Neri 0:05

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We're back to regular programming after Passover, after Easter, and after the ceasefire in the Iran War, at least for now. Our good friend Amos Harel, the defense analyst and correspondent at Haritz, is with us today to help us make sense of the past six weeks and what the coming days and weeks may yet bring. I asked Amos to assess the results so far of the war from the Israeli, American, and Iranian perspectives, the prospects for a real ceasefire deal emerging out of the ongoing talks in Pakistan, what happens if it doesn't, and then we also talked about the Lebanon Front and Israeli campaign against Hezbollah. At the very end, a really important point on how national security decisions are actually made today in Israel. Terrific conversation as always with Amos. Let's get into it. Hi, Amos. Welcome back to the podcast. Hi, Neri. Thanks for inviting me. Uh and a good morning, and thank you for coming, uh, Amos. Uh last time you were on, you may remember, you may not, was last October after the Gaza ceasefire, uh, at the end of that war, which uh seems like a lifetime ago at this point because it was. But I wanted you on today to talk about uh a different war, obviously the recent Iran war and a different ceasefire uh that was reached last week between Washington and Tehran. Uh and later on, I wanted to get your thoughts about Lebanon and a few other things. But my first question to you, Amos, and it's a complicated one, I think, for many people. So five plus weeks of war uh by the US and Israel, joint military campaign really unprecedented and historic, tens of thousands of strikes, Iranian leaders gone, Iranian military and economic assets destroyed, uh, but the regime is still standing, uh, still able to fire missiles, as we saw until the very last day, 440 kilos of highly inert uranium still somewhere in Iran, um, and the Strait of Hormuz is still, for the most part, closed. So uh I know this war may not be over. Uh, this is like midterm exams, not final exams. But how should we, uh both people here and people not in Israel, think about this second Iran war? Uh, did we quote unquote win, quote unquote?

Amos 2:39

To begin with, and without trying to avoid your question, um uh the answer is first of all, it's complicated. And I think that the verdict is not out yet. Uh it's a mixed bag, exactly as you uh described it. Uh we're in the middle of something, and we still don't know uh how this would end. And of course, um the the number one problem is that um some of the main actors are very hard to explain or understand uh regarding their motives. Uh when it comes to when it comes to President Trump, lots of surprises, um, lots of times where he contradicts himself. Uh when we talk about the Iranians, what we now understand better after five weeks of fighting is that we don't understand them at all. Um I think that most Western countries suffering uh a similar amount of humiliation and uh military blows would probably uh uh had given in to pressure uh by now. But this is not the case. Um after about a hundred hours of fighting in early March, there's uh there was a sense of euphoria, both in Israel and uh in DC. Um Israeli military planners uh were saying that this was going on much better than expected, and suddenly they did have high uh hopes that the regime would uh crumble and fall uh under the pressure. Uh regarding President Trump, we now know he's admitted that publicly, quite strangely, that he believed the war would take three days and that the Iranians would uh capitulate after uh 70 hours, 72 hours or so. This isn't where we are. So, as I said, it's um it's not a miserable draw yet, but it is a mixed bag. And the main contradiction here is between uh the absolute uh military superiority of the Israeli Air Force and the American Air Force over the Iranians and the limited um uh attack capabilities uh remaining with the Iranians on the one hand. Uh, but on the other hand, uh the absolute refusal of the current Iranian uh regime, it's not a new leadership the way Trump describes it, uh, to give in under uh such pressure. This is not what they're willing to do. For them, the fact that they remain standing, it's um victory by not being defeated, victory by survival. The fact that they're still here for some reason that uh makes them quite optimistic about the outcome. And this is why they're uh refusing uh to make important concessions. We're uh facing apparently a second round of uh uh negotiations, another session at Islamabad uh Thursday. But as far as we know, the Iranians would uh be willing to compromise, but they're not going to give up everything that the Americans demand. And while Trump uh is proud as presenting himself as a master of the deal, this time he's facing an opponent uh he hasn't dealt with before. It's much more complicated than reaching another uh real estate deal in Atlantic City or New York.

Neri 5:34

And a lot more ambitious uh campaign than maybe in Venezuela or even the negotiations over the Gaza War.

Amos 5:41

Iran is not another Venezuela. That's one thing that I think that uh the president understands now.

Neri 5:46

Yes, uh, I think we we all understand that uh very clearly. It's not just an overnight snatch and grab. Uh Amos, just staying on the military assessment of this recent war, even if it's maybe not over yet, or definitely not over yet in terms of uh a final conclusion to it. We heard this throughout the campaign where you had the the IDF especially and also the Americans, uh but less frequently, but uh coming out and saying, okay, we hit this, this, and this site, we've conducted X number of sorties in the thousands, uh, Y number of bombs. So it did seem like highly, highly successful tactical and even operational achievements, right? You know, like you said, complete air superiority, they can hit whatever they want whenever they wanted. To your mind, now five and a half weeks after this campaign started, did that translate into some kind of strategic achievement for the US and Israel in their in their campaign?

Amos 6:43

I I think that's unfortunately this is the heart of the matter. It hasn't uh yet. I I still hope that there will be a more positive outcome, but we're not there uh as we speak uh on uh Wednesday morning. Uh let's go back to February 28th. Uh Amit Segal, who's probably the journalist, Israeli journalist with the most access to Netanyahu, publishes that Saturday uh tweets about uh three uh main goals for this campaign. This is the speaking from Netanyahu's mouth, that's uh quite clearly.

