Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Back this week for our regular check-in and kibbits is Israel Policy Forum's very own Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow, and our dear friend and former colleague, Shera Efron, a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation, and their distinguished Israel policy chair. I wanted to hear from Michael and Sheera about the big news this weekend in Israeli politics, with the merger between Naftali Bennett and Yar Lapid, the latest on the Iran non-war and non-deal still ongoing, Iron Dome deployed to the United Arab Emirates, and much more. A great conversation as always with those two. But before we begin, I'd just like to say a word about the other big news of the weekend, the attempted attack and shooting on and of President Donald Trump at the annual White House Correspondence Dinner in Washington. Thankfully, no one was seriously hurt, including the president and other senior U.S. officials in attendance. I also had many journalist friends at the event, some of whom even continued reporting right through the chaos in Mayhem. So kudos to them. But I'm very glad everyone is safe and sound. Also, kudos, of course, to the U.S. Secret Service for doing their job quickly and professionally, stopping the gunmen from getting into the ballroom and avoiding, well, something potentially terrible taking place. So with all that, let's get to Michael and Sheera. Hi Michael, hi Shera. Welcome back to the podcast.

Shira 1:46

Hi Nary, hi Michael. Good to be here.

Neri 1:50

Hi guys, good to see you. Good to see you both, especially Michael, bright and early on a Monday morning. Uh why Michael? It's not that early. I've been up for three hours. Well, earlier.

Shira 2:00

Yeah, and why especially Michael?

Neri 2:02

Well, it's Monday afternoon in our neck of the woods, Shira, and we're already, you know, two days into the week.

Shira 2:08

I also saw you last week in person, but still.

Neri 2:11

That's true. That's true. Um, how are you both doing? I'm doing all right. How about you guys?

Shira 2:16

Praise the Lord. Bahu Hashem, alhamdulillah. Everything's fine.

Initial Reactions to the Bennett-Lapid Merger

Neri 2:20

Yeah. Uh this waiting game, but the waiting game doesn't mean that there isn't uh a lack of activity, far from it. So what I wanted to do this week is uh touch on several recent big ticket stories and issues uh in the news. And uh I dare say, probably for the first time in four or five months, uh, we won't be starting with Iran, actually. We'll be starting with Israeli domestic politics um and the big news literally 24 hours ago that came down the pike. Former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yari Lapid announced that they would be merging their two parties ahead of elections later this year. Uh the new party will be called Biachad together in Hebrew. Uh and Bennett, not Lapid, will be the head of the party and their clear candidate for prime minister. Uh, we should mention that Bennett's previously unnamed party was already polling pretty close to Bibi Netanyahu's Likud party in the polls. So this new party has uh a really good chance, at least in opinion polls, at least theoretically, uh emphasis on theoretically, uh, of ending up as uh perhaps the largest party uh in the next Knesset. So uh a dramatic event, really the start, the kickoff to election season here in Israel, with elections scheduled at least by law, uh to October, late October at the latest. So, Michael, let's start with you. Uh, your initial thoughts when you saw this news flash on your phone yesterday. Uh, were you surprised?

Michael 3:51

No, I was not surprised. And I think it makes a lot of sense for both. I wasn't surprised because this is the third time that they've effectively partnered. You know, the first was 2013 to 2015 when they had their so-called alliance of brothers, right? Is that is that what they called it, if memory serves correctly? Bros, exactly. Where they agreed that the that they would either both go in or neither go in to that Netanyahu government following the 2013 elections. And then, of course, there was the Bennett Lapide change government, uh, where they alternated as prime minister for a year and a half. So this is the third time they've done this. They obviously get along well and have an effective political partnership. So I wasn't surprised. And it makes sense for both of them, given their respective weaknesses. Lapide is going down in the polls every week. He seems to lose another seat. And so joining with Bennett gives him a boost. Bennett doesn't really have any political party apparatus or nearly as much funding as he has uh now that he joins with Lapide and gets the benefit of all the Aishatid infrastructure. So it makes sense. Obviously, there are some downsides, and we can speculate on what those might be. If you're a right-wing voter who was going to vote for Bennett, maybe you are uh put off by Lapide. Um, but I think in general, this this makes sense.

Neri 5:15

The the converse. If you were a more left-wing voter potentially voting for Lapid, and now Naftali Bennett is the head of your party. Absolutely.

Michael 5:23

Although I suspect that the more left-wing voters are in Yayur Golan's camp anyway, not Yayur Lapid's camp. But, you know, I think in general this makes sense for both of them. I don't know that it's going to actually net them more seats together than they would have gotten separately. But as I said, it it does bring benefits to both of them, especially if you know you're Lapid and you're actually worried about getting close to the threshold and Bennett with funding. The more interesting part of this to me is actually not Bennett and Lapide. It's the people who are left unspoken. So we have Gaudi Eisencoat, we have Benny Gans, and what this does to them or or how they react to this, I think is actually more interesting. You know, there's now speculation that Gaudi Eisencoat might join with Bennett and Lapide. I actually think that would be a political mistake for the anti-BB block, because Eisencoat does seem to be drawing folks from the right, people who maybe would have voted for Bibi or Likud in the past. And I think they like Eisencoat because his security credentials, he's Mizrachi, which you know is also a big deal in a lot of ways. He he doesn't code as a politician the same way that certainly BB does, but also Lapide and Bennett. So I think he might actually be able to bring people from the other block. And I do worry that if he joins with Lapide and Bennett, then voters who may not like Lapide and Bennett but do like Eisencoat might look elsewhere. And, you know, this should be about increasing the size of the block, right? Not increasing your share within the block. And so I don't know that Eisencoat joining with them makes a lot of sense politically. The other person to talk about is Benny Gantz, because, you know, he's he is in many poles below the threshold. And so there's a world in which it makes sense to say, all right, like just ignore this guy and let him go. But BB is definitely going to try, I think, to bring him into his camp, especially because Gantz has been open that he would be happy to sit in a government that includes Netanyahu. And while we've been counting Gans if he's above the threshold in the anti-Bibi block, if BB somehow orchestrates uh a merger on the right that brings him Gans, or maybe even brings him into Likud, then that actually might shift some votes. And, you know, in the anti-BB block, these guys all hate Gantz, right? They've all they've all joined with him and it's split apart. So it's it's hard for me to see Lapid or Eisencoat reaching out to Gantz and saying, come with us as a way of keeping him from BB, you know, and sort of letting him fall, letting him fall. But um, I have no idea where that where this leaves Gantz and what those machinations are like. But that's actually more interesting to me than the Lapid-Bennett stuff on its own.

