Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Hopefully everyone had a nice long holiday weekend for both Shawot and Memorial Day. And we're now also in the Muslim holiday of Idilatha, soid Said, to everyone celebrating. But there is a lot to catch up on this week on multiple fronts, especially Iran. So back with us are our favorite regulars, Israel Policy Forum's very own chief policy officer, Michael Koplaw, and our dear friend and former colleague, Shira Efron, a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation and their distinguished Israel policy chair. I really wanted to get their take on the looming potential deal between Iran and Donald Trump to end the war, what this would mean for how we should assess the Oval success or not of the war, and what this means for Israel, for Bibi Netanyahu, and Lebanon moving forward. We also got into Gaza at the very end and laid out where things stand on that very important front. Like I said, a lot to cover, but this was a cracking episode. Let's get to Michael and Shera. Hi Michael, hi Sheera. Welcome back to the pod. Hi guys.

Shira 1:22

Hi guys, good to see you.

Neri 1:25

Good to see you both. Uh after a long holiday weekend in various places in various countries. How are we uh how are we all feeling? Feeling good. Everything is going swimmingly in the world, right? Shera's nodding. Uh yes. This is why we this is why we have convened today to discuss. Yeah. And you mean that with absolutely no sense of irony or anything like that. You mean it literally.

Shira 1:55

I mean on the personal level, I think it's fine, right? Really? Thank thank God. But but yeah, a lot of a lot of um a lot of things are not going in the the right direction.

Neri 2:04

So that is why I have convened you both today, uh, after the holidays, uh, to to discuss uh a lot of what's happening. Um but we have to start with Iran and the looming deal between

The Looming U.S.-Iran Deal

Neri 2:17

the US uh and the Islamic Republic to possibly end the war. It seemed like we were quite close to a deal this past weekend, uh, but it's not quite there yet, as of recording time, uh Wednesday afternoon Tel Aviv time or Wednesday morning DC time where Michael is, so just FYI if something does happen between now and when this recording goes up. But basically, for everyone, our listeners and viewers, these are the broadstorks of the deal as we understand them. In the first stage, both the US and Iran will reopen a Strait of Hormuz to shipping. So basically, no more mutual blockades and Iran is set to receive some kind of financial relief, uh likely maybe billions of dollars in frozen assets, maybe waivers on oil sales. Uh the ceasefire will then also be extended for another 60 days during which the two sides, the US and Iran, will hold talks over the fate of Iran's nuclear program and highly interesting uranium stockpile, uh, presumably in return for even more sanctions relief, because uh the Iranians will uh presumably not give anything for free. So uh those are the broad strokes of the deal as we've come to understand them. Uh that could of course change, uh things could also collapse, but that's also a scenario at the very last minute. Nothing is final until it's final in the Middle East. So, Michael, first question to you. Uh what did you think of this deal uh when you first heard about it this past weekend?

Michael 3:44

So, first of all, I'm gonna question your premise. Is is there a looming deal? I don't know. Um, maybe, maybe, maybe not. I mean, we've we've heard the president talk about deals that are uh just about to be signed and just about to be agreed on um for two months now. So um I I'm I'm actually not convinced that we should treat this moment any differently than we treated the previous ones. But let's assume that for a moment there actually is a looming deal and they're about to agree. This reminds me of of something I've seen before. It was called Quiet for Quiet uh between Israel and Hamas and Gaza for uh over a decade. Um, that's basically what this is. But before the war started, the Strait of Hormuz was open. This is something that was caused by the war, not something uh that existed before the war. And so, and there was no US blockade of Iranian ports. So if the bones of this are the strait is back open and the US stops this blockade, and the Iranians agree to a 60-day negotiating period in return for sanctions relief, well, that's quiet for quiet. So I don't know that anybody should look at it as a win of any sort. I'm not sure what it has actually accomplished. If it actually gets to a phase two, then we can evaluate it after that. But otherwise, this is this is like the the Trump playbook. We've seen this in Gaza too. It's it's a phased approach where phase one, you end hostilities and you agree to push the hard stuff off into the future. And I think as we've also seen in Gaza, the hard stuff is much harder than it looks, or much harder than the president posits it will be. So whether we get there or not, even if we get to this phase one, uh, I think that's that's how to evaluate it. The phase one is really uh just a distraction from my perspective.

Neri 5:46

So before we get to Shira, I will say that according to the information I have, they are actually close. It's not just play acting or wishful thinking from one side or the other, but that it is uh not final yet. So we are close, but you're right, Michael. Basically, the deal on the table, the only thing that may actually happen is the Hormuz deal. Right? It's not necessarily a deal for uh the highly interesting uranium or the nuclear program that still needs to be negotiated, um, which I'm sure we'll we'll address in in a second. So, yes, uh first stage deal over Hormuz, second stage TBD to be determined. Shera, what did you think when you heard the news over your long holiday weekend?

Shira 6:30

Well, I think with all the necessary caveats, right, because we we really don't know. And I I also think both sides really want uh an agreement. Um however, the Zopa, right, the ZOPA possible agreement is still seems to be quite far. Uh Iran is uh not only not capitulating, but it's increasing its demands, right? And it's not even quite for quite, right? It's not just like a mutual opening of the Straits of Remoz. It's also Iran is expecting some financial benefits. And we can talk about the different pockets of money that that they're expecting, but they're not going to give this only for the US, you know, moving its its blook, right, removing its blockade. So um, but but you know, as just thinking from here, um talk about the sort of explicit and then the implicit goals of this campaign, right? From Israeli point of view, Iran has always employed three pillars of deterrence, right? There was this nuclear file, the nuclear program, the ballistic missiles, and the proxy network. Um, and implicitly, and depending on who you believe and when this was gonna happen, also a regime change. So I'm not even gonna go to the regime change that we could you can say that the regime has changed from within, although the Tula still has the same last name, but we're not seeing uh different um more moderate pragmatic mode.

Neri 7:47

There's no it's not Venezuela.

Shira 7:48

No, no, no. There's no, it's not Delcy Rodriguez, right? And who knows what's gonna happen in Cuba, but it's not. It's a very different type of uh change within the regime. Uh, but also if there's an agreement that is only on the Strait of Hormoes initially, as Michael said, this would be sort of, and then we're letting in the period of negotiations, would it be 30 days or 60 days or whatever it is, um, to negotiate the nuclear program with the proxies and ballistic missiles not even being subject to negotiations, which like all of us that know Iran and know the Middle East knew this was going to happen, but it's not what Israelis were sold, right? The whole idea was like a bigger, better deal than nuclear agreement with Obama's nuclear agreement. We are not seeing that. We are seeing freeing, possibly Iran demanding uh freezing, the sort of unfreezing the frozen funds, right? And we're seeing those are the visits now we're seeing in Qatar because there are a lot of the frozen funds there. We're talking about between 25 and 50 billion dollars. They want a waiver on oil exports, but also sanction relief, which depends on Congress, but like that's that's a total lifeline uh for this regime. And of course, Iran, speaking about chutzpah, they want a whole compensation reconstruction fund, which uh I I you know, there are probably areas where they're gonna be more flexible, but it's also gonna provide a lifeline for this regime. And I'll just say one last thing on this. I think that, you know, the criticism comes from both the you know proponents of this war and the opponents of this war, right? The opponents of this war say, well, this was not a wise uh campaign to begin with, so let's cut our losses, right? And it's better getting to a ceasefire now, even with a bad deal or understandings. It's not really a deal, uh, if if it comes. Uh, but the proponents of the agreement say every achievement in the in the on the battlefield, right, in the military campaign, uh, Iran will erode in the negotiation table. Normally I would say when no one's happy, you must be doing the right thing. I'm not sure this applies at this this point.

