Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilver, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Astaf Orion is back with us this week to make sense of the very much ongoing and very deadly still Lebanon Front, and also to discuss the latest with regard to Iran, naturally. Astaf is, of course, a retired Israeli brigadier general who previously headed the IDF Strategic Planning Division, and he's now an international fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as well as a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. This was a terrific conversation as always with Astaf, where he broke down for us what exactly has been happening on Israel's northern border against Hezbollah over the past two months since the start of the Iran War, why it's now still the hottest and most active military conflict in the entire Middle East. It's true. And what Israel is actually trying to achieve in Lebanon. There are a few better than Asaf on this topic, believe me. So let's get into it. Hi, Asaf. Welcome back to the podcast.

Assaf 1:22

Hi Neri, thank you for inviting.

Where Things Are Headed on the Iran Front

Neri 1:25

Uh, it's really our pleasure to have you back on Asaf. Um, especially this week, I wanted to talk about Lebanon, and we'll get to Lebanon uh in just a minute, trust me. But uh we have to start, I think, with the latest on the Iran front. Uh and just for awareness for our listeners and viewers, we're recording this Wednesday night Tel Aviv time, uh, Wednesday afternoon DC time, where you are ASAF at the Washington Institute. Uh fair to say it's already been a tumultuous week uh in the Gulf and on the Iran front. Uh also a very tumultuous day uh on Wednesday today. Um so always a good chance our our listeners and viewers will be smarter than we are by the time this episode goes up. But I really wanted to get a sense from you uh where do you think things are headed, given the fact that we started the week uh with President Trump declaring uh Project Freedom, which was his bid uh using the US Navy and US military to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, to break the Iranian blockade. Um Iran started firing a bit at the UAE and Oman, but by what was it, late Tuesday night, early Wednesday night uh well Middle East time, uh Trump said he was pausing Project Freedom uh and in order to let uh ongoing talks with Iran uh progress, and in his words, to see whether or not an agreement can be finalized and signed. Uh and then over the course of today there were various reports that uh there was discussions over a one-page document um to get the US and Iran uh literally on the same page and and potentially end the war officially. Um so a lot happened today, a lot has happened in just the past few days. Uh first question is Yo Asaf. Uh, what the hell do you think is going on here on the Iran front?

Assaf 3:12

Well, uh from the get-go, I think we uh could uh describe two parallel campaigns uh waged by the Allies from uh one hand and by Iran uh from the other hand. Uh the Allied campaign was uh mostly a massive in intelligence uh-driven precision strike, uh which uh Iran couldn't block, couldn't foil, couldn't counter in uh any effective way, you know, just uh suffer what it must. Uh but uh in uh asymmetric strategy, you don't need to excel in the same uh competition that your rival imposes on you. So Iran uh does what it does uh best, which is hostage taking. Uh hostage taking both of the uh regional uh uh um neighbors, Gulf countries, and so on, but also of the world economy through the grip on the Strait of Homos. So uh basically you could say that uh the uh alliance or the US and Israel uh uh could uh dull a bit, you know, the sharp edge of this uh campaign, but couldn't uh totally counter it. And the the place where those uh two campaigns which run in parallel uh converge is the negotiation table, uh, discussing the conditions uh of uh of uh ceasefire, of the end of the war, of OMOS, of the nuclear uh issue. Israel has uh some other issues uh that it wants to see resolved. But uh that's uh that's the the politics of this, that's the exchange uh or the change office between military inputs and political gains or political uh uh achievements. So we are now at the at the moment of another moment of test of whether the uh this campaign or that campaign could cause uh either side to say, okay, enough is enough. Now beside that, I think we we have uh uh uh verbal discussions of the end of the war, which to me sound more like uh uh trying to feed the the Washington, maybe even the Hill questions of the war authorities within the 60 days limit. And uh also discussions of uh uh the ceasefire and whether the attacks on the UAE are breaking the ceasefire, violating it, totally violating it, only partially violating it. Uh and when people uh uh argue, and it the same is in Lebanon these days, whether a ceasefire is in is on and off, and it's difficult to discern because fire is ongoing, uh, it shows you the margins of uh maneuver of uh of the political leadership. Uh in 2019, when uh Iran attacked the Abkhai uh uh installations in Saudi Arabia, um President uh Trump decided uh to say it's it's not America's problem but uh Saudi, and we're not really sure who did it, and you know, all these. So um the administration choosing to say the attack on the UAE is not a major rupture in the ceasefire, shows you uh the priorities uh right now, but uh that's not the end of the game. When when you're standing on the sword's edge, you can fall out either way, both to escalation or to termination.