Neri 7:13

From the horse's mouth.

Amos 7:15

Yeah, and the uh the the the desired outcome at that time was A regime change, b um um uh wiping out the nuclear threat, and and and c wiping out the the missile, the ballistic missile threat uh to towards Israel. Now, when we judge according to these three uh categories, then this hasn't been achieved yet. The regime is for the time being is still in power. It may be the the you know the successors, but they're still um um you know on the same uh ideological uh um level as as their uh uh predecessors. Uh the nuclear threat hasn't changed much. The main event you've uh mentioned earlier, those uh 440 kilograms of uh enriched uranium to 60 percent. This is the main danger. It's possible for Iran to, in the future, to produce 11 nuclear bombs from from that uh stockpile, and this needs to be dealt with. And regarding uh missiles, again, we were too optimistic. Uh as many of those launchers uh were hit, but in most cases they were stuck on the ground and not destroyed completely. What we say now uh just yesterday CNN published uh new satellite photos of the Iranians trying to um um reuse uh those same launchers, and it's quite uh clear that the uh Iranians, if uh war resumes, that the Iranians would uh uh resume launching rockets, uh missiles towards Israel and the Gulf states. Not the end of the world. It's not the hundreds a day that they wished uh they could uh shoot at Israel. But even if it's 10 to 15, if they're divided properly, and this is what we're very good at doing, it can we know how it can uh influence our uh uh public morale and so on, and it's a it's an imminent danger as well. I wouldn't underestimate uh the danger. So, what are we left with? One thing that uh we've seen is that because we haven't been able to reach regime change, what we're doing is uh state destruction or disruption. This is this is uh what you actually see. Israel is systematically wiping out capabilities and not all of the military. So uh I think a lot of this has to do with long-term uh damage to uh the Iranian state, to the Iranian leadership. The question is how much does the uh regime care? Does the leadership really um uh agonize at night uh uh over the hardships uh suffered by the population? I'm not so sure. And then there's uh there's the question of uh uh military capabilities. How far ahead are we? It's presumably this has been quite significant. Uh but then again, we've seen the same story with Hamas. How many times did Netanyahu promise a final decisive victory? How many times did he announce that this was uh more or less over? In all of these cases, what we see now is uh the the uh opponents, our enemies are still standing, whether it's Gizbalah after being defeated at 24, Hamas after uh supposedly being defeated in 25, they're still there. So the same is true uh for Iran. So the capabilities, a lot of them were hurt, but it's not enough uh to take away their uh will to fight and their um um you know their ability to hurt us in some way. And of course, I keep repeating that. Life in Tehran is a dozen times more miserable than it is in Tel Aviv. We complain, but there's no strode to truth for order, people go to work, people are back in school, and so on. That's not the case in Tehran. Tehran is is much worse right now.

Neri 10:47

So I thought you were gonna take it somewhere slightly different, where uh even last June, after the first Iran war, there were uh assessments that we both heard. We even talked about it on this podcast because you came on right after that, uh, not ceasefire, but end of that campaign. And Netanyahu said, you know, we've eliminated a existential threat. It was a historic victory. It was backed up by all kinds of data points from the IDF. And even going back to, I think, nearly every round in Gaza before October 7th, you had Israeli generals get up there and say, Well, we we've taken them back 10, 20, 30 years, back to the state.

Amos 11:27

Yeah. Look, I I it's good that you mentioned that. And I hope I was uh doubtful and suspicious enough when we discussed that in June. But yeah, Netanyahu at that time bragged about wiping out uh two major existential threats to the state of Israel. And when we talked to experts at that time, I I assume you had the same experience. They refused to commit to the same kind of uh loud rhetoric that Netanyahu uh was using. Uh the truth of the matter was that there was significant damage to the leadership at that time, not as high as Khamenay, but others were hit, leaders of the IRGC, of the army, uh nuclear scientists, and so on. Their um uh missile arsenal was uh depleted to some extent. And uh, of course, nuclear damage, uh damage to nuclear sites, such as Faudon, Natanzi Sfan. But actually, uh, when you discuss the uh those uh nuclear uh sites, uh they were hardly hit this time. We remain the main problem remains those uh uh kilos that we mentioned.

Neri 12:27

Right. So uh damage was inflicted, is inflicted, uh, and yet it remains to be seen how far back they're actually taken, how far it's degraded. Uh and by the way, I must uh you cited CNN earlier about the the missiles and Iran's vast missile arsenal. I think you were the first one to report uh a week or so ago, maybe two weeks ago now, that uh Iran was able to uncork or unplug all of those underground missile sites, uh which the entrances were bombed, so they couldn't access it, but then they were able to reopen uh those tunnel shafts. Um so again, how do you count that? Are they really out of use? Are they temporarily out of use? Um, not a minor point when you're counting when you're counting data points.

