Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. A dramatic week this week, as I'm sure you're all aware, with the major exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel for the first time in two months. Hello, missiles, my old friend, for all of us here in Israel. Thankfully, though, that's now behind us, for now at least. But to help us make sense of what happened and what it all means, I'm delighted to be joined by Israel Policy Forum's very own chief policy officer, Michael Koplow, and Rachel Brandenburg, IPF's Washington Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst. Rachel, Michael, and I got into what the escalation likely signals in terms of Iran's current thinking, what it says about Donald Trump and his ongoing efforts to secure an elusive deal with the Islamic Republic, and where BB and Israel are in all of this. In the second half of the episode, we also took a deep dive into the super important topic of what a new 10-year security assistance deal between the US and Israel should look like, drawing on the new IPF report, which Rachel and Michael co-authored. One important note before we start right after we finished recording, President Trump issued a statement saying that Iran was responsible for shooting down a U.S. military Apache helicopter over the Strait of Hormuz overnight. As the president put it, the US must, out of necessity, respond to this attack. It remains to be seen what this response will actually look like, but as always, by the time this episode goes up, you, our dear listeners and viewers, will be a lot smarter than we are. But just keep it in mind that this wasn't yet known when we were recording this episode. So with that caveat, let's get to Michael and Rachel. Hi, Michael. Hi, Rachel. Welcome back to the podcast.

unknown 2:07

Hi.

Neri 2:09

I think this is an auspicious week for you both to be on. We originally wanted you to talk about your recent IPF report on the US-Israel security agreement, uh, known as the Memorandum of Understanding, the MOU. But it's fair to say uh events early this week uh in Israel in the Middle East overtook us slightly. So I really wanted to talk about uh the more immediate developments uh, well, closer to where I am at the first half, and then we're gonna definitely get to the MOU and your recent report in the second half of this podcast. Just as at the table for our listeners and viewers, this is essentially the timeline of events given what happened, the dramatic events uh of Sunday, late Sunday and into Monday. Um basically Sunday afternoon, Israel launched, fair to say, rather limited airstrikes uh against Hezbollah command and control centers in the Dahiya, the southern suburbs of Beirut. Uh this is something Israel had long threatened uh in recent weeks, but had held off on because uh, well, mostly due to US pressure, which was itself mostly due to Iranian pressure and threats. If Israel was going to actually attack Beirut, then Iran threatened to respond in kind against Israel directly. But Israel did go ahead and strike Beirut. And then a few hours later, Sunday night, Iran made good on its threats and fired about four barrages uh at northern Israel, uh, the first time since the April 8th ceasefire that Iran actually fired directly onto Israel, a major escalation to say the least. Uh, and then Israel responded in kind early Monday morning with two rounds of airstrikes at least, targeting Iran uh air defenses and one petrochemical plant uh in Iran. Uh again, first time since April 8th that Israel struck directly on Iranian soiled. And then uh finally, uh Iran responded with a few more barrages basically Monday morning, midday almost, all told around 30 ballistic missiles fired at Israel, so not a small amount. Uh thankfully, no casualties were reported and no major impacts that we know of. Um and then by yesterday, Monday afternoon, uh Trump demanded that both sides, as he said, would stop shooting, uh, and both sides complied. So as they call it here, the 17-hour war. Uh really, it was about 14 hours of an escalation, wasn't even 17 hours. But let's start with you, Michael, uh, given these rather dramatic events of earlier this week. What are your initial thoughts?

Michael 4:48

First of all, it's interesting to

The Israel-Iran Escalation

Michael 4:50

me that in in some ways Iran and Hezbollah have have switched positions. Uh Hezbollah was was the proxy that was supposed to threaten Israel and keep it from shooting at Iran, and that has not worked out. And now we have Iran threatening Israel to keep it from shooting at Hezbollah. So uh I'm not sure what that says about Iran and Hezbollah and their relationship going forward, but it is interesting that Iran is now expending resources trying to defend its proxy rather than the other way around. The other aspect of this, which comes to mind immediately, is that Israeli officials were so excited uh after Hezbollah entered the fray in the very beginning of March. And they talked about it as effectively Hezbollah having fallen into an Israeli trap and given them a golden opportunity to go after Hezbollah once and for all. And it obviously has not worked out in the way that they envisioned. And it's not just that, it's also put Israel, I think, in a worse position vis-a-vis Hezbollah, where the northern border wasn't perfect, but you know, it was relatively quiet for about a year, maybe even a little longer than a year. And now you have the northern border and those communities on lockdown again. You have Iran having successfully tied their front to the Lebanese front with Trump and now tied them together even militarily, where they are saying that a strike on Hezbollah positions in Beirut means that they're going to strike at Israel. And you have Trump saying to the Israelis, you've basically got to lay down your arms and not respond to direct Iranian attacks on your territory. So for all of the military successes that we've seen Israel have since October 7th, this is an area where perhaps they have miscalculated worse than in any of the other arenas. And given the Trump factor here, I'm not entirely sure how they extricate themselves from this problem.

Neri 6:59

It's definitely a problem. And like you said, uh strategists and politicians here were very excited on March 2nd when Hezbollah fired uh a few barrages at northern Israel, and that gave Israel uh the opportunity, as they saw it, to actually go and um, well, try to finish Hezbollah off once and for all. And as we're seeing now on a daily basis in southern Lebanon, that's proving to be very difficult, on top of the fact that, yes, Trump acquiesced to Iranian demands and essentially tied the Lebanon front to the Iran negotiations. And hence uh a lot of people here in Israel feel like uh Trump is the reason why they're fighting Hezbollah with um, and I quote, one hand tied behind their back. Um, on top of now the Iranian threats, literally tying the two fronts together. Um, and we'll get to that in just a second. Rachel, what did you think? Your initial thoughts.

