Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We're going to take a deep dive today into wartime Iran with one of the best analysts out there on the issue, Garrett Nada. Garrett is an expert on Iran and its various proxy groups and is currently a policy fellow at Israel Policy Forum and a member of the Advisory Council of the Sage Institute for Foreign Affairs in Virginia. Garrett was for over a decade an analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he was managing editor of the Iran Primer website, an essential resource for all who do it, as well as the Islamists website. This conversation did not disappoint, believe me. I asked Garrett who is actually running the Islamic Republic right now. What are they likely thinking and feeling in the midst of this massive US and Israeli offensive? And the question on everyone's mind, how will this all end? All right, let's get into it. Hi, Garrett. Welcome to the Digital Policy Pod. Thank you for having me. Uh it's my pleasure, Garrett. Uh, we were just talking offline before we started recording. Uh, there are very few proper actual Iran experts out there, um, at least good ones. Uh, and so we wanted one as yourself to come on this week to answer a whole host of questions that a lot of people, including myself, have about the ongoing war, uh, what we may be expecting in the days, maybe weeks ahead, uh, and also uh what Iran may look like on the other side of however this ends. Um, so it's great to have you on. And also, by the way, welcome to the IPF family. Uh, that's a recent development. So we're happy to have you. Um, and a lot to get through on this episode, but I really want to start with the more immediate developments and then kind of zoom out uh and look at the big picture strategic questions uh on everyone's minds vis-a-vis Iran. So, first issue, Garrett, uh the most obvious, uh the most recent. Uh late Monday, early Tuesday, um, Israeli airstrikes killed a major figure in the Iranian regime, Ali Larijani, who was the head of the Supreme National Security Council, I believe. Uh, some even called them the de facto leader of Iran, since the Supreme Leader Ali Khamani uh was killed in the opening strike of the war. Um, that may be true about Larijani being the de facto leader. I'd love to get your thoughts on that. But that same night, Israel uh also killed uh two top commanders in the powerful Bestige paramilitary group. So, with all that said, uh how important were these figures uh really inside their Islamic Republic, inside the system in Iran, uh, and how big of an impact, if at all, will their uh early passing have on developments?

Garrett 3:01

Uh I would first say that one of the most surreal things about observing this war happen in real time is uh such a long list of individuals that I've been monitoring, um, profiling for so many years are now gone, um, or at least uh taken off the battlefield, so to speak. So Arla uh this regime, of course, is built uh to withstand um shocks and changes in leadership. You know, you've got overlapping structures, um, a lot of seasoned bureaucrats that are often doing things without the left hand knowing what the right hand is doing. The loss of Larajani is on a different level, though. He was definitely probably the most important civilian leader at the time of his assassination. He's been a longtime insider, was a former advisor to the Supreme Leader, head of the Supreme National Security Council, as you mentioned, former Speaker of Parliament, a former IRGC commander. And he was one of the few individuals at the top level of the regime that really had the ability to reach across the internal factions, including the more pragmatic wing of the Islamic Republic, which would include, for example, former President Hassan Rahani, foreign minister Zarif, and others that he sort of had a de facto alliance with when he was um uh heading parliament. Most people, most analysts agree that he would have been the person most likely to have been able to push through some sort of diplomatic off-ramp, should one be offered and to be you know amicable for both sides, uh, being his uh his position as a long-term interlocutor between these different groups that he could have you know gotten the ducks in a row. Um, with his assassination, it's really, really not clear who uh who would be able to pull enough of those strings and know which levers to sort of pull on to get something um done. Because of course, all wars eventually end with diplomats to a certain extent. Um, all wars are political, even if uh the kinetic uh military uh objectives have already been met. Uh the second person who was taken out, Khulam Resa Soleimani, I would say much less important for the strategic outlook of Iran, the head of the Besiege uh paramilitary since 2019. And in that sense, he definitely directed several of the bloodiest crackdowns on Iranian protests uh over the years that have happened sporadically. Um, not necessarily somebody who is known for being particularly sharp or that deep of a strategic thinker. Of course, he was a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and had sort of checked off a lot of the boxes, as with a lot of the members of the Beth Siege. You know, they were able to, he was able to climb the ranks. And some of it had to do with personal relationships and being in the right places at the right time over the course of uh, you know, the Islamic Republic's uh military history.

Who Is Running Iran Now

Neri 5:40

Really good, comprehensive answer, Garrett. Uh, this is why we wanted you on to cut right to the chase. And yeah, I mean, I spoke to someone earlier today who a few years ago had met with Larajani, had negotiated various things with Larajani or attempted to, and he basically said this was the brain of the Islamic Republic. I mean, really, kind of like you said, on a different level, uh, really had his hands behind everything, a real very bright, smart, strategic thinker. That's the way it was put to me. So uh I'm curious, there's no one that can fill his shoes. So then it begs the question: who's actually running the show uh in Iran right now? Who's actually running this war? And, you know, to the extent that we can know these things, how are they running the country? How are they running the war now 19 days into this?

Garrett 6:27

So one of the things that uh the Iranians had sort of talked about even in advance of the war is that they had this sort of um mosaic doctrine that they've been talking about and has been on the shelf for a while. The idea being that if there is uh a breakout of a significant, you know, uh war in this sort of case, that the provincial IRGC commanders would have quite a bit of latitude to act independently. So if there was a shock to the leadership, that you know, the the country's security apparatus wouldn't be crippled. So there's there's that aspect that it's still unclear to what extent uh local commanders have um, you know, uh jurisdiction to decide uh what the pace of uh firing, what targets, that that sort of thing. I would say the first round uh the first sort of like day or two of the strikes looked relatively pre-programmed. And if you if you like take a look at some of the graphs put out, whether it's by the UAE or others, and if you kind of amalgamate the data, it does seem that there seems to be a more of a strategic sort of uh pacing of of the ballistic missiles at least um over the last week or so, suggesting that they that at least somebody in the central command understands sort of what's left in the stockpile and what's possible, and they don't want to necessarily blow their their wad at once at this point. So, in terms of who's probably left and has the most influence that's running the country right now, I would point to uh the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Bagar Khalibaf, former IRGC aerospace commander, former national police commander, former mayor of Tehran, also um sort of a talented politico in terms of being able to talk to different factions, not necessarily the most hard line of the hard line, but with the credentials that he can sort of uh talk to that uh uh aspect of the that faction in the regime. Uh another important individual is uh General Mussan Rizoy, um, in some ways, almost a another half generation older than Kalibah, for example. So sort of a giant of the IRGC, a former IRGC chief, also with experience for the Iran-Iraq war. Uh, he's been tapped to be a military advisor to Mujtaba Khomenei and sort of was brought out of like quasi-retirement. He's often known as like the perennial like presidential candidate that couldn't. Um, and so at one point sort of tried to rebrand himself, you know, wearing wearing a jacket and that sort of thing. But at his core, he's a former IRGC chief. Third individual uh to watch is Ahmed Vahidi, the current head of the IRGC, um, who stepped in after his predecessor was assassinated. Uh he's a hardliner, perhaps more so than the previous two individuals that I mentioned. Um, he served as deputy chief of the IRGC before, he's defense, interior minister, um, involvement in the intelligence as well. Um, and so this is somebody that's known to be very a very capable um manager on the back end as well. So those are the three individuals that I would say are are very key at the moment. You know, President Pizeshkian not really having much of an impact, I would say, on the day-to-day strategy of uh of running uh the war effort right now.