Neri 9:52

Nicely put. Uh I was gonna interject and say that it's not just the Israelis who are disappointed, surprised that the missiles and proxies are not included in these negotiations, and and they're not. It's only really Hormuz and the nuclear program. But it's even the Trump administration negotiators who in January, that last ditch effort to negotiate with Iran before um well, the bomb started falling on February 28th, they had a whole list put forward by Steve Whitkoff, Trump's uh senior envoy for for everything, uh laying out a long list of demands uh that he wanted from Iran. And that those included the missiles and the proxies, the various terror groups and militias all across the Middle East. So um it is a climb down. It is a climb down. And uh look, I'll say a couple things. Number one, um you know, this is a step back from uh what Trump himself promised, right? Before we get into the whole, you know, Israel of it and Bibi Netanyahu. Trump uh started this war by demanding nothing less than unconditional surrender from Iran. Which this is not unconditional surrender because he's actually negotiating and uh not getting everything that we just talked about, including, by the way, regime change or even a shift in regime policy. Um and even since the initial ceasefire on April 8th, that actually stopped the war, that ceasefire Trump came out and said, Okay, uh, we're stopping the bombing because Iran has agreed to reopen the strait. That was a condition of the of the previous ceasefire. So now he's negotiating once again and offering, like we said, financial incentives for Iran to do what Trump told us that they agreed to do a month and a half ago, almost two months ago. So that's not a great sign in terms of the art of the deal. Um you know, we'll we'll probably get into Lebanon in a minute, but Lebanon was re-included by Trump uh very early on uh after the Iran ceasefire came into effect, and Iran demanded it, and Trump put it back in to the overall deal, much to the chagrin of of the Netanyahu government. Um and Trump never really uh even attempted uh to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force. The 36 hours of the so-called Project Freedom um didn't didn't do much of anything. And then he eventually kind of gave up on that. So all the indications are that we've gotten to this point, and it's Trump actually giving things to the Iranians and not the other way around. And so at least for me, when I heard the news uh this past weekend, I was like, well, it's of a piece with the last month and a half where yeah, it does look like Trump basically just wants this to end. He needs the Strait of Hormuz open, as we've talked about on this podcast for many weeks. That is really the the major leverage. And that uh, you know, down the line, maybe they'll get a deal over the over the nuclear program and the uh in risk uranium. But I don't know. I mean, my question to you, right? Let's say hypothetically they do get the first stage of the deal and they reopen the strait. What leverage does Trump have to actually force the Iranians to give him what he wants in terms of the nuclear program, Michael?

Michael 13:06

Very little. I mean, the leverage he'll have is is the leverage that existed at the beginning, which is military force. And as we've seen, that has not actually gotten what he wants. You know, part of the problem here is that at every single stage, the expectations that the president has are completely out of whack with what turns out to be the reality. So at the very beginning, it's pretty clear from all the reporting that President Trump's expectation was that three, five, seven days of massive airstrikes would bring about regime change and the collapse of the regime. You know, he was thank thank you, thank you, Prime Minister Netanyahu and David Barnet and other folks who who put that on the table. Um, but they, you know, seem to have, they seem to have at least convinced President Trump, even if uh other US officials were skeptical that that was going to happen. It didn't work out. And then let's not forget that we're what are we, uh, six weeks into the claim that uh two weeks of a blockade would collapse the Iranian regime because uh it wouldn't have anywhere to store its oil and all of its wells would collapse and be permanently damaged by groundwater. Well, that was six weeks ago, and that was a two-week window. None of that has happened either. So whatever the president seems to think is is going to happen on whatever timeline it's going to happen has been consistently wrong. And I don't trust that if we do get this first stage of a deal and we have this 60-day window, and that 60 days does not result in a full agreement that deals with at the minimum the nuclear issue in an acceptable way. I'm not convinced that the president's expectations go, you know, next will will be any more correct than they have been in terms of what the US can do and how that will result in in changes in Iran or not. So the leverage remains what it was before. As we've seen, it hasn't really worked. You know, the only the only real thing left on the table is to up the game in a serious way and bring half a million ground troops to the region and launch an invasion of Iran against what the US did in Iraq. I am not in any way suggesting that as a course of action. That would be an unmitigated disaster. But that seems to really be the only thing left on the escalatory ladder, unless you want to go after energy infrastructure, which the president clearly doesn't want to do, I think wisely so, because when you're worried about the economic impacts of the Straits of Hormuz, you're not going to then go blowing up uh oil fields and refineries and everything else. So that's kind of what's left. And at some point, the US just has to has to accept that and figure out how to get out of this in a way that will be viable. And um, you know, better better hope that US negotiators uh can can outwit the Iranians over 60 days, because after that, I'm really not sure what is left.

Neri 16:24

Shira, what do you think the prospects are for both second stage deal to actually get the nuclear program and to fully, I guess, and finally end the war and the prospects of Trump and maybe Israel. I mean, Israel would love to restart the war, I I I think. But Trump, I mean, can you see him in August or early September launching airstrikes again?