Rachel 7:51

I think it's increasingly looking like you have three different players playing different games on different boards. Each of Israel, the United States, and Iran have different interests or sort of calculating in different ways. I I um I don't play chess, but I think of chess as a much more complicated strategic game than checkers. And it's kind of like they're playing checkers instead of chess because it's unclear what the strategy is. Trump would like to see the situation de-escalate. He's most worried about the global economy. Now the Strait of Hormuz, a problem that arguably this war created. Uh, Israel is fighting in Lebanon, as you both just discussed, while also would prefer to see Iranian military capabilities, ballistic missiles, nuclear program, all of that degraded. And for Netanyahu to be able to follow through on his promise at the beginning of this that this is one and done, right? This is going to be the end. This is going to be another version of total victory following his um discussion of total victory with respect to Gaza. And then Iran, who can kind of just sit and take it for a while. And they've played a bunch of cards and it's worked, and the regime is still standing for as weak or not as they are, as many domestic problems as they are, they do have leverage. Um, and none of neither Israel nor the United States in my assessment are thinking particularly long term as sort of like play after play, right? 14-hour round after 14-hour round. Whereas Iran's playing a long game. And right now it looks to me like it's working in their favor.

Neri 9:28

So I think that was a one point that very much struck me because uh, well, I got some questions uh after Israel struck in Beirut, asking me, hey, should we be prepared for Iran firing directly at Israel? And I'm sad to say I got this wrong once again, misjudging Iranian uh appetites and confidence, really. And I didn't think it was quite reasonable for Iran to actually fire on Israel, especially at this scale, um, for what was, like I said, a fairly limited uh Israeli strike um on the Dahiya. And yet Iran did fire in a big way, multiple, multiple barrages. So I think big picture for me, uh, the notion that you hear either from Trump administration officials or even, well, uh still from Bibi Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials, that Iran is at its weakest point ever. It was decimated during the 40-day war uh in well, March and into April, um, and that they're they're I don't know, if pleading, but they're very much kind of uh eager for a ceasefire. I don't I don't see that at all. I don't see that at all. I mean, they're they were willing to risk Trump letting Israel actually escalate even further, you know, just to I guess prove a point with regard to defending Hezbollah from the Iranian point of view. So uh it was a very uh clear uh message by the Iranians that A, um we're still here, we still have capabilities, and we're not scared about a resumption of full-scale war. And then B, stemming from that, that they're definitely not scared of Donald Trump, and that the fact that Trump reigned in Israel and reigned in Bibi, and almost I mean, literally, he drew this comparison, right? Equal comparison between Israel and Iran, both of you stop shooting, that doesn't auger well for the US leverage in the negotiations. And I think Iran smells that, senses that.

Rachel 11:29

If I can add a thought too, Iran has always been good at asymmetric warfare, better than the United States, for sure. And Israel and Iran are pretty, they're both pretty good in their own ways, but Iran for decades has proven capable of fighting two different battles at once, a conventional one where they have to, or persecuting their own people where they have to or where they want to, and the asymmetric tactics that they can shown that they're able to employ almost anywhere in the world on different levels. So I think here too, they're they're sort of experimenting, right? They're throwing different forms of spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks and see what works. And there are very few of those tactics that haven't worked yet, including what we saw two days ago, where, as you said, it seemed pretty risky to strike Israel directly, but they don't really pay too high a price for doing so, at least from what we can see publicly.

Michael 12:20

And I think they seem to be reading Trump much better than the Israelis are reading Trump. I mean, how many times now has Trump had to restrain Israel from whatever it is, whether it was ending the 12-day war prematurely or the report that there was uh Israeli jets ready to take off on Monday, and then Trump told BB to pull them back, the the Gaza ceasefire, which I don't think any of us believe that uh the prime minister actually wanted. Whereas the Iranians seem to understand what Trump cares about. And I think that to the point that it was a risky move for them to shoot at Israel, maybe that's only if you assume that that's what Trump actually cares about. Whereas if you assume that he cares about not restarting the war and doing whatever he can to get the Strait of Hormuz open, then they're not actually taking a big risk if they if they shoot at Israel. They're taking a bigger risk, maybe if they shoot at this point at Gulf Partners. So but that's exactly. I think they're reading him, I think they're reading him well.

Neri 13:20

But that's a point. They've spent last two or three weeks also firing at Gulf Partners, including hitting, what was it, uh late last week, the Kuwait International Airport uh with casualties, and the American response wasn't so vociferous. Trump did not let alone start a full-scale kind of military campaign again. He didn't even really escalate or try to establish escalation dominance uh over the Iranians. And again, it kind of feeds into the idea that Trump uh really wants this deal uh more than the Iranians, needs to deal more than the Iranians, um, despite near daily comments by Trump that the Iranians uh really want the deal, and B, uh that the deal is just, you know, a day away, two days away, three days away. I mean, he said it I think Sunday, right? He said, Well, we're gonna have a deal Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday of this week. Now we're recording this Tuesday evening uh Tel Aviv time. By the

The Chances of Trump Securing a Deal With Iran

Neri 14:20

time this podcast goes up, it'll be Wednesday, hopefully. Do you do either of you feel confident that Trump is gonna get this deal by tomorrow?