Neri 9:27

And we're gonna get to Mujdeba Hamenei, uh, the new supreme leader, at least nominally, uh, in just a just a moment, trust me. But uh, Garrett, the second part of my question, right? So those individuals um and their various backgrounds, notwithstanding, how do you think they're actually managing this campaign? If, like you said, there is some semblance of a strategic direction, decision-making being taken place, um, messaging as well, both internally and to the outside world. Again, to the extent that we can know this, how do you think they're actually doing this and coordinating a unified message?

Garrett 10:01

Yeah, I I think so far they have managed to maintain a coherent message uh through uh the military statements, through the foreign ministry. There seems to be quite a bit of discipline. I'd say the one hiccup was when Pizeshkian seemed to get out in front of his maybe superiors, you could say, and sort of uh sort of giving a back-handed apology to the Gulf nations um for the attacks that had happened. But other than that, they've been relatively disciplined, I would say. And in terms of the the pacing of uh launches of drones and missiles also uh seem to have fallen in line with some sort of strategy. So the message that they've been able to project, I think, is one of continuity and one of stability. And it seems to be relatively convincing. Um, there doesn't seem to be um, you know, any high levels of domestic uh, you know, unrest. Um, yeah, you know, Iran was already, especially Tehran and some of the major cities, were already facing, you know, sort of rolling like power outages on occasion and other things. It's tough to know exactly what how things feel on a day-to-day basis for your average um, you know, middle class or working class citizen because of the internet outage. But the stories that have come out, it sounds like people are, you know, obviously scared and are are holding up, but you don't really have a sense of, well, there's no drinking water, uh, there's no food in the stores. We're not really at that level yet. And in some ways, that's not surprising because of what this uh regime has already weathered over the past uh four and a half, five decades. Uh, keep in mind that some of the people that are in top levels of leadership uh were also in top levels of leadership during the Iran-Iraq war, you know, an eight-year war, much bloodier. Uh, the economy uh, you know, looked was really on a on a war front uh a war economy on a war front and not in the way that it is now. I mean, obviously we're we're only a couple weeks into this, so it's not gonna look like that. But, you know, um people in Iran have long memories and remember, you know, having coupons um to get basic goods. And uh you just don't have a sense that the regime is at that point yet, and you don't really have a sense that they're flailing uh either. They seem maybe not happy about the strategic place that they're in, but they seem relatively comfortable uh where they are, you know, using their asymmetric capabilities and honestly doing a lot of the things that they've uh talked a good game about for a long time.

The Fate of the New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei

Neri 12:16

So hold that thought. I want to get your assessment of how the Iranians think they're doing uh now, well into the third week of this of this war. But uh I wanted to touch on uh Mustaba Khamenei, uh obviously the 56-year-old son of the previous Supreme Leader, uh Ali Khamenei. Uh Mustaba is believed to have been injured in the initial decapitation strike uh that killed his father and dozens of other senior uh Islamic Republic figures. Um Mushtaba was appointed the new Supreme Leader. Uh and yet we haven't seen him in public. We haven't heard his voice or seen him issue a statement in his own voice yet. So what do you think is his fate currently or his condition currently? Um, you know, can can someone like this who arguably is injured actually be running things?

Garrett 13:06

Yeah. Um, I mean, hard to say without any certainty. You would assume that um the reason why he hasn't appeared um publicly or at least given an audio statement, uh, you know, suggests that he was injured to the extent that, you know, it wouldn't be palatable for him to appear on camera, at least, given that he doesn't have much of a public profile. There isn't there is no single like video of him giving a public speech. Um, this is the average Iranian citizen does not know what his voice sounds like. And so it could be a set uh a case that the regime wants to save his grand introduction uh for when the security conditions are ripe and when maybe he looks uh camera ready. Uh that that might be as simple as that. It could also be that he's injured to the point where he's sort of bedridden and isn't really necessarily in the mind to be, you know, guiding things. But even if he was, this is not somebody that's necessarily known for being a strategic thinker or of having that sort of level of responsibility. Um, the assumption is that he's a capable manager and was doing a lot of the behind-the-scenes uh operations for uh the office of the supreme leader, which is its own sort of um economic and political um you know institution, alongside that of the IRGC, of course. Uh, but you know, doesn't really have that strong of an individual profile. The assumption is that he was groomed by IRGC commanders and not the other way around. So in that sense, his uh not being really present on the scene, I don't think really matters in the short term in terms of how the the war strategy is being uh executed. Um, because I don't think he would have been one who would have much to say on on setting like you know day-to-day strategy uh in in that sense, and probably would be listening to the advisors around him uh anyway.

Neri 14:57

And uh in the parlor game that is uh coverage and analysis of this war, do you think uh he's severely injured, you know, in his legs? Is he disfigured in his face? I mean, what do you think personally?

Garrett 15:11

How about it guys? If I had to guess, uh if I had to guess, I I would think it would probably might have something to do with his face for the simple reason that he that he hasn't um been uh on camera.