Neri 7:12

Right. And even Donald Trump um while saying that there was a a new proposal uh to potentially end the war on the table and that he there was progress, uh he also said that uh if Iran didn't accept uh he would renew the bombing at a very uh how do you say intensive level. Uh so he's he's still threatening, but at the same time, he he stopped this uh Project Freedom, right? This naval campaign um after what a day or two? Did that surprise you that he he didn't continue it even while he was still negotiating with the Iranians?

Assaf 7:50

Uh I would say uh surprised, but uh but uh not uh astonished me.

Neri 7:56

You weren't bowled over.

Assaf 7:58

Yes, it's it's uh it's like a path with many switch switchbacks, uh, that you go this way, you go that way, uh seeking for the right uh way. Basically, I think both sides are trying to shape uh the other side's uh Batna, you know, the best alternative to no agreement. Uh Iran would like to see it, you know, we will insist, uh America would accept our conditions, and then they will go home and we will continue with our business. Uh, this is why uh America has to uh show that uh the alternative to an agreement is a major escalation and additional loss. So the question is how convinced are the Iranians uh that they can have it uh their way or not? And not uh a few analysts, I think, sense that both uh both parties reach uh the negotiation room uh feeling triumphant. Right. So you see the demands is very, very uh ambitious, and maybe there is no uh there's no zone of possible agreement, but we we will see how this goes. I think um the the administration is showing a lot of motivation to get to a deal, which is good if you want to end the war. It may be less conducive if uh this is intended to uh convince Iran that it it better uh accept the US demands, because uh if you're over-eager uh to get a deal, the bazaar makers won't uh won't miss you know the indicators uh that there's money to be made here.

Neri 9:46

They can they can sense it. I think even certain Iranian media outlets and even officials uh saw the pause of Project Freedom uh what earlier this morning on Wednesday as a sign of Trump blinking first. Um and yet we will we will see. We'll see. Yeah, again, our listeners and viewers may well they'll definitely be smarter than we are because they'll be uh a day or so ahead of us. Um and in terms, just a final question, Asaf about Iran. I mean, do you think that zone of possible agreement is is possible? I mean, the Trump maintains consistently it's all about the nuclear issue for him, it seems like.

Assaf 10:35

Now I won't uh tell any state secrets, uh, you know, uh implying that it's a complex situation. The Iran problem set is a complex one, and if it fits into one page, uh I think we can uh trust that it's not a detailed uh agreement, but maybe a framework of how to move ahead and so on. Just kick the the can down the alley. So make sure that you don't get heads-on on on some issues, but you decide to discuss some of them later and so on. Uh so more uh postpone than uh than actually solve. Uh I think that uh that might be the common uh ground because when you sharpen and when you go to details, uh the level of enrichment, or if there is enrichment, and for how uh long uh it uh it will be prevented from Iran and so on and so forth, uh these things are getting uh uh indeed sharper and more difficult to uh to reach agreements because the gap is uh is uh still serious. So I I think it's um maybe uh um a bit reminiscent of what we see in Gaza when you have 21 uh points and you uh declare a ceasefire, uh some uh players cease, some players fire. Uh uh phase one is partially uh implemented, not really, phase two is not really coming. So we are not in the game over uh part of uh life, but in the okay, game is ongoing, uh, but on different uh dosage of let's say uh fire and and uh diplomacy. You know, different different uh uh level levels of uh of effort.

Neri 12:36

Sounds like a classic Middle Eastern solution, which isn't really a solution, uh, but may serve both parties uh to quote unquote end the war.

Assaf 12:46

Yes, not everything is not not every problem is laying itself to uh solutions, uh certainly not immediate ones. So uh sometimes patience is uh is what you need to uh to saddle here. That's your mount.

Neri 13:03

Muddling through, uh, and your comment about the one pager reminded me of uh our mutual friend Amosarel, who's uh a regular on this podcast, he his famous line uh it was in relation to Gaza years ago, years ago. Uh he said, you know, the agreement that ended, I think it was a 2012 Gaza war, it was a non-paper that wasn't worth the paper it wasn't written on.

Assaf 13:28

So maybe Yes, in fact, uh throughout my years, uh, you know, along the Gaza conflicts, 2009, 12, 14, uh my uh my impression is that uh it's almost as if we're running around the same stadium, different uh number of rounds, you know, of uh uh laps, but eventually the the end point is the same, and you go out uh through uh the the the same uh rooms, you know, dressing rooms on your way out. The conditions for most of those conflicts were pretty much the same. They uh uh touched on the same issues, uh they were relatively uh uh implemented the same level or not implemented, but the important part was to uh uh stop the fire and go back to quiet. Those were were uh those were those years. Yeah uh how it ended, it ended in on in October 7th, so uh the end was uh pretty bad.

