Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom, and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Mary Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. So we're into week four of the war. And right before passover next week, I thought it'd be the perfect time to check in with our regulars, Israel Policy Forum's very own Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplo, and our dear friend and former colleague, Shira Efron, a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation, and their distinguished Israel Policy Chair. I wanted to hear from Michael and Shera what they thought of the war so far, the chances for a deal or not, maybe even in the coming days, if Donald Trump is to be believed, and what the moods are like in their respective perches in Washington and Israel. Hint, they're very, very different. Finally, we also touched ever so briefly on the not forgotten and not minor front in northern Israel against Hezbollah. So this was as always a terrific conversation with those two. And no clear answers, to be clear, but a lot of questions still outstanding. But I think that's the nature of this war and our current moment here in Israel and across the Middle East. Let's get into it. Hi, Michael. Hi, Sheera. Welcome back to the pod. Hi, Nari. Hi, Shera. Good to see you both.

Shira 1:29

Hi, Nari. Hi, Michael. Good to be here.

Neri 1:31

Shera, uh, our listeners on the podcast and the audio can't uh see your face. You're smiling, even though we just got an incoming missile alert about 15 minutes ago uh to central Israel. So we had to um, well, we hadn't started recording yet, luckily, but we had to stop and head into the safe rooms. And then we returned to record this pod for all of our listeners and viewers.

Shira 1:56

Um I'm smiling tragically because um our um children, some two of them whom are teen, have gotten so used to this. So they count the sounds, right? The booms. I don't know how it's what's the technical. And they know if it's an interception, direct hit, a cluster rocket. And so smiling because it seems like, and it's really sad, there are probably hits around us in Petitwa and cities that are not close to here. So um it's it's uh it's a sad smile, actually. It's more what what have what have we uh become accustomed to uh in this country in the past two and a half years.

Is a Deal Possible With Iran?

Neri 2:34

Yeah, and uh we'll we'll definitely get into the ongoing war now in uh well into its fourth week. Um I was gonna remind you too of the last time you were on, it was February 11th, right after Bibi Netanyahu met with Donald Trump in the White House uh for the last summit uh on the eve of this war. It seems well, it seems like a lifetime ago. It was just like a month ago. Definitely a different world. But uh now we are firmly in it. So I really wanted you both uh on, uh especially this week before Passover to break it all down. Um and I think before we kind of analyze big picture the war and how it's going, the positives, the negatives, and the TBDs, the incompletes, the big the big news uh of yesterday was uh deal or no deal, uh, for those who remember that that game show on TV. So, I mean, basically Donald Trump, I'm sure everyone knows, but I'll break it down. Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Iran this past weekend. 48 hours he gave them, uh, either open up the Strait of Hormuz, or he threatened he will start bombing power plants uh and other civilian infrastructure all across Iran. Uh and then yesterday, uh, and we're recording this on Tuesday night Tel Aviv time. So yesterday, Monday, uh Donald Trump woke up uh morning East Coast time and tweeted that negotiations were ongoing. There was some contact between the Trump administration and the Iranian regime, and that he was giving uh diplomacy at least five more days uh to see what would happen until the end of the week. So uh a state of execution on Iran's power plants for at least a few more days. Um, but all kidding aside, I think before that tweet, we were all primed for a major escalation uh in the in this war. Uh so I guess the first question, the more immediate question on everyone's mind, do you rate the chances of diplomacy actually succeeding? Uh talks are mooted for the coming days in Pakistan. Uh, not confirmed, but that's the general direction of travel. So uh I'll start with you, Michael. Uh, is a deal possible at least between the US and Iran?

Michael 4:48

A deal is possible, but I think that the only way we get one is if Trump decides to back off his requirements. You know, when we talk about the zone of possible agreement, right? The the Zopa that we're that we know from Israeli-Palestinian talks. I don't see where it is right now between the US and Iran. Uh, you know, the US, the US is kind of a moving target. It's hard to pin down precisely what Trump's requirements are at any given time. But certainly, if there's one that's been a consistent theme, it has been regarding Iran's nuclear program and uranium and not allowing the Iranians to keep the uranium, the already enriched uranium on Iranian soil, and also not enriching any further. And the not enriching any further also seems to be an Iranian red line. So I'm not sure how you square that circle. The reporting all seems to suggest that at this point the Iranians are not really in the mood to back down. Uh, so if there's going to be some sort of agreement, and I'm pessimistic about it, and I'll also note that if we look at various other conflicts over the past year and a half, the president certainly got his agreement on Israel and Hamas, but we've been teased with pending agreements on Russia-Ukraine. I've lost track. I don't even know how many times the president has claimed that we're close to one. We never get one. So this seems more in that sphere to me than Israel Hamas in terms of likelihood of an agreement. So I think if we get one, it depends on Trump. If he decides that he wants to end this, then he'll he will sell his base of victory no matter what he says. You know, one of the interesting things is that for all of the for all the public displays of the MAGA coalition fracturing over Iran, and you know, we see and hear all the voices from Tucker Carlson onwards who were who are very against what's going on. When you look at polling of Republicans, MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA Republicans, they're still pretty much in the president's corner. So I think that if he decides that he wants to end this, he'll say, All right, we we won, we destroyed all sorts of stuff. And presumably, if there's if there's an agreement, it will also mean that the Strait of Hormuz is opened back up. So he'll say, we obliterated the nuclear program for the second time, and we destroyed all sorts of missiles and launchers, and the Navy and the Strait of Hormuz is back open, which is now number one on the list of US goals, and he'll sell it as a victory, and his base will buy it. And uh the people who were against the war will certainly be happy the war is over. And if that's if if there's a deal to be had, I think that's the deal to be had, not a comprehensive deal over all of the things.

Neri 7:49

But you're also describing a major climb down by the US in this. Yeah. Which by extension will uh will uh be operative on Israel as well, uh, because Israel can't go against Trump.