Neri 8:23

Just for our listeners and viewers, Yeshateed is uh Yari Lapid's centrist party, second largest party in the current Knesset. Um and Isencott, Gay Eisencott, obviously the former chief of staff of the IDF, um, entered politics, I think the last election cycle and uh had been had been in Benny Gantz's uh party. Uh, and then like Michael alluded to, like everyone else that has partnered with Benny Gantz, he uh split from Benny Gantz, and now uh Eisencott, at least nominally, is heading his own party. So he was uh essentially the uh the very named but non-present third man uh in last night's press conference between Bennett and Lapide. Uh a lot of questions, a lot of comments with regard to Gadi Eisencott and the potential for him actually joining this new uh Biachad, this new together party. Uh Shera, what did you think last night?

Shira 9:15

So I'm surprised at a few things. Uh first and foremost, I'm surprised that Michael thinks it's interesting what's happening with Benny Gandhi. That is my number one surprise.

Neri 9:23

I don't know what's interesting. The Benigans minute and a half won't be cut from this podcast. It'll obviously still remain there, but I don't know why. I'm not saying he should be relevant on his own.

Shira 9:34

I just don't know why you're why you're saying it's interesting. But anyway, it's fine. Maybe you don't have enough action in your life. Had you lived in Israel, the last thing in your life on your uh agenda. Uh I will say that I was a little bit surprised by uh them joining together, not because, as Michael said, that it's the third time they're uniting forces, but the previous two times, right? In 2013 and 2021, uh, it was after the elections. And this is something that's happening before the elections, sort of in a sense that is um, you would think that with Bennett trying to appeal to a more right-wing uh crowd and Lapide, even if it's not the left-left that is uh the Ayur Golan, it's definitely not necessarily the same sort of voters that are constituents or potential voters uh that uh Bennett um targeted, but uh it made sense that probably based on some polling and their understanding that people are not really moving between this sort of anti-BB versus BB block, that it makes sense for the advantages that Michael laid out very clearly in terms of coming together and preventing the leakage of votes, right? With the advantages of the financial and infrastructure of the party for Lapide, there are clear uh advantages here. I'll say two things that I think, I mean, it's very interesting what's going to happen. I think Eisencoat is an interesting one, and he was probably the catalyst for this, right? Because polling did show that he's uh coming close to there are a lot of people saying that he should be sort of the leader of this anti-BB block. Um, so this was in a way to corner him. But two things, first of all, credit to Yarlapid. I think it's third time that he's basically stepping aside.

Neri 11:10

Yeah, right.

Shira 11:12

Um he's sort of the senior partner, or at least formally, right? He has lots of seeds, but he's seeding uh his seat to someone else, right? With Benigans, Michael's friend, but also, no, I have nothing against Benigans, really. Just anyway. Um, I I do not. I have a lot of respect for him. Just politically, he's not uh as relevant uh at this point. Uh but he um but so kudos to Lapid that he clearly, and not for the first time, showed that he cares about the state of Israel more than his personal career, which I think he should be given credit to. I think it was also interesting to see um the BB, sort of the Likud counter campaign yesterday, immediately showing uh Lapid and Bennett and Mansur Abbas and like Arabs, they will go with the Arabs and all this like smear campaign. And I I gotta tell you, I mean, and this is something that, you know, I think to outside voters may not be clear, but if there's something that frustrates, I mean, there's so many things that are frustrating uh in Israel in the last several years, but the fact that it's legitimate to outcast or to to just ignore 20% of the population because they're of a different uh religion and ethnicity, and that even Gandhi Isencott today is apparently calling for an opposition leader's uh gathering to think of next steps without the Arabs, and the fact that it's legit and that people talk about it in ways that after October 7 we cannot have the Arabs in this, which is like, why? What have the Arabs done except for being functioning members of society very responsible that themselves they have themselves been victims of the Hamas attacks, of Lebanon, the attacks from Hezbollah, the attacks from Iran? I mean, this is if there's something that needs like tikkun olam or some sort of like fixing, it's this it's this aspect. So just put it there.