Michael 14:30

I retain my skepticism from the last time you and I spoke on the podcast. I I I don't see any reason why the deal is any more imminent now. Trump, you you can't pay attention to anything that Trump says. The words are effectively meaningless.

Rachel 14:47

I I would agree with Michael. No. And I think I saw somewhere that this is something along the lines of the 37th time he said that the deal is right around the corner.

Neri 14:57

So But that's I mean, you know, we can kind of joke about this all we want and say, well, uh, you know, uh what's the what's a Seinfeld episode with the Chinese restaurant where the the host the host uh says, oh, you know, five minutes. Yeah, five, ten minutes. And the entire episode is just in the Chinese restaurant. This is like Trump at this point, and all cutting aside, I think it degrades the U.S. president's credibility, right? On a whole host of issues, but especially on this in this negotiation.

unknown 15:27

Of course.

Rachel 15:28

That assumes he had credibility to begin with.

Neri 15:30

I think I think there were moments where he he definitely had credibility because they even said, you know, he's he's a man of his word, right? Maduro is now sitting in a Brooklyn jail, right? Um he did launch, he did launch the war against Iran.

Rachel 15:44

If you think about the beginning of the war in the first, what, 48 hours, 72 hours, where the objectives went from regime change almost overnight to degrading Iran's ballistic missile nuclear capabilities and proxies, and then the Navy was added. Like I questioned his word on this since the beginning of the war.

Michael 16:03

Right. And and since then, the the constant claims that the war is over and has been won, and also that the nuclear issue isn't really a problem anymore because they can't get to it, but he'd still like a deal anyway, you know, just to just to sort of uh put put a bow on it. I mean, none of this is credible. And after after it's been reported that he's telling people that the only way he will resume real military activities is if American troops are killed. Well, he's basically now given the Iranians a playbook. So I I just we've you know we've we've been talking about this for months, and I still don't have any inkling that there is a wider strategy behind this or that he has any sense of what he's doing, even from day to day. I think to you know what Rachel said about the Iranians, they're throwing spaghetti against the wall and trying to see what sticks. Trump is doing that too, except that he seems to be throwing the same pile of spaghetti over and over and over again because he's he's run out of other strats.

Rachel 17:05

And I'd say his wall is true social, and that's about as far as he can throw.

Neri 17:09

Yeah. Um, again, I, you know, uh we can laugh at it. We are we are laughing at it, but it it has real world implications when it just of course it does. It's just not credible. Um not credible.

Rachel 17:21

It's not credible, and he is doing damage, like doing damage, in my opinion, to certainly America standing in the world, certainly Israel's security, and just the um even the illusion that the American president is someone who partners can trust, who has um a vision and objective that is in the interest of the United States. I mean, if we want to get serious, there's lots of negatives that you can relate to this war, in my opinion.

Neri 17:48

And and I say this is someone sitting in sitting in Israel, it degrades his leverage in the negotiations with Iran. Right. And if the objective really is to get a deal, then this is not to to borrow a phrase, this is not the correct art of the deal. Um and this is in a long line of of Trump climb downs since April 8th. Right. The original ceasefire, I said this before on the podcast, I'll repeat it. The original ceasefire that Trump declared, he said, well, the Iranians agreed to reopen Hormuz in return for that initial ceasefire. Hormuz was not reopened. Um multiple ultimatums and deadlines have kind of come and gone. He's uh declined to use military force to reopen Hormuz. His project freedom lasted 36 hours until he gave up on it. And now uh, you know, again, from vantage point in Israel, it's like, well, Iran fired on Israel because Trump forced or acquiesced in tying the Iran negotiations and ceasefire to the Lebanon front. Now Israel is getting hit, and he's not even allowing us to kind of return and again establish escalation dominance, at the very least, not even just you know in terms of Israeli deterrence, but in terms of US leverage in the negotiations. And so here in Israel, uh there was a lot of consternation. There was a lot of consternation, especially Sunday, late Sunday night, when the first Iranian barrages came in, and there were reports from well, the dozen journalists that Trump took phone calls from, uh, where he made it very clear to the journalists and their reports that, well, I don't want Israel to respond. It's even worse. Right? He doesn't want to risk undermining the fragile ceasefire and the possibility of a deal. Um, and there were also reports that you you know, Trump and Bibi spoke that night and that Trump would ask Bibi not to respond. This is my next question. Uh I mean, Rachel, we'll start with you. When it seemed like Netanyahu was not going to be able to respond because of a Trump veto, that to my mind would have been fatal for Bibi politically here at home. It would have been very damaging for Israeli deterrents in the region. Um, Bibi ultimately pulled the trigger, but well, do you believe that it was uh in the face of US slash Donald Trump opposition, or was it kind of well, good cop, bad cop? I didn't really want Bibi to strike back, but we'll let him strike back.

Rachel 20:11

I have no idea what actually transpired between them. Um, I think BB certainly did need to respond. Like you can't let your country be attacked and just sit pretty because another leader,

Did Trump Tell Bibi Not to Respond?

Rachel 20:23

even given the relationship between Donald Trump and Prime Minister, if another leader just said, no, please, please sit still, um you can't. So I think BB had to respond. Was there a quiet agreement between BB and Trump, or did Baby just decide, screw it, I gotta do this. I'll, you know, um, what's the saying? Do now and apologize later, uh act and that not don't ask permission, apologize later, or something like that.

Neri 20:52

Yeah, it's it's Israeli credo. Ask for ask for forgiveness after afterwards.