Amos 13:13

I I would also add uh that there's one uh uh thing that's common to to all uh these rounds of uh fighting in Iran, uh Lebanon, Gaza, and so on. And that I think it goes to the heart of the problem regarding Netanyahu. And that's the this huge gap between military capabilities under him, uh, led by the army, Mossad, Jinbet, and so on, and the absolute uh inability to translate this to any kind of strategic uh um uh agreement or any kind of uh new strategic situation. Of course, Netanyahu himself described this uh very differently. Uh he's uh recently began saying that we are not only a regional superpower, but almost a world superpower. And he brags about um creating security zones uh in Lebanon, in Syria, uh uh on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights at Mount Helmon, and in Gaza, 50% of the Gaza uh strip. So this is the new reality. This is the answer that he's trying uh uh to provide to accusations that he hasn't reached strategic victories. But in reality, this is the problem. We're left in a situation in which I call them tabs, like the tabs you have on your uh computer. All of those tabs remain open. All of these problems remain without any kind of uh stable solution. Of course, Israel is stronger than all of its enemies, and perhaps all of its enemies combined. But this doesn't lead us, nobody's talking of peace, peace, and tranquility anymore. But this doesn't lead us to any kind of a satisfactory long-term arrangement. And part of the problem is is because of his refusal to negotiate on these issues. So there's a breakthrough regarding direct negotiations with Lebanon in Washington, but this is because Trump demanded that of him. And we all know that Gaza would never have ended the way it did in October, last October, if Trump hadn't intervened after that uh Israeli strike in Qatar.

Neri 15:07

All true. Uh the lack of uh, as they say here, uh a diplomatic finishing leg to all these various military campaigns that have been going on now for over two and a half years, incapable of reaching those diplomatic agreements, and he doesn't want to, right? There's domestic politics involved.

Amos 15:24

It's both. It has to do with his uh legal problems, his will of survival, which is very, very strong, and his political issues. But I I should remind you that for months, if not more than a year, um regarding Gaza, his uh answer to American pressure, first from President Biden and then from President Trump, was that he couldn't reach a final deal because that would create enormous political problems. And Benkville and Smotovic would leave uh the government, the coalition, if he uh dares uh sign a final deal with Hamas. And in reality, all of these prisoners, uh our hostages came home. Uh, I think around 2,500 prisoners, uh Palestinians were released, many of them murderers, and we didn't see one single demonstration from the hard right against the deal. And Smoto Chemeng remain in government and in power, the seats are quite comfortable, and they did nothing about this. So I don't know if it this was pre-arranged, but in reality, he uh his explanations, the explanations he gave to Biden and Trump uh appear to be false.

Neri 16:28

Yeah, uh he was able to end, at least for now, the war in Gaza. He's now negotiating with the Lebanese in Washington. Um he stopped the offensive against Iran, obviously, in coordination with the Americans. I mean, he's done many things that uh let's say if Netanyahu was in opposition, uh there would probably be demonstrations on the street in the streets against the government of the day.

Amos 16:51

No, this is again welcome to the Middle East. Uh it's Haqalbin used to say that there are no holy dates uh in the Middle East. Uh Netanyahu is is very much integrated into the region. Uh, he cares nothing about uh dates, deadlines, and so on. He's not bothered by this at all.

Neri 17:07

Let's get into the ceasefire talks that are currently still ongoing. And like you said, uh there may be a second round of talks between the US and Iran in Pakistan um maybe tomorrow, Thursday. And like you said, we're recording this on Wednesday morning Tel Aviv time. Um I mean, look, the the fighting has been halted, paused, uh, not ended fully. Uh do you think, I mean, first kind of very broad question almost, do you think there are prospects for the US and Iran to actually get a deal to formally and officially end the war?

Amos 17:39

I'll say something and then I'll contradict myself. Uh I think there's uh there's a zone of possible agreement there. And I think that both sides uh actually would prefer a deal than uh a continued uh war. Uh the Iranians, in spite of everything that we've said, have uh suffered quite a lot of blows. And the regime, um, first and foremost is its survival, but it would like to turn uh a page. And regarding Trump himself, uh, what we see after all of those weeks is that he he had many opportunities to uh step on the gas, to you know, to move forward with all of America's might and to strike Iran, its uh national uh infrastructure, and so on. And in all of these cases, uh he hesitated and he chose another way. The best example is last week, of course, or the week before that, I think it's a slightly uh earlier. On the one hand, he threatened the total destruction of Iranian civilization. It would be a pity, but uh he would do that. And on the other hand, a day later, uh he sent uh JD Vance to negotiations. So I think it's quite apparent that he would prefer a deal. Having said all that, uh the main issue for me is that the Iranians are too full of themselves right now. That they feel uh by surviving they had the upper hand, and therefore they can still present uh um hardline demands in the negotiations. And as long as we don't understand that they can be hit even more badly, then it will be hard uh to squeeze uh concessions out of them. And this is the main issue. I think there's a possibility there, but if it doesn't, then we'll see quick escalation. And perhaps that would be needed for them to get back to the negotiation uh table. We'll have to see. Uh there's a will uh to compromise. Perhaps it's not enough uh considering the gap in in the uh positions. Although uh, you know, we've heard already uh talking of uh the both sides talking of the number of years uh with no enrichment uh in Iran, whether it's 20, as the Americans are demanding, or five years as the Iranians are suggesting, there's a middle way. My worry as an Israeli is that perhaps the agreement would not be enough, that what would be achieved would not be enough to uh uh keep Israel secure, and that Trump would lose interest. And perhaps having, if not exactly failed, having not succeeded in the region, perhaps he would actually gradually uh withdraw uh and and and lose interest in what's going on there. And that could be very, very problematic for us. It would be problematic on Iran, but also regarding Lebanon and uh and Gaza. And to combine everything that we've said with the political issues, it's quite clear the elections are supposed to be held in October. It's quite clear that this uh either strategy or or the opposite of strategy, but that this result of keeping tabs open means that this is useful for Netanyahu. That as long as the fire is burning on one front or more, then he can have all the excuses in the world for what he's doing. And that would be extremely useful if we have uh close uh uh um elections, a competition between the two sides, which is uh a narrow gap between the political support of opposition and coalition. And also it keeps people on their toes. It's something that he he wants. The more there are discussions over what to do with Hamas in Gaza or the Holy Crusade against Gisbalah in Lebanon, that would mean less talk of who's uh uh more corrupt or who's to blame for the terrible failure of October 7th. So I think it's useful for Netanyahu uh to keep uh uh the war going, at least on one front and perhaps more. And if Trump does withdraw, that becomes a big issue for Israel.