Neri 15:21

So Okay. Fair fair enough. Um and final question, Garrett, about the regime structure and the regime system, especially now in the midst of this war. Uh one thing that struck me earlier was you know talking about Larajiani as uh somewhat of a pragmatist or able to kind of straddle this line between uh more hardliners inside the system versus uh more pragmatic thinkers inside the system. Is is that still operative when we look at Iran today and when we try to understand Iran today? Because if they were really pragmatic, how did they get into this position fighting both the US and Israel?

Garrett 16:02

Yeah. So I think the voices in the more pragmatic camp, and I use the word pragmatic because the word moderate is even more divisive, and we can debate about that. Um but uh your Hassan Brahani, former foreign minister Zarif types have been marginalized for years at this point. Um, they were really sort of discredited with first with uh President Trump pulling out of the JCPOA during you know his first um term. Um but ever since, um, basically, uh, because of how things have gone since October 7th, uh, a lot of the rhetoric um coming from the Moore Heidlarder camp and from the former Supreme Leader himself, Khamenei, has sort of proven that narrative correct. Um, you know, whether it's to talk about regime change or wanting to, or you know, flirting with the idea of um, you know, supporting, you know, the Kurds and the idea of breaking Iran up and separatism and sort of feeding into all the very real paranoia of the regime, uh, has all sort of bolstered the most hard line of the hard line of narratives about what the Islamic Republic needs to do and and what the United States is interested in doing to Iran. So, yes, those voices have been marginalized, but you know, Iran is like it, it's it's not North Korea in that sense. And that even in their elections, which are neither free nor fair, they still were competitive to a certain extent, at least in the in the sense of there being, you know, a voting mechanism and the public having debates. And, you know, there still are some newspapers that publish a variety of opinions, um, not as wide as even maybe 20 years ago when things were allowed, but you still see a fair amount of debate, and some of these more pragmatic voices were still out there making public statements and did represent a constituency within the regime, uh, for sure. Now I would say post Khamenei's assassination and the rise of Mojtaba, we're in a very different ballgame. If the New York Times uh piece on sort of the Game of Thrones uh, you know, uh getting the game, for lack of a better word, that happened, the horse trading, whatever you want to call it, that happened behind the scenes that led to Mojtaba getting the job, suggests that Laurajani, Rouhani, and some of these others were on the other side and would have backed either, you know, Rouhani or maybe even the grandson of the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Rukhala Khomeini, Hassan Khomeini, uh, who's even, you know, um, you know, he's considered to be more closely aligned with the reformists, not just pragmatists in that sense, um, and perhaps could have had, you know, between the name recognition and everything else, may have wanted to push the country in a in a different direction or at least a slightly different direction. Um, but now that Molstaba is in, which really means the IRGC is firmly in the driver's seat, I would argue they were already in the driver's seat, but I would now say there's not, you know, there's the backseat drivers of the pragmatists have even like less voice than they used to. Um, so I do think something has has tangibly uh shifted. And because of not having Laura Johnny there to sort of amplify some of those voices and and give some credence to some of those other arguments, it's really tough to see uh who would be able to sell any sort of an off-ramp um at this point. Arachji is a very capable uh diplomat, for example. Um, the current foreign minister is sort of kind of hard to know exactly where he sort of sits. You know, some people consider him more or less a protege of of Zarif and that sort of thing. But he's not necessarily, you know, he's not gonna be playing that role given his position as foreign minister. He's executing a policy, not necessarily making it and more of a conduit rather than um somebody that's gonna be behind the scenes and you know whipping the votes um at the Supreme National Security Council.

Neri 19:38

Playing the uh the high-level game of thrones inside the system. Um, by the way, just for our listeners and viewers, uh I forgot to mention this earlier, IRGC, obviously the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, uh and JCPOA was uh the technical name for the nuclear deal signed by uh former President Barack Obama with Iran back in 2015, and Donald Trump uh famously withdrew from in 2019.

Garrett 20:03

2018, I believe. Yes. All blending together at this point. You know, the the the the joke in Iranian politics is that the the withdrawal, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA uh actually broke Iran's domestic politics, more so than Trump sort of broke US domestic politics in that sense, maybe in other ways, but in terms of that, because it um the JCPOA was you know a political football in both countries. But in Iran, where you had you know a whole political camp that really could sort of staked its legacy on that deal, and then for it to collapse um really undermined their credibility, and that you know led to a lot of other uh uh knock-on effects. Yeah, knock-on effects and uh evolving the regime with you know certain people getting higher up on the totem pole and and lower.

How the Iranian Regime Assesses the Current Moment

Neri 20:47

Yeah, uh the more pragmatic or moderate or reformist wing of the Islamic Republic and the regime staked a lot on that deal. Uh and when it didn't deliver like they had promised, the the country and and really the government um for a variety of reasons, uh they they took the hit. Um so consolidation by the hardliners. We're now into the third week of this of this war. Uh, I wanted to zoom out a little bit, Garrett, uh, and look at the big picture. And you alluded to it earlier. How does the regime or what remains of it um understand its situation uh in the midst of all this? So just before we started recording, uh there was a suspected Israeli strike on a massive Iranian offshore gas field uh called South Pars. Uh now Iran is threatening to retaliate against Gulf Arab energy facilities. So um, as we speak, escalation may be in the offing, uh, even 19 days into this. But uh, even beforehand, uh, kind of on one side of the ledger, Iran was getting pounded by uh US and Israeli uh airstrikes, taking out all manner of military facilities, command centers, air defenses, missiles, navy, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Um As we were talking about earlier, leadership has been getting targeted as well from the very top to now lower levels on the ground, like the Besiege. Israel and the US are threatening that more is on the offing. On the other side of the ledger, Iran, to their credit, has made this very, very messy and very widespread all across the Middle East. Iran is still firing, not only at Israel, as was the case, what, an hour ago here on Tel Aviv, but also against the Gulf Arabs and beyond. And most critically, Iran has been able to effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, the critical waterway uh in the Gulf, in the Persian Gulf, and they're uh holding the global economy hostage. Uh, I think uh uh there's no way to kind of under understate it. So uh a mixed bag, I think, as far as Iran is concerned, but how do you assess that they assess their doing?