Michael 8:03

So okay. And and and and by the way, just you know, last point on this, I am describing a major climb down by the US if there's going to be a deal that ends the war in the next five days, a week, whatever it is. And I think that we saw Bibi Netanyahu preview that climb down, uh, or maybe not Bibi, but Israeli officials preview that climb down today when they talked about wanting to wanting to see a uh effectively a deal that isn't terrible. Um, it's it seems that they have heard something from either Trump or other folks in the administration indicating to them that there's going to be a real US climb down. And now all of a sudden Ron Dermer is is racing to avert it. So I think that reading those tea leaves as well indicates to me that if this is going to end within a week, it's going to be because of the U.S. climbdown.

Neri 8:53

Shera, what's your take about the diplomacy gambit in the middle of, by the way, an ongoing war as as we we just experienced here in central Israel?

Shira 9:01

Right, which makes complete sense, right? There's no ceasefire. At the best, I think there have been some engagement, uh, either direct or indirect, but we're not in the middle of peace talks. So I don't see a reason why uh the fighting itself uh would wind down at this point, at least before at least there's uh agreement for negotiations, which which is all that we might have. But uh I think sort of it's gonna be a deal or not deal, but we are we are at the intersection, right? A very critical one with two uh almost diametrically opposed uh options. There is the deal option that uh Michael described, and I'll add to this, I'm not optimistic because it's not just that uh uh the US would have to maybe tamper down its expectations, right, in terms of the enriched uranium stuff. The Iranians want stuff too. They want guarantees they're not gonna be attacked again. They want sanctioned relief to expect that they will give anything without, I mean, at this point they want reparations and compensation for the war. So, but I'm just saying, without sanctioned relief, I just don't see that them sort of you're gonna give them sanctioned relief just for opening the Strait of Hormuz where you refuse to give them sanctioned relief before the Strait of Hormuz were closed. I mean, there's there's just a little bit of where we are on this. But this uh may or may not go forward. I agree that the ZOPA that um Michael described uh does not look very promising. And especially as we look at in all these Iranian and Iran analysts around us are speaking a much uh even more hawkish leadership that is less willing to make uh uh concessions inside Iran, right? The the hawkish uh uh parts of the IRGC, the revolutionary guards, that are calling the shots. Uh so that's one thing. The alternative is that Trump really said, okay, well, this ultimatum, you know, red lines, kind of orange, we're postponing this for a few days because every Monday or so, if we look back three weeks, there's the tweet of like calming down the markets, we want all the prices down, we want the SP 500 up. There happens to be a very big uh energy conference in Houston, Texas, that just started this weekend. There's a lot of there are a lot of there's a lot of pressure from industry leads on this. Where are we going? They need predictability. There's a supplemental, in addition to the polling that Michael suggested, it's true that maybe among Republicans um this war is still uh popular. But what I'm reading, that even Republican lawmakers, when they see a request for $200 billion for a supplemental, they're asking questions, right? So um, and then uh and then and but you'd you'd argue that maybe the president wants to just buy time for the the the other amphibious forces and associated groups to come to the region. I think the Tripoli is gonna make it in three days, and the box already feuds. So maybe he needs more time. So if negotiations fail, he has the military option ready. But this military option is not a military option that I think, at least when when we speak about Trump and his pattern of using force so far, which has been relatively right from standoff, aerial, less um, there's of course risk, but less risk to service members, US service members. When we're talking about uh opening the Straits of Hormuz, taking over hard islands, these is these are complicated, lengthy, dangerous uh endeavors that I'd assume that he would also uh prefer to avoid. And which way this goes, uh probably too early to say. Maybe it's my wishful thinking. I'll rate the agreement um option a little bit higher than Michael does. Not because I think they're gonna agree to the ZOPA. I think the fear in Israel is that they're gonna agree to sort of like, oh, let's reach a temporary ceasefire, kind of agree on a set of principles, and that will shut down the war. With something much more vague, and then we go into the landscape where Iran really is dominates, which is like playing for time, being a much more sophisticated negotiator. This is a fear in Israel, could happen.

Assessing the State of the War

Neri 13:15

It's definitely a fear in Israel. I say this kind of definitely jokingly. I love the leaks from various journalists here in Israel laying out, you know, these very hard-line 15 points that uh that are being demanded of Iran, which is like this, you know, wish list of things, you know, that even predate the war. Right. Uh and now they're still operative, obviously. They're still there, you know, limits on their ballistic missile program, uh, removing all highly enriched uranium, limits on, you know, no no enriching uranium on Iranian soil, um, and on and on and on. Really, uh honestly, a wish list, uh, an amazing, a beautiful list of demands. But I'm skeptical Iran would ever agree to that, right? They've they've kind of weathered maybe the worst of it, but maybe not, right? That's hence the military threat and the threat of escalation. But maybe they're willing to once again uh call Donald Trump at the this massive kind of uh Middle Eastern poker table um and maybe even race. Right. But I yeah, I don't believe those uh leaks are are accurate, but um I think like Michael does, uh there's there's more there's a greater likelihood that Donald Trump kind of climbs down and he's already preparing. We heard it uh earlier tonight. Uh he he claimed the the Iranians really, really, really want this deal badly. Uh maybe maybe not. But yes, he's already kind of saying that they're they're they're decimated uh completely, and yet, you know, Strait of Hormuz is not open. They still fire missiles and drones all over the place. So obviously they still have that capability. Um it'll be interesting. It'll be interesting. Um you could also see a situation where they do engage in talks, but they they don't come to an agreement, and then you have an escalation with an eye to improving your situation at the bargaining table. Um and then at least you have that that channel and maybe things move um on the other side of any kind of escalation. But yeah, the the you know, the the the surprise uh twist in the running Donald Trump reality show, uh yes, uh pulling the carpet out from his 48-hour ultimatum. Um I wanted to ask you, kind of zooming out a little bit, and we've touched on various issues like the straight-of-forward moves and ballistic missile fire and all of that, but uh three plus weeks into this, and Shira, I'll start with you. Um, how do you assess the war going? Right. So obviously, on the one hand, still major, major strikes by the Israeli and US, primarily Air Force and US Navy. Um Iran's military capabilities are being degraded. The leadership, at least the older leadership, was taken out, um and on and on and on, right? Uh the offensive continues. And on the other side of the ledger, like we said, uh Iran is fighting a classic asymmetric war that shouldn't have surprised anybody. Right. Um, you know, an economic war primarily, an energy war. Um so how do you assess the war so far, you know, irrespective of potential talks to end it?