The Northern Front Since the December 2024 Ceasefire

Neri 14:39

Yes, uh in in retrospect. Well, not even in retrospect. There are some people who who said it was um those campaigns did not go as uh as swimmingly as maybe the political and even military leadership at the time uh wanted us to believe. Um but again, Asaf, uh we didn't have you on to talk Gaza. We may touch on Gaza inadvertently, which we already have, but I really wanted you on uh to take a deep dive uh into the Lebanon front. Uh and it's obviously intimately connected with with the Iran front, which I'm sure we'll talk we'll touch on. But uh the Lebanon front has its own, I think, unique dynamics. And uh you may recall last time you were on the podcast, way back in December of 2024, it was right after the US uh brokered a ceasefire uh to end the well that Israel Hezbollah war. Um and we should also remind our viewers and listeners uh that war started on October 8th, 2023, Hezbollah firing into northern Israel in quote solidarity with Hamas. Um that didn't really end up too well for Hezbollah uh because 15 months later, um, it's fair to say it uh it took a heavy beating. So uh bring us up to speed, Asaf, set the table for us. Uh what has happened since that late 2024 ceasefire, um into 2025, early 2026, until this latest Israel Hezbollah war that began uh on March 2nd.

Assaf 16:13

I think the starting point uh on uh November 27th, 2024 found, as you said, a greatly weakened and diminished uh Hezbollah after losing um, let's say 80% of its uh its uh rockets. But uh since the numbers were very high to begin with, uh 20% of a very high number is is still several uh dozen uh thousands, which is in fact impactful. Uh during those uh uh months between uh the end of November 24 and uh uh the beginning of the current war on uh on March uh uh 2nd, when when uh Hezbollah decided to attack Israel, uh it was a special uh period in which Hezbollah uh suffered uh repeated daily attacks by uh Israel within the ceasefire, because the ceasefire had two parts. One is deciding or agreeing with Lebanon uh to halt the fighting, uh second is agreeing with a side letter, through a side letter uh with Washington, that uh if uh Hezbollah returns, resurges, rebuilds, reconstructs, and so on, and the Lebanese armed forces or the Lebanese state does not prevent it, Israel can operate to remove those threats. And indeed, we saw uh Hezbollah trying to reconstruct, going south, and and so on, and Israel striking almost daily. And and uh I think the figure I uh saw was that Israel in this period killed 450 Hezbollah members, and during this whole situation, this whole period, Hezbollah hasn't responded. In parallel, uh the mechanism for implementation of the ceasefire uh pushed, together with the US leadership, pushed the Lebanese government to disarm uh Hezbollah, at least in the south. And the Lebanese Armed Forces issued a plan uh to uh to uh start this. At uh some point uh they they began rather effectively, then they pulled back. It was all uh based on uh the agreement of Hezbollah. In January uh they said that the first phase south of the Litani is mostly accomplished, and they they did some uh uh reporters' uh uh you know visits and and so on, and they said that the next phases will be upper north, you know, uh uh north from the Litani, Beka, Beirut, and and so on. Israel uh um was initially uh content with the with the Lebanese armed forces' uh conduct and then uh started to uh voice reservations uh showing that uh the the water was muddier than than it looked, and uh that the Lebanese armed forces are not really uh doing what its government uh committed. And uh since uh this uh war began, uh the IDF moved in under uh you know gradually five uh divisions uh command. It doesn't mean there are five divisions there, the the forces are much less. But the general idea was to make sure that uh if Hezbollah is embedding its uh forces and military assets inside homes and villages, uh these become uh kosher military targets and they need to be destroyed in order to prevent Hezbollah from reentrenching on Israel's borders. So beyond the first line of villages, uh in which Israel stayed in five hilltops uh since the ceasefire, uh the IDF moved further deeper uh inside, establishing what is uh now declared as a security zone with forward defense, uh buffering between whatever may come from Lebanon and the northern uh border communities of Israel. And the find and sorry?

Neri 21:13

Of Israel, the northern border communities of Israel.