Garrett 22:58

Yeah. Um, I would say that the Iranians are relatively comfortable with where they are at the moment. They feel that they have uh the strategic patience to wait this out. Um, they think that the president, uh I mean, you can even see in the in the sort of like uh, you know, backhanded appeals to even the US domestic audience in the tweets of the foreign minister and Larajani before he was assassinated, is sort of like, you know, pointing to gas prices and, you know, even US domestic politics and you know, kind of alluding to the idea that um the president, you know, may not be able to keep this up on a the President Trump may not be able to keep this up forever in that sense. So they've employed a lot of the asymmetric capabilities that we would have assumed. I think there's still room for escalation, and I think that's part of the tough part about determining what the direction of this conflict is going to be, because the three principal actors, Israel, the United States, and Iran, all have the ability to up um uh to go further up on the escalation ladder, regardless of what the other side does. So we mentioned, you know, the hitting of South Pars of natural gas facility. That's like one way you could run up the ladder, uh, both on the Israel and the US side. I think like the US on the US, there's also you know been talk about whether or not, you know, uh the possibility of seizing Harg Island, which would be the more downstream, you know, getting the actual gas and oil out of Iran as opposed to the facilities that are this is the critical island, uh that basically what 90 plus percent of all Iranian oil and gas runs through for export. Right. Yeah. And so there were we already saw a US attack on the bit of military infrastructure that was there. Uh there seemed to be, you know, a concerted US effort to not really touch the energy infrastructure. You know, the assumption being that the idea is that if the United States is not interested in breaking the country, that, you know, if something, some different regime were to come in in the future, you know, we would want the ability, we would want that oil and that gas to flow for international markets and everything else. Um, or you could think more to the Venezuela model if we're still talking about that. So on the so energy infrastructure is one way the escalation ladder could go up for both the US and the Israelis. On the Iranian side, they may still have some cards to play that would um cause significant headaches. You know, there's been a lot of talk about um their ability to mine the strait in the past week or so. Iran has a lot of mines uh in its stock, and it ranges from sort of you know, your your dumb or your stupid mines that have been around since you know the 80s and even before then, um, that you sort of drop in the water, and if they get you know bumped, you know, they they explode. And so uh then they have smarter ones that are able, you know, with more with electronics and things that are that are more sophisticated. But point being, this isn't a very difficult thing for them to do. Uh, even if most of their larger naval vessels have been sunk, you know, it's not out of the realm of possibility to put two, three, four, depending on what type of mine, on some of these fast patrol boats, um, even fishing boats, and simply drop them in the water. And um, you know, it wouldn't take a lot of them to necessarily, you know, it wouldn't be something that the US couldn't take care of. The US like has, you know, way better technological capabilities than we did, you know, with uh than during the Iran Iraq war um with the mining issues there. Um, you know, we basically have these surface vehicles that are basically like drones in the water that can take care of some of this stuff, but it's still time, it's effort, it's resources, and things that could definitely scare off insurers and shippers um with relatively minimal effort from the Iranian side. And I just um want to also make clear that, and I'm glad we're having this conversation because, you know, watching a lot of the talking heads on the cable news networks would, you know, suggest that the strait is closed. Well, it's not exactly closed. It's not, this is not like an on and off switch necessarily by all the reporting from uh various uh private sector companies that sort of uh follow some of the tankers with satellite imagery and with uh other ways of uh open source tracking. It seems that Iran is still able to get a fair amount of its oil out um to China and it's you know been in talks with Turkey.

unknown 27:01

Yeah.

Garrett 27:02

Well, I was gonna say they're I think they're exporting more now than they were on the eve of the war. Yeah, it depends on on which set of numbers you're necessarily looking at. So it's either slightly, yeah, it's it's either very close, maybe even more, maybe slightly less, may depend on the day. Um, but they're definitely able to still get um some of their their goods uh out for sale. And then they've also been talking to Turkey and with uh other um regional actors and and those in Asia about, you know, maybe you know negotiating passage for certain vessels, you know, for those that really aren't quote unquote involved in in the war. So it's a more complicated picture that in terms of the strait simply uh being closed. And even once the US, you know, at some point when the military operations stop, it may not necessarily be the case that you know the Gulf nations are able to just resume commerce the way that they were. Um, this is yeah, it's not an on and off switch uh sort of situation.

Neri 27:53

So that is a fair point and a correct clarification. Um I guess I suppose closed to Gulf exports and US allies would be a better way to put it. Um as our mutual friend Nasan Rafati, uh, who has been on this pile a number of times, put it to me, I think last night. Um this is basically Iran sanctioning uh oil exports or energy exports out of the Persian Gulf. So it's Iran's version of a sanctions regime where they're they're allowing, like you said, uh their own exports, obviously, but also exports to India and Pakistan and countries that they that they wish to have this uh access out of the Strait of Hormuz, and the ones who they do not want uh to get access to, they do not allow.

Garrett 28:39

Right. And one other uh aspect of the import-export uh issue that um is sort of you know second or third concerns, especially from a US perspective, but very much you know, front of mind for for the Gulf, is that something like 90% of uh foodstuffs um are imported from the Gulf. You know, um the these nations are not able to survive on, you know, just desalinated water and dates and the and the couple other crops that that they grow. Um so you know, fresh produce and a lot of other things are gonna start to become scarce. You know, I remember when uh Qatar was sort of being blockaded by the rest of the Gulf countries, Iran was the one that came to their aid, you know, yogurt, milk, you know, refrigerated goods and that sort of thing. Uh so the Gulf is going to be feeling the the squeeze uh the deeper uh we get into this.

Neri 29:23

Yeah, I mean it's fair to say uh the Strait of Hormuz and the the control that Iran is still exerting on this very critical passageway um is is really uh what they they hope, I suppose, right, will eventually break Donald Trump and force him to back down and end this.

Garrett 29:43

Right. And in terms of the this sort of this idea of uh escalation dominance, there are still open questions as to what Iran still has in its stockpile of ballistic missiles. So Iran's um, you know, sort of toolbox of ballistic missiles include a very wide range of types. Some developed uh you know, derivatives of North Korean models, others that are more have more domestic and newer technology that have been applied. And there have there has been a little bit of evidence um with the deployment of a couple of uh the missiles that have uh warheads with cluster munitions that have been fired at Israel, for example. So there is an open question as to whether or not Iran has sort of strategically saved some its some of its more advanced missiles for you know later on in the conflict when interceptor stocks may be lower, when you know, uh even just you know humans that are manning, you know, the defenses are more taxed, where there's the idea that maybe one or two of these things might actually get through and maybe hit a strategic target. So that is uh another uh open question. Uh Iran doesn't have like true hypersonic missiles in the sense that the things that you know the United States and Map, maybe China are trying to develop, but their more advanced missiles supposedly um do have the ability to sort of have more maneuverability and would be potentially harder to shoot down, um cluster or not, but just in terms of maneuverability. So there are questions there.