Shira 16:49

We don't know. I don't know. No one knows what Trump will do, but clearly closer to the midterm, there's a World Cup, there's his 80th birthday, there's uh some boxing match. UFC uh there is no, but I mean there's the right, there's US birthday. Um there there are like a lot of other things that make this a little bit less likely uh true that you know the posture in the Middle East is gonna remain and you could always sort of have Israel do it. But there's no question that once you get into uh understanding understandings, again, and this is with the caveat that Iran was struck once, twice when it was negotiating, right? So let's just put this aside. But assuming that we are getting to some sort of framework agreement, it's gonna be uh less likely that the US will have this military uh leverage. Where I think that we can achieve some progress in those negotiations. And again, I I have no idea. And at the moment, it doesn't seem like Iran is being is willing to be flexible, but we've known that all along that Iran was uh willing to be more flexible on the highly enriched uranium to 60%, 450 kilos of that. That represents uh that would be a good thing. The problem is what about the the other your highly enriched uranium to 20%? And given where we are with Iran, I was never that hawk on this. But I think at this point with this regime, you really want to get the nine, 10 tons out of any enriched uranium result. So the enriched is 3.67%. And I just don't see this happening, which is gonna be complicated. It's also gonna be very, very difficult, even when you have the best negotiators in the room and technical people, which it's gonna be hard to find now, um, within 30 days or 60 days to come to an agreement, not just on what you do, but how do you verify and monitor, right? Uh, with all the faults of the JCPOA, the people didn't like it. I mean, it did have very uh stringent uh verification and monitoring measures. And it's fine to say we will see everything, we have Vizent, we have satellites. Now it's complex, and you know, and even a small, right, like a small, uh small quantity could produce a dirty bomb or you know, say it's a it's it is rocket science, but it doesn't have to be rocket science. You can develop some sort of like a uh uh improvised nuclear device, which would provide it, which would be deterred. And I'm not saying that Iran is gonna do that, but you know, it could be a scenario. So it's it's gonna be very, very difficult. And that's why I do hope that there is an agreement, and I think everyone should calibrate their expectations on the ballistic missiles and the proxies. I never thought this, but at least try to get uh a good agreement on the nuclear uh stuff that that is strengthened with with verification. How do you do that? I'm not sure. I am concerned that we're gonna be in a pause and some sort of like mowing the grass strategy where Israel would have to basically Israel would want to go in and strike in Iran when it detects threats uh in years to come. And this will be obviously without I just say obviously, but very unlikely that it will come with all the with the US Armada that came to the region um this time. And I just I mean I don't want to be too nerdy about it, but I guess like you know, this seems to be kind of like a theme here when we talk about this overconfidence, right? The two weeks, what what was it within two weeks the Iranian economy is gonna collapse, they're gonna make changes, they're gonna be under pressure. I mean, we're just not seeing it, right? We're just not seeing it. And this is on every front. And it's not just, it has to do with it, it's not just an Israeli problem, it's not just a US problem, right? I'm sure that when Putin uh invaded Ukraine uh for special, what was it called, security cooperation, he also thought it's gonna be four days, maybe not four years. But this idea of what we believe about our adversaries' intentions and their and the psychological biases and the thought that they will succumb to the same pressures that we will and behave the same because what matters to us matters to them, that's so much more important than you know um looking at economic measures or how many launchers we we removed and how many people we killed. And we just again and again we keep making the same mistake kind of thing in underestimating our adversaries' um both capacity and capabilities, but also resolve.

Neri 21:22

And also having way too ambitious of objectives for the military campaign that you do launch, uh, and not being ready for any contingencies, say like Iran blockading the state of the city.

Shira 21:36

So you have overconfidence, right? You you overestimate your abilities and you underestimate theirs.

Michael 21:42

Yeah.

Shira 21:42

Um and its capabilities and resolve. Sorry, I have a child.

Michael 21:46

And and and by the way, I I think we're we're seeing that even at least on the Israeli side, in the context of uh a discussion over negotiations. Like it it's it's pretty clear to me that if there is A successful agreement here beyond just quiet for quiet. It's going to be on the nuclear issue and the nuclear issue only. Only. Which to my mind is also like the most important part of it. But uh, you know, I I still see and hear Israeli expectations that any deal has to be evaluated not only on the nuclear issue, but it also must address proxies, it also must address ballistic missiles. That's just not gonna happen.

Neri 22:24

But they're just not they're disconnected from reality. You also have Israeli, even people that we respect um inside the system and also former officials, saying, well, uh, no deal is better than this deal or any deal, and that the best thing for the US administration to do is just to wait the Iranians out and maintain the blockade of the Strait of Hormous, and basically that will lead to Iran's, if not capitulation, then uh increased flexibility at the negotiating table. And I read this and I hear this, and I was like, in what world are you living in where you can you, the US and you, the global economy, can withstand six months of the Strait of Horror Moose being closed? Israel could because it's willing to bear the cost and quite quite frankly has uh bigger priorities, I assume, on a national level. But like in what world uh do the Israelis expect uh the US president to just uh weigh them out and lead to the crash of the global economy? I mean, it you know, as like isolated kind of strategy, sure, there's a logic to it, but in the real world right now, no way.

Michael 23:35

And also the assumption that even if the the presidents and the economy were willing to do that for six months, that that would be the thing that would finally bring the Iranians to heel. I don't know. Maybe maybe it will, maybe it won't, but yeah, I don't see. So anybody can be confident confident of that given the track record.

Neri 23:52

And also, is it is it six months, is it eight months? Are you gonna go into into a winter with with no fuel in East Asia? I mean, you're you know, these aren't like laughing matters, even though we're kind of being very flippant about it. Um let me ask you about uh Israel uh and Bibi Netanyahu. So uh as uh as our good friends uh Renan Bergman and David Halfinger wrote in the New York Times uh a few days ago, uh Netanyahu started off this war in the cockpit alongside Donald Trump. He was his co-pilot. Uh and now, as uh as they both wrote, Netanyahu is back in economy class. He's a passenger in all of this. Um very jealous of that line, by the way. It's a great line. And President Trump also said the other day that uh when asked by reporters, well, you know, Bibi will uh will do what I ask him to do. I mean, that's very clear, cut and dry. So how do you think this looks from Bibi Nyawa's point of view and uh more to the point, how does Bibi spin this in the event of a deal uh to the Israeli public? Shera, do you wanna start us off?

Shira 25:00

So again, with all the caveats, because we don't know what the deal is gonna be. Uh, but there's it's gonna be a spin. Amo Sarel uh, as you know, said that we're gonna be lied to a lot. Um Friend of the Pod, Amusarel. Um, there's gonna be emphasis over the achievements of those. These war and this war and there are military achievements, right? No question uh about that. Um military achievements and sort of just look into the future, uh, what we're gonna, right? The Iranian regime will fall, they will weaken, they're on their knees. So I think there's no question that um if if this is where it ends, right, and it's a big if, it's gonna be very, very difficult for Netanyahu to justify this to his public. And I think it's bigger than this, right? Like, just think about it. All these years, right? The the doomsday weapon, right? Like, this is this was this was the thing that was that Iran feared the most, and that we all like we all feared, but we all thought like the costs are gonna be terrible, but maybe it's worth it, right? This is gonna be the final war ever.

Neri 26:06

Yeah.

Shira 26:07

Israel and the US together launching their air power on Iran. And I think it's not saying Iran is hurt, but it survived. And this is not just like um uh a military achievement, right? It's it's like something that has to do with strategic of how Iran uh perceives itself, how countries in the world perceive the United States and Israel by extension. Um, regional countries having to recalculate, but obviously they would have to come to a detent with it. So it's it's really, really complicated. It's gonna be very difficult for Netanyahu to explain that this thing with the props and right, like what he was hoping for all these years that would happen. I'm not going into who who led who into this war, but it's clearly Netanyahu wanted this for many, many years. He said it, he admitted it. And to get to this this point, I think it's gonna be very, very, very difficult to spin this to the Israeli uh public. I just I just don't see how he does it. And by the way, he's not the only one. I mean, there's there's this whole group, also in the US, that this is what they're right, like that's their objective in life, to get to this point. And okay, we got here, and then what?