Neri 13:10

Very well put, Shera. I'll say a couple of things. Um I mean, do we have to start with Benny Gantz? Uh I think the m the closer the elections get and the farther he gets below the electoral threshold, the less of a political uh factor he will be. Um and it has kind of a reinforcing effect, right? Uh when people see that he's below the threshold, they don't want to throw away their votes. And I think at some point he'll have to make a very likely difficult decision. Um and I don't see him going, you know, going to Likud or something like that. I don't think uh there's a constituency for for that per se. Uh maybe there may be other mergers in his future, but uh like we talked well, like we talked about earlier, um he he has been proven in the past to be a problematic uh political partner. Um Gaudi Eisencott, uh let me put it this way. I think, like Shira said, he was the catalyst for this uh whole move. My theory of the case, uh which I believe to be true, um obviously, uh why did this happen yesterday between Bennett and Lepide and not say between Bennett and Eisencott or even between Lapide and Isencott is precisely the reason why Bennett moved first. That uh the natural move, especially given Lapide's uh uh decreasing poll numbers, was for him to go to Isencot and offer him the top spot in a merged party. And that in theory could have put Eisencott, like we said, in the poll position to be the opposition's uh candidate for prime minister. That uh spooked Naftali Bennett, so he moved first. And he wanted to be the clear-cut front runner and the clear-cut candidate for prime minister and not have uh potentially a a challenge from from Isencot. And for Lapide, uh, I think I don't know whether he offered this to Isencott, but I think Lapide made his own calculations and said, okay, I think uh Bennett has a better chance of of winning the next election, of being the next prime minister. I think also deep down in his heart, he probably believes that Bennett will uh be a better prime minister potentially than Ghadi Eisencott because we've seen it in the past in the change government of 2021 and 2022, which uh Lapide was the alternate prime minister uh alongside Naftali Bennett. Lapide really built that coalition, uh, but it was a real partnership. And and that government uh worked. It served the people of Israel until um well, until it collapsed because of Bennett's uh own small political party. So again, I think there are reasons for Bennett and Lapide to to make this move. Um I disagree with Michael, I think Isencott should should join this merger. Why why? What's the what's the benefit? I think there are two benefits. Number one, um it will uh how shall I put this without hurting people's feelings, it will dilute the left-wingness uh of this party. So if a potential Bennett voter uh is potentially put off by Yarlapede being you know the co the co-head or the senior partner in this new party, that bringing in Eisencott will actually uh dilute that and maybe reinforce the idea that this is really kind of a center uh center right, whatever you want to call it, uh political entity. So kind of re reinforcing the security bona fides, uh reinforcing, like you said, Eisencott's um Mizrachi. Um he's also, by the way, he lost a son uh in the Gaza War, he lost his nephew in the Gaza War. Um, these are things that that are important here in Israel, especially after the 7th of October in the last two and a half years. Um so I think it it will only kind of um uh increase the appeal of this particular party, not decrease the appeal. And this idea of kind of moving votes from one block to the next, sure, in theory, uh, but it but is somebody who is not willing to vote for Netanyahu and Likud and is not really in the space of Batila Smotrich and Nitabar Benvir in the far right, are they really gonna be put off now that Bennett and Lapide are running together? Um, they were gonna be allies in any future coalition anyway, right? And by the way, if you're a more hard-line kind of Israeli voter, you also have Evidor Lieberman as an option. So I don't know. I don't I don't think you know this idea that Bennett could could move votes, in theory, maybe. I think I think that proposition is kind of overblown, and then we've seen that in successive successive Israeli elections.

Michael 17:26

I don't see the upside to Isencoat joining them, but I do see potential downside. Um, but we'll see what he does. I do have to say one one one more one one last word on on Benny Gans. I agree with you guys. He's he he he he's a very bad politician, and until yesterday I would have said that he is completely irrelevant because nobody in the in the anti-BB block particularly likes him and he was above the threshold. I do think that B. Yes, but BB is much better at at this stuff than anybody else, right? We've seen him now for decades convince people to run together, uh, get mergers, you know, do things to basically capture every single conceivable vote for his coalition. And he just he does it better. And we've seen and we've seen people on the other side, including Yay Lapid, who who is probably their best tactician, drop the ball in that regard. And so the only reason I bring up Benny Gantz is because it seems obvious to me, at least, that what this does in Bibi's head is say, okay, there are there's a pool of some votes sitting out there that may get wasted on the other side, but maybe I can bring them to my side and you know, maybe, maybe that gets one one marginal seat that leads to a deadlock. That's all I'm saying.

Shira 18:41

You know, Nary, Michael um Dr. Koplow went to law school, and it's very annoying to argue with him. So I wouldn't start because then he's gonna defend his position now. Michael, just for the record, because I didn't say anything about Benny Ghans in the sense of like bad politicians, good politicians. And Neri said you can trust him, not trust him. I was just intrigued by the fact that you find it so interesting. Now I understand why.

Michael 19:04

But I'm fine having a moratorium on any more Benning Ghan's talk. I agree. We're spending too much time on it on a on a guy who's below the threshold.

Neri 19:11

You never know what may happen in Israeli politics. Uh and by the way, I I have very little experience arguing with Dr. Koplaw because we are usually in agreement. But in this instance, we are in violent disagreement. Um, by the way, the the idea too, right, in terms of kind of future scenarios, future surprises, there have been reports uh in recent days by the uh political reporters here in Israel that there's a an idea of creating a Likud B party. Essentially kind of these moderate uh MKs, former ministers, either current or former, people like Yuli Elstein, Giladir Dan, Moshe Kahlon uh coming back from uh retirement, creating this new party. Uh so it's not quite the Likud A team, uh i.e. BB Stan, but it's not Nafdali Beneth, right? Or even Avigor Lieberman. It's maybe something in in between on the Israeli right to appeal to those uh disaffected uh Netanyahu voters. Uh and that's interesting. And that could uh it could draw voters away from uh both Likud uh and Naftali Benet slash Jair Lepid or Isencot or uh Avigar Lieberman, um, if they can kind of muster uh a real a real political campaign. Um and they could you know decide to go either way, right? They could join forces with the current opposition, they could very easily hand those votes back to Bibi Netanyahu. So again, uh the this kind of war gaming scenario is okay, we're gonna move X number of votes from the pro Netanyahu block to our block, and that way we're gonna get over the 61-seat majority threshold in Knesset. Yeah, right now, as we're talking in April, maybe that makes sense, but it could, you know, the political map could look very different come September, October. Yeah. Now we're now we're all in in agreement. Uh by the way, um, aside from the uh how did Lapide put it at the end of his remarks yesterday? Uh, he looked at the camera, you know, in this very uh lepide way and said, you know, that feeling you're all feeling, speaking to the Israeli public watching, that feeling is hope. So I I enjoyed it, a bit saccharin, but I enjoyed it. Uh, but let's talk about the potential complications of this Bennett-Lapid alliance. Um, and they didn't really shy away from saying they don't, there are issues that they don't agree on. And Bennett very clearly in his own comments said, I believe in holding on to, how did he put it, our ancestral lands, and we will not give away one centimeter uh to the enemy. That's a clear reference, uh I believe, to the West Bank. So do you see this issue complicating the uh the bromance, the renewed bromance, the official bromance, Michael?