Rachel 20:56

That's right. Ask for forgiveness, not for permission. That seems perfectly plausible to me. And then the second time he did stop, right? So after that first strike, when Baby said, okay, now you've both like you both hit each other. It's like talking to children, right? He did it first. No, they they hit back. Okay, now you've both hit each other. Now stop, right? Just put your sit on your hands. I think there are many ways in which Trump seems to be frustrated with Prime Minister Netanyahu, whether in Lebanon or Iran or otherwise. And so this one skirmish, it seems to me Netanyahu made the decision that he needs to act for the sake of his own politics, policy, security, et cetera, and he'll figure out how to make up later.

Neri 21:34

Michael, what did you think of the Trump BB angle to what transpired this week?

Michael 21:40

I assume that that BB got some sort of green light to do what Israel did, whether from Trump directly or from Rubio or from somebody else. He obviously had to do something. I mean, it's not just about the politics of it, right? You can't abet, even if there wasn't an election coming up, you can't abet a direct Iranian strike that breaks the Ceasefire from April on Israeli territory that wasn't precipitated by an Israeli strike on Iranian territory and just let it go. So there was no chance that Israel wasn't going to do anything. You know, you you see uh over the past couple days in the Israeli press the the the Netanyahu uh the Netanyahu uh mouthpieces for lack of a better term, you know, writing about uh what what how much damage the the limited Israeli strike did and how Israel got the better of it and how it really cost the Iranians. And you know, there's no question that BB is trying to spin this as a big deal. I I don't think it actually was that big of a deal. I think that he probably did the limit of what the Trump administration was willing to let him do. And going forward, uh, you know, I question how many more times this will work because Trump doesn't seem to have a lot of patience for this stuff, and he definitely seems to be frustrated with Bibi over many things. And doing it this one time after Trump has told people the Israelis aren't going to respond, negotiating some sort of wiggle room, okay. But the more times that happens, the likelier it is that Trump actually brings the hammer down. So I think the Israeli government needs to find some way to break out of this bind. And their best hope at this point is probably Trump concluding some sort of deal with the Iranians, which is absolutely not what the Israeli government wants to see. But otherwise, this is going to spiral out in all sorts of different ways.

Rachel 23:32

I think it's important to remember also this comes on the heels of, and even just amiss increasing chatter that the Trump administration is constraining Israel's behavior in Lebanon to. Right. And that's an arena that Neri, you tell me, but I think Israelis care about as much as Iran, given the day-to-day operations. And you're seeing Israeli soldiers die when the Israelis are kind of being told, oh, don't strike here, don't strike there, don't do this, don't do that. By Trump, who is trying to negotiate a diplomatic agreement. I commend the United States for that. I hope it goes somewhere, but you're negotiating with one party and fighting another. So the two are still running in parallel and not actually related.

Neri 24:14

Not actually related. And also it was Trump, again, that acquiesced to tying the two fronts together because he didn't want to risk Lebanon undermining the Iran negotiations. And again, um that has caused a lot of consternation here in Israel because um on a uh near daily basis, especially in recent weeks, you know, Israel is taking casualties. In southern Lebanon, there was also fire on northern Israel still. Um it's kind of calmed down a little bit, uh, but still still ongoing. But this brings me to kind of uh the last point slash question with regard to what happened earlier this week, uh to pick up on Michael's point, right? This can spin out very easily. And the the primary kind of uh location where it can spin out again is Lebanon. And uh, you know, again, despite Trump declaring what was at last week, that there's a ceasefire in Lebanon, there isn't a ceasefire in Lebanon. The IDF even today uh still pounding southern Lebanon and uh including the major city of Tyre um in in Lebanon's south. But basically this is the this is the problem. Um what happens next time Hezbollah does actually fire on northern Israel? Right? Netanyahu and Defense Minister Shal Khatz have made clear, including by the way, uh after the escalation with Iran this week, that they have a very clear equation that northern Israel equals the Dahiya equals Beirut. Iran has also made it very clear that they have their own

Tensions on Israel's Northern Front With Hezbollah

Neri 25:45

equation, which is that Dahiya equals uh missile fire on Israel. Um and you know, if Iran does fire on Israel again because of something that happened in Lebanon, uh Israel will again almost certainly want to strike back against Iran. So you have this uh very weird and combustible mix uh with Trump now, I guess, playing some kind of arbiter and restrainer and negotiator, even though he was uh a principal mover in a war that literally just ended two months ago alongside Israel. So again, Michael, we'll start with you now. I mean, what do you think will happen if Hezbollah does fire on northern Israel? Are we going to be back here in a week, two weeks, three weeks?

Michael 26:30

We we very well may be. And you know, Israel has an advantage in that it is the strongest party here and can do the most damage both in Lebanon and and in Iran, but Hezbollah doesn't have anybody restraining it. The Iranians are not telling Hezbollah um to act with restraint or don't hit certain places, whereas Israel does have somebody restraining it, and that's Trump. So they're operating in that sense at a fundamental disadvantage. And yeah, we we could be back here again. And unless the Iranians think that there are going to be real costs imposed on them, and probably by the United States, if they keep on allowing his baladventurism, I just don't see the incentive they have to not try this again, right? Right. They saw how this one went. Um, they see the way that Trump is sitting on Israel, and they seem to, you know, they listen, they they they weathered the actual war. They can weather another limited Israeli strike on some stuff. So um, yeah, we very well may be back here again, absent some fundamental change in this equation. And I'm not sure what that fundamental change is gonna be, uh, unless there's like really a deal that ends the conflict. Rachel.