Neri 27:13

Well, uh that chorus, um, BB can't say it outright because he has to maintain good relations with Donald Trump, but the chorus, say in in Washington and other parts that are uh have been a lot more hawkish on the Iran issue for many, many years, will say, well, uh Trump at the very last minute uh didn't go far enough. Right? That's what they're gonna argue. That uh he should have kept the war going, he should have uh escalated once it was clear that the Iranians, you know, were not doing what the US wanted them to do. Uh that's I I imagine gonna be their their line of argument.

Shira 27:45

Uh and and Shira, when you say I'll just I'll just say like this is this is exactly it. Like we had the plan, but it wasn't implemented in full, right? So had we gone full enough, and it will be also on the campaign, but also, you know, I'm hearing a lot of like chatter on oh, but we have a really, really, really good operational plan to at least get the highly enriched uranium. Um, and we should have at least done that. All the nine, ten tons, we could have done it. This is it's doable, it's a genius plan.

Neri 28:11

With a commando raid that would take a week, yeah.

Shira 28:14

Yeah, good luck. Um, so so I think there are going to be a lot of like, we could have done that, but obviously it's a package deal, right? Like there's there's one uh boss, the Hefe.

Neri 28:23

Yeah, well, he's um he's the only person that counts. Or as uh Senator Lindsey Graham said very uh obliquely, it's like, well, if you essentially go and take this deal that's been talked about since the weekend, then you're essentially admitting that you're afraid of Iran's ability to close the Strait of Horror moves and you're afraid of Iran's ability to strike back at the Gulf Arab allies. And if that's the case, if you were afraid of that, then you shouldn't have started this war in the first place. Tough stuff, even obliquely, by uh Senator Graham.

Michael 28:51

Um I was gonna And and the the finish the finish the job argument, it's completely unfalsifiable, right? That there's there's no way to ever to ever end it or settle it, right? If if at any point you negotiate or you end it, then you know the argument is oh, exactly. Uh Trump didn't go far enough, right? That he didn't he didn't fulfill the plan to its to its fullest extent. You know, one one more week of bombing, one more month of blockade, um, one more hit uh hit on the on the right person or or the right installation would have brought the whole thing crumbling down. There's literally no way to ever prove the negative. And so it's it's not gonna stop. I mean, it just um it sort of doesn't matter what happens next. There's always going to be a group of people who insist that just one more thing would have been what brings the entire house of cards tumbling down.

Neri 29:44

Yeah. I was just gonna say, uh, in terms of Shira's point, yeah, it could be the it was uh billed as the final the final battle by the US and Israel against Iran. Um it could actually be the final battle waged by the US and Israel together against Iran, because I don't see at least uh a future US president, how did uh Donald Trump call it, taking this little journey uh to Iran, which to your point, Shira Excursion. He called it called it an excursion. Yeah, this little excursion to uh to Iran. I don't really see a US president having having the appetite to do this again, which again is another kind of strategic victory for Iran, that they actually took this major shot, this kind of sword hanging over their head for for many years, if not decades, and they're still standing.

Michael 30:28

What's interesting about this is that folks on the right tend to make arguments about credibility, uh, arguments, by the way, that I agree with. And you saw it in particular after President Obama threatened action on Syrian chemical weapons, said it was a red line, and then Assad used chemical weapons, and and the US did nothing in response. There were a lot of people who said this is going to damage US credibility and and deterrence and the ability to get things done going forward because you've got to actually make credible commitments. A position, by the way, that I I agree with in in theory and in principle. Here too, it works, it works in the opposite direction as well, right? If if you then take the more hawkish approach, as happened here, and you launch a war and you say the following wonderful outcomes will happen and they don't, well, that's also a credibility problem. It doesn't only work in one direction. It isn't just about threatening to use force and then not using it. It's also about using force and having none of the things that you said were going to happen happen. And yeah, that that's that's going to be with us for decades in terms of future decision making, how the US operates and how US adversaries respond to the US.

Shira 31:47

Right. And that's the thing that's sort of like I'm afraid of, right? Before it's like, how does Xi Jinping see the US? How does Putin see the US? How do European countries like if you can't if you can't get a coalition, all right, reopening states of our moves, and that's actually not fair, right? It's the free rider problem. It's always been the US at the lead, right? They should have contributed, it affects them, jet fuel and stuff, but you can't, will you get a coalition to protect Taiwan? I mean, these are like very, very, very important questions and also um, which are obviously affecting uh the US and affecting Israel. And Michael, I I think you're you're so correct about this idea that you can't, right, like falsify this claim. Had you only continued, if we didn't have our ties, uh uh if our hands weren't, sorry, my child he was, if we didn't have our uh hands tied behind our backs, we would like finish Hamas for good, right? Like it's always the same, it's always the same argument. I just do want to acknowledge, and I think this is where it's a little bit unfair, we are judging and assessing the outcomes of a war while the still the war has not concluded. And I think that, you know, looking back at the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, obviously it didn't solve the problems, but it didn't bring quiet for 20 years. Like there could be really very significant achievements that with time would lead to an outcome that otherwise wouldn't happen. And we can never also prove that they're counterfactual, right? I don't know if uh Tula Ali Khaminae would have died, but but like it's just very difficult, I think, for us to to judge this as failure or as success. Um because we're still it's it's it's too soon. Uh so I just think we need to be a little bit more charitable about this assessment. Sorry. No, I mean, I know, but just against the objectives of finishing the course. Yeah, of course.

Michael 33:39

But right. I mean, I I hear that like in the in the you know greater scope of things, but that only works if you if you throw out all of the claims that were made initially. If if President Trump or Bibi Nisniahu or anybody at the beginning of this had said uh we're gonna achieve all of these things, regime change, nuclear, ballistic proxies, all of it. And by the way, it's gonna be a three-year war. Okay, well, fine. Um, but that's that that that was not what was sold. So yes, I agree with you, Shera. No matter what we're talking about, we'll have to revisit it in one year, five years, 10 years, and see exactly what followed from what's gone on. But I do think we can absolutely evaluate now what has taken place against the claims that were made on the timeframe that they were made. Um, and on that account, yes, there have absolutely been accomplishments. I'm not somebody who thinks that nothing, nothing positive or or or you know, there's nothing on the uh on the accomplishment side of the ledger here. I'm not in that camp. Um, but if we're like assessing this, the overall picture, I just don't see how anybody looks at this as a success.

Speaker 34:46

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Neri 35:44

So I was gonna say, and this is gonna be kind of my my next question, the devil's advocate position. And I have no doubt that BB Netanyahu is gonna try to spin this in a way. You already kind of see it, where now he's he's generalizing to the point of um kind of insignificance where he he said the other day, or he put out like on social media, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. It's like okay. I mean, that's been true for forever. That it like that's is that where you're negotiating? Do you believe that Donald Trump will actually hold a line? Are you willing to go back to war? I mean, that's not that's not the issue at hand.

Shira 36:17

Um and also, you know I mean it is the issue, but how do you make sure that they never get a all because they said so? It's the it's in the preface off the JCPOA.