Speaker 31:04

Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure Jewish democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic US policy towards the conflict, U.S. Israel relations, and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary, and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political, denominational, and generational spectrums. Our Young Professionals initiative, IPF Ateed, works to elevate the discourse among next generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at Israelpolicyforum.org and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes.

Further Escalation and Whether the Houthis Will Get Involved

Neri 32:04

And in terms of Iran's ability to escalate further, the proxy that hasn't barked yet, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, uh, they have not joined the fray. Uh his Hezbollah has joined the fray. Some of the Iraqi Shiite militias have joined the fray. The Houthis have not, as an expert uh also on Iran's proxy network. Are you surprised the Houthis have yet to bark?

Garrett 32:30

Yeah, I I'm not surprised uh in that sense, because I I don't really have a sense that the the the IRGC or the regime is really flailing or panicking yet. So they haven't necessarily pressed that button. I would also say that uh the Houthis are not exactly uh not I wouldn't I wouldn't really characterize them as a proxy necessarily. They're more of a partner. Um, they benefit from Iran's patronage, but they're definitely the most independent of all of uh the members of the so-called Axis resistance, if we can even say that the Axis exists anymore. Uh the Houthis have, you know, first of all, they're not 12 or Shiites, they're Zaydi and have their own sort of uh religious hierarchy and aren't beholden to the supreme leader the way that some of the Iraqi militias um and Hezbollah are like literally, you know, religiously sort of uh you know required to follow the dictates of the leadership uh out of Iran. Um the Houthis uh have their own domestic um constituency and also interests, you know, uh that depend on you know the balance of power with the other Yemeni factions, because the Houthis um don't control all of Yemen. Um that you know, that conflict is kind of hot and cold, and right now it's relatively like cold. And I think the Houthis would like to keep it that way at the moment. Um they were probably happy to see uh, you know, the uh conflict between the various factions backed by the Saudis and the Emiratis, which already seems like ancient history, but that happened within the last couple of months. So I'm not surprised that the Houthis haven't just jumped in necessarily at this point. And you know, they could also be biding their time or have been maybe perhaps trying to replenish their stocks. I don't think the Iranians are in the, you know, the mindset to be able to or the ability to be sending them missile components across the Gulf of the way that they were or through Oman and smuggling the way that they were, you know, even a month or two months ago. So I think the Houthis really need to like take a careful look at this and decide where you know they want to put their pieces. Um, and even so, like the relationship between them and Iran, it's not necessarily uh the sort of the type of relationship where Iran just says, you know, fire and they fire. Um it may be more of a conversation.

The Impact of U.S.-Israel Air Strikes and What Could Shift Iran's Calculus

Neri 34:35

Okay. Uh, but yes, it it's um I I think it not only in the Israeli context, right? Another another front uh that's firing missiles at you. So, you know, a personal and also uh well a national preoccupation uh in terms of more incoming missiles, but the Houthis' ability to actually uh shut down trade in a different uh uh strategic waterway, uh the Balamande of the Red Sea. So that could, you know, if if the world economy is already having trouble with uh the Strait of Hormuz, uh having difficulties, shall we say, in terms of access and movement, uh, I don't want to think uh how the markets will react if uh the Houthis start firing on shipping in the Red Sea. I'm turning now to the other side of the ledger. You a couple of times uh during the course of our conversation in recent minutes, uh have touted uh the uh Iranians not being all that uncomfortable. The Iranians are kind of okay with where they are two and a half, almost three weeks into this war. Um I mean, my first question, maybe it's uh an obvious question. Are they not at all perturbed by the massive bombing campaign that's been ongoing? I mean, by some metrics, this this air campaign that the US and Israel and Israeli Air Forces and also the Navy are waging, um, is the most intensive air campaign ever waged in the history of warfare, just in terms of the number of sorties, the number of munitions used, the number of strikes, targets. So is it not having an effect at all on both Iran kind of in practical terms and also Iranian thinking?

Garrett 36:14

Yeah, I mean, definitely has severely limited their ability to project power outside of their own borders. And now that we're seeing attacks on, you know, police, you know, facilities or but definitely uh besiege um, you know, bases and and facilities inside Iran, even their uh sort of domestic repression mechanism is definitely taking a beating as well. So it's definitely having a tangible impact. But I think the to go back to the perspective uh from the Iranian side, they feel that they are in a battle for their survival. This feels very existential. And so, given the rhetoric coming out of the White House and and and from Jerusalem as well, there is no off-ramp they're being offered. They don't appear to be um interested in sort of a ceasefire at the moment. Uh, the reporting is that um Mulchtaba's first sort of meeting with some of the, you know, the other advisors and other high-ranking officials was that the directive was we need to make the US and Israel bleed more or bring them to their knees, you know, before we think about, you know, any other sort of uh uh pathway at this point. So I think the Iranians feel like the US and Israel need to pay a heavier price before there's talk about this ending anytime soon. And so um, and the people that are doubling down on that, you know, uh are I would say, you know, the the more ideological part of the regime that see this as playing into a you know a decades, if not centuries long narrative about resistance and standing up to injustice and you know, you know, the latest incarnation of uh Satan on earth or however you want to feel it. So it there's a lot of different elements uh here in that sense from the Iranian perspective.

Neri 37:49

So both a strategic logic to actually extract more of a price from the US and Israel for for launching this war, and also an ideological and religious component that they're they're going to resist for for as long as necessary. And they take great pride in that fact. Okay. Right.

Garrett 38:07

And even in the event that things do de-escalate, I still think that there's the idea that like they are going to somehow want to have uh the last say, um, so the last missile salvo or something to show that they are in control of the timeline.