Assaf 21:16

Yes. Now uh the findings are very definitive. So there's a lot of weapons found there, a lot of Hezbollah members uh uh found there. I saw that uh the IDF command speaks about 2,000 uh Hezbollah members already killed uh since the beginning of this round, but definitely the Lebanese Armed Forces uh didn't deliver and uh probably lied about uh what it did. And its commander, uh General uh Rudolf Haikal, uh was more or less in cahoot with Hezbollah, making sure that nobody will be embarrassed and where. That are not supposed to be found will not be found, and so on. The problem or the special uh challenge in this campaign is that both uh Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Minister of Defense Israel Katz at the outset of this campaign said this is going to change the reality in Lebanon once and for all. And uh as you may have seen, my my piece on this from the Washington Institute was once and for all again.

Neri 22:34

Yeah.

Assaf 22:34

So uh we don't see the once and for all. Uh we see a serious problem in in this uh setting. It's important to clear up uh South Lebanon from those weapons. So there is understandably uh um a logic of going out and cleaning it and so on. There is uh, I think more difficulty uh arguing that it needs to be permanent Israeli presence inside Lebanon because it draws us back to the lessons of the 18 years of the security strip uh between 82 and uh 2000 until our withdrawal from there.

Neri 23:18

So hold that thought because I want to get into the security zone looking back and also the current moment. Um but you did a very good job of kind of bringing us to the current moment. Um and by the way, just for our listeners and viewers, um the Litani that you mentioned is the Litani River, basically the kind of the geographic marker between southern Lebanon and the rest of Lebanon, uh southern Lebanon right up to the Israeli border, we should say. Uh and the Becca is uh the Becca Valley in eastern Lebanon, uh well-known Hezbollah stronghold. So summing up, basically, uhsaf uh from the ceasefire in November 2024 right up until March 2nd, 2026, you had a, let's say, um, how do they call it here in Israel? Uh uh a luxury ceasefire where Israel could still take action against Hezbollah all across Lebanon, not just the south. Um you still had the five uh IDF outposts um inside southern Lebanon kind of guarding the Israel-Lebanon border, but from within Lebanon.

unknown 24:26

Uh-huh.

Neri 24:27

Uh but yet on the other side of the ledger, you had a Lebanese army that wasn't really fulfilling its obligation to disarm Hezbollah, including in southern Lebanon. Uh, and you also had the issue of Hezbollah, I guess, reconstituting, reorganizing, potentially re-arming. Um, and that, is it fair to say, was a concern for Israel, both the politicians and also the IDF, that brought us, I guess, to another round with Hezbollah in Lebanon?

Assaf 24:58

Yes, I think uh basically the fact that Hezbollah uh initiated an attack on Israel uh made it very evident that the threat is still there. Uh it showed that Hezbollah changed its uh calculus from uh containment to uh action and reaction. Uh it showed that the main war objective in the north, as was uh uh defined in September 24, before the uh offensive uh campaign began, and that was to safely return the northern communities to their homes, uh, that was unachieved, so yet yet to be achieved, and that the uh assurances by the Lebanese uh government that uh Hezbollah's arms in the south will be taken care of uh were uh proven to be empty, you know, hollow. So uh I think uh the IDF jumped in to uh to so call so-called get the job done or to finish the job, but uh uh we need to take uh into account uh contextual issues and and changes. You you don't um enter the same river twice, and we are not at the end of 24. Hezbollah has rearranged, it doesn't fight anymore as a terror army, massive and so on, but it moved back to the patterns of guerrilla warfare uh which were characteristic uh until our uh um withdrawal in uh in June 2000. It also introduced uh on the techno operational level uh first person uh UAVs, yeah uh uh and some of them are uh fiber optics uh guided, so they're not emitting and cannot be jammed. Right.

Neri 27:15

These are and sorry, I just gonna explain that these are basically drones that drag a fiber optic cable uh up to the target, and like you said, they're immune from kind of electronic jamming and other measures.

Assaf 27:30

Uh jamming and uh and uh you know um detection because they're also uh small signature uh uh vehicles and so on.

Neri 27:42

Uh this and they're causing sorry, they're causing massive massive headache and damage and sometimes death to IDF soldiers operating in southern Lebanon.

Assaf 27:52

And until uh today we we lost uh in this campaign 17 soldiers and I think one uh one uh civilian and uh several dozens of injured, including uh today. Now uh the the talk in uh Israel is of course that uh this kind of weapon was already demonstrated in Ukraine and uh the IDF should have been uh ready, it's true, but uh it is what it is, and and you have to uh uh to deal with this uh now. As was very predictable, and we wrote about it as well, as soon as you establish a permanent uh presence in South Lebanon, you become the target of uh of guerrilla warfare, of rocket fire, of those uh new uh drones. And of course, uh if if you decide to go, let's say 10 kilometers north from the blue line, the Lenaation line between Lebanon and Israel, uh lo and behold, they're shooting at you from the next ridge and the next ridge and beyond the Litani. Uh two additions there is that uh the ceasefire is now uh uh constrained by uh uh directives from uh the White House, because there is an interconnection that the Iranians insisted on, although Israel uh uh you know uh was against it, opposed, on on connection or connecting between the Iranian ceasefire and Lebanese ceasefire, what what they call the connection between the theaters.