Neri 36:26

Yeah, the 2015 nuclear deal, right? Um, you know, so the uh the war is a success if Iran never actually moves towards a nuclear weapon. Like that's not those weren't the goals that were set forward, to Michael's point. Um and also he's gonna use the uh the 60-day period or however long the second stage negotiations take to be like, well, nothing is final yet, so it's unfalsifiable.

unknown 36:50

Right?

Neri 36:50

It's like, well, you know, you wait, you wait, Trump will hold the line until I don't know, the end the end of time. But I was gonna say stemming from that, the devil's advocate position, uh, you know, the more charitable interpretation that I've heard personally, especially from here, is like, well, uh, you're being way too negative. Um, Iran was very heavily hit, uh missile program, especially was severely degraded, uh, defense industrial base badly damaged. Uh, no matter what sanctions they get, and they will definitely get sanctions if there is a deal. Um, their economy, which was uh on the verge of collapse even before the war, will now be even more on the verge of collapse. I don't know what what expression you can use. And basically the bottom line is that 40 days of US and Israeli bombing definitely had an effect, uh, and we may not see the overall strategic kind of implications yet. That's the devil's advocate position. That's the counter-argument. I think that's way too much.

Shira 37:48

Right, but also Israelis saying it's gonna be a bunch more difficult to um try to get a nuclear weapon, nuclear device, even a simple one because we took out all their scientists, and you you you caused a substantial delay um all around, and and you did hurt like Iran's legitimacy, you know what I mean? Like for other countries that viewed it as sort of like maybe they'll have to find a way to get to get along with it. But the Arabs are upset, not just the Arab leaders, the Arab public is extremely upset. I have no doubt that at the moment the Gulf countries are trying to sort of end this, right? Because they know that they're gonna be the victims of retaliatory Iranian attacks, right? Like, and and there goes their visions for uh turning the Gulf into uh you know economic uh development haven. But uh but they're upset, and I think they will have their sort of long-term vendada on Iran, which is not gonna be a military. Uh, the Gulf countries, I mean, if you speak to, I spoke to, I I won't mention names, but I spoke to some formal countries of Arab formal representatives of Arab countries, including Qataris, by the way, in in a conference uh abroad. And I was I was surprised at the harsh tones that they use. You always think, okay, well, the Emiratis are like that, but the Qataris are okay. No, no, everyone is extremely upset. And I think this is something that also, you know, Isra Israel would would uh would appreciate in the sense of the of their achievements. I will just say that I think you and maybe others are disappointed because you listened to the promises in the beginning of the war. Um looked like a joke back then, and it looks like more of a joke now.

Neri 39:33

No, look, uh I listened to the promises uh in the beginning of the war, and also you you're there's almost like a uh like a psychological reflex, right, deep down by I'd say most Israelis, maybe not all Israelis, most Israelis, and definitely certain people in America and maybe other parts of the world, including the Middle East, where bombing Iran, good, no matter what you did, no matter what the fallout is, no matter what the damage to Israel's international standing or the global economy or the fact that Iran now has de facto control over a major international waterway, doesn't matter. You bombed Iran, can't be bad. And you degraded them, I don't know, to X extent, even though as we know from last June, a lot of the assessments were way too optimistic. And we were sold a bill of goods coming out of the 12-day war last uh year. So I think you know, you you kind of want it to be true in terms of the damage inflicted on the Islamic Republic, but as professionals in this in this space, we also have to be kind of very clear-eyed about the wider implications. Um Michael, we didn't get your input into the counter-argument.

Michael 40:43

Even if you grant everything you said as correct, it it's only looking at one side of the ledger. And by the way, but both sides, both sides, I think, to a large extent are doing this, right? The the people who who view everything that's gone on as a complete and total unmitigated disaster without reservation, they're looking on only one side of the ledger as well. Um I think that if you're only gonna look at one side of the ledger, they probably have a stronger case than the folks who are who are looking on the positive side of the ledger. But the point is that even if you grant all those positive things, and yes, that there are definitely positives, there's no question that Iran is in worse shape militarily now than they were before. There's no question they're in worse shape economically now than they were before. There's no question they're going to, when this is done, have to expend even more of their resources and energy to stay afloat and to keep their population in check. And, you know, the the costs of repression will be will be higher for them now than they were before. These are all, and and their nuclear facilities have have been bombed. And so that in rich uranium is presumably buried under tons of rubble and not easy for them to get to. These are absolutely all positive things. But that's never, that that should never be the end of the question, right? The the question is the full cost-benefit analysis. So is all of that worth the tens of billions of dollars that the United States and Israel have already expended on the military operation itself? Is it worth all of the munitions that they've used up and and will take time to replenish? Is it worth the damage to the global economy? Is it worth now Iran learning that they can actually close the Strait of Hormuz pretty easily and at will? Something that they didn't actually know before. Is it worth the likelihood that the lesson the Iranians learned from this is that they really have to get a nuclear bomb come hell or high water because that's the only way to avert this sort of thing? Is it worth the just accelerated collapse in Israel standing in the United States on both sides of the aisle, by the way, not just with Democrats, but with Republicans as well? Are all of these things worth the victories that have been racked up on the positive side of the ledger? I would argue that they aren't. But if you're not even having that part of the conversation, if you're not even factoring it in, if you're just saying, look at all of the things that the US and Israel have blown up and look at all the damage they've done to Iran, then you're not having a serious assessment of whether this has been a good idea or a bad idea.

Neri 43:17

Very well put. Um in our main time, I wanted to talk about Lebanon and Gaza, uh, very important fronts, albeit not the main topic of our conversation or really, you know, the international conversation at present. Uh as we mentioned at the top, Lebanon is intimately tied to the Iran ceasefire and the negotiations. We don't know if they're going to include Lebanon in the overall deal. My sense is that Iran will press for it and Trump is likely going to give it to them, like he did uh back on April, well, early April. Um and so we've had this weird kind of faux ceasefire. Not really a ceasefire, but a Trump definitely limited the idea. Ability to hit Hezbollah in Lebanon over the past month plus, much to the chagrin of Israel and the IDF and northern Israelis. And so you've had these kind of limited uh limited strikes uh in southern Lebanon primarily, uh IDF still holding the security zone about 10 kilometers in to Lebanon in the south of uh Lebanon. Uh and yet uh yesterday it seems like uh the Trump administration did give Israel a bit more rope and that you've seen since yesterday, and even as we speak, uh wider scale airstrikes by the IDF. Um you've uh seen uh IDF forces uh move further north uh beyond the Litani River, uh kind of taking up more positions uh deeper into Lebanon, uh in retaliation, really, and

Escalation on the Northern Front With Hezbollah

Neri 44:48

this is where the frustration comes in, because Hezbollah is doing a sorry to say a decent job of firing back, primarily through these explosive drones and IDF casualties are are mounting, are mounting, and life in northern Israel is definitely not anywhere close to being normal. So a lot of frustration on the Lebanon front, which is tied to the Iranian front. My question to you, Shira, you're here, we'll start with you. I mean, where do you see this going? So the IDF is going to escalate somewhat. Maybe Beirut will stay out of the equation, but okay. The IDF is literally striking more stuff, will it have an impact? And what happens if well, Trump actually tells it the IDF to stop?