Michael 21:50

I hate to say it, but I I don't. Uh listen, we're post October 7th, in particular, the idea that this is gonna fall apart on On the Palestinian issue, that just seems inconceivable to me. And there's this epithet that has been going around DC for a long time. PEP, people are progressive except for Palestine, right? It was, it was sort of a knock on the pro-Israel left. And in the context of Israeli politics today, you know, Naphtali Ben describes himself as a as a liberal, right? He's going to rebuild the liberal right. It's liberal on everything except for the Palestinian issue, except for the West Bank. And that's going to fly completely because who's going to who's going to step in there and contest him on that, particularly if it means getting rid of this government? You know, even Yayir Golam, the only, the only leader of a Jewish party out there who's really talking about the West Bank and the Palestinian issue, he's he's not gonna let that stop him from joining this government, assuming that they can form one, you know, full-throatedly and becoming a minister. Uh and I'm not I'm not saying this is a criticism. I understand the politics of it, but it it does certainly uh leave me um leave me a bit upset in the sense that this is such a critical issue for Israel's future. And at this point, it's just consensus in the anti-BB block, effectively, that there's not gonna be any movement on it. You know, Natali Bennett's thing from the change government, right? Was that uh that the way he put it usually I think was 80% of the voters agree on 80% of the issues, and that's what we're gonna deal with as well. Yeah, well, that that that part, that part that's left out of there is not a minor issue. No, it's not a minor issue at all. It's Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And so I I do expect that if they're able to form a government, there will be changes in the West Bank. I I find it impossible to imagine that they will take the same hands-off stance to Jewish terrorism and settler violence. I find it impossible to imagine that they will approve 103 new settlements over the course of their government, which this government has done in three and a half years. I find it impossible to imagine that they will just let illegal farms and outposts go rampant in area B. Area C might be another matter. Uh, but there will be changes, but nothing that's gonna actually impact the trajectory of this in a huge way. And yeah, that uh that's not that's not a particularly hopeful thing from my perspective.

Neri 24:41

Shera, what did you think of that bit uh in last night's press conference about uh very clearly we're not gonna give a centimeter to to the enemy of our ancestral land. Also, by the way, uh Bennett was asked in the Q ⁇ A, I believe, by a right-wing uh journalist whether he supported Smotrich's efforts for, shall we say, his master plan in the West Bank of the past few years. And Bennett completely uh dodged the question. He blasted Smotrich for supporting ultra-orthodox draft uh exemptions or draft dodging, um, and didn't even touch on the issue of settlements, which I think was a good move by Bennett.

Shira 25:18

Listen, we know where Bennett came from, we know his views. There's no surprise, I agree with Michael. I think there's so much to do. It's not post-October 7, but there's so many challenges uh this nation will have to cope with, right? A new government speaking about, you know, there's gonna be a national uh commission of inquiry right into the October 7th thing. There's fixing the sort of the civil service, right? The professional government part of things. There are gonna be different fronts open before we um concede land or give back land. Um maybe the idea will be just not taking more land, right? So, I mean, this this could be also, I don't think this the next uh government will be faced with critical decisions of dividing Jerusalem. I'm not sure this is where this is gonna be, and therefore I don't think it's gonna be a challenge. What I hope we will see, and I think based on people who work with Bennett, uh, who say that, and again, I have not had conversations with him about it, um, that he understands that Israel is on a very dangerous trajectory, right? Making things worse. And he may um say reverse the trend, but at least ensure that the trend does not continue in terms of what we're seeing, which is annexation of the West Bank, uh, settler uh violence, in all but name are toppling the Palestinian Authority, making division of the land totally impossible. I think Bennett understands that there are negative trends and sort of like ensuring that the trend uh maybe stops, not reversed. We're not gonna see a different trend we're not gonna see. And and that in the current situation with the alternative is continuation of the status quo, but the status quo is not static, right? It's very much dynamic. Uh, and we know what's happening in the West Bank and in Gaza and in Lebanon. And you know, if the next government addresses those challenges and signals a future openness to coming to diplomatic agreements with the Palestinians, uh, in when when the conditions are more ripe, I think, I think that that that is probably all we can hope for. And I think that that Bennett that Bennett is there. Um I I think that Bennett is there.

Michael 27:39

And but and by the way, that's that's not nothing, right? As I said, like it's this this government has been so harmful and and revolutionary. So ending that is is a big deal. But uh, and I agree with you, Shera. Uh, you know, for years, uh I've heard folks in in Bennett's camp and Lapite's camp talk about you know the the need to uh take certainly US opinion into account and and world opinion, and you know, they understand the way in which the stuff in the West Bank impacts Israel negatively. I do worry though that, because I've also heard this from folks in in those camps in the past, that uh in some ways they're often under the assumption that just a change in government will be enough to roll back a lot of the losses, particularly here in the United States, that Israel has suffered politically and and and with Democrats more than Republicans. And I think that will help a bit. But but yeah, when Bennett comes out the gate and says, um, not one inch, you know, not now, not ever, I'm not sure they're correct that just having a different face at the top who isn't BB and, you know, maybe speaks about things in in a nicer way is gonna have the full impact they want. Like ultimately, when push comes to shove, particularly in the United States, people are upset about Israeli policies. And yes, you can get rid of the worst ones, the most harmful ones, and that will that will absolutely do some good, but they're gonna run up against a wall. And that wall doesn't necessarily exist in the context of Israeli domestic politics, but it definitely exists here in the United States and in the USSR relationship. And that has me worried.