Neri 21:29

It does. I want to unpack a few things. Uh and by the way, Amos, um, yes, uh kind of endless conflict, this low-level state of emergency or even high-level state of emergency does does serve uh especially uh a right wing prime minister in this country, especially heading into an election.

Amos 21:44

A populist one, yeah.

Neri 21:45

And a populist, right. And a person who um, well, we've we've seen it for for years, if not decades. He's uh you know, he can get up there and and basically say anything.

Amos 21:54

Quite persuasively.

Neri 21:55

Yeah, quite to quite persuasively to to himself, first and foremost, and then by Extension at least to his supporters.

Amos 22:02

But it's also um Are you old enough to remember Seinfeld? So it's not a lie if you believe in it, as uh George Costanza has told us uh constantly.

Neri 22:10

Yeah, George, George Costanza, uh the George Costanza theory of um Israeli politics. Right. If you say something uh with enough conviction and repeatedly, then everyone maybe starts believing it. It's true. Uh and I was gonna add, it's it's almost unfalsifiable, right? If you don't uh acknowledge or commit uh to some campaign or front or war ending, and you say, well, uh, you know, next month or in three months or next year, we're gonna continue the war and and this time really bring total victory, then well, why why wouldn't I vote for that person? You know, he's promising, he's still promising, decisive victory, not total victory anymore.

Speaker 22:55

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Neri 23:54

I wanted to unpack a few things. So you mentioned the Iranians uh very full of themselves. Uh obviously they they think they've, you know, if not won, then they've definitely not lost in their minds. Uh, but Trump is also, at least publicly, maintaining a very maximalist line where he's saying no nuclear weapons, reopen the strait. You know, there were reports even that he he himself didn't like this idea of a 20-year window for uh Iran to not enrich uranium. So going back to I think the third point you made, I mean, is there is there a risk here that Trump um either maintains a very maximalist demand and then you can't get a deal, or is there a chance Trump actually blinks, which is very concerning to people here in Israel?

Amos 24:40

Look, it's it's hard to tell. And one thing we've learned is that you should never gamble on what Trump would do. He keeps contradicting himself, he's all over the place, truth social, and so on. Uh I I I heard uh uh a podcast uh um uh where it was discussed uh that mostly his um the way he tweets uh late at night and early in the morning, these are the important uh statements. It's him and his and his laptop or him and his uh iPhone, and and that's it. And and then you know what he actually feels. But it's hard to say. Right now, I again I don't pretend to have a uh a deep understanding of the man. I've I'm I've I'm following him with a lot of interest uh from far away for quite some time. My guess would be uh that he's not uh that he's not happy, that it this is uh going on for too long, that it became too complicated and too costly. This isn't the way he imagined it to himself after Venezuela. We've mentioned he thought it would take three days. He was uh looking for a remarkable uh perhaps a parade in New York or Washington, a remarkable victory, something that would help him portray himself to the public as a wartime president, the guy who never fought in uh in Vietnam, of course, although he's he was the right age. Uh and it's not going on that well. It's again, it's uh the Iranians, I wouldn't overestimate their capabilities. I think very disappointed with themselves regarding the amount of the level of harm that they've managed to cause here. And yet they're uh you know, they're uh quite an uh an um uh an impressive enemy. Uh they're not, you know, they're uh maybe it's not three-dimensional chess, but it's they're playing a uh uh hardball and they're willing to fight. And this is not the way he imagined it. So is there more of a chance of him losing interest, declaring victory and getting out? I would suspect yes, that at one point or another he'll either reach a compromise or just disassociate himself from the from the events here in the region and and I don't know, concentrate on Greenland or on China uh or whatever. Uh for the time being, we saw that in spite of the economic uh damage around the world, in spite of the uh emerging uh energy crisis, he's sticking to his guns, perhaps because it's hard for him to withdraw under these circumstances. It's against his image as a tough guy and so on. But are the Iranians more willing to fight than he is? Um I I I suspect there's a possibility, I'd say this very, very carefully, there's a possibility that this is the reality.

Neri 27:09

Yeah, and uh again, he's he's maybe stayed in this longer than people expected. Uh but also if he cuts and runs, that doesn't match his um projection of strength, at least in his own mind. Uh Amos, the the second point you you mentioned, um the potential for the talks to to actually break down and at least some level of fighting resuming. So we saw Trump uh declare a naval blockade, I think, two days ago now, which has been um according to CENTCOM implemented. There is a potential for further escalation, um, I imagine if the talks break down. How do you how do you see that happening? In other words, what is a scenario that you imagine from a military point of view where um if diplomacy does not move forward, what could we be looking at? And uh I'm sure you get this question uh every hour of every day. Um, you know, are missiles gonna start flying again uh at uh at Israel?