Shira 16:21

Yes, it is. I think they're clearly um very impressive operational military achievements in terms of leadership decapitation. It shows again uh the level of intelligence penetration Israel has with Iran. Uh, we're looking at uh we keep hearing the 70% magic number of you know, launchers, ballistic missiles, there are different facilities, uh nuclear sites that have survived. It's a huge country, very difficult to pursue um uh different security assets, and there is uh seems you know credit to credits to the Israeli Air Force and the US Air Force uh in um probably going by the target bank and its very long list of targets and pursuing them uh one by one. Um I also want to say that before I criticize this approach, I also say that I think there are also strategic uh achievements. Uh one is really, I think, a level of integration, cooperation with the US operational that is extremely impressive. Um, and that is important, that it does show that Israel and the US are together in this. Um even though US and you know Trump and BB went to this war without uh without a coalition, right? With no international or regional support uh for this campaign operation. I want to remind others that when Putin started his uh Ukraine thing, it was also a three-day security operation, but operation. Um there was no coalition support, but what Iran has done with its uh behavior, with its retaliation, it in fact created a coalition against Iran. So what Israel has always looked like an Israeli inflated threat of Iran, I think is very clear now to other countries uh the extent to which Iran is a threat, and that is a strategic achievement. And this also, by the way, is not just in Europe and among Arab leadership, but I also think it's with the Arab public. And that is important, you know, and this is the strategic achievement.

Neri 18:32

But with that said, um, and Nary, you and I having said all that, I are free to continue.

Shira 18:41

And you and I spoke about this yesterday. There's no discernible uh difference in the level of security that Israelis uh feel here on the ground. And I think it's the same for people in the Gulf who didn't think they have a right of dog in the fight. Uh they sort of like didn't want this war and were dragged into it. So that's uh one thing. We are seeing a recalibration of the objectives of the war, right? From this is going to be sort of the end and uh all but this is gonna be the last war forever. It's tampered down to sort of like, well, we're degrading a lot and we are pushing uh the next uh round. And this approach, which we've been hearing in Israel, we've been seeing it everywhere, right? Um the counting, this counting of targets, which which is needed. But it kind of reminds me, you know, us uh those who were sort of forced to uh learn the lessons of Vietnam, the McNamara fallacy, right? This sort of like this idea that we will count and count and we'll bring numbers. Um but the numbers just don't seem at this moment in time to align with the big strategic picture. And this is where I think my issue is it might be too early to assess. We're still in the middle of the war, things may come to be. But if uh we're gonna reach an agreement or this is gonna end, with Iran not uh you know, not making compromises on this enriched uranium that they have at very high levels, um, with uh even more, it's hard to believe, but even a more of a hawkish uh regime, right? A North Korean-style regime, and their um indigenous knowledge, nuclear knowledge, and uh missile development uh knowledge, and they're effectively being the gatekeeper to the Straits of Hermuz, deciding who's gonna go out and in. And by the way, selling oil, this whole idea of like selling just to China. No, no, this Indian company just bought five billion. Um I need to look at the numbers, but many, many barrels of uh brand oil from Iran. Uh, this will be hard to uh market as victory. Uh maybe Trump to his constituencies here in Israel is gonna be harder.

Neri 20:54

So uh for our younger listeners, McNamara, that's uh Robert McNamara, the four.

Shira 20:59

Oh, Defense Secretary during the Vietnam War.

Neri 21:02

Exactly. Just just uh you know, covering all our all our bases here on the Israel Policy Pod.

Michael 21:07

And uh For for our for our younger listeners, anybody under the age of 60.

Neri 21:11

Yeah, I mean for our younger listeners, I I think uh early early in the war, I think I had to explain to our colleague and friend Shani, um, not to her, but like when I was recording a podcast with her, uh, who Donald Rumsfeld was. So I I prefaced my Rumsfeld quote uh by explaining who he was. So we're McNamara, you know, a generation before Rumsfeld's well, uh as as defensive. More more more more than one. Yeah, more than one. So uh he was famous, you know, they had these uh these metrics, right? Counting uh counting dead enemies, uh armaments, bombing strikes. And I agree with you, Shera. Uh you get a lot of that from the IDF. Um they've degraded 70% of Iran's ballistic missile launchers seven times, going back nine months. Uh So if you know, and that and that math doesn't really check out, but it's it's an issue, and um, you know, I'm sure they're hitting something in Iran, but uh, like you said, does it come together into a cumulative whole into a strategic gain? Um leaving aside the issue of regime change, uh, which is now very much less talked about with um well not talked about at all from the Trump administration. And Netanyahu still says, Oh, our objective is to create the conditions for regime change. That's a climb down even from his language before in the early stages of the of this war, um the nuclear file, uh, and on and on. Uh so it's well, you'd like to give them the benefit of the doubt to if not the political leaders and the military professionals, but you know, we're nearing four weeks and Iran is still showing a resilience that maybe surprised them. Michael, how do you assess the war so far in military terms?