Shira 45:29

Well, first of all, we have to say you started saying earlier that Trump like pulled um because of Iran, Trump pulled sort of pinged the Lebanon front to the Iranian front, but actually it's Iran that calls the shouting Lebanon now.

Neri 45:41

No, no, that's uh it's a that's what I said, it's a capitulation by Trump to what Iran wanted. Yeah.

Shira 45:46

Yeah, I was gonna say, like, we have never seen Iran uh traditionally has tried to keep some sort of not really plausible deniability, but attempted to have some deniability, right? And not it so it doesn't look like it's interfering in the sovereign uh country's affairs. Um and we saw Hezbollah less um preserve some independence from from Iran being uh sort of a dual-hated also Lebanese political, religious uh group. Uh we're not seeing that anymore. So I think uh speaking about our sort of positive assumptions, right, that Israel would go in, do a little thing, uh degrade Hezbollah Balad's capabilities because they replenish some of their arsenals uh and restock their like command and control and all that, you'll do a little thing and we'll get out. And what do you know? Uh Israel is in. And I think the it sort of got out of control from an Israeli perspective, right? And I'll say something that I think is a bit blunt. I normally I do mince words. Um, but I but no, no, I don't know. But I think on this, there are two things. First of all, it's just horrific, right? Those daily news about IDF soldiers being killed. Yeah, really, for what? But it's not just that. It's not just that, it's also the embarrassing. It there's an embarrassment here because they're killed by those FPV, those like drones that fiber options are prepared for cable, yeah. And I mean, it's a tactical thing, but we knew from I mean, the Israeli state controller who spoke about the readiness to the drones. We've, I don't know in how many workshops of the IDF I've been sort of like prepare learning the lessons from the Ukraine war, right? Like, and so there's a cumulative effect of being under substantial pressure here and looking at like something that's like we'll put those soccer nets to defend people from drones. Like, I think Netanyahu is under immense pressure for objective reasons, but also because of, you know, we're close to elections and it just it Israel looks helpless in the face of the drones. So what is happening is this Israel's deepening down, you you you are correct, uh raising villages, going further in. Um, I think for the first time, Israel IDF teams are operating north of the Litani River, which is uh an escalation. Uh in Beirut, uh assassinations would be okay, but not taking down full buildings. But if you listen to members of the cabinet today, I mean they're going full and right on everything. And of course, the buffer zone. And I just like you, it's hard for me to think that you do something again and again, if it hasn't worked before, it would work now. How does this lead Hezbollah to disarm? It may degrade it more, but how does it lead it to disarm? And how does this preserve the ability of the Lebanese government to sustain, you know, support for its negotiations, the diplomatic track with Israel, which is happening, by the way, there's a fourth round next week. Right. Um, and also and and try to enforce its sovereignty. There's a real issue here, but I think we're we're crop we are close to an overreach situation. We're not only like undermining Hezbollah, we're undermining our partner. And there's no question the Lebanese government is Israel's partner in this.

Neri 49:03

Um A lot of Israelis would question that, but I'm I'm on your side, Shira. Uh Michael, how do you see the the Lebanon front in all of this as we maybe get a deal in Iran, maybe not, and as the IDF escalates in Lebanon?

Michael 49:18

I think that separating Iran from Lebanon should be at this point Netanyahu's highest priority uh in terms of trying to convince Trump of something. Um the Iranians have successfully linked them again, and um it's a huge problem. You know, the uh as Shira points out, like it it seems kind of madness to assume that um more military force, you know, uh another buffer zone moving north to Lutani is is going to solve the problem. Um you know, the the buffer zone, the security zone for 18 years uh in the 1980s and 1990s did not accomplish what was intended. Um, the current security zone is not accomplishing what was intended, and you know, it's it's the theory of it is collapsing even quicker. Um I share both of your concerns about Israel needing to separate between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government and look at the Lebanese government more as a partner. Although I also have to say that over the last few weeks, I'm I I I'm becoming increasingly skeptical of that. Maybe I'm becoming more Israeli in this sense, um, where you know you've you've had you've had the, even though it's not actually a ceasefire and being violated primarily by Hezbollah, the Israelis have refrained from hitting targets in Beirut. Um, they've refrained from hitting the Dahiy A quarter itself. And I don't see a lot of evidence that that space that the Lebanese government and Malaf now have has been used to effectively pressure Hezbollah on anything, um, on disarming, on getting them out of the organs of the state. So, like, yeah, I agree we need to give the Lebanese government more time, understand the situation they're in, understand their structural weaknesses. But unless you guys are seeing something that I'm not, and maybe you are, uh, I don't see a whole lot of evidence that the theory that if you give them more space and you give them some political room, that they will start to act against his ball in a real way. I don't see that developing yet. Doesn't mean that it won't, um, but in some ways, this is also an unfalsified, unfalsifiable argument. Right.

Shira 51:31

But I will say though, that I think this is one of the things. There's no question they don't have enough uh capacity to act and they don't have maybe enough will. And I, again, I'm gonna be blunt. I think especially specifically the the chief of staff of the uh Lebanese Armed Forces, right? Haeckel, who did say that he can disarm Hezbollah and obviously it didn't accomplish the goal. He should probably be, I don't know, I don't want to tell other other uh leaders in other countries to resign for failures. We have an issue with that here as well. But clearly uh the LAF didn't do everything. But I think there is a story that we're forgetting. Um, according to CENTCOM, Central Command, right? We've seen that there was a disarmament. There were like, I don't remember the numbers, but there were a few thousands of missiles that were decommissioned uh by uh the LAF at the time. It's just like disarmament and rearming happen uh at the same time. And of course, Hezbollah is stronger. We're seeing the LAF take over the Beirut uh uh airport, which was all what was it, uh a smuggling nod for Hezbollah. We've seen them take over the uh deploy uh soldiers to the uh border with Syria, also to prevent smuggling. We've seen them take actions, the central bank taking actions against uh Kardil Hassan, which is the uh financial tools that Hezbollah uses outside the central bank. Is it enough? No. But to say they're not doing, I think it's also not giving them the little credit where the credit is due.

Michael 53:01

I'm not saying that they've done nothing. Uh all I'm saying is that if the idea is that you give them space and and they're gonna sort of really step up their ability to tackle Hezbollah, I don't see a whole lot of evidence of that. And listen, I I don't think that renewed Israeli strikes in Beirut are gonna bring Hezbollah down. I'm not sure that I'm not sure that's the answer either. Right.

Neri 53:22

I wonder if on the Lebanon policy pod they're talking about Israeli policy vis-a-vis Lebanon, like we're talking about, you know, the intricacies of Lebanese. I'm sure it's literally all they're talking about. Um but we do have we need a crossover, we need we need a crossover episode.