Shira 29:20

I I agree with you 100%. And I think, you know, while many pro-Israel constituencies would be, will breathe a sigh of relief when there's a change in Israeli government, um, they're not gonna have all the slack in the world, right? There's gonna be an expectation of different policies. I'm just saying I think Bennett says something different today, before the elections, but based on, and again, this is not something I I don't know if I'm gonna flee, but but people around him say that he understands that the policies that he will have to uh support and lead. This government are not gonna, he's not gonna sound like that, right? He's still trying to win an election. So I agree with you 100%. It really depends on what they will do. And I think this type of messaging doesn't help the US-Israel relationship at the moment, but we'll have to wait and see what kind of messaging he has, if if, right, and when he's uh prime minister. And it's and it's it's still an if.

Neri 30:19

It's still an if. There's still an election to win, which is why you're hearing uh certain uh rhetoric and not uh other kinds of rhetoric. Uh, but I'll say the same thing I told uh Yushira and a few other of our friends in 2021 and 2022. Uh whatever non-netanyahu government comes into being, hopefully uh later this year, early next year after uh the election, um it's a stepping stone government. Uh you know, they even call it, they don't even call it the the government of change anymore like they did back then. They call it uh a government of repair and healing. And it's that's gonna take a lot of repair and a lot of healing to undo the damage of the past uh three years, uh nearly four years. And uh there's a stepping stone government and stepping stone coalition uh to show uh that the Israeli center and the Israeli left and whatever other components are involved in uh potentially the next Israeli government can govern and can deliver. And uh primarily to keep Bibinet and Yahoo out of the Prime Minister's office. Uh that's the biggest electoral card that the Israeli right and the far right have uh by far, uh just based on on the numbers. Um so yes, it's not everything we might hope for. It's definitely not everything that the people tweeting on Twitter uh hope for when last night they were already like, well, there's no difference between Nafdali Benet and Bibinek and Yahoo. Again, you know, the same rhetoric we heard uh several years ago. There's a massive difference. Uh there will be there's a massive difference now. There will be a massive difference uh if and when Naftali Bennett becomes potentially the next prime minister. Uh again, we'll have time to to debate all these points leading up to the election and definitely after the election.

Shira 31:57

But but if I can just add one thing, because I do think what Michael brings up, the relationship with the US, the relationship with American Jewry, the relationship with Europe, where you're seeing more and more um calls, right, for limit Israel's association agreement and with Hungary, which changes in Hungary's government, right, to not having uh an automatic veto, because Israel is a small country that depends on relationships with partners and allies, like the fact that you need healing and repair and let's hold the hands and a vision of unity and like it's just not enough. First of all, it's not a vision. Sorry, it's really not a vision, but it's it's just not it, it's just one enough, it won't be enough to make this country more secure. And there, therefore, I do think that what Michael, you know, they will have to get to the point where they're not gonna continue to say only what they're not what they're against, right? We will not do this, we will not give to the Arabs, we will not do and what you are for and sending this vision, you don't have to act on it, but I think sending a signal to the world that Israel can offer a vision and can be uh not a just a naysayer, right? Like a yes sayer. And I I think it's critical.

Neri 33:14

I think it's critical for after they win an election and form a government. Right now, they're there are two Israeli politicians, one of whom has no real party. He's got the name of a party now, finally, uh, and he's polling very high in the polls, but that's you know, he's done that before. And another politician who's, you know, cratering in the polls. And so they're they're trying their best to organize the opposition into some coherent form to win the next election.

Speaker 33:44

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The Non-War and Non-Deal Between the U.S. and Iran

Neri 34:42

We should move on to the other big news. Iran. Uh and well, Iran is still with us, don't worry. But uh, as I discussed at length with my uh friend Nasan Rafati on last week's episode, uh, we're still in this weird kind of twilight zombie zone period, uh, no war, but no deal uh between the US and Iran, uh a dirty ceasefire, as one of my colleagues called it, with this double blockade of the Persian Gulf by both the US Navy and the IRGC. Talks didn't really materialize this past weekend in Pakistan, like they were supposed to. Uh and Trump, you know, still saying uh Iran has no cards, that the US has all the time in the world. Um, and what did he say uh I think yesterday? Uh the Iranians have our number. I don't I don't know if he was purposefully channeling Jim Baker. Uh when he famously said uh the Israelis have our number, they can call us. Uh Trump said the Iranians have our number, uh, they can call us. So uh Michael, we'll start with you again. Uh, where do you think all this is headed as we speak now on uh well, Monday morning DC time? Who knows?