Amos 28:05

So I'd say something that is goes perhaps uh uh um uh against what you've heard in in recent days. I think the main event is Islamabad and not so much the Gulf. What you see in the Gulf is a sort of a double blockade. Uh there's the Iranian blockade of closing the Homo Strait and uh perhaps demanding tolls and uh and so on, but it has been effective to an extent, but it hasn't changed uh everything. And on the other hand, you have the American response because the last round of uh negotiations in Islamabad ended with failure, Trump needed to do something. Uh he was not close yet to the end of his ultimatum, but he needed to to to uh um to project uh uh uh power, and this is why he blocked uh exit from the Gulf uh for the Iranians themselves, uh a little bit south of the Homo Strait. So this is important, but as we speak on Wednesday uh morning, and this is about I think uh 30 or 36 hours after this has been uh uh implemented, we haven't seen uh massive friction. The Iranians are of course capable of launching uh missiles towards those ships or trying to uh uh to send explosives, they haven't done that yet. So both sides are a bit cautious. It it hurts the shipping, but it doesn't it didn't blow up yet. I could be wrong on this and could it could change in a few hours, but this is the reality. So I think the decisions would actually be made in Islamabad and Washington and Tehran. It's what's going on in those negotiations, if we indeed resume tomorrow on Thursday, which would decide uh the course of events in the next uh weeks or so. Uh but I think uh that if it fails there, then Trump wouldn't have uh a lot of uh uh options and that he would have to escalate under these uh uh circumstances. And that's the that's the issue. Whoever this next round of talks succeeds, and then uh the the blockade would be eased. Or uh if if they can't reach an agreement and there's uh there are no signs of uh of progress, then maybe the president would have to go to escalate to go to the next uh round. But it has for the time being, it has less to do with it what's actually going on in the field, so to speak, uh, or at sea.

Neri 30:21

Right. Uh the military maneuvers and potential actions uh as an extension of the politics and diplomacy uh in the various capitals. Um final question, almost just uh a follow-up. I mean, in terms of escalation options for the US and I imagine also Israel, what more can be done short of um well, Trump has already threatened power plants, bridges, civilization?

Amos 30:46

There are other uh uh possibilities there. Uh he could hit uh infrastructure, uh, and he's already threatened that. Uh he could do something to uh to actually uh uh move through the Homo Straits, which would uh mean uh uh massive uh friction such as uh we haven't seen uh yet, neither on ground or at sea. That could also mean uh um some kind of uh use of uh the marine forces that is already deployed uh uh to the area. I doubt whether this would mean uh a real ground uh military commitment. That's I I suspect, correct me if I'm wrong here, but I suspect that this is too much for the American voters and it wouldn't uh um escalate in that direction. But anything uh short of this is uh entirely uh possible. Regarding Israel, uh Netanyahu does not hide his uh intention for this to happen. He may be not as influential as he was before. We now know from the New York Times uh uh story uh that Netanyahu, it was Netanyahu who persuaded Trump on February 11th uh that uh uh they should go for uh uh uh a joint campaign against the Iranians, and it was against uh the advice of most of the people around Trump. Netanyahu was able to convince him. He promised him quite a lot of things that didn't uh materialize, such as regime change and so on. I think there's he has limited, never underestimate Netanyahu's uh influence on Trump. We've seen that work before, and yet I think that at this moment he has more a more limited influence than he had before. This is about Trump's interests and not Israel's interests. Israel has to play second fiddle uh to what the uh Americans uh decide to do.

Neri 32:30

And yes, it you know, in fairness, uh even the New York Times article uh laying out Netanyahu's influence on Trump made it clear that Trump agreed with those assessments, uh wanted to do this uh, as he calls it, little journey uh to Iran. So it wasn't uh entirely uh kind of Netanyahu and Israel pushing Trump uh into this campaign. Uh we have to we have to kind of be be fair on that front. Uh but uh Netanyahu and Israel's influence, uh especially on this last ceasefire in Iran, definitely um was not there. Uh they were not consulted ahead of time. They were told after it was a fate accomplished. So uh they're following Trump's lead uh in terms of the diplomacy. Amos, uh I wanted to definitely touch on the what was a secondary front um in this overall campaign, which was Lebanon. Uh it was uh definitely not a secondary front for all of northern Israel, which is still, as we speak, getting hit by uh Hezbollah rockets and drones. Uh but even Yal Zamir, the IDF chief of staff, has now said, at least for the military, that Lebanon is now their primary focus. Um, I mean, big picture, can you explain to me and to our viewers and listeners uh what Israel is trying to actually accomplish in Lebanon? Uh what's the objective and strategy that they're trying to implement on the ground? Uh, because we have heard over the past, what, six weeks now, different things from different Israeli officials with regard to uh what they're trying to do.