Michael 23:00

If we're doing a cost-benefit analysis, there are absolutely benefits. There's no question that Iran's military capabilities have been severely degraded. I I share your skepticism about uh about knowing exactly uh how degraded. Um but uh lots of things have been hit. Um they certainly aren't aren't firing the same um the same huge volleys of missiles as they did uh in the three previous rounds that they fired at Israel. Top military leadership and and top political leadership in Iran have have been killed. Now, maybe they've been replaced by people who are even more radical, but um, but certainly, you know, there have been real there have been real successes. And if we're thinking about the various components of Iran's nefarious activities, you know, nuclear missiles and proxies, nuclear jury is still out. Um, you know, missiles and drones, they they clearly still have, but uh, it seems that many of them have been taken out. And proxies, it's hard for me to imagine when this is over that Iran is gonna be in a position to spend billions of dollars rebuilding the proxy network given how expensive it was and how many years it took, and it hasn't really paid off all that much. You know, Hezbollah, obviously, as you guys know all too well, is firing rockets at Israel. But in general, the idea that you were gonna have this proxy network that was gonna surround Israel from all sides, I don't know that that the Iranians really have established proof of concept. So if we're looking at benefits, I think there are certainly clear benefits. To me, though, it really comes down to a few things. At the end of this, is is Israel going to be in a better security position? I think so. But you know, I certainly acknowledge Shira's point that at the moment it doesn't necessarily feel that way. And if the regime remains in place, it's gonna be hard to make that argument, right? You know, even if their capabilities are damaged, they're still going to have the same uh single-minded purpose, I uh I imagine. The real big question, of course, is on the nuclear part of this. And there, I just don't think we know. Maybe the US and Israel are able to bomb the nuclear sites enough times that the stuff is buried even farther underground and becomes completely inaccessible. But unless we have one of two scenarios, one, there's a deal where the Iranians give up the uranium to a third party, and there's an actual robust inspections regime to make sure they don't enrich again. Or B, the US goes in there and and frankly, I I know there's speculation about this, but um, how it would work, I don't exactly know. Going in there with specially trained units to take the material, but first you've got to secure the sites, dig it out, figure out where it is.

Neri 25:57

Nearly impossible. You need heavy, heavy equipment. Yes. Um Right.

Michael 26:01

Right, heavy equipment, and it's not gonna be it's not gonna be a few hours. This isn't this isn't like snatching a Maduro from his bed, right? You got to assume this is a days-long, if not weeks-long operation. I just don't see how you secure the nuclear sites and pull this off for that amount of time without you know, serious, serious casualties, if it's even possible. So absent one of those two things, the nuclear part of this is still obviously uh very much up in the air. And, you know, there there is this question of lastly, is the US and Israeli position in the region going to be better off writ large than before? And that goes beyond the question of whether Iran has been militarily degraded. That really depends on how the other countries in the region operate after this. And I think the jury is still out there as well. There, there's certainly unbelievable US-Israeli security cooperation and military integration over the past four weeks. And I assume that extends to integration with the Gulf states as well, just based on what we're seeing in terms of uh coordination and missile defense. Um but at the end of the day, even if the Gulf states are really angry at the Iranians, it doesn't automatically follow that they're going to be so happy with the Israelis that greater integration happens. It also doesn't necessarily follow that they're not going to be annoyed that they were targeted because US bases are in their countries. And I also think it's an open question as to at the end of this, whether they continue to welcome the US presence or not, right? There can be all sorts of relationship with the US in terms of defense cooperation under the CENCOM umbrella, in terms of buying US weaponry, all that stuff can continue, but it doesn't necessarily mean the same close level as we've seen before. And that's also an open question. I don't have an answer. So um at the end of this, I'm uh the the answer is I'm not sure. I I I see I see clear benefits and I also see clear costs. And I don't yet know which one outweighs the other.

Neri 28:08

I think that's uh an honest answer, which is very rare these days uh in the heated emotions and heated analysis about this particular war. But uh I think you laid out uh many uh very appropriate strategic questions, right? Um the issue of what kind of regime you'll have in Iran on the other side of this, right? We were promised one thing publicly, and uh maybe it'll be uh if not that, then perhaps even the opposite of that. Uh we were promised you know, the two main goals, right? The Iran's nuclear program and a ballistic missile program. Uh what happens to uh the 440 kilos of highly enriched uranium? Is there a solution for that? Uh the US security architecture uh in the Middle East, what it will look like uh on the other side of this and what decisions um the Gulf Arab allies make. Uh you could make a case, I think, either way on the other side of this, but again, TBD. Um and really uh what kind of it's not even a credibility issue, but it's uh you know, what kind of strength will leave aside Donald Trump, what kind of strength will the US be projecting worldwide if let's say after a month fighting Iran alongside, by the way, a not a not incompetent military, the IDF, you couldn't even defeat Iran with all the forces that you brought to bear on on this particular problem set, right? What what what kind of strength or lack thereof will that project globally? Um I don't know.

Michael 29:41

This thought just Well, of course, I mean the the the the problem there is that you couldn't defeat Iran, it's because we still don't know what defeat looks like, how how how it's defined.

Neri 29:51

I mean, they laid out objectives. And again, I mean I think we're we'd be we'll be a lot smarter once this war ends, in whatever fashion, right? If Donald Trump calls it quits and climbs down because Iran is choking the global economy through the straight upward moves, that's not a great look. Um, with a current regime intact with no resolution to the nuclear file. And by the way, you also hear things, you know, the new the fashionable thing that you hear, and again, I don't disagree with it, is well, regime change was always going to be difficult, but this war will set the table for regime change or regime collapse in a year or two years or three years because Iran won't be able to rebuild and really address all the acute problems that it had even before this war, and the war just made worse. Um, and that it's almost inevitable that the regime will collapse. What happens if the deal gives them sanctions relief? What if they leverage this?

Shira 30:45

I just don't see a way for Iran to compromise without any sanction relief. And also, this is the counterfactual. Arguably, when you have massive protest waves in Iran in January, right, that's that sort of started, at least uh from the US perspective, I mean from an Israeli perspective, it's gonna be another round beforehand. Uh, but the complete loss of legitimacy among the public in Iran even before the war, and the fact that Ali Khaminay, the Ayatullah, uh, right, not his son, you still have a leader with the last name Khaminayi in Iran, which also makes it difficult to claim victory. But uh, he was gonna be 87 years old in April. So arguably, you could say, and we would never know, that in a year's time you would have had a change in Iran anyway, right? Without the war, it's gonna be very difficult to attribute any change to a specific activity. There's no question that Iran has lost its legitimacy domestically even before, and maybe this after this war we'll see it. I think it has lost legitimacy internationally, right? Everyone that was gonna pursue some of this detent with Iran because it made sense, and this idea of like, oh, let's just like try to put right always like put this Iran problem in a box, this idea, and and and and this this is done. It's gonna be more difficult for this regime to recover, but but we have lessons. North Korea, wait, I'm saying it's just like you were we there's a risk of Iran turning to North Korea, which is even a worse case. And I also want to remind you that we keep comparing to uh Iraq, uh 2003, and then Afghanistan, but we also have uh Iraq 1991, the first Gulf War, where did we win over Saddam Hussein? I'm not sure. He was weakened for sure, but he was not less emboldened. And this is also an optional uh outcome.