Rachel 27:43

I think especially if you assume, as I think we've said, and the Iranians see that Trump doesn't want to go back to war. And the threat that he made, was it yesterday? Uh, you know, Israel, if you hit again, you're gonna be alone next time. If so the Iranians can operate on the assumption that if this heats up more than you described, it's gonna be Israel versus Iran. And that's a different calculus than Israel and the United States against Iran or the United States against Iran. Still, still difficult. Um, but that may be among their operating assumptions and why they're willing to just push buttons. I also think about the many years of sort of unofficial rules of the game between Lebanon and Hezbollah. I'm sorry, between Israel and Hezbollah and Lebanon prior to October 8th, where there were certain areas, and the same applied in Syria, right? There were certain things and areas that was okay for Israel to strike and certain things that Israel wouldn't strike. And the understanding of who would hit back in what ways was sort of this unspoken um equation. And I wonder if we are starting to fall into another form of kind of unofficial rules of the game in what you described. Frankly, I was thinking like, what a terrible love triangle between Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel, right? But it's it's not unsustainable for any of those actors. I think they could handle that for some amount of time. The worst victims are the people of all three countries, right? Nobody wants to live under 14-hour wars every few days or every few weeks. Um, but that doesn't sound unworkable for any of these three parties at this point.

Neri 29:18

And it's a point I think, Michael, you made it a few weeks ago on uh your last appearance on this podcast, where you basically said the deal between the US and Iran, at least in the Gulf, was quiet for quiet. Uh and this harkens back to years of Israel Hamas wars uh in and from Gaza. Uh there's also the word that uh has returned to the Israeli lexicon, which is rounds, Svavim, which is basically rounds of fighting uh every whatever it might be, every few weeks, every few months, every few years. So rounds of fighting. Um, and also, Rachel, to your point, equations, rules of the game. All of these terms were, at least we were told by the uh leaders of this uh this Jewish state, uh were jettisoned after October 7th that these wars, the wars of the past uh two and a half plus years, uh, you know, those paradigms are no longer operative. We're operating under uh different strategy, um different rules of the game, by the way, with different backing from the US. And this now all harkens back to a pre-October 7th reality where you're kind of just trying to, I guess, fire, hit, degrade your enemies, whether in Lebanon or even early this week in Iran, um, also in Gaza, you know, the little bit of Gaza is still ruled by Hamas, but very much still ruled by Hamas. You know, I hate to say nothing was accomplished over the past two and a half years because a lot was accomplished, at least militarily, but strategically, you're kind of stuck in this in this doom loop uh until something changes.

Michael 30:54

Yeah. And we shouldn't, we shouldn't downplay the challenges, right? I think to your point, there have been lots of military accomplishments. Uh and you know, Iran is a very, very tricky actor, uh, Hezbollah only a little less so. So it's obvious, it's it's certainly not all on Israel's head to figure this out. But ultimately, when your only tactic is military, when everything that you see around you you treat as a military problem, yeah, that's gonna lead to endless conflict and all of these things that we're talking about, where you're back in the world of these equations and quiet for quiet and mowing the grass and all the terms that we uh were used to between Israel and Hamas. And this Israeli government just does not seem to want to translate any of this stuff to a larger political or strategic picture. So, yeah, a lot of this is on them, despite the fact that they're dealing with very tricky foes.

Rachel 31:50

I think also, and I was saying this at the very beginning of the Trump administration, for at least my conscious or the my conscious lifetime, and I think much of the last few decades, when there has been a conflict or a war between Israel and another party in the region, it has been the United States who has come in to sort of try and quiet the scene with the help of Egyptian mediators, Qatari mediators, but the United States has taken the leadership role. And this, the Trump administration is trying to broker deals, but I think the um the capacity to do so, the capability, the knowledge, the attention, um, willingness to sort of consider partners and allies as important assets instead of sort of annoying things that you have to handle, um, is just missing. And so you're sort of missing the role of the United States that would provide checks on one party or another, or would actually be thoughtfully in a sustained way trying to negotiate a deal. We sort of have it in a very superficial way right now, but I think of the fact, and this was in the press that some um Trump administration officials went to one of the US labs this week to talk about nuclear material. And the fact of this being in the press is not great, but also the fact that they're doing this now. How many months into a nuclear negotiation? And the negotiation started long before the war started in February. So it just reflects like, oh, someone woke up to the fact that maybe expertise is helpful and that maybe there are professionals who know something in the US government somewhere deep inside a lab. Let's go talk to them. But that, like, it's a minor detail, but it really made me think, wow, we are so far behind. And I think the entire region and each of the individual um war/slash conflict zones we've talked about are feeling the effects of just a lack of a leader who is willing and able to think strategically in meaningful ways. We haven't seen Prime Minister or the Israeli government willing or capable of taking sort of these tactical victories into the strategic realm in ideally long-term wins. Um, and there's like nobody there to really push them who's able to do so.

Neri 34:02

Nope. Nobody there. I mean, again, maybe you we're seeing a shift, a slow motion shift by President Trump. You know, some of the quotes were uh were quite strong. You know, he said, well, uh Netanyahu will will basically do what I tell him to do, uh, things of things of that nature. Um I can't prove it, but I think maybe one of the strategic rationales by Iran of escalating in this kind of, well, at least to me, unexpected way was actually to drive a wedge between the US and Israel, between BB and and Trump. Because they knew that Trump very much did not want an escalation, and they likely, almost certainly knew that BB would have to respond uh in kind to their missile barrages. And that, you know, combined with you know the current climate in American politics and Trump's uh well, other concerns. I hear there's a World Cup starting on Thursday. Uh definitely, definitely very excited for that, uh, as is President Trump. Uh so people people are aware of that, right? So again, how much how much rope does BB have to respond if the US President uh is not going to let him respond the way he wants? Uh remains to be.

