energy and money on all of these foreign adventures? What about your focus on domestic issues back home? So it's not, it's a very um, it's a very complicated situation that has, I think, broader implications than the situation in Gaza and between Gaza and Hamas and Israel. For as complicated as that is on the ground, I think philosophically and politically, Iran is just a bigger, more global challenge.

Neri: 1:09:12

And can carry actual costs to America directly, i.e., the servicemen and women who are in the region right now, uh, in any event, and that that's something Trump and the American people obviously care deeply about, as as they should. Um I I mean, I've talked about this for nearly two months uh on this podcast and well, off this podcast. Uh I'll just say that my thinking on what may happen uh shifts quite regularly, but I still think, like Dan said, we're headed for a clash. I don't think the negotiations, if they happen on Thursday, will actually yield something that Trump can agree to or can at least sell uh first to himself and then to the American public. And then you run into a second issue, which is yes, there is an idea of okay, limited strikes and then returns or negotiations, but I think the pros in the Pentagon will tell them, you know, once you once you kind of start this process, you may as well go uh whole hog and go in heavy because uh the Iranians will will fire back and it's gonna escalate anyway. So you may as well get the big first shot in. Uh and then as uh Raz Simit told me last week. I mean, the sense here is that whole hog and uh a heavy hit could could involve uh decapitation or attempted decapitation of the regime and uh you know everything that that may bring on. So yeah, I I I'm still uh of the view that a conflict is is uh more likely than not, uh, with the caveat that it rests still on the decision of what of one man of one man. Donald J.

Rachel: 1:10:47

One man who has yet to articulate what the strategic objective is and what happens afterwards, right? You go whole hog and you can decapitate the regime, and then what? And that is where I have the least confidence that there is a plan. But I'm just an observer.

Neri: 1:11:01

And and again, we're recording this, like I said, a few hours before the State of the Union, presumably given the stakes of what he's about to engage in once again in the Middle East, i.e., a war, uh, he will articulate what his objectives are and what his plan is to the American people and the world.

Rachel: 1:11:19

Um not holding my breath.

Neri: 1:11:21

We can only hope.

Dan: 1:11:23

Well, uh actually, I I read somewhere that uh Secretary Rubio is actually going on the hill to brief congressional leaders on this. Uh, I think it it'll be not an open um, you know. Briefing. Uh, but actually, Rubio, I think, has been the one that's been best at translating Trump's instincts, intuition, and inclinations into a semi-coherent strategy uh that sort of at least makes sense on you know geopolitical terms. Let's see how that unfolds.

Rachel: 1:11:55

I also keep thinking about how much Trump loves symbolism, right? And some of the, you know, there's an element of showmanship to what he does and even the timing of things, I think. And this game, too. Uh Neri, I've been playing for months, like, oh, well, this thing coming up, maybe that's when I want to strike, or maybe it's after this or that date. And I will admit, I keep thinking back to the first Gulf War. And as a child, then, you know, I was here in the United States, the TV screens of war only showed the green night vision um scuds falling, basically. But the juxtaposition of watching that on TV and scuds falling on Israel, and then seeing pictures of my relatives and friends in Israel using gas masks as part of their perm costumes.

Neri: 1:12:38

Huh.

Rachel: 1:12:39

I know nothing about what will come, but I do also keep looking at the calendar and thinking what are the potential dates that Trump might want to hang this historic victory on. Uh, and I can't help but think of that next week.

Neri: 1:12:52

Purim. The Jewish festival of Purim. Yeah. I don't know if Trump is is the the greatest student of Jewish uh Jewish tradition. I uh look, I I think all cutting aside, yes, uh I think this has to happen sooner rather than later because you can't keep this level of naval and air assets in the Middle East indefinitely, right? So there is a there is a kind of deadline for it, number one. Number two, I forget if it was you, Rachel, or Dan, you know, he's holding a gun to the Iranian's head. He's also uh metaphorically holding a gun to his own head because he's you know, he's made all these promises publicly, right? And climbed up this very high tree to use a Middle East term, um and deployed this level of force that he's almost um I don't want to say committed because he can always backtrack and sell it, right? He he can sell anything, but he's almost committed, almost fully committed to to doing something if he doesn't get what he wants from the Iranians.

Rachel: 1:13:49

Yeah, there's gotta be a hell of a good deal for him to turn around all those planes and carriers and just back out gracefully.

Neri: 1:13:57

Yeah, yeah. But uh but again, our listeners and viewers will be a lot smarter than we are, and we may have to cut this entire segment if uh Donald Trump surprises us yet again. Um but Rachel, Dan, thank you so much for your time. This was a great conversation about Gaza and towards the end about Iran, but uh we'll see if that makes it into this episode. Uh so hope to see you guys and speak to you again soon.

Rachel: 1:14:21

Thanks very much.

Neri: 1:14:22

Thank you, Nair, Rachel. Thanks again to Rachel Brandenburg and Dan Rottim for their generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening and please, please subscribe and spread the word.