Speaker 3 29:35

Right.

Assaf 29:35

And uh President uh Trump more or less uh told Israel, you know, uh uh uh lie down and don't uh don't go beyond the the frontier lines. So we got this uh fighting with one hand uh uh tied behind our uh back, which only today we hear that Israel uh finally struck in in Beirut uh for the first time since the ceasefire.

Neri 30:02

Yeah.

Assaf 30:03

So we're we're fighting in a confined and and constrained uh uh situation.

Neri 30:09

That's right. And let me just set up uh kind of this next stage of the war. Uh basically you can divide the Lebanon front into two, I think, basically March March 2nd to April 16th, which is when uh Donald Trump uh imposed ceasefire on Israel and officially Lebanon. Um and like you said, it came a week after uh the original ceasefire between the US and Iran. So uh initially I I've reported on this, I know this for a fact. Uh initially, Iran insisted that Lebanon be included in the overall kind of regional ceasefire.

unknown 30:46

Uh-huh.

Neri 30:47

Uh Israel objected. Uh Trump took Lebanon out of the overall ceasefire initially. Uh, and then Iran uh as well as the other various mediators, including Pakistan, uh, insisted again.

unknown 30:59

Uh-huh.

Neri 30:59

Uh and Trump uh re-included Lebanon uh into the ceasefire. So that's basically uh the second half of the Lebanon campaign, which is now April 16th until the present day. Um so you you have these two these two halves.

Assaf 31:15

And you can uh add a third half, uh which is uh a uh diplomatic channel opened mid-April between the ambassadors of uh Lebanon and Israel in uh in Washington DC under the auspice of the State Department and uh the Secretary of State, uh beginning what uh is called peace talks. And of course, uh Lebanon naturally uh demands a ceasefire, withdrawal, uh stopping the Israeli attacks, and so on. And while making bold declarations and statements on the uh illegality of uh um Hezbollah's military assets and so on, and activity, uh they don't seem to uh to have the uh the mineral, so to speak, to to go and really disarm them, confront Hezbollah. Israel on on its own insists on disarmament of Hezbollah as a condition to uh to future peaceful relations and so on.

Speaker 32:32

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The Successes of the Past Two Months of War and What Still Needs to Be Done

Neri 33:34

I just wanted to get your your kind of net assessment, especially in military terms, okay? Um what has been achieved over the past two months in Lebanon uh from the Israeli point of view? So you mentioned the five uh so-called uh IDF divisions that are that moved in and took um well, set up this new kind of security zone. Uh 2,000 estimated Hezbollah fighters killed, um, locating, destroying weapons. They've also been finding major tunnel complexes in southern Lebanon. I mean, in military terms, has has this kind of new round, this latest round with Hezbollah been been successful?

Assaf 34:16

Uh if you go uh narrowly and you say, okay, I want to push away the threat of Hezbollah from our border, well, it's very successful. Uh it's about it's more than uh more than a hundred Hezbollah members killed to each of our fallen soldiers. Uh you could say we push them away uh from the border and the border communities, but at the same time, we still cannot secure totally. We can secure the communities from the Radwan attack, from the uh like the invasion attack, which is an October 7 model of a threat, and uh direct fires, which are the most lethal, including anti-tank, but it cannot uh stop the drones, it cannot stop the rockets. Right. Uh uh Netanyahu said uh just last week that we have two main problems uh left: the 122 millimeter uh uh rockets, the famous Katiushas for 40 kilometers, and those drones. But uh more than that, I think we need to zoom out and understand the strategic, the military strategic aspect here. Uh the doctrine of uh Hezbollah as uh part of the Iranian school of uh indirect warfare, uh, in fact uh was based on Israeli acceptance of the rules of the game. You don't attack Iran, but only the proxies. You don't attack first, but only when you're being attacked. Uh, if they and when they systematically embed themselves in urban areas and behind population, you're supposed to hold your punches, uh, pull your punches and not attack them. Uh and uh as uh Chairman Mao said, the guerrilla swims in the population like fish in the sea. I think what we see here is Israel's strategic uh uh sea change uh rejecting the the rules of uh the Iranian game and saying, okay, you want to swim, you'll have no sea. So evacuating uh a million uh uh southern Lebanese from their homes, destroying all the structures uh that were used, and there are many for military uh purposes, actually uh raising uh many, many Shiite uh villages, and not just the first line, but second, third, and fourth uh lines.