Rachel 35:11

It's already it's also sorry, one one thought on that. It's also election season, right? It's not only election season in the in Israel, right? It's also election season in the United States. There's primary after primary this summer in anticipation or in in preparation for the November midterms. So Trump has politics, I imagine, on the brain in um maybe not as much as Netanyahu, but certainly as a very relevant fact of his day-to-day conducting of policy.

Neri 35:37

Right. So you're saying that US midterm elections for Congress is they're more important than the World Cup? They're more important than a cage match on the White House lawn and Trump's birthday and America's birthday.

Rachel 35:50

I was gonna say, probably not for many people.

Neri 35:52

I don't, I don't, I don't see how how that uh how that makes sense. Um no, I'm I'm kidding.

Rachel 35:57

Obviously, American democracy No, but really soccer's way more important than politics for most for many people.

Michael 36:04

I I mean I mean if you if you if you if you follow the president's true social account, the uh these things may be more important to him too.

Neri 36:10

So Yeah. Yeah. Um out of my own uh my own my own thinking, President Trump.

Speaker 2 36:18

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Neri 37:17

Let's get to our other big issue uh for this episode: the US-Israel MOU, the US Israel Security Agreement. Um, it's a 10-year security agreement uh that goes back now 30 years almost. So this is now we're coming to the end of the third such MOU. It's supposed to expire in 2028. So um, well, negotiations uh are set to begin between the US and Israel on a new uh MOU. Uh you both, along with your uh great co-authors and our dear colleagues, Gabriel Epstein and Lisa Ewers, authored this report. It came out last week, titled Partnership Recalibrated: The Next Era of US Israel Security Cooperation. Um, it's available on Israel Policy Forum's website. Michael, start us off here. Uh, give us a sense of the history of these very important decade-long agreements. What do they entail? What do they look like? Um, what have they kind of given definitely to Israel, but also to the US?

Michael 38:21

They've generally laid out the framework for the US Israel strategic relationship, and they focused on security assistance. Uh that's why

The History of U.S.-Israel Security Agreements

Michael 38:30

it's why you have them in these 10-year increments and dollar amounts. And that isn't the only aspect of the US-Israel strategic relationship. Yeah, I think we argue in the report that it's not even the most important aspect, but that's in general how these have been structured. And they have some other elements too, but that's been the main focus. And one of our motivations in writing this is to say lots has changed, lot a lot has changed and a lot will change. And the relationship is really important. It probably should be codified in an MOU in some way. But if there's another MOU, it isn't going to look like the previous three, and it shouldn't look like the previous three. And there are all sorts of factors that go into it, from the changing nature of the USSR relationship to greater Israeli capabilities, to all the things that have happened in the region over the last 10 years, to the way in which threats in the region are different now than they were before, levels of integration are different than they were before. And the politics of Israel have also changed dramatically in the United States. So there are all these things that are very different than they were 10 years ago. And for all of those reasons, the next MOU is gonna have to look very different and focus on other things beyond security assistance.

Neri 39:50

And Rachel, so this current MOU signed under uh President Barack Obama was the biggest ever just in terms of dollar amount, $38 billion over uh 10 years. So $3.8 billion per year. Uh $3.3 billion went to uh what's it called, foreign military financing, basically money provided to Israel for weapons and such. Uh and then $500 million a year uh in joint missile defense projects. So this is the current MOU that's set to expire in 2028. What do we know in terms of the future negotiations over a new MOU and what you uh and Michael and your co-authors lay out in the report? I mean, even Bibi Netanyahu has said, okay, I want to phase out the direct military financing part of it.

Rachel 40:41

That's right. And I think that is we know that and a little bit more. There aren't a ton of details as far as we've seen negotiations have started. Um they are led by two people on each of the United States and Israeli side. And particularly last week, there was a more chatter than I've seen in the past about what the Israelis want to see in it. Um, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ambassador Leiter in DC have been saying for some