Michael 35:50

It's amazing how this is how this is looking like Gaza again, right? Uh you have this seize fire between the two sides, but doesn't really exist because you still have the straits being closed down on one side and a blockade on the other side, and you know, they're gonna negotiate later, but talks aren't actually happening. And um I it it seems so on the one hand, it seems unlikely to me that Trump is going to want to just have this state of limbo go on where the US blockades Iranian ports until the end of his presidency and and there's no real resolution. I'm not sure what he gets out of that. Uh and my my hunch is that he doesn't want it. So that points me to what I've thought all along, which is that we've seen negotiations at some point when he realizes that the Iranian's capacity for pain is much larger than the US capacity for pain, he will give on something and portray it as a win. And, you know, this is what I said on the last podcast, too. The one thing that gives me pause is that he keeps on sending troops to the region. There are now three aircraft carriers there, and he keeps on sending more people. And if there's like one iron law of Trump two this term, so when he sends troops places, he uses them. So uh maybe he's maybe maybe he's been convinced that that one more giant operation will be decisive. Maybe he's actually contemplating going in and seizing uranium. I have no idea. But that that points me to you know the opposite conclusion from the one I voiced before. So I I really don't know where this is going. I I I can argue both sides. Uh, like most things with Donald Trump, I just find him uh confusing and maddening and impossible to read. And I don't think that's necessarily because my analysis is poor. I think that he probably changes his mind back and forth every single day. Um so yeah, I don't I don't have a good prediction here at all. Maybe, maybe you guys do, but I don't. Shira, what do you think?

Shira 38:01

I mean, we are in the eighth week of this war that was supposed to, I think initially they probably planned for something shorter, but then Trump said four to six weeks, right? So we are we're beyond that. Um and you mentioned it's the Slimbo situation, uh ceasefire and double blockade, uh, which has not done anything. And I think very, you know, it's kind of a paradox here, right? Because you have two sides that both um, I think both kind of rely on dubious assumptions that they have the upper hand and that their uh pain threshold is higher, right? That they can withstand uh longer. Um and it's both the Iranians and and the Americans. It's and it's it's interesting to see that for the first time, I agree with Michael, there there are a lot of troops in the region. And what we saw is don't listen to what Trump says, but let's look at how many troops and assets he moves. With that said, uh the Wall Street Journal article that came out last week and basically reported uh President Trump's how um terrified he was of sort of a military failure, right, with with the downing of the with the air crew uh missing, um and mentioning the the Carter, right, uh Carter's faith uh in this. And I makes me think that you know military escalation is not what what he would prefer to do, right? In a sense, I agree that he might think that just one final blow will will make the Iranians capitulate, but hopefully by now it's clear that the Iranians don't work for us, right? They don't capitulate when we think they will. Um, so but that that is certainly an option, not a prolonged war, but maybe one more thing. What the thing is is is unclear. There's another option, which is like not doing anything, kind of like staying in this, not for much longer, but hopefully for this um there's some optimists um on Twitter and on X that say that within two weeks Iran uh will be in trouble because not only the oil that they produce, they have nowhere to store to store it, and then they will come into real trouble. Whether this is true uh or not will have to come to bear, but you can sort of play for time, right, and see what happens. Or you try to come to some sort of an agreement. Uh it seems that the gaps are very are still wide on the key issues uh in terms of the agreement. The key issues are being, you know, the Straits of Hormuz, right? This has become the Hormuz War, even though the Straits of Hormuz were not even part of this, the war objectives to begin with. And then the the highly enriched uranium and the nuclear uh program. I think very much like Israel is very unhappy about it, but the Iranian proxies and the missile programs are not even up for debate. And then, but not only the gaps are still wide between the sides, it seems that the parties cannot even agree to the terms that bring them to the negotiation table. Um, so we'll have to see. There are so many things that are difficult, and we can't get into them now. But between us, like what's gonna happen. Um but if you compare, I mean, we'll have to, we'll see if there is an agreement, and we'll have to see what this agreement looks like. But is it gonna be a much improved agreement over what could have been agreed in Geneva before the war? Is it gonna be much improved over the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, the Obama nuclear agreement, right? Um, I had heard that in Islamabad, the previous round, there was not even one page that was written. If you compare it to the JCPOA, whether you liked it or not, like it was a very detailed uh document. Also to think that around the table back then you had the Europeans, you had China, you had Russia, it was like a world thing. Now we have Pakistan. I mean, not to say anything, but but like we are relying on different types of countries to resolve global issues. So that that is that is a question. I think another interesting thing, there's certainly a lot of debate in Israel, and I think the President Trump also referred to this like who makes the decisions, who calls the shots in Iran, right? And saying because there's uh friction inside, they can't come to consensus. I think that's a very interesting intellectual debate. But to me, the fact that you have Araq Chi, who is supposed to be the more pragmatist, um, now in you know, moving from Pakistan to Oman and then he's going to Russia, but he's representing a view, and it's the most maximalist view of the revolutionary guards. Maybe they coerced him to think this way, uh, but maybe it's an agreement. I think that uh should uh at least make us as analyst stop saying, okay, let's let's divide the the fault lines within the Iranian leadership and just assume that this is they represent some kind of one view. Um and we have to, and and I I would assume that this is what we have to deal with at the moment, whether we like it or not.

Neri 43:11

So I mean I agree with both of you. It's very difficult to get a sense of of where we're headed. Uh, and it changes uh not only day by day, but also kind of Trump uh truth social post by Trump Truth Social Post. But I I do think there there are real difficulties in in getting a deal uh between these two sides, even just like a framework agreement. Um and that's not a minor uh point. It's not a minor difference on our moves, on uh the nuclear program, on sanctions relief potentially, and uh whatever Trump may uh feel uh deep down inside in terms of his uh unwillingness uh to kind of uh escalate again. I think I think that's where he's headed, right? If he doesn't get what he wants, he's not he, I don't think is gonna cut and run. I don't think he I don't think he can uh uh politically I don't think he can personally in terms of taking taking that loss at least not right now and so I think the the course of least resistance inside his own mind will be to you know well these guys are playing hardball they're not giving me what what I want so I'm gonna uh increase the pain and hit a few uh a few more um well not a few more but power plants infrastructure and also go after the people he thinks uh inside the Iranian system are uh striking a harder line in the in the negotiations.