Shira 53:36

Sorry, it's a spoiler thing. I have an article coming out in Foreign Affairs about this. I don't think you need to give the Lebanese space. Space is not gonna do anything. They need to be held accountable. There needs to be a very clear list of demands, acknowledging what they have done, but listing the gaps, having some sort of like roadmap for the long run, understanding that Hezbollah is not gonna be disarmed like quickly, right? It's like a social, political, religious process need representation for the Shia people. I mean, and this is part of the reason part of the problem. Setting unrealistic expectations, you're gonna be, you're gonna be uh uh, you know, we're gonna be disappointed, right? It took the the to decommission the full arms of the IRA a decade, I think. And and that was, you know, as part of an agreement, voluntary agreement. And you didn't have a failed stake and you had Tony Blair, right? Like we're not in the same. These things take time. And I just think that if it's not space. They need we need pressure, but also uh uh support.

Neri 54:37

Sure. If you want Tony Blair, he can show up in Lebanon tomorrow. I don't know. That's not that's not the obstacle. You you know it's not the obstacle. I'm being I'm only joking.

Shira 54:45

You mean Tony Blair spends time in Lebanon?

Neri 54:47

I think Tony Blair spends a lot of time in our part of the world, yeah. You know this to be true. Um final issue, and it it does involve Tony Blair, uh, I mean tangentially, is uh Gaza. Uh and in brief, I just wanted to focus on the latest state of play because it often gets very short thrift and and it shouldn't. Um but that's the sad reality of Iran, Lebanon, and everything else going on, Israeli politics. Uh so yesterday on Tuesday, the IDF killed uh the latest Hamas military chief in Gaza, Muhammad Ode. Um this was about a week and a half after uh the guy's predecessor is Din al-Hadad uh was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City. Um all for the good, I would argue, but aside from continued IDF strikes uh in the still Hamas controlled 40% of the Gaza Strip, um it really is important to uh explain, analyze, highlight what's happening politically, diplomatically, or rather what's not happening on the ground, um, on the Gaza front. So uh Shira, you follow this closer than most, closer than anybody. Uh give us kind of uh broad strokes what what has been happening in Gaza as all of our eyes have been focused uh eastward on Iran.

Shira 56:09

So Gaza, right now a lot of Israelis are talking again about Gaza after literally uh ignoring this issue for uh many, many months. Uh what happened is um I think we go back to, you know, we we spoke about this before, but there's a different structures, the Board of Peace, the Executive Board, the Office of Uh High Representative headed by Nikolai Mladenov, um, with the with President Trump's 20 or

The Deadlock in Gaza

Shira 56:33

21-point plan, any way you you want to look at it, that um brought back the hostages. And then there was an announcement, I think it was in January, by President's people, right, that we're moving into stage two of the plan, uh, which was the thorny issues of Hamas disarmament, the idea of withdrawal, uh starting having a technocratic uh government enter Gaza with a political horizon for the Palestinian story to return. Obviously, and I think we said this before, you know, neither side has uh signed onto this plan. They only signed on the ceasefire, return of hostages uh in return for prisoners and partial Israeli withdrawal. And what we've seen in practice on the ground that not only has uh progress not been made, but we're seeing reversal of gains. Uh there's been some humanitarian improvements, although this also ebbs and flows depending on you know access and restriction uh movements. Uh we've seen Hamas, surprise, surprise, uh becoming again the de facto government. There's no vacuum, right? Uh without an alternative, a viable alternative. Of course, Hamas will be the government again. Um it's it's it holds on to the territory. Israel has not maintained the yellow line. Uh it's now we're seeing IDF, now it's public information. Is IDF is taking more and more territory. And so what we have, and I think we spoke about this, right?

Neri 57:52

Like just moving the the line of control kind of westward, more inward into Gaza. Uh initially, after the October ceasefire, the yellow line constituted what, like, 53% of Gaza. Now it's like 60 over 60% of Gaza.

Shira 58:08

64% I'm seeing, I'm hearing. Okay. I I haven't measured, but I'm hearing 64%, uh, with this with displacement of uh further communities. So we are in a situation where, you know, when we looked at this and we said, Israel said no occupation by Israel, right? No Hamas can control Gaza, no Palestinian Authority, no UN mandate, no kind of. It's like you got all the options kind of like mixed. Um what we have is Nikolai Mladenov, the office, the high representative for Gaza holding a very tough line on Hamas as he should. Um, but I think what happened here, and I'm very happy on the tough line on Hamas, but I think what happened is inadvertently um there was a situation created where uh the whole premise of the plan is conditioned upon Hamas agreeing to disarm. And Hamas is not agreeing to disarm. Of course, it doesn't say flat no, but it says yes if or yes but like Israel does, right? And places unrealistic uh conditions. And you know, our friend Imranovic always says, right, when it's in the Middle East, when it's all or nothing, it's gonna be nothing. The thing is that uh where I was hoping to see progress, the plan itself says, point 17 of the plan says that of Trump's plan, uh, that if Hamas delays its response or refuses to disarm, there's gonna be progress in the areas not under its control. In practice, and I uh this is just based on a hunch, uh, under an election period. Uh I don't see the Israeli government at the moment allowing anything to move forward in Gaza, even if it's anti-Hamas, uh, because politically it's gonna look very well. So we are in a it will look very bad. So we are in a deadlock. It's reflected in Nikolai's uh remarks and his new roadmap. I still think it's salvageable. I hope it's salvageable because uh the plan B cementing the current situation of two Gazans or and two very poor Gazans, yeah, and and or return to war is is far worse, but but after but I just don't see it happening in the in the near future.

Neri 1:00:12

Yeah, I was gonna say the plan B, it's not even kind of uh a secret anymore. That idea of Southern Command is preparing plans for a Remunio offensive against Hamas in the 40% of Gaza it still controls, and that Bibi Netanyahu um would like nothing more than to restart the offensive in Gaza ahead of a future election, especially if he's stymied in Iran and Lebanon is kind of wrapped up with Iran. Um, but that requires a green light from Donald Trump, which um remains to be seen. Uh Michael, your thoughts about sorry, I just want to say something.

Shira 1:00:47

I think there is an assumption that for BB, like this constant fire is good, and it may be, but you know, there are gonna be soldiers coming in right in body bags from Gaza as well, and I don't think the Israelis like that. So this is also something. And the chief of staff, Yal Zamir, is raising, I don't know how many red flags about the situation in the IDF and the ability to fight multi-fronts. So I think this is also, I mean, I agree with you that that keeping sort of the fire on on one front um politically could be advantageous, but I also see that there's uh it's not just Trump, uh Trump that's holding the break. There are other reasons why it's difficult to move on to a full-scale war with a gr with a big ground operation. What Israel would like to do is, you know, resuming like the airstrikes.

Neri 1:01:36

I mean, which they're conducting some airstrikes. Uh we'll talk we'll talk in July when he gets the green light from Trump. And he he says, you know, uh two months before an election in the fall, that now I'm really going for total victory. Which will play well with his base. It may not play well with the majority of Israelis, but uh, you know, at this point he's just trying to But at least it's a story, it's a better story than hey, I lost in Iran and we're getting bled in Lebanon. It's a better story to tell.