Neri 38:20

Yeah, I mean, as uh somebody who's covered endless wars with uh between the IDF and Hamas in Gaza uh before October 7th, and well, definitely before October 7th. Uh yes, the the last the last barrage and this elusive search in the Middle East for uh the victory picture on both sides, uh yes, that that is almost a given. But hold that thought. I want to talk about uh how this all uh may end or could end. But my follow-up question to uh kind of the Iranian side of of the ledger and and it facing uh both the US and Israeli military is okay, what would actually maybe move the needle in terms of the regime's thinking, the regime's capabilities, uh in terms of uh what the US and Israel uh could do. So maybe we got a taste of that uh what two hours ago with the strike on the South Pars uh gas field, but what do you think may move the needle uh in this campaign for um for the good side?

Garrett 39:19

Yeah, I would say, yeah, the more civilian infrastructure um and really, you know, going at the ability for the country to like sort of function and deliver basic services. Um so I would include energy infrastructure in that sense, not just you know, gas and uh and oil facilities, uh, but also power plants, um water treatment facilities. Um one of the things, you know, uh just looking at the calendar now, not just looking at you know when the midterms are and you know, and the you know, political machinations of of Netanyahu and his coalition, but also just in terms of uh seasons. Um Iran before this conflict has been going through you know uh very long drought and issues, decades uh long issues with environmental mismanagement and degradation. And uh so depending on how long this happens and how hot things get in the summer, like issues over water could come to a front, you know. I I I would say that, you know, we can get into what the future scenarios are going to look like, but regardless of where they are. Uh, there are a lot of issues that are not specific necessarily to the regime that any other government would inherit that could bubble up in the future in the environment, um, drinking water and a lot of things and pollution being another one. So if the economy is squeezed to the point where people are having trouble accessing electricity, food, and basics at the same time that the domestic repression um mechanism of the besiege and others are being, you know, targeted by the United States and Israel, you can start to see them being squeezed, and maybe the strategic uh thinking starting to shift. I think it would take sort of a while to turn that big ship around in that sense. And given that we're only a couple of weeks into this war, I think they could probably last a fair amount longer, depending on what the pace of uh escalation is on their end. And just going back to our previous like um conversation about escalation, the other thing that people are worried about in this in the security sphere here here in the US is the possibility that Iran could try to activate you know potential sleeper cells, either in the United States or in Europe or in other places, or you know, there's you know very documented evidence of them literally hiring, you know, Eastern European mafia types uh to carry out either kidnappings or attempted assassinations. So the Iranians have any number of you know uh unsavory cards that they could play if you know they're really panicking or want to sort of um you know get things moving uh in that sense that they haven't necessarily played yet. Or perhaps they have and things have already been foiled and we just don't know about it.

Neri 41:48

That's the uh another dog that has not yet barked, thankfully. Uh yes, uh Iran and also Hezbollah's ostensibly global terror network, uh, whether in Latin America, Asia, Europe, uh maybe even inside America. Perhaps we got a glimpse of that in Michigan uh last week, perhaps. But uh, but yes, that that has also been a long-running concern uh in any escalation with with Iran, uh terror attacks uh on foreign soil. So, you know, I almost don't want to apologize for putting you in this position, Garrett. You know, how how can the US and Israel squeeze Iran more to maybe kind of win this war? But if I understand you correctly, basically more pain uh and more kind of widespread targeting to actually cripple not just the Iranian military and the RRGC and their repressive organs, but also just cripple the country.

Scenarios For How and When This War Ends

Garrett 42:40

Right. And of course, part of this conversation comes back to what are the actual end goals of the United States? Is there something more than the military objectives that uh, you know, that sort of coalesced uh, you know, more than a couple days into the war in terms of taking out the Navy, nuclear capabilities, ability to support proxies, and of course the ballistic missile program. You could argue that there's been quite a bit of success on on those four counts. Um, of course, one of the biggest question marks is the nuclear program and the stockpile of the 60% enriched uranium. Um, so for you know, those that don't follow nuclear science, 60% enriched uranium uh has already gotten quite a bit there towards weapons grade or 90%. It doesn't take very much effort to get from 60 to 90. It takes quite a bit of effort to get from zero to 60, but not a lot to get from 60 to 90. And that stockpile, the status of it is still somewhat unknown. We know that a fair amount of it is under S-Fahan, could be accessible by the Iranians. We don't know if like the canisters are necessarily damaged or not. And so that's one of the talking points or one of the points of debate uh in the US, at least about what a potential ground operation could look like to either secure or um sort of like dismantle or neutralize uh that uranium on the ground and what would be needed there, either with Israeli or US commandos or both. And that would be another thing that would escalate the situation. Maybe not necessarily like on the battlefield in that sense, but you know, the chances for things going wrong or for things to be miscalculated uh would go up exponentially with that sort of a complex uh ground operation. And then there's also the question of the rest of the uranium that wasn't at that facility. What is the status of that? And what is the status of that after the war? And that depends on you know what the future uh uh configuration of this uh regime is if if it remains in power. I mean, that's a good transition.

Neri 44:26

So I I mean there's two questions really on everyone's mind. Um, I mean, the first one, maybe again the most obvious one, like how does this all end and and when does this all end? So what kind of scenarios are you looking at? I mean, we've talked about a glide path towards further escalation, but uh that's that's pretty clear. But how long can both sides keep that up for and and what would actually lead to de-escalation and a potential ceasefire or ceasing of fire?

Garrett 44:59

Right. So I I think part of it may depend on on markets, on where gas prices go. I was talking, I'm originally from California. I was talking to somebody who who saw you know near eight dollar prices in Los Angeles, you know, a day or two ago. And so uh part of this may depend on what the domestic sort of patience is uh to see this uh through. I think one of the likely scenarios is that at some point um President Trump may make a political calculation and declare, you know, victory. And they can make a credible, you know, argument to have uh completed most, if not all, of um sort of the military objectives that were listed with you know a bit of a question mark over the nuclear program, which of course, you know, the narrative was that it was obliterated in the last war in June of 2025. But you know, that aside, um, you know, the Navy, most of it has has been sunk. Ballistic missiles have either been used up or destroyed to a large extent. We don't know exactly how big the stockpile is. A lot of the drones have been used up. Now a lot of the targeting is shifted to the Iran's military infrastructure. So if they were to build back, it would take a lot more effort and a lot more time to do so, would also depend on China's, you know, um ability, willingness to um, you know, sell them dual-use components and get them the fuel to power the missiles and that sort of thing as well. Um, so in the event that Trump does declare victory at some point, sort of unilaterally, one scenario is that you have a rump regime or a weaker uh Islamic republic that is also more extreme and with less sort of options to build back any sort of uh conventional deterrence mechanisms. Um, and arguably with more incentive than ever to try to produce a nuclear weapon. By all accounts, uh the previous Supreme Leader, uh Ayatul Ali Khamenei, may have been one of the voices that was sort of a stop uh on that narrative that Iran really did need the ultimate deterrent. Um, you know, you don't really get to be uh uh uh that long-term of a ruler um by uh gambling. Um he was relatively risk-averse and and relatively predictable, I would argue, in in some cases. Except except for the last two and a half years after October 7th, for some reason. Yeah, but yeah, yeah.