Neri 37:03

You can look at El Khiz from the border uh with Israel north into Lebanon.

Assaf 37:08

Yes, you go northwards and you see more and more villages uh ruined. That means that if you plan for guerrilla fighting, you have nowhere to swim. Those those uh this modus operandi of Hezbollah uh fighters in civilian clothes, under uh uh civilian uh uh villages, under towns, inside mosques, in hospitals, in all the the gallery of uh of uh guerrilla that we know from Gaza, uh, well, they met a different Israel. And you cannot really sustain over time this modus operandi without a population and villages. So I think that's a new phase. We're yet to see how it works. Uh it's it's not uh lacking uh risk, it's not a forever solution, but it's a new situation because if Hezbollah was embedding itself inside the Shiite uh communities, most of those uh Shiite communities are not at home, and many of those homes are no longer there, they're rubble. So I think that's a new situation. If we can combine it with the diplomatic side and uh and take this uh uh diplomatic channel as something that can establish um uh security arrangements for the longer term, uh, in uh participation of the Lebanese uh state with uh good monitoring and uh inspection that the Lebanese Armed Forces doesn't do what it really does or usually does. I think we have an opening for for something uh better in the future, including one day uh peace relations. But uh that's a long uh long uh hole.

Neri 39:11

And barring a kind of major uh diplomatic breakthrough and in a genuine and real security arrangement, especially in southern Lebanon, like like you alluded to, um will the IDF continue to hold a security zone? I mean, obviously the the current Israeli government has I mean they haven't come out and said it, but they've placed a lot of um let's say public emphasis on seizing additional territories and buffer zones and security zones, by the way, not just in Lebanon, but also in Gaza and Syria. Uh so let's say on the other side of the ledger, there there is a risk that Israel just kind of has recreated the model that didn't quite work that well in the 80s and 90s.

Assaf 39:55

Um yeah, well, you know that the Klausevich said that uh war is a continuation of uh politics by other means, by military means. Uh I think he meant mostly foreign politics. And uh in our case, as in uh other uh nations' uh case, it's uh often uh the domestic politics that dictate the the war, the course of war. Uh I find it difficult uh to see in an election year the current government uh walk back from its uh you know stated commitment to holding uh Lebanese uh soil uh as a way to secure our border communities. I think that militarily there are alternatives to that, but uh it will take time uh for those uh alternatives to emerge through the through the cracks of uh maybe the next government, if it's a different one, but also after the real uh prices and repercussions of this uh security strip uh is uh will be accumulating, plus uh when uh new uh constraints emerge from the diplomatic and political side. So you need some flexibility there. Uh it's definitely not going to solve the Hezbollah problem. I think one of uh the IDF seniors recently said this campaign is not going to defeat Hezbollah, because this will call uh uh for the occupation of the whole of Lebanon, and we're not going to do it uh right now. So more realistic. But if we look at the problem in a systemic way and we understand its combination, uh uh the weakness of the Lebanese government, the uh strength of Hezbollah being an armed group which still enjoys the Iranian support and finance uh sources, uh, the um complicity of the Lebanese armed forces with Hezbollah, the uh uh inaptitude of uh of the international effort through the United Nations interim force in Lebanon, Unifil, which will end its mandate this uh the the end of the year.

Neri 42:37

And uh you're not gonna shed a tear for the end of their mandate, as somebody who who dealt on this issue very very closely.

Assaf 42:45

Uh some analysts uh uh warn against um a security vacuum that will uh will be created as they as they leave. But uh it reminds me of uh Churchill. So uh he he once uh said in another, I'll I'll make a paraphrase on what he said, but a peacekeeping, an empty peacekeeping vehicle will uh leave Lebanon and out of it will come Unify. So uh, you know, uh say hello to Clement Attlee. But uh anyway, I think we we need to uh we need to approach uh this uh systemic problem as a systemic problem. And the the uh the approach to it should be similar to the problem structure. We need to isolate uh uh Hezbollah from the Iranian uh sources, like isolate Iran and Lebanon flights and and so on. It's already begun. We need to uh to cut its financial sources. Uh the IDF needs to go after kinetically, it needs to go. After some of its uh assets. The Lebanese armed forces, or at least part of it, should be carved out under direct uh um authority of the president and address uh disarmament uh uh you know missions. Don't now uh fund the whole Lebanese armed forces, but take a dedicated, I don't know, Presidential Guard or special units. Uh uh Secretary Rubio uh mentioned something like that.