Michael 1:02:03

Yes, um This is why I think Israel's going back to warn Gaza.

Neri 1:02:05

Yeah. But uh Michael, I wanted to give you uh the last thought about the Gaza front. Um you had in your latest Koplo column last week saying that the Israeli spotlight is about to return to Gaza. So I mean, is that is that the reason why?

Michael 1:02:20

Yeah Yeah, I think I think the I think the political incentives for for Bibi here uh are pretty clear. I mean, they're not you know, they're not um completely gonna work 100%, but I do think that the political incentives are pushing him uh to return to war in Gaza. And it is it is gonna be popular with much of his base, and maybe even with people outside of his base. It will give him a different story to tell. Uh, it's an easier front, certainly, than than Iran and Lebanon. And as for his ability to convince Trump, uh, you know, do you think Trump is even thinking about Gaza anymore? I mean, like the the guy, the guy has moved on to 20 other things. So I I just uh it's hard for me to it's hard for me to see fighting in Gaza being the the barrier for Trump that it was, you know, even six six months ago, eight months ago. Um so yeah, I definitely I definitely think it's it's likely. And yes, it's it's naive that Hamas is going to just disarm. That's why I agree with Shera on point 17. Uh it's not going to happen before an election, but you know, you know, I've I've been saying this for months too. I I would love to see the US uh convince the Israelis to start implementing things in the Israeli-controlled green zone. Let the NCAG come into the green zone and and start to run, start to build and run new Rafah in whatever other cities you want to build. I don't know that that's going to work to convince Palestinians to leave the Hamas-controlled red zone for the Israeli-controlled green zone. I'm very skeptical of that. But at least, at least start to do something. Start to establish some sort of non-Hamas Palestinian institutions in Gaza, even on the Israeli side. But yeah, if that there's no chance that happens before the election. And even after the election, even if there's new government, you know, I think uh it's still um it's still a steep hill to climb, but definitely not going to happen before the election in the fall. So uh FYI, the NK.

Shira 1:04:24

I will just say I don't know what Trump wants or not. I do think, still think that there are people, US officials, high levels, Jared Kushner. I think there are people, at least in the US, that that are wedded to the plan and they would like to promote it. I I I agree with with all you said. I think it's like our responsibility, not well, Nary, you're a journalist, so you like reporting on bad things, but for all of us who are trying to promote things constructively. I think what we should all try to do is find the the small steps that can happen now and once elections. How do you prepare the ground for NCAG, then uh technocratic committee, or stuck in Cairo to get all the sorry, all the data that they're not funny? Um, the data that they need and whatever they need to become an effective government, uh training the police, there's international stabilization force, right? Like there's some solve the issue. There's a tiny issue called the Palestinian Authority, and it's the nation state of the. I mean, no, no, I mean, you know, address those issues in full force that that we get to a situation. And by the way, also disarmament, maybe start with a small pilot project in one area. I mean, I don't think it's all lost, but the honest is on everyone here proposing other alternatives.

Neri 1:05:47

So uh by the way, uh we have uh a visitor on this podcast, uh Shura Shura's uh young son, Lev. Um by the way, just for our listeners and viewers, NCAG is the Palestinian Technocratic Committee, uh, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. This was uh the body that was set up through Trump's Board of Peace to actually administer Gaza. Um, it's still sitting in Cairo and has not yet actually deployed its writ inside Gaza. Um but uh yes, uh I mean to put a bow on all of this, if this is really an order of priority for if not the president than Jared Kushner and the other American officials, then they could be doing a lot more to convince Israel and to pressure Israel to say let more things happen in Gaza, short of just everyone waiting for Hamas to lay down its weapons, which will be a very difficult and tall order. So uh if it is a priority, they should make another.

Shira 1:06:47

I'm not gonna interrupt you again, but we do have to remember we're like always down on Israel. There is a challenge. We have a terrorist organization that is de facto government, and it's it's not uh working for us, and it's not doing what it wants to do, and we're you know killing, right?

Neri 1:07:03

Like But it's but you said it yourself, Cheryl.

Shira 1:07:06

I agree with you. I think the pressure, I think Israel is stalling progress and not doing what needs to do. But I think like we can't just be down on Israel. There is no an evil, cynical terrorist organization, and that is the issue.

Michael 1:07:21

For sure, but that's that's precisely why that has to be priced in here, right? Nobody should expect Hamas to just disarm because because Nikolain Ladinoff and Arya Lights don't want them to, or because the three of us want them to, right? They're not gonna do it. So, right, then the question is what what what is the next step? And I do think there are not not to put the all the onus on the of this on Israel or to or to put the majority of the blame of this on Israel, but the next steps are things that are under Israel's control as a way of of bypassing Hamas. That's just as far as far as far as I can see, um, that's kind of where the conversation should be going next. Not not because Israel owns the lion's share of the blame, but because they're dealing with Hamas. Yeah.

Neri 1:08:05

And I mean, to bring it back full circle, um, our criticism, such as it was for uh the excursion taken by Donald Trump at Bibi Netanyahu to Iran, it's not because we uh we love the Islamic Republic and the regime, far from it, but we're trying to be kind of clear-eyed analysts about what our respective leaders uh have chosen to do, and in certain cases in Gaza and whatnot, not do. So um yes. Sorry, Sherry, that wasn't directed at you, but uh you do hear.

Shira 1:08:38

I agree with you, but just the qualify, right? Then people like, but you're forgetting about Hamas. No, I'm not forgetting about Hamas. Obviously, we're in this problem because they're really like evil people and organizations, countries in the world, right? Like the this, yeah.

Neri 1:08:52

But yeah, you have um if negotiating with them very nicely and asking them to put down their weapons is not working, then you either have the threat of the IDF going back in, or you have some other political, economic, diplomatic maneuvers that you need to start implementing now in order to well increase your leverage vis-a-vis Hamas and also undermine them on the ground in Gaza. And they they've done none of it. Hamas is solidifying its hold on 40% of the territory. Um, so yeah, it was important to get Gaza in there because it's gotten kind of lost in the shuffle, but I'm happy we we did it. Um, we'll have to leave it there. We went over time. Shera, Lev, Michael, thank you. Thank you all for your generous time.

Shira 1:09:36

Uh acquiring uh um transition, you know, transferable skills for the day that AI like kicks everyone out, but you'll still always need people to brush your hair. Um yeah, but like it's nicer to have them in touch.

Neri 1:09:50

The people, the people listening to this uh via audio only have no idea what we're talking about. Um that's fine.

Shira 1:09:56

Check out brushing my hair.

Neri 1:09:59

Yeah, check us out on YouTube uh for bonus bonus content. Um thank you both. Talk to you soon. Be well. Okay, thanks again to Michael Coppla and Shira Efron for their generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. Id Said, and let's go next.