Neri 32:32

But this is also the the question, and I think this is the point Michael was gonna make. And correct me if I'm wrong, Michael, but you know, you could make uh uh the same, you know, kind of comparable argument that on the other side of this, people will be afraid of Iran. They're gonna be the sheriff of the Gulf, to use a quote from the old sh the Shah's days, and then everyone will have to go to Tehran and cut deals and pay them off.

Speaker 1 33:00

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Michael 33:57

I disagree that Detente is done. It might be, but I'm certainly not confident of that, especially because the Gulf states still understand that they've got to live, you know, just just across just across the Gulf or, you know, just across the Strait of Hormuz from the Iranians. Whereas the United States, when this is over, is is going to do what the United States does, which is be sort of around, but but not really. And um I don't think Detente has done it at all. I think that when this is over, the Gulf states are gonna go back to trying to sort of push and pull and appease the Iranians as much as they can. And I think they're gonna be a lot more cautious and smarter about what Iran is capable of doing. I think they're gonna be a lot more cautious and smarter about their own internal defenses. I'm sure we'll see their defense spending both go up and get smarter. But I I think if they believed that the aftermath of this is treating Iran as an implacable foe, we would have seen the Saudis, the Emiratis, and others get directly involved by this point. And they haven't, and I and I also don't think they're going to. And I I I don't know the detente is over.

Neri 35:07

It's it's I mean, we don't know, right?

Shira 35:09

We don't know.

The Different Perceptions Between the U.S. and Israel

Neri 35:10

We don't know. No, I was gonna say it all depends how this ends and if I mean really what Trump decides. Um, sorry, Sheera, I was gonna cut you off. Uh this this thought occurred to me literally five minutes ago as we were having this conversation. Is there a scenario where Israel wins the war, but the US loses the war? Does that make sense? That for Israel it's it comes out strategically ahead, but the US definitely takes an L in this whole thing.

Shira 35:39

The threat perception is different, right? Like, what is the threat for the US? I mean, there's no question the Islamic Republic of Iran, horrible, right? Like a horrible regime to its own people, to the world menace. Really, I mean, there's no question, but it's hard for me to find Americans who are not sort of in the Middle East hawk, you know, uh uh policy wonks that even know that Iran is a threat to the US. I think from an Israeli perspective, yeah, if you uh got the US uh to join you and you've eliminated 70% of Iran's capabilities, whatever this means, right? Many of them, and you got them far of everything. 70% of the besieged, the RGC leadership, the Ayatullah, 70% of everything.

Neri 36:24

Yes, just like just like last June. But okay.

Shira 36:29

Um, and nuclear is gonna be more difficult to develop, and it's gonna be different for Iran um given its situation after this war. Could be different. Sorry, it could be more difficult for Iran to uh sponsor its proxies, right? Maybe it's gonna be more difficult to re-arm uh Hezbollah and Houthis are sort of like their own free radical, but I but I'm but looking at uh uh and and and the proxies in uh uh Iraq and and definitely in Gaza. Um and and this also has to do with the situation in Syria, right? That's no longer the passage of arms and funds uh from uh from Iran to Lebanon. In that regard, Israel says, okay, our situation is better after this war than it was. For the US, and this I'll give I'll let Michael uh answer this, but I do, you know, you look at like Russia clearly benefiting from this war, as is before the war started. I'm looking at China. I don't see, um, I don't think anyone in China is uh particularly upset at looking at the US drop all its munitions, uh, offensive and defensive, not all, but spending a lot of munitions in the Middle East and not making the pivot to Asia that is supposed to happen, and also finding the US is finding it very difficult to uh enlist a coalition to open the Strait of Armoose. So, what does it mean for a scenario in Taiwan? Um and so, in a sense, it's not like a loss, and I think all our definitions of sort of like what's victory and and and loss are are muddled, but I could see a different a situation where Israel's like, we're better off.

Neri 38:10

I'm sorry, Gosh. I was gonna say, I mean, let's use that as a transition. How does this all look from from where you're sitting, Michael, in in Washington? Um not just in pure kind of military or geopolitical terms, but also domestic political, economic, social. I mean, how is this how is this war being experienced in America?