Amos 33:59

So we'll have to remo rewind a little to the beginning of this war. October 7th, immediately after the uh Hamas attack on the Gaza envelope uh communities, uh Kizbala hesitates. Uh Hamas asks Hezbollah in Iran to join. They don't exactly uh join. Hezbollah starts shooting at Israel on October 8th, but it doesn't go all the way. It's not committed to the cause to that extent. Later, by the summer of 24, uh things escalate along the border, and Israel manages more or less to defeat Kizbala, or this is at least what we fought, by November 24. A ceasefire is reached after uh the Pager attack, after uh uh Nasralla, uh the leader, Hezbollah's leader and uh other commanders are uh assassinated by Israel. It's quite a victory. Yet, having said that, uh actually fighting continued. It was Israel that struck uh Kizbala targets in southern Lebanon and sometimes in the Baka Valley and even Beirut since November and up to February uh 26. There were more than 400 during the ostensible ceasefire. Yeah. Yeah. There were more than uh 400 Hezbalah operatives uh who were killed uh during that period, and yet Hezbollah sat tight and didn't do anything until uh Israel assassinated Khamenei, the number one persona in the Shiite uh world, a religious uh leader as well, Kizbalah reacted by launching a few rockets to the northern border. For Israel, that was enough. Israeli generals uh said that Hezbollah actually walked itself into a trap, a trap, and then Israel retaliated with all its might. And what we have, uh fast forward five weeks later, is an ongoing problem, uh, maybe the beginning of a quagmire. Because Israel is now saying that it will need a security zone, uh, that perhaps it would maintain control of outposts that are about uh eight to ten kilometers north of the border. But in spite of the ceasefire uh in um Iran, uh no such ceasefire or agreement was reached in Lebanon. And fighting goes on. Last week, uh the day after the ceasefire in Iran, there was a very heavy Israeli uh bombing all over the place, mostly in Sunni population centers around Lebanon. More than 350 people killed, according to uh Lebanese health authorities, two-thirds of them, more or less, uh Hezbollah uh personnel. And yet this was devastating. And what we have now are, of course, negotiations going on in Washington. So, what actually happened? Trump allowed Netanyahu some leeway. Netanyahu needed again a place where he could continue fighting as the war stopped uh in Iran, and this is why uh he struck uh Kizbalah. He has a problem there with uh the residents of the Upper Galilee and the Western Galilee. He's promised them so many times that this is over with, and yet Hezbollah is capable of launching around uh a hundred missiles and rockets and drones uh a day, and life is not safe uh uh near uh the border. So for him, for Netanyahu, it's it's important to continue this war. The problem, as usual, is that in spite of the fact that we've killed many, many Kizbala uh personnel, um, according to the chief of staff, more than a thousand uh were killed. And in fact, in spite of the fact that there's heavy destruction all over the place in Lebanon, this hasn't persuaded Kizbalah to give up. Hezbollah continues to fight, and it's uh it's refusing to accept an agreement. The negotiations are going on with the Lebanese government now with Kizbalah. So this is where we are a continued fight, uh no end in sight. Israel has the upper hand, that's very, very clear. Our casualties are quite limited. I think it's around 13 uh killed since the beginning of the war on the north, only one or two civilians, most of them soldiers. And yet, again, trans how to translate this into a strategic agreement and a victory, that remains a mystery. And the army itself seems a little bit uh lost uh there. I think that they're not really sure what their goals are or what they could achieve. What we're doing is hitting Lebanon, I wouldn't say blindly, but with massive force, but without reaching to uh reaching final decisive uh results.

Neri 38:20

There's a pattern here, uh which we've been talking about now since uh for over 30 minutes. Um just in in terms of a Lebanon. Right, over two and a half years, actually. Uh just in terms of of uh you know their concrete goals and strategy. I mean, the one thing that seemed very clear because we heard from Netanyahu um and then in different terminology by IDF uh officers as well, is that a new security zone, buffer zone, forward defensive line will actually be established um in southern Lebanon. Uh as somebody who who covered this for years, the old security zone in the 80s and 90s, should we be worried? Is there a strategic rationale to actually re-establish uh this thing? I'm worried.

Amos 39:08

Look, there are no uh easy solutions here. If if there were, we would have tried them already. And yet the security zone in the 90s was not a success. And there was a reason why the Israeli public was went out, wanted out at that time. It was not because of progressive uh beliefs, it was not because of the Oslo Accords, is not it was not because the army or the society were weak. It didn't serve its uh purpose. In the end, it was not a problem for Ghizbala to shoot rockets over the heads of the soldiers in southern Lebanon and hit targets inside Israel. And the same is true right now. It doesn't, it's true that some of these rockets hit southern Lebanon and the army units, and yet every day rockets are launched from north of the Litani River and hitting uh Israeli targets. So I think that people are looking for solutions which are much too simple, and this is uh this is a basic issue. Another thing that worries me is this obsession with symbols. We're in the Middle East, we're fighting against jihadists and so on. Therefore, we need to teach them a lesson and we need for this to be symbolic. I I just read a uh a headline at the Adiotachono today suggesting that victory would be achieved through the town of Binch Bail and that the chief of staff should give a speech at Binch Bael. Why Binch Bail? Because in 2000, this is the site of the Kizbala's uh uh famous victory, of Nasserala's speech about where he compared the Israeli society in May 2000, a day after the Israeli withdrawal, which was um unilateral and unconditional, uh he gave a speech in which he compared the Israeli society to a cobweb, a spider's web, saying that Israel was too weak and all the Arabs uh should do is learn from Krisbara's lessons, and and the way to defeat Israel was by force and fighting them on the battlefield. And I don't know if I have to remind you of this, but in 2006, during uh Lebanon II, the next Lebanon war, Israeli uh army fought a census battle in Binch Bael. Uh soldiers were killed actually trying to uh uh to get themselves uh uh photos with an Israeli flag uh in Binch Bel. And Amir Perez, who at the time seemed to be the worst defense minister, we've since then we've learned that uh it could be worse, uh, actually had plans to give a speech at Binch Bael, at the former, at the pre- uh at the site of the former uh uh headquarters of the Israeli Western uh brigade in southern Lebanon. So 20 years later, we haven't learned anything. We're repeating our mistakes. And every day soldiers are being injured now in Binch Bael, and there's there are reports of a pocket of resistance there and a small enclave where Hezbollah fighters are still uh holding and will defeat them soon, and of course, life in the Middle East will change completely. You will feel this at your home, uh Nelly. Once we defeat Hezbollah once and for all, everything would be changed. So that kind of talk scares me, especially because we don't learn from history. We we refuse to learn anything. It's not as if I have alternative solutions, but I'm pretty convinced that a speech in binge bail wouldn't change anything.