Neri 47:10

All bets off within the last two years. No, no, he's he started like like it was, I think it was a a break, right? He started gambling more and more in these direct confrontations with Israel and culminating in February 28th.

Garrett 47:24

Yeah, I I would agree with that. But in terms of uh, you know, wanting to really liter in this case, literally press the nuclear button and want and wanting to go that way, I I think there there's a danger that um there would be more voices that and they would, you know, there have more credence now than ever to want to go in that direction. But there's that potential. Uh another scenario, and I don't like hard to even with the perfect intelligence, I don't think there'd be a way to know if something like this would be coming. And part of this will depend on how this war ends and how long it goes. Um, but you know, sort of a coup or a young officer takeover sort of scenario. You know, Iran's military is is large and it does uh include um, you know, young men that are doing mandatory military service. It isn't as if every member of the IRGC, and definitely not every member of the Artesh, the conventional military, are, you know, hardcore true believers in the revolutionary, you know, narrative and rhetoric. Um, there could be people um that are maybe have a more nationalist bent and maybe would want to put less emphasis on the Islamic narrative and and and mukawama and eternal you know resistance. And also maybe just to cut their losses. Mm-hmm. Yeah, just for pure self-preservation. Um, maybe even if they even if they have been drinking the regime Kool-Aid and do believe in that, they may say, you know, we've got people at the top that are driving drunk and we've got to cut them off. Um, because my, you know, my import-export business, you know, can't can't function. Um, or my patronage network is, you know, um, you know, hungry and and you know, uh, you know, need some perks. Um, so that that that's one potential scenario. The one thing, uh the couple things that I don't see are very likely, but still possible would be, you know, sort of regime collapse. And we just really haven't seen um serious cracks uh so far. Um so one thing to look out for, of course, you know, everybody's been hoping that there would be, you know, high profile defections, you know, either from the political class or from the military. Just haven't seen that. Uh the thing that's harder to detect, uh, but also perhaps even more significant would be, you know, how many people how many members of the security forces are sort of like slow quitting their positions or not showing up for work? Um, kind of tough now because you know, there's some reporting that some you know security forces are like maybe literally not being told to go to the barracks so they don't all get you know bombed. Um, and so you know, they may be hiding out in parking lots or schools or or other things of that sort of thing, um to sort of like cut their losses that way. But you know, at the at the lower mid or or lower level, if there are people that start to decide, you know, I'm gonna tell my guys to sit this one out or sort of start start to see some hedging. But you know, in order to see that sort of thing, you would probably need more time for things uh to play out. Uh another thing that could sort of escalate some cracks in the security sector would be if there is more domestic unrest. But of course, very hard, if not impossible, to see Iranians wanting to get out on the streets, you know, while there's live, you know, fire and and and bombs literally falling on major cities. But if you have a scenario in which, you know, things calm down and there's more domestic unrest, you know, what the proposition of the security forces shooting their own people, we've seen that tested in a lot of ways, especially, you know, in the protests that happened in January and December. But it's it's a little bit unclear in my mind from the reporting, there is conflicting reporting as to exactly which units were literally doing, you know, the mowing down with machine guns and snipers and that sort of thing. Because it's one thing for, you know, a unit of ethnic, you know, Persians or whatever um you know uh ethnicity to go into a Kurdish area and put down unrest or a baluc era area and do that sort of thing. It's a different sort of uh order if you have local besieged forces that are firing on people that could literally be members of their own extended family, um, cousins, you know, on cousins and that sort of thing. And I have a feeling from the reporting is that the regime might may have been a little bit nervous to test that prospect. And so some of the uh units that were responsible for doing the dirty work were sort of mobile ones that were going, you know, kind of like cross-country or at least cross-province. And so if uh there's there's a lot of ifs here, to be fair, but if the security forces are pressed from the air, from the United States, from Israel, and in other cases, and you know, are are being tasked to do things they're not used to doing in places that they haven't done things before, you know, there there could be more of a grind there. But again, could take time for for things like that to play out and would require a lot of other things to happen. Um, so the next round of mass protest, I think, is inevitable, but will depend on a lot of other factors, um, not which uh, you know, including the war.

Neri 52:10

So right, how the war ends and um whether it's even likely slash realistic to have mass protests in the middle of a bombing campaign.

Garrett 52:22

Right. Yeah. I mean, the average Iranian right now is basically focused on survival. I mean, I mean, just even before the the conflict, you know, the reports are showing, you know, the middle class increasingly unable to, you know, uh afford um, you know, eating like red meat or poultry. Um, you know, the the economy is really, really being hollowed out and people just have daily bread to worry about, uh, not necessarily, you know, um a vague political future, because of course the opposition is unorganized and mostly in prison. Um, hopefully still being some of these prisoners that could be, you know, part of something a bit more positive. It hopefully they survive this, you know, because there have been terrible reports about conditions inside the prisons uh and how things have um, you know, gone even more downhill since the war started.

Neri 53:05

So yeah, uh let's hope that the Israelis and the Americans had some kind of plan for those people in the prisons. Let's hope. Um I like the fact, Garrett, that we it took us 50 minutes, but we finally got to some positive news in terms of scenarios uh like palace coups and you know, a young officer coup and whatever, whatever it might be.