Michael 44:32

Mary it is it is interesting to to to give you know some uh some backup to to what you just said the the cut and run argument is is that he'll get a deal on on the Strait of Hor moves and say all right you know we we've we've even though it wasn't a it wasn't an issue before oh we fixed it it's open and we've also bombed all their facilities so the nuclear program effectively doesn't exist and you know he'll call that a win right that that seems to be the obvious scenario for the the Trump cut and run um which again I I won't rule out completely. But it is interesting that when he is spoken about Iran over the past week almost every single time he fixates on the nuclear issue more than anything else. He keeps on bringing it up right that it's unacceptable for them to have a nuclear weapon that that they've got to get rid of their you know nuclear dust whatever whatever he means by that I assume he means the uranium uh and so yeah I I I agree with you it'll be harder for him to do the cut and run type deal and maybe it's not where his head is at given you know if we if we trust his public statements that he's kind of stream of consciousness um he does seem fixated on the nuclear issue and if he doesn't think that he can get a deal on it then yeah maybe maybe he thinks that more military escalation is the way and by the way I don't know there was a report overnight by our our friend Barak Ravid in Oxios saying that well maybe if they can't get like a a full agreement or a full framework uh memorandum of understanding they'll just do a uh uh a a reopening of Hormuz deal I'm not convinced Iran will go for that because then they give up a lot of the leverage that they that they're holding at the moment you know if if the only deal is for Iran and the US to reopen Hormuz.

Neri 46:14

I don't I don't see that as being likely.

Shira 46:16

They they will the Iran will want something once they use this card and they understand they have it they will want to want something this is also something I don't see us going back to the status quo ante, right? Like even if you get to a deal on the the nuclear issue and on Hormuz, do you think this is this choke point is going to stay? I think that once the world saw what Iran is able to do to this, it's gonna change freedom of navigation in that part of the world forever. I mean at least until there's a different regime I mean I think things it's it's different difficult to grasp the the implications that this war will have but I I really think that you know we opened a can of worms here and with this what Iran showed that Iran saying that they have this card, uh just the threat of it right this is deterrence will make us all hesitant uh in the future and they will want something in return. I agree with you like just a framework agreement on this why would Iran go for it?

Neri 47:13

We could talk about Iran again like we talked about domestic Israeli politics for for 30 minutes. We're gonna move ahead now a very interesting uh article yesterday again by uh our friend Barak Ravid at Axios he reported that Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery along with a few dozen actual Israeli soldiers to the United Arab Emirates during the Iran war. Um massive scoop which I think uh in normal times in a more normal weekend I think would have gotten a lot more attention but uh a lot of firsts here uh the first time an entire Iron Dome system has been deployed to a place not called Israel or the United States of America uh the first time I believe the IDF has ever been deployed on foreign soil to help another country actually fight a war first time ever um as opposed to you know covert operations and and spy stuff correct me if I'm wrong but I think it may actually have been the first time ever. And all this in a country uh an Arab country that six years ago Israel didn't have any formal diplomatic relations with. So uh a remarkable story. Uh Shera, what what did you make of the story? Um which by the way uh I checked and and the story is is accurate uh so let's just lay it out there um what did you make of the story and what is what do you think this says about the UAE?

Shira 48:35

So here I will I was not surprised I actually knew this kind of and you didn't tell me I don't tell you everything you're a journalist no but I I knew I knew it and I know I think I think it's it's very interesting. I think it's as you said it's it's a first it uh highlights the really what do you want like special relationship it also helps explain why the Iranians are after the Emiratis I mean it's just clearly like into like if you look at like lines in the region and speak about Arab solidarity and GCC and you if you've been hearing all this time about from the Emiratis, right? Like we saw who who came in and clearly the Israelis came in. I mean arguably because what we heard initially before the war started is that no one in the Gulf wants this war right to begin with. So to me it makes a lot of sense that if that Israel would provide the defense it can to its friends in a war that was its war, right? It was the US war with Israel's war but it wasn't the Gulf's war. Um so interesting definitely a strategic asset for Israel definitely interesting that you know the Emiratis uh did that i it's also interesting who leaked it I don't think it was the Emiratis. Um certain I'm certain it wasn't the Emiratis exactly and I uh am pretty convinced that this is uh aimed to serve as sort of uh the pretext or uh the justification for an atanyao request to be invited for a public visit to the UAE which he has not done he signed the Abraham Courts right uh with uh Bennett goes to the UAE all the time Lapide goes all the time they're all like visitors goes all the time um but but but not Bibi uh at least publicly I don't know if he visited uh not publicly could be uh but he publicly has not uh been there and I think is someone who wants to show that he transformed the Middle East and that he brings uh peace through strength right and the Abraham courts is an agreement that he signed uh I'm sure this is tied to the two uh things very interesting although I can't imagine an Israeli prime minister flying to the Gulf right now no really I don't know I mean there's still a if not a hot war then some kind of war happening in the Gulf anyway I mean look I I'm not ruling out anything given the past few years of our lives uh but very very interesting uh theory Shera he also doesn't have to go now he can go in just right before the election before the election yeah that would be by the way that would be a major reversal by the Emirates who have uh on purpose not invited Bibi de Tidyahu to uh yeah to the UAE in recent years uh they have not been happy with him or his and it would look like an intervene uh intervention in the elections if there's an invite right before the elections which hopefully they learned their lessons from past precedent hopefully yeah but I but I'm I'm saying there's clearly an interest by the Prime Minister to be invited.

Neri 51:46

I I'm sure there there is an interest uh by the Prime Minister's office.

Shira 51:49

Uh Michael and I'm and I'm sure the leak is connected to that interest.