The Negotiations Over a Next MOU

Rachel 41:08

time, you know, we want to use this next MOU to phase out security assistance and instead find other ways to increase our partnership. Last week, the latter part of that included increased joint RD investments and increased co-production investments. In the US Congress, last week was the week that the House Armed Services Committee marked up their national defense bill. So they sort of negotiate over the draft text of the bill that authorizes all of the funding for the Defense Department. And because it tends to be one of very few pieces of legislation that actually become laws, a lot of interest groups and a lot of members try to attach all sorts of different things onto it that are a bit peripheral to the US Defense Department operations. And the there were a number of members of Congress who introduced provisions and bills related to the future of the US-Israel relationship around this time, including one who introduced a bill saying the next agreement between the United States and Israel should wind down security assistance, increase uh investment in research and development, joint research and development, and increase joint co-production. And anti-Semitism is very bad and it should stop. And Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to that with a letter saying, Congressman Stutzman, thank you so much for introducing my idea. This is great, and I look forward to the partnership between the United States and Israel. So that was kind of the clearest in-writing uh expression of intent that we've seen from Prime Minister Netanyahu. It was um fairly awkward politically for a foreign leader to say, hey, member of Congress, thanks for introducing my idea, and led to a firestorm of criticism. Um, but that's that's sort of the premise for what we've seen, in addition to the statements that Prime Minister Netanyahu has made. He's talked about wanting to wind down security assistance in the next two years, which to me says before the Trump administration leaves. And he's talked about winding down security assistance over the next seven to 10 years. So we don't know exactly what that looks like. In our assessment and the work that we did, we also think it's appropriate for the next MOU to wind down security assistance. Um, we don't think it should be used as a cudgel against Israel. We don't think it should be reflected as a punishment. Um, but because Israel has a strong economy and a strong defense industry, they themselves have said, you know, we want to find other ways to partner. Um and there are ways that the United States can benefit from an increase in joint RD, in continuing to harvest Israel's innovation ecosystem and defense tech, which is quite good, and continuing to build on the partnerships between US and Israeli defense industry, between the US military and the IDF, continue to sort of build the relationship that. Has been certainly reflected over the last three decades. But to have a partner who is willing to share the burden in our shared interests and actually, you know, fight a fight with you is not to be taken for granted, even if we may disagree on whether the fight should have happened in the case of Iran or what our shared interests are. Personally, I disagree with my own president on that on a number of topics. But I do think partners and allies are critical for the United States. And we are stronger as a nation when we don't have to operate alone, particularly in the face of challenges and emerging threats. And Israel has proven to be a good partner in sharing the burden of some of those threats.

Neri 44:42

And as you both wrote in the report, to kind of um leverage Israel to uphold and ensure the regional security order in the Middle East. Um again, if you're looking for partners across the world that are capable and that you trust, then I think you could do a lot worse than than Israel, um, especially well, in a very uh combustible, uh unstable Middle East. Um I'm curious uh was there any inclination from uh people you spoke to when you were preparing this report that okay, you have the joint partnership side of it, which seems very clear, especially from the Israeli side led by uh Prime Minister Netanyahu, who um also I imagine it ties into Trump's um well uh skepticism with regard to giving aid anywhere. So it plays well, I think, probably uh in Trump's mind and in this current administration, also I imagine also current uh uh US domestic politics. But was there any sense that you got that uh okay, uh joint partnerships is are one thing, but what about direct military support? Because I spoke to uh I mean basically the chief economist of the Israeli Defense Ministry in January as he was coming out, and he he was actually the first one to to lay out uh the difference between uh what the upcoming MOU could be like versus the now outgoing MOU. But he also said that you know one thing that is kind of worth uh more than money in some respects is direct military support, like you saw really over the past three years, right? You know, U.S. air defense is being deployed in Israel, um, armadas being deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. So did you hear anything about that in terms of being codified in the upcoming agreement?

Michael 46:23

I think if you were to codify that sort of stuff, then it would have to be some sort of defense treaty. Um and, you know, people have talked for years about a potential defense treaty between the United States and Israel, but I don't think that's in the offing at all. I I think that the point is if you're gonna have a strong strategic relationship where you're cooperating on all sorts of things, then I don't know that you need to codify the notion that the United States is going to help Israel out in times of war, that the United States will help out Israeli, Israeli missile defense and air defense as we've seen. I think the bigger key for the Israelis isn't necessarily security assistance and us giving them money to buy stuff. It's them wanting to make sure that they will still be able to buy American-made weapons and platforms, that they will have access to the things that they need and the level of trust that when they're in a particularly bad spot, like they were after October 7th, that the United States is a strong partner and a strong ally and will have their back. But I don't think that that's the kind of stuff that you can necessarily put into an MOU. I understand from the Israeli perspective, there are a lot of people who view the security assistance itself as being effectively guaranteed. And so, you know, that on its own may bring other things. But the US Israel strategic relationship is a strong one. And even to Rachel's point, even if you don't agree with what's going on now in Iran, I think the value of it has been demonstrated in an enormous way. And if I were the Israelis, I wouldn't be that concerned about the strategic relationship just going away. I think that they need to really figure out more how they can stop Israel being such a big issue in US politics. And to my mind, the answer to that doesn't lie exclusively in things like winding down security assistance, but that's a big part of it. So, you know, there are just there, there are lots of angles here. And yeah, we talk to a lot of people, and um, everybody has different opinions on what should or shouldn't be in it. But for us, really the key is figuring out how you both protect and grow and expand the strategic relationship, while at the same time not just throwing out the values aspect of the relationship, which is really critical as well.

Neri 48:51

And Rachel, picking up on uh Michael's answer, I mean, um you guys even wrote it in the report, right? When uh Barack Obama um and Bibi Netanyahu finalized the now outgoing MOU and back in 2016, uh, you had 62% of Americans more sympathetic to Israel than the Palestinians. 62%. Um and as we we all we all know, and our listeners and viewers know, that number has gone down in recent years. So I mean, I guess the the first part of the question is okay, uh given the changing dynamics in US domestic politics vis-a-vis the uh Israel question, um will there be an MOU? And how much kind of pushback do you envision for if and when Trump goes and kind of says, okay, this is this is what we're actually signing with this country for the coming 10 years?

Rachel 49:48

Yes, I think there's there will certainly be political pushback. Um, you know, the c the climate in the United States around Israel is not friendly. It is quite toxic. Um, a demonstration of this again last week, very sort of DC politics focused, but um, some of the provisions that were introduced, the allegations around them that the United States was or that one of the pieces of legislation was proposing to integrate the US and Israeli militaries, and the Israelis were nefariously trying to sneak funding uh in ways that were less public and therefore less accountable and less transparent, were relatively fact-based, factless. The stories about

The Current Politics of Israel in the U.S.