Neri 42:22

You're being a bit modest. Amos, you and our good friend Avi Zacharov wrote a whole book about the Second Lebanon War, uh, and Binge Bale featured featured prominently uh I'm busy promoting my next book by now, so I'm not I'm not focused on that. I mean, I I I I will not name I will not name uh names, but uh you and Avi's book is being read as we speak. Uh not in not in Israel.

Amos 42:46

Um I look, there's uh there's there are some good uh stories about that. But once a colleague sent me a copy of our uh book from a bookstore, a photograph of a copy from a window in a bookstore in Binjbin. It has it's it's actually here. It has uh it's actually here at my study. It has a picture of uh Khomenei and uh and Khomeini and our book at uh at the window. So uh I we've had that experience in the past. And actually during the war, every now and then I would get uh a mail from uh an email from a Miliwimnik from a reservist saying that they were reading the book and how much history did repeat itself. So yeah, we're in sort of a time loop for quite some time.

Neri 43:30

Oof. Uh yeah. The first anecdote I really liked, the second one uh less so that reservists are that that are now fighting in southern Lebanon are are reading uh a book about the war two decades ago. Um just uh wrapping up the Lebanon issue almost, I mean, any hope that these talks, albeit low level at initial in Washington that started yesterday will will lead to some kind of breakthrough?

Amos 43:53

I I think there's hope. I think the Americans want this over. It's pretty clear after the bombing that uh Trump told Uh Netanyahu to restrain himself. And what we see in recent days are skirmishes in Southern Lebanon, but less Israeli bombings in Beirut or in Baka Valley. If indeed Iran ends, the war in Iran ends, then the war in Lebanon would end as well. The problem would be how to get a secure agreement, something that would uh promise us uh that we'd be safer on the on the Lebanon front. But there's also a lesson. In 24, I felt that the army was victorious. It was actually, it did a very good job at that time. And yet our hopes were uh probably too high. Uh I think that we were too optimistic about the outcome, and we didn't uh fully grasp their willing to fight, the willingness to fight in spite of the damages inflicted in fight in spite of the casualties. I keep being reminded, I think Avi uses that uh example a lot. But you remember Monty Python and the the holy grail. Yeah, that uh knight who keeps fighting after his uh hands and legs are cut off and so on. Come back, you cowards, come back and fight. This is the way Hezbollah is quite willing to engage in spite of this uh massive destruction all over uh Lebanon and to its own villages, headquarters, uh military sites, and so on. It is willing to fight. We'll have to see how this plays out between Beirut and Tehran, what Tehran wants Kizbala to do in the long run. Tehran still see still sees Khezbala's proxy force that needs to be protected and perhaps kept for the next round. So we'll we'll have to see how this plays out. I I haven't lost hope that some kind of an agreement would be reached. I would yet uh um um warn of one possible consequence, as one possible consequence, and we've already seen Kizbala threatening, and that's uh uh the lives of the uh Lebanese president and uh military chief of staff and so on. Kizbala has used uh um you know such uh methods in the past. We've seen the Khariri assassination. Uh I wouldn't rule it out completely as a possible outcome.

Neri 45:57

Yeah, they've um I think become more emboldened than they have been definitely over the past year uh in recent weeks because they're they have been putting up a fight uh against the IDF. Uh that's true. So uh they've maybe refound both their military and uh political footing, uh, but hopefully it doesn't come to it uh in Lebanon. Final question for you, Amos, and it probably sums up maybe a lot of the topics that we were talking about with regard to Iran, Lebanon, and it's an issue that you've touched on in recent call-ups uh of yours, but I don't think is really well understood outside of Israel, and that's the lack uh of coherent decision making uh at the very top of the national security and defense uh establishment here. I think one explanation is the, as you've laid out, uh, is the lack of uh appointments to senior posts, uh like the National Security Council and the Prime Minister's office, or at the top levels of the defense ministry. Um, and also, again, correct me if I'm wrong, but the way Netanyahu has uh politicized or corrupted uh other bodies in the defense establishment, like the Shin Bet, uh, the Defense Minister himself, um, maybe even soon the Mossad with this new appointment. So, could you explain to people, especially outside of Israel, why this issue is so important and how decisions are actually made on these very, very fateful issues of security and defense? Because to my mind, it just seems like Netanyahu is at the top with no real pushback, deciding alone.