Garrett 53:26

Uh I I will say Iran does have one other thing going for it, is that unlike a place like Yemen, um, where you know the average household has any number of weapons, in Iran, the police state, I mean, unfortunately, has uh you know done a very good job of maintaining a monopoly of force and attaining a firearm in Iran is not an easy thing, sort of you know, being part of you know a cell that's gonna smuggle things in, or you know, by all accounts, drug smugglers have access to arms as well. Um, but you know, there are tribal hunters that have, you know, bolt action rifles to protect their flocks, but you know, Iran is not a place where you can, you know, walk into the Iranian equivalent of uh, you know, a Walmart or a gun show and get a semi-automatic rifle, unlike the United States. Uh and so be given that the population is not armed to that extent, the chance of a civil war, I feel like is much less likely. Um, there's been a lot of talk, uh, especially after uh the reporting on supposedly that the CIA and the President Trump was, you know, talking to Kurdish leaders and the possibility of Iraqi and Kurdish militias going into northwestern Iran to sort of be a ground force to foment unrest and that sort of thing. Um, but I would just caution people uh to remember that uh Iran, yeah, it it inherited an imperialist state, an empire, very grand empire, but also a very old one. And that even though these minorities have faced systematic repression, discrimination, lack of investment um for decades by the Islamic Republic, they also have been part of an Iranian or a Persian-led entity for a very long time. And the sort of these newer notions of um whether it's federalism or separatism or that sort of thing, those are relatively new ideas and they don't necessarily have um like a lot of popularity amongst the population that has stayed in the country as opposed to the opposition groups that are now operating on the other side of the border. So it isn't as if every ethnic Kurd in Iran is itching to break off and form its own Kurdish state. Um, then the same goes for the Arabs in the Southeast, you know, who happen to live like literally on top of a lot of the gas and oil, um, or the Baluch uh in the southeast as well. So I would just caution the idea that, you know, this uh this country could like fall apart, you know, very easily a couple weeks uh into this war.

Will Iran Agree If Trump Declares Victory

Neri 55:43

So bit of a digression, but no, no, it's an important digression. And yes, no matter what potential fever dreams uh some people may have cooked up, I think I think that's also important to to clarify. Uh it's it's likely not going to be kind of a the uh a separatist uprising in the provinces that go and march on the Capitol. Uh that's that's likely not in the cards. Um final question for you, Garrett, and it's something you did allude to earlier. If Donald Trump wakes up a week from now, and I should have mentioned we're recording this Wednesday afternoon, Tel Aviv time, uh, but in a week from now, next Wednesday, he's like, all right, I declare victory, I'm done. It's the the most devastating war ever, the most beautiful war ever, the greatest victory in the history of these United States. Um, will Iran agree?

Garrett 56:35

Yeah, heart hard to know. Um, I mean, one scenario that I could see is that uh they try to have the last word, you know, with the last, you know, um salvo of of missiles at at some targets, or um maybe even like you know, ones that are not considered very strategic so that they don't inadvertently like reset things, um, something to at least uh make it appear as though they have the last word. If it's that inconclusive in a sense, they may take that, um, betting on the idea that you know the president had this card to play and maybe uh used up a lot of his domestic credibility um and won't necessarily be able to do the same thing, at least in the near future, the next eight months, the next year or whatever it is. And uh, you know, uh the Iranians like, you know, have a reputation for you know playing chess or playing the long game, but I think we also have to keep in mind that you know they feel that they're you know their backs are against the walls. This is uh they feel like they're they're they're up against an existential threat. And so if the idea is that they might have a reprieve to rebuild, um, you know, they they they may take that kind of de facto uh off-ramp. That's definitely not their ideal. Um, they've actually been quite explicit, they've been more explicit than the Americans in some ways as to what they want, you know, the end of this conflict to look like, as unrealistic as it may be. But you know, they're still talking about wanting reparations for you know the economic damage. Um, they want guarantees that this won't happen again. Uh so you know, there's quite a bit of uh distance between how they would like the conflict to end and how it may end up ending. Um, but with no other alternative, it's kind of hard to see them wanting to just wanting to see things drip, drip, drip, um, you know, um, with with no end in sight. Um if the president's willing to stop shooting, they they they may take that, um, depending on what happens between now and and whenever that is, of course. So a lot of unknown.

Neri 58:29

Okay. So that's more optimistic than certain scenarios that I've heard that uh even if Trump wanted to end it, say, in a week or two, the Iranians would be uh again, for strategic reasons, to kind of uh increase the cost to America and the global economy for having done this, that they'll keep the straits quote unquote closed, that they'll they'll keep squeezing and dare the US and Israel to keep going in the face of, like you said, likely major domestic opposition.

Garrett 58:58

Yeah, and I can see that happening for a time while like sort of on the, you know, under under the table or more quietly, courting countries like Turkey, like India, and others to see what other sort of alternative mechanisms um they could sort of suss out. And if they are able to get to a point where they can export a certain amount and have a certain amount of traffic go through, yeah, then then you could see them, you know, wanting to bleed the United States and Israel uh for a longer period of time. But I I do wonder to what extent, you know, uh some of these other countries are gonna want to be playing along with that, um, especially if the US loses patience and basically says, you do business with Iran or you do business with us. Um, and especially given, you know, Turkey, a member of NATO and you know, and some of the other bigger geopolitical, you know, calculations there. I mean, I'm sure India is happy to be able to buy Russian oil for a limited period of time to sort of replenish some of its stocks, you know, maybe at a discount. But uh it's hard to to you know kind of game out how long some of these odd arrangements would last and also the will the willingness of other countries to potentially, you know, patrol or you know, escort like along with convoys and that sort of thing. The US doesn't hasn't seemed to have, you know, gotten very far in terms of recruiting other countries to to to do that. So um yeah, things could still look very messy, even if the US sort of wants to say, you know, um uh time's out. We're we're done.

Neri 1:00:19

Yeah. Um and like we were talking about at the top of the conversation, we're likely uh not heading towards de-escalation, we're likely heading towards uh greater escalation uh in the in the coming days and and maybe weeks. It seems like Donald Trump lost patience because if somebody quote unquote some you know, somebody, probably the Israelis, but doing it with Trump's green light, if they hit that gas field, South Pars today, uh that's that's a very clear sign Trump is losing patience.

unknown 1:00:48

Yeah.

Neri 1:00:48

Garrett, we'll have to leave it there. Thank you so much. Uh very illuminating conversation uh for me, and I'm sure for our listeners and viewers. Um and once again, welcome to IPF. Thank you so much. Great speaking with you. Okay, thanks again to Garrett Nada for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. And for all of you in Israel and across the region, please be safe.