Neri 44:33

He did.

Assaf 44:33

And go uh and go after the this as a dedicated uh effort. Uh the international support should support those units and only those units. And then you can uh also uh think of how to isolate Hezbollah's political partners, namely Amal and Nabi Berry.

Neri 44:55

You need some kind of he's a speaker of the Lebanese parliament, uh a veteran Shiite politician uh in Lebanon.

Assaf 45:03

Yes, and and he's actively uh torpedoing and undermining whatever effort the government uh makes to disarm Hezbollah and isolate it. So he's a real trouble in in the in the uh in the mechanics. Uh also uh uh we we need to look at the legislation. We need to provide through the uh through the uh diplomatic uh channel a strategic alternative to the narrative and and uh ethos of the resistance as the only way to protect Lebanon. And then people say, yes, but how can all these work while the IDF is inside? Well, graduality. We can uh think of, let's say, parallel missions that the IDF is working somewhere in the south, the Lebanese Armed Forces dedicated units go somewhere in the north or Beirut and so on for a certain period. After that, uh, when this is over, uh uh the IDF can hand over the cleared up uh place and still uh keep tabs on this to make sure that Hezbollah doesn't return. You can think of it of a phased and gradual uh effort. It's nothing that is going to be solved by one uh sword stroke and once and for all, this is not going to be once and for all. When I was in service, I used to joke that this is going to be operation once and for all six. So after thinking about all our problems in Lebanon since the 70s, the Litani uh operation of 78, the first Lebanon War of uh 82, the the many, many years that we spent there, including additional uh uh operations, and the third, and uh the third Lebanon, uh the second Lebanon uh war in uh in uh 2006, and the third in uh in 23. And now we are in the fourth, yes. I know they they they began in uh 23. We began with a very long defensive. So we need to understand that it will take time, but it won't be solved by just looking at the problem and admiring it. We need to apply really a systemic uh approach uh that that will touch all uh the parts of this, uh all components of this problem.

Neri 47:37

And it also sounds from what you're saying that it won't just be handled and resolved uh by IDF bombs and tanks and and kinetic action. That it does require a certain finesse, diplomacy, politics.

Assaf 47:54

It's a composite problem. It has a political base, it has an economic base, it has a financial base, it has a military aspect, it has a governance problem. There is you know many pieces to that. So it's very tempting, like Alexander, to uh come with a sword and cut the Gordian knot. But uh then you find that um the knot is is not made of leather but of uh uh you know spring steel. And unless you untangle it uh in combination of local uh agency and Israel's insistence and uh uh international support, not just you know, complementing and commending Lebanon for trying, criticizing Israel uh uh for uh doing what it does to self-defend, and never mentioning Hezbollah, so there is like the yellow elephant in the room, like in uh UN reports, when you don't understand, you know, when you read, I read for many years the Secretary General reports about Lebanon. If you read those reports and then look at the wars we had, you you don't understand how it happened, because those weapons were never there, and Hezbollah was uh not really there, and the UN could not uh uh verify what Israel is alleging. But uh, you know, then it it's like in the Princess Bride, as I told you before, when uh there comes a moment when we know who is right and who is dead.

The Politics of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government

Neri 49:37

That's right. That's right. Um I do remember that. Uh Asaf, final two questions for you. Uh the first one is something um you know well that we we've spoken about very recently, uh, and that's Hezbollah's remaining, lingering capabilities, uh, especially during this what you said, the fourth Lebanon War. Uh was Israel surprised, was the IDF surprised by these capabilities? And kind of by extension, um if some of the things that you laid out earlier are are put into practice, is there a risk that at a certain point Hezbollah uh says, okay, we're gonna go after Lebanese uh government figures, institutions, i.e., you know, are they gonna actually train their guns inside Lebanon? So two related questions, but maybe two uh two separate questions.