Rachel 50:30

these provisions were not really based on what the provisions said, but they took off like wildfire. And suddenly things other than security assistance became targets for um detractors to accuse Israel of um uh, in some cases, subjugating the United States military to its own military, things that were not actually happening. Um, and I expect a next MOU that tries to enhance or expand the partnership is going to be all the more difficult. I will say it doesn't have to be brought to Congress. This in the MOU as designed is an executive agreement between two governments. So the United States, President Trump, can decide to negotiate an agreement and not bring it to Congress for a vote. The last one was, um, but he can choose to not take that step and avoid a little bit of the rancor around it, it will still be a topic of conversation, and Congress will still have to appropriate any dollars that are related to a next agreement, even if they're not security assistance dollars. If they're joint research and development dollars or procurement dollars or production dollars, those just happen through a different bill and a different agency than is currently the case now. So I don't think the politics around this will get easier. And regardless of where the negotiations over an MOU are or whether President Trump brings it to Congress, it will be an issue not only for the presidential campaign in the next round in the United States, but also in the midterms. You're already seeing the conversation around Israel and U.S. support for Israel take up so much space in the conversation with candidates, even in the lead up to primaries for um in advance of the November midterms. So, no, this doesn't get easier. Um I do think if there is a next Israeli government that is not led by Prime Minister Tenyahu, they have an opportunity to try and rebuild a little bit of confidence with the United States and particularly with the Democratic Party, or rather the United States public, but really the Democratic Party also. Um, but it's going to be tough.

Neri 52:29

Rachel, you you were being kind. There were um various kind of statements, reports, uh, public comments by left-wing, far-left, progressive column, what you will, um, individuals and organizations that, like you said, uh made it seem like these negotiations over a new MOU was uh a backdoor to let Israel take over the US defense industrial complex. Um, whereas the the reality situation is it's supposed to be a joint partnership between the two countries. Emphasis on partnership.

Rachel 53:01

Yes. And and like we have laws, right? The United States has laws related to export controls and technology sharing and intelligence sharing or lack thereof. So I I put some responsibility on the United States also as half of the negotiation, hopefully, to um identify the ways in which additional partnership is useful and identify areas where maybe Israel needs to do some things differently. One of the areas, one of the elements that we talked about was China.

Neri 53:30

Right.

Rachel 53:30

Right. And ensuring that if there is to be further cooperation on RD or co-production or industry-to-industry cooperation, Israel really needs to increase its firewalls against Chinese investment and espionage in its own economy and its own industry. So there are policies on the books, conversations that have been had, guidelines that have been written, but not a lot of them have actually been implemented. And so our advice was this is one thing that the United States needs to hold firm on and ensure Israel actually acts on before any agreement can be concluded that increases the ways in which we as partners are sharing our information and um even iterating together over how to counter emerging threats.

Neri 54:13

And by the way, there are already ongoing high-level joint partnerships on all kinds of weapon systems and platforms and intelligence sharing. I mean, it it's already ongoing. So um it isn't that much of a sea change. I imagine it'll just be kind of on a larger scale.

Rachel 54:29

A larger scale and codifying some of the partnerships that have been created, expanding, updating some of the partnerships that have created. I mean, there's been missile defense cooperation for years, there's been counter tunnel cooperation for years. There's been um Bird and Bard, two of the longest standing joint RD uh efforts, have themselves been updated over time to include different levels of scientific cooperation, for example, that reflect the different levels of technology that exist in the world. So there are certainly ways in which existing arrangements can be um grown and advanced. And then there are new areas that simply didn't exist 10 years ago, like quantum, like AI, like areas where the United States has something to offer the Israelis and the Israelis have something to offer the United States. It's for people who know more than I to figure out exactly what is the comparative advantage for each and where it's in both the United States' interest and Israel's interest to advance together.

Michael 55:28

I also think it's important to iterate that the Israeli government, whether this one or the next one, should take very seriously what happened here over the last week because the firestorm over these provisions in the NDAA, it's over relatively anodyne things that are in there every year and that don't even get commented on because they're not seen as being controversial. And you know, we're now starting to see the tale of Israel's reputation in the United States bleed into all these other things and into core aspects of the strategic relationship. And one of the things that we write in the report is that this is also an opportunity for the United States to push the Israelis on Israeli-Palestinian issues because, in one very tangible way, which is regional integration, you can see in a variety of ways how this question of values and the question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel's action toward the Palestinians is not only preventing normalization with states like Saudi Arabia, it's also making the US's job harder in terms of integrating Israel into Sencampfully and in terms of marshaling partners for regional projects. So, you know, we see it there, but we're now starting to see this bleed into other areas as well. So the strategic relationship is important, and if you're writing a report of the next MOU, that's you know, logically what it's going to focus on. But we shouldn't lose sight of the values aspect of that and the ways in which this sense that the US and Israel no longer necessarily share the same democratic values, liberal values, whatever, uh whatever adjective you want to use before the values part, uh, really is impacting the strategic relationship in a negative way. And so what happened last week, I don't think is gonna be a one-off. And the Israelis should take it seriously and think about how they can repair the relationship in the United States on both sides of the aisle and with regular Americans. And a lot of that is gonna lie in not the strategic aspects, not the interests-based aspects, but the values-based aspects.

Neri 57:46

And I say this with uh full confidence: this current Israeli government and this current Israeli prime minister