Neri 51:54

Interesting. I heard that the leak came from somewhere else but we can talk about this uh offline somewhere else in in Israel but uh anyway that's uh inside baseball Michael what did you think of this uh Barak Ravid hashtag scoop pretty major story yeah uh unlike Shear I did not know about it but it's not you know here too again not not someone told me I didn't like have my own in fairness somebody somebody had told me about a month ago uh to look at the UAE and they couldn't give details but they were almost like like they they wanted to tell me uh that this was happening um so I had a sense that clearly I have clearly I have the wrong friends.

Michael 52:32

I mean you guys are just you're you're getting you're getting much much juicier stuff than I am. Yeah it's not it's not surprising listen I people who for half a decade now have been predicting the collapse of the Abraham Accords for one reason or another I've never been in that camp. It's very clear that the Israel Emirati relationship in particular is is ironclad and you know in a lot of ways this is the new special relationship. And uh it's too important to both sides and the politics of it also work for both sides right there there's a reason that uh that the Emiratis can can have this type of relationship where the Saudis for instance cannot. So listen it it's it's a good sign of it's it's good for Israel. It's good for the UAE aside from the fact that obviously it's going to drive the Iranians crazy we should definitely be happy about greater defense integration between these two and we should also be happy that this is a relationship that Israel has in the Arab world that now looks like an actual relationship like an actual partnership like actual allies. You know this doesn't exist with Egypt and Jordan.

Neri 53:38

Aaron Ross Powell not just in military terms but also I mean there are flights back and forth every day. Also throughout throughout the war between the UAE and Israel.

Michael 53:46

Yeah uh so this is this is a good thing. I I I wouldn't I I think that you know there are people who want to look at this and then extrapolate out to the rest of the region and say that as soon as the Iran war ends this is going to be the norm for Israel. That I I don't think is true. Like I said the the Emiratis are to my mind a distinctive if not unique case given their politics and given their interests so you know I wouldn't draw too much from this in terms of what it means for the Saudis or others. But this is a this is a good development. Like I said good for Israel, good for the UAE and frankly good for the United States too right we we want our partners uh to be able to do stuff um between themselves and and without us and you know I I'm sure the US was involved in this in in some way shape or form but I'm not sure the US would have had to have been involved in some way shape or form. The bilateral relationship right now between Israel and the UAE is strong enough that they don't necessarily need us uh babysitting it.

Neri 54:47

No. Don't need us babysitting it. Um it's also really interesting just from an operational point of view okay um you have dozens I suppose of Israeli military personnel manning an Iron Dome battery somewhere in the United Arab Emirates. Where do they sleep? Who's securing them? Did did the Iranians have an inkling? So they did they try to target this battery? I mean very a lot of questions that my um journalistic mind went to uh immediately. Uh and also by the way I think it's also fair to say Israel had an Irondome battery to spare because um well during the Iran war it was mostly the the David Sling Arrow or the American THAD that were dealing with like the heavier longer range ballistic missiles and the UAE was dealing with shorter range um drones and shorter range rockets and missiles that were being fired from from Iran so Irondome was perfect for that and um maybe explained a lot of the success the UAE had in in intercepting a lot of the incoming so uh a lot of questions still uh still to be answered. Um but yeah a remarkable story by by Barak. I think we'll leave it there. Uh I had a vision to also get into Lebanon and the ceasefire there which seems potentially on the verge of collapse this very afternoon uh and also the the ongoing disarmament talks in Gaza that seemed to be at an impasse. Um we'll I'm sure touch on that uh in future episodes. Uh also somebody wanted to talk uh for 20 minutes about Benny Gantz. So uh so so a lot of our time was uh was chewed up uh no I'm I'm kidding uh the conversation at the top.

Shira 56:25

Listen then Benigantz is only going to have so many more moments in the sun so I'm I'm glad that we could provide this you are doing this for a discussed but exactly but I mean right it's either that or speaking about the bunch like a region um ceasefires held by duct tape across multiple fronts.

Neri 56:42

So that's the thing I mean there there will be like a common theme if we delve into like Lebanon and Gaza but uh like with most things I think our listeners and viewers may be a bit smarter uh once this episode goes up likely tomorrow. But yes um suffice to say that uh the Lebanon ceasefire is looking increasingly shaky and the ceasefire in Gaza I mean such as it is is is holding I suppose on it on its own shaky terms but the talks uh with regard to the next phase of the ceasefire deal concluded last October um are seemingly going nowhere uh including by the way reconstruction and disarmament of Hamas and all of that. There will be time to talk about that I'm sure in the weeks ahead. Uh Shira Michael thank you as always and uh yeah it was it was interesting a little invigorating to talk about Israeli domestic politics. This kind of this kind of this light at the end of the tunnel that we've been talking about now for three years is actually drawn near.

Shira 57:40

Yeah I'll I'll I'll take more of this every single week between between now and the election I don't know how this conversation can be defined as invigorating but guys you're why but wait should I no no okay well we'll see I mean it's Israeli politics first of all I just don't enjoy politics. You know I prefer the speaking about sort of the I prefer talking about the red team right like not the what's happening inside Israel. But um if we're if we're not talking about trucks and tents in Gaza then Shira's just not happy right the biggest the winners of the war of the war in Gaza are the trucks we're all still counting trucks. No no no I mean it's fine we'll have uh we'll have a lot to talk about but I'm sure when it comes to Israeli elections um we will but um because uh in theory they will they will still be happening later this year.

Neri 58:32

Shira do you want me to quote Yarlapede again to you from last he said this is hope. Yeah the the feeling you're feeling right now is is hope. Yeah. Thank you guys talk soon. Okay thanks again to Michael Koplow and Shira Efron for their generous time and insights also a special thanks to our producer Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy and our assistant producer Eden Jessison as always and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so it can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly thank you for listening and please subscribe and spread the word