Michael 38:32

So picking up on where Shira ended, I I agree. The sort of wins wins and losses is is difficult because it's so many different vectors. Hard for me to see how the Chinese aren't benefiting from this really across the board, um, given given almost everything. But in in terms of the Iran piece and the Middle East piece, the threat perception thing has always been at the root of this, right? The the gap between the US and Israel on this. I mean, Israel's big success with this war is convincing the United States that the threat is big enough that the US should come closer to the Israeli threat perception than the traditional US one. Because Iran's nuclear program, sure, it's a problem for everybody, but much bigger problem for Israel than than for the US. Iran's ballistic missiles, huge problem for Israel, not really a problem for the US. The proxy network, huge problem for Israel, again, not really a problem for the US. So the US can can walk away from here, even as things are right now. If the Strait of Hormuz is reopened, if other countries in the region take their own defense requirements and defense burden more seriously than before. So, like sort of leave the China piece out of it, then you know there's a plausible case for a US win. I'm not saying that this is necessarily what I subscribe to, but I but it but like I said, the the argument, the argument is there. How this looks in the US more generally, uh obviously people are uh are worried about the economy, about the price of energy, you know, what but uh Tashira's point earlier about even Republican members of Congress saying that they're not gonna pass a $200 billion supplemental for the war unless they have a better sense about what the aims are and how it's going to end and how that money's gonna be spent. You know, this this this is all real. And it's certainly when you look at public opinion, not popular overall. But you know, I I'm not I'm not sitting here recording a podcast and then having to run to a shelter um a minute before we start, like you guys are. So Americans, you know, certain certainly we're we're feeling the impacts of the war, but it's not in the same direct way. And a lot of the predictions about what the Iranians would do in the US, thankfully, have not come to pass, whether that's because they haven't they didn't have the capabilities or because the US is thwarting all sorts of stuff. But you know, if there were Iranian sleeper cells hanging around somewhere, they're they haven't come out yet. Um, if if Iranian uh cyber capabilities are supposedly just a tick below you know the US and Russia and China, there hasn't been evidence of that yet. Um so yeah, it's not it's not popular here, and and we certainly see it in in different ways. And it's absolutely starting to take over politics. Um, but it it's it's not the same, it's not the same visceral impact at all. You know, I'm I'm far more concerned about, and maybe, maybe this is a transition, Ari, if you want to take it, I'm far more concerned about what it does in the longer term for US-Israel relations, because you know, I wrote about this a couple of weeks ago, and I think it's even more true today than it was a few weeks ago. Um, even if the US and Israel come out of this with a a genuine military victory, and even as we're seeing this is the second time I'm gonna use the term unbelievable, but but but unbelievable growth and coordination and maturation of the US-Israel security relationship. And even as I think that this demonstrates an even greater argument for making sure that relationship, that relationship remains solid, what this does to the US-Israel relationship politically in the long term is gonna be devastating. I I'm not sure there's any way to actually avert that unless the war ends like literally tomorrow.

Neri 42:33

But does it matter how the war ends? What if it's a great success? What if Trump, you know, doesn't take a deal and then he follows through and escalates and the regime collapses uh by April Fools? Shira Shira Shira Shira is like I mean, I'm I'm I'm exaggerating for a fact. Shira is looking at me like, why why are you an idiot? No, no.

Michael 42:52

Um, let's let's take that best case. Let's take that that quote unquote best case best case scenario.

Neri 42:57

On US Israel relations specifically.

Michael 43:00

Yeah. So even in that best case scenario, let's look at both Republicans and Democrats. On the Republican side, uh it's now it's it's starting to become Republican Orthodoxy. It's not it's not any longer some crazies shouting from the peanut gallery, even if they are legitimately crazies, Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, all the rest of them. You know, now Joe Rogan, we can add to the pile as well. Uh it's it's fast becoming Republican Orthodoxy, that even in that best case scenario, this was an enormous waste of American resources that could be better spent at home. It was a huge distraction from genuine issues over here. Even if it goes again, according to the the best possible plans, there's still this notion that is spreading like wildfire that this still wasn't really in the US interest. This was all Israeli interests, and Israel is controlling U.S. foreign policy. That that's very quickly becoming the I hate to say it's becoming the default Republican position, but it's it's starting to become the dominant Republican position. And on the Democratic side, you know, you're hard pressed to find anybody who supports this, including, you know, there's one member of Congress who who voted against the war powers resolution in the House a few weeks ago, uh, who said yesterday that if it came back up, now he would he would vote in favor of it. Like he's kind of he's he's seen enough. Um and so on the Democratic side, it's it's even it's even more. It's wall to wall, right? Why why would we support another boondoggle in the Middle East, especially from this president who is, you know, a fascist demagogue, all the things that Democrats uh view Donald view Donald Trump as being. And on top of that, Israel is not exactly popular among Democrats right now. So even if you don't have quite the same level of conspiracy theorizing about the the Israeli hold over Donald Trump, there is still very much a widespread idea that this is far more in Israel's interest than in the US interest. And yeah, it's it's it's Donald Trump's fault. It's on him for deciding to do this, but still didn't make sense from a US perspective. So I think that even in the best case scenario, and you know, I know there's some Israeli voices in the past few days, um, including our friend Michael Goodman, who has said that uh, you know, he's he's worried about the US's revelations if this goes south, but if it goes well, then he thinks we'll be we'll be laying the foundation for a new golden era, just based on what I'm seeing here. And you know, I'm sitting here in DC and I talk to folks on both sides. Um I'm very, very worried. Shera, you and I have talked about this at length.

Shira 45:40

Again, I don't know what victory looks like for you know for the US. And that's why I look, first of all, the scenario of like doubling down, bringing 4,000, 5,000 Marines to physically take over Hajj and open the Strait of Hermuz. And then you need to stay there to keep it open and be uh vulnerable and maybe take over some parts of the Iranian coast. I mean, this is this is this is not like quick and dirty, right? This is maybe dirty, but I just don't see this as something being quick. So I don't know if this leads to this goal. So maybe, maybe a military, such a military endeavor, and you know, I hope I personally don't think it's the best option going forward, but uh, and I I hope uh, and if it does happen, I hope service members are not hurt. But in all likelihood, this is not, it's gonna be a risky endeavor. So even if at the end of this you have a regime change, does it mean you have like uh a Delcey Rodriguez, like the Venezuela case, someone who you can work with? We're not in that scenario anymore. You can have a complete breakdown, like a Libya situation, right? Like an Iraq situation. There could be some sort of like a pragmatic Iranian leader that unifies the whole thing. But I just I just it's hard for me to tell a compelling victory story that is enough compelling to the Americans that it's worth the investment. And that's why I think taking the win, whatever the framing is, and hopefully there's some sense also in Iran to stop this and make it it will require compromises, uh, maybe makes more sense. But I 100% agree with Michael and some people, very smart people, wrote about Michael, of course, being one of them, but also Dana Strull from the Washington Institute about this. And Neri, you had you interviewed her also for your uh great story about this. Um, but but this uh issue of Israel looking like it dragged the US into this uh war uh is a narrative that I disagree with, but it exists. And we have stories in the New York Times such that it's all like an idea of uh Mossad Head Daddy Barnea, that he convinced the Americans that he can lead to the regime. It just uh it it keeps feeding this narrative. Um and and and of course, this is on top of other trends that we know about US-Israel relations, and it is worrisome.