Assaf 50:33

Um I'll start with the second. Hezbollah is already actively uh threatening uh the Lebanese government. And uh the the most uh impressive uh threat is not only going after the leaders and assassinating them, but uh the great specter of the civil war. So whenever you say civil war in in Lebanon, it's uh it's supposed to uh petrify all the rest and stop them from even thinking about doing something harmful to Hezbollah. Uh will they go there? Do they want to go there? Okay, military, militarily when maybe they can, but can they survive it politically? They took a lot of damage uh by their uh repeated uh action to draw to drag uh Lebanon into war with Israel. It didn't go well with most of the Lebanese uh with the Lebanese uh public. So they they can easily uh go there and do it and then face the consequences. Um I don't think that Israel is uh is very you know active in in uh in Lebanese politics or in maneuvering the Lebanese politics. I think Israel lost most of the this the appetite to even think about it seriously in the in the early 80s.

Neri 52:09

Right, didn't go very well.

Assaf 52:11

Yeah, the we were taken uh to the cleaners by uh by the Maronites and it ended uh bad badly for us. So I think in general, uh there's no appetite in the Israeli establishment for meddling in in uh in Lebanese uh in Lebanese politics, although uh I've seen some uh indicators that in the uh just after the ceasefire with Iran, I think uh on uh April 18th, there was a massive uh aerial strike uh in Lebanon using the uh free air power that that wasn't busy now in in uh in uh in Iran. And among those were some signaling uh attacks or strikes uh in Atineh near uh near uh Nabiberry's uh home. This was a clear uh warning signal.

Neri 53:11

I see.

Assaf 53:12

And I I hear that he heard it, like he he he took he got the signal. Uh so on this I'm I'm putting it uh for uh over the side uh in uh for a minute. On surprises, well we I think we need to to differentiate between things we don't know and things we we know and still we are not getting ready. It seems that uh what we hear is that the uh Hezbollah of this round is much more active and risk-taking and bold than the Hezbollah of uh the fall of uh 24.

Speaker 3 53:58

Right.

Assaf 53:59

So they seem to be more active. Uh tactically, they're using uh means, some of them very expected, predictable, uh, some of them uh are uh uh expected and still still surprising. It's a bit like hormone's hormous was in the cards for yes, the the straight of hormoths closure was in the cards for 40 years, and still some uh somehow uh the US seems to uh have been surprised by this happening at this timing.

Neri 54:36

They were.

Assaf 54:36

I'm I'm I'm just judging by readiness for for counter options. So again, uh what what we read from Israel is that uh some uh of those threats like the uh uh first-person uh uh UAVs drones uh were known and were watched uh in Ukraine and they were very predictable. And still the readiness level is is not good enough, and we're losing equipment and and uh people uh to to this uh kind of attacks. So you know you should be always ready. Many times you're ready for the last round instead of this round. It's a learning competition, and he who learns faster uh will prevail. Although, let's be candid, Hezbollah can't defeat Israel. Uh, Israel will find it difficult or very costly to defeat Hezbollah all the way. So, what we should be seeking, I think, is some kind of uh how to optimize the mixture of direct Israeli approach against Hezbollah, some uh responsibility by the Lebanese Armed Forces, uh, and directed by their government, supported by international uh players like US Centcom or if there are other willing nations to support this, with financial warfare against their sources, isolating them from Iran, dealing with their political partners. Eventually, I think we're all looking for the Lebanese election to see how Amal and Hezbollah decline in their influence over the Shiite sect. Because eventually, Hezbollah is much about how to respond or how to satisfy the needs of the Shiites by a non-Iranian, non-radical, non-Jihadist way. So it's basically a social uh political issue, which is not for Israeli uh Israel to to resolve, uh, but uh maybe uh to support a little.

Neri 57:07

Okay. Um I like that. Uh it's a more optimistic note to end things.

Assaf 57:13

I didn't say it will work, but I I what I'm what I'm saying is that one hand uh one military hand clapping will not uh will not do the job.

Neri 57:22

Yeah, look, uh we're not gonna come back uh in one five or ten years and and say, well, you said that this will definitely work, but at least it's a plan. And at least it kind of takes into account uh, like you said, this very complex, multifaceted uh problem set um and not just uh well airstrikes. Um let's hope. Uh Asaf, thank you so much for breaking it all down with us. Um and we should also say uh what happens between Donald Trump and Iran in terms of the negotiations or not, potential escalation, could also have a major impact on Israel v. Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Assaf 58:04

Uh this cannot be disconnected from uh the regional uh context. And uh I think that uh inshallah those things will fall into places, but uh as usual in the Middle East, a lot of things can go wrong and still will.

Neri 58:22

And they and they definitely will. Uh thanks, Astaf, and uh send my best to everyone in Washington.

Assaf 58:29

Thank you. Take care.

Neri 58:32

Okay, thanks again to Asaf Orion for his generous time and insights. Also, special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do you consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so it could keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening, and please subscribe and spread the word.