Amos 47:29

There's no bottom. Look, it's a combination of two trends. One is uh Netanyahu attempting to corrupt everything around him, it's a battle of survival, and it's about uh survival by any means necessary by now, because in his view, I don't think he's right about that. But in his view, uh not only uh is there is uh is there a possibility of him losing in his trial, but there is a vivid possibility of him ending his life in jail. And that needs to be avoided by any means necessary. And a lot of his calculations during those years, I think a lot of what led to the disaster on October 7th has to do with that, with his uh insistence on staying in power. Uh but what he does is by now corrupt the people around him. We see his uh legal campaigns, his campaigns against the legal system, but also his attempts to find uh more and more people who would only say yes, sir, to everything he says, the way uh Trump wants it uh to happen in the United States as well. And this is what he does in Shinbet, this is what he already did in the police. Uh we see signs that this might happen in Mossad uh as well. And the army is affected as well. Uh General Zamil was an appointment suggested by Defense Minister Khatz. He probably uh regrets it by now. But Zamir himself, he's fighting, it's not exactly a losing battle, but he he keeps withdrawing and still fighting. And he keeps telling uh people around him that he needs to pick his battles. He can't fight all the time against everybody. But what we see is gradual withdrawal regarding all kinds of uh uh military uh uh positions, regarding uh moral issues, and so on. So this is one issue. The second issue is uh, and and we've alluded to that before, the lack of strategy. Netanyahu is a guy who doesn't uh appreciate strategy. He keeps quoting when he talks to the generals, he quotes his father, the famous historian, who never believed in strategy, who felt that leaders uh did not do uh strategy but had other uh motivations, whether ideological or interest or so on. But Netanyahu despises the word strategy. One American general told his counterparts in Israel when he left, he said that he understands there's no Hebrew word for strategy. This is the way the Americans uh perceive us. So this is uh this is uh where we are. So it's not only the fact that a lot of people have left, have been fired, resigned. Think of Sahya Negbi, the national security advisor. Fired by Netanyahu, forced to leave on October after they had disagreements over the hostage deal. He hasn't been replaced yet. Others, and to other important positions, he's actually appointing people who would only say yes to everything he demands. So the combination of corruption, of changes in uh military and security leadership, and of the general mood around the country and his legal and personal problems, all of these uh together create a very uh troubling situation, which I think affects our uh our our uh um the the way we we achieve our goals on the battle uh front, because again, because this is not discussed uh properly, and because there are not enough people to tell him no. And an example for that, I think, would be what we've heard from uh uh from the New York Times regarding the regime change. How many people in Israel believed that was possible? Did Netanyahu force his uh position uh on the uh professional uh level and so on? There's a lot we we don't know yet, but I think the signs are there. I think that we were already seeing deterioration. And a good example of that is what happened this week with uh head of Shinbet, uh Zini, uh, who actually gave uh Netanyahu a statement uh which warned against Netanyahu from appearing and uh against Netanyahu appearing in at the Tel Aviv District Court because uh the Iranians could hit him there. At the same time, Netanyahu is on all of these ceremonies for uh Independence Day, Memorial Day, Holocaust Remembrance Day, and so on. While he claims that he cannot be at a single place uh uh which is known in advance because the Iranians could hit him. Well, apparently the Iranians could hit him deep underground in the district court in Tel Aviv, but not at the Advashem in Jerusalem, when he's out in the open at an hour in which everybody in the region knows uh that the ceremony is held every year. That's uh part of our newer reality.

Neri 52:02

Right. Um appointing people very close to him or aligned with him.

Amos 52:07

You get what you invested in, yeah, the return of your investment. As Zini is a very good example of that.

Neri 52:12

Right. And uh hovering over all of it is a security cabinet of his government. Nonexistent. Nonexistent, rubber stamp. So in in the past in Israel, you've had very um contentious security cabinets with uh a diversity of opinion. Um but that's good. It's a good summation. It's something that is not really well understood outside of Israel, uh, but something that you've definitely highlighted uh in your columns, Amos. Hoping for your you know better days, I suppose. Uh speaking speaking of something positive, Amos, uh, how is the book coming along?

Amos 52:45

Uh the Hebrew version is uh finished, should be out in uh a month, uh slightly over a month. But the problem, of course, is how do you end the book about a war that keeps on going? Uh I think it's uh is it Al Pacino at the uh the um Godfather saying that he each time he wants out, he's you guys pull me back in.

Neri 53:06

Godfather three.

Amos 53:07

I never remember if it's Scarface or or or uh or uh the Godfather, but this is the way I feel about this. I want an end to the story. Uh perhaps not with a positive note, but you know, just an end to the book. And I keep adding more pages, but at least the Hebrew version should be out uh by by June. I hope uh we'll we'll stick to the deadline. And regarding the English uh version, that would take a while.

Neri 53:30

Okay. Uh so we'll look out for that uh hopefully this summer. Talks in Islamabad, notwithstanding. Uh Amos, thank you as always uh for the time. Thank you for having me. And we'll talk to you soon. Take care. Okay, thanks again to Amos Harrell for the generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor, Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so keeping a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening and please subscribe and spread the word.