Neri 48:06

And no, as if um the CIA and the Trump administration and Donald Trump himself don't have agency and can't make decisions for themselves. Um Deddy Barnea is not gonna fly into Washington and make promises and convince people of certain things if um they don't somehow agree with that. Um it's also open to speculation what Deddy Barnea actually said was gonna happen. That's a whole other conversation for maybe another time about what what Mossad was confident and less confident about in terms of bringing about regime change. Uh but Shira, uh what I really wanted to get your your take on, you know, we heard the perspective from Michael and from Washington. Um you and I have spoken about this, but uh explain this perspective uh from Israel about how this war is perceived still, now three and a half weeks into it, uh, and the perception of the the enduring, the beautiful, the the rock solid US-Israel relationship.

Shira 49:06

Yeah, so I mean, I'm just relying on polling data, right? And you see that polls um that even beginning before the beginning of the war, that you had a majority, according to INSS, the Institute for National Security Studies, majority of Israelis said that Israel should strike in Iran, even without the US. And since the beginning of the operation, at least in the first two weeks, with the US being in this and with the um operational achievements that we described, uh, you had those numbers climbing up to over 80%, and depending on the survey, even more. Um really overwhelming support for, I think it was even uh 90%, but um overwhelming support uh in Israel for this uh campaign. And you know, can't blame the Israelis, right? Iran was always sort of the the enemy, there's no question, with the pillar of deterrence uh all all designed to basically kill Israelis and Jews. Um, and with Israel being convinced that even if it's just an operational opportunity, you seize the opportunity and you go after them when they are down, especially when you have the US uh on your side. And the support continues I looked at polling from the last few days. The support continues still around 80%, is a little bit less. Where I do see some fluctuation in the numbers is terms of um the belief that they will be able to achieve all their objectives. And sort of the the idea of like regime change or regime collapse or whatever you guys there are more and more Israelis who are more skeptical about this. Um, we are seeing more, and you know this, Neri, even if personal, you know, on the personal level, I think the Israelis are fatigue, right? It's not um this comes with the backdrop of two and a half years of basically nonstop war, um, starting on October 7. Uh Israelis are still in a state of trauma or post-trauma. It's been it's been difficult, it's been taxing on the personal life, on the people, uh business owners, on parents who haven't had their kids in school, I don't know, the past six years, including COVID, maybe six months, uh inclusive on the reservists, some of them who've been in reserve duty for 800 out of the 900 last days. It is taking a toll, but you see some sort of resilience in the Israeli society and saying we still have to support this. Um, it's interesting. I saw one survey, um, uh Shaol Arieli's uh survey, which was really, I think this really caught my eyes. 81% of Jewish Israelis believe that the war will bring the US and Israel closer together, which is very uh disconnected from the discussion in Washington. And, you know, we constantly bring sort of the case of Israel to the US, but it's about time that someone brings the case of what's happening in the US in a serious way to Israel, and that will be feed into civil society as well as to leadership, the current one, uh, but maybe the prospect one, because as Michael said, if Israel loses the US, and I'm not saying loses like, you know, US, not out of Trump, but normally US can have a relationship also with Belgium. What Israel has is very special. And if Israel loses this, um, it's gonna be much more significant than whether we cut uh 70% of the Iranian capabilities.

Michael 52:33

Shira, Neri and I were talking about that exact poll today before we started recording. And yeah, I I agree. It it is such a sign that that Israelis they're they're optimistic. That's great. There's a reason that Israelis rank very high on the the OECD rankings of of happiness. Denial. But it's a very bad misread. Well, you said it, not me. But it's a it's a very bad misreading of what's going on here and the trends. And I think that it's it's it's it's easy to see how you you have this tight relationship with the president and the Trump administration and you know, all of all of the amazing security, security cooperation and and really sort of hand in hand uh on military issues that's going on. Totally misreading what's going on outside of that bubble in the rest of the United States. Completely.

Neri 53:26

Um I don't think the quote unquote analysts here and even the media here do a great service to the Israeli public to explain to them how this war looks uh not just from the US, but also from all over the world. Right. So you can turn on um whatever and name your international news network, and you can see uh reports of, I don't know, fuel rationing in the Philippines and Pakistan and four-day work weeks in uh Western Europe and whatever it might be. Um that's almost completely absent from the Israeli conversation. You know, it may be it may come up briefly in the middle of whatever the nightly news, but uh the average Israeli is not uh not aware of the actual impact that this is having all over the world. Uh I don't think the average Israeli in in good days understands the major shifts in American politics that have taken place in recent years, let alone now um, you know, the middle of war where it's kind of a rally around the flag situation. So yeah, I I try to explain this to my Israeli friends and acquaintances. But like Shera said, uh there's uh you know, there's a real belief here in Israel that every day that this war goes on, it's better for Israel. Every day we're hit, you know, this is we're paraphrasing, every day we're hitting them and they'll be weaker. That's essentially the the position and that uh like Shera mentioned earlier, and even at the top, right? Uh the sleepless nights and the missile alerts and the schools being closed and the businesses being impacted is a worthwhile price to pay for uh if not total victory over the Islamic Republic of Iran, then at least degrading the Islamic Republic of Iran. Um and that's still the majority uh position in Israel. And I think, by the way, as much as we criticize Israelis for not understanding the outside world, the outside world really does a bad job of understanding the Israelis' uh position and the Israeli psyche.

Shira 55:32

Especially after October 7th.

The Northern Front With Hezbollah in Lebanon

Neri 55:34

Yeah, and look, October 7th doesn't uh shouldn't be the answer to everything, but it's just the reality within which you need to begin to understand the kind of politics and then by extension the military decisions of of this country in the Middle East over the past two and a half years and uh likely in the coming months, because uh we were supposed to talk about the other front going on, a secondary front, but definitely a a major front, which is in the north at Lebanon against Hezbollah. Uh, we're gonna have to save it for for another time because uh well, we talked about Iran for for almost an hour now, uh, and rightfully so. But yes, uh look, there's still, you know, again, in normal times, this would be a a massive war and a massive story. It's a secondary story because there's a US-Israel war still going on uh with Iran. But it remains to be seen if Donald Trump will give diplomacy a chance. I'm skeptical.

Michael 56:36

Well, he's he's he's gonna he's gonna give it a chance. Yes. Whether whether it works or not, that's that's where the skepticism comes in.

Shira 56:44

Yeah.

Michael 56:44

Uh it definitely does.

Shira 56:45

We could we could we could hope that if he gives diplomacy a chance and uh he folds Lebanon into this, uh this could be a far greater deal, right? Give diplomacy a chance on that front as well, and uh help Israel not engage, not not occupy Southern Lebanon again. Um because it's the last thing that Israel needs, and we we've been there before, right? Um so so there's real opportunity in Lebanon at the moment. I I'm I doubt that we're gonna have a good deal and in the with Iran and definitely one that includes Lebanon, but you know, one can still hope.

Michael 57:26

Shera, you don't you don't support Batsala Smotric's statement today that Israel's new northern border should be the Latani River until the end of time?

Shira 57:33

Yeah, I um I was actually on Channel 12 when he said it's in an interview, and I chuckled. I said, why not farther up? But here I'll give you a mass joke. Someone was just like, you know, sort of like the length of Lebanon um from south to north is 200 kilometers, but the rockets that uh hurt but the rocket range, they have rockets of ranges of 300 kilometers. So how deep do you need to occupy Lebanon to make sure there's no threat to Israel? Uh it's it's it's uh it's what Israel wants. It's not just Smutrich, this idea of uh buff, you know, preemptively taking out uh capabilities of adversaries. And with Hasbad's the same story. We were supposed to eliminate the threat also, not eight months ago, but a little bit longer, right? Um there was an agreement, uh, a total missed opportunity in my view. Still, maybe we can we can uh recover, but this idea of buffer zones, as you know, buffer zone in Lebanon, uh we still haven't moved uh out of a single inch in Syria. Uh we haven't got to speak about Gaza, uh the facto annexation of parts of the West Bank. I'm sure if Israel could have buffer zones with other countries, it would. Um this is the new this is the new uh mindset here. You have to make sure there is uh space between uh your communities and the enemy.

Neri 58:56

Yes. Uh I mean I I gave you both a very elegant uh out for ending this episode. Because it's 10 o'clock, it's 10 o'clock at night uh in in Israel, and Shira just wanted Sure really wanted to talk about about Lebanon. Um but I will I will say the yes, the buffer zones are a big part of this post-October 7th kind of national security. Is it a strategy? Is it a doctrine? Is it a a mindset? Call it what you will. But Shira, we talked about this yesterday. You and what army, right? Petelus Motrich may want to reoccupy southern Lebanon along with everything else, but at a certain point, you're gonna run up against the limits of your own manpower. And this is before you get into a potential guerrilla war like you had in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, um I do I spend a lot of my time trying to uh explain these crazy statements from various Israeli ministers to my bosses and editors. Um, I I don't actually believe that the Litani River will be Israel's new northern border, just like uh Bethel Smart said that they're gonna kick all the Gazans out of Gaza and reoccupy and resettle all of Gaza that did not happen. Doesn't make it any less abhorrent or alarming. I'm not trying to downplay it, but just because Batzilus Martrich says something, uh doesn't mean we all have to kind of jump because that's the reaction he was.

Shira 1:00:20

Sorry, I was just gonna say I think what Batzala Smart would say to you, it hasn't happened yet.

Neri 1:00:24

Okay. Uh just like an election hasn't happened yet. And just like he hasn't gone to the opposition yet. Uh sorry, that's uh more uh a hope than a reality.

Michael 1:00:37

Uh Michael, you were gonna say I was gonna say, I I agree that there's no way the Latani River becomes becomes Israel's actual northern border, but um, you know, are you willing to put money down the Latani River doesn't become the de facto northern border of a buffer zone that lasts half a decade? I'm not.

Neri 1:00:55

Look, that's that's a legitimate and uh fair point. I guess that will also depend a lot on the Americans and the regional actors. Um, can you depopulate a third of Lebanon and control half of Gaza and occupy the entire West Bank and then hope or think that you're gonna have more normalization deals with other Arab states?

Michael 1:01:19

No, but it doesn't it but it doesn't mean that somebody's not gonna try.

Neri 1:01:22

Maybe. Um, but again, at some point this year, there will likely be an election here in Israel. Um I mean, one thing we haven't talked about is like the political impact here in Israel of the war. The polls haven't moved. Um and so you can kind of see Netanyahu under pressure. You can always kind of tell by his public appearances uh and you and public statements, and he he is feeling the pressure because this could have I think in his mind this should have gone a bit more swimmingly. Um and he may yet pull it out, but that's the reality as of now. Um, you see how I brought everything back full circle? Uh you know, will Trump cut the will Trump cut a deal and cut this short before BB can, you know, do well, achieve more more victories on the battlefield? Maybe, maybe not. Still like like Trump, stay tuned to Digital Policy Pod uh for next week.

Michael 1:02:12

But uh with the Thank you, thank you for your attention to this matter.

Neri 1:02:15

Thank you all for listening and watching and for your attention to this matter. Uh, thank you both. Um happy upcoming Passover. Um as uh Israeli leaders, both political and military, have promised, it will be uh a Passover of war, fighting.

Shira 1:02:33

Not of liberty.

Neri 1:02:34

Uh how did Yal Zamir, the IDFG staff, say it. Uh, we're going to be fighting for our freedom this Passover. So you see how he meshed both the holiday and the current reality. Um, yes. Um maybe we'll have freedom from uh incoming missile alerts and sleepless nights. We can only hope um to be continued, that I am sure of. Michael Shira, thank you both.

Shira 1:03:01

Thank you.

Neri 1:03:02

Thank you, Neri. Okay, thanks again to Michael Kaplo and Shira Efron for their generous time and insights. Also special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work, do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so it can be being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. And for all of you in Israel and across the region, please be safe. And Chakzamech, upcoming for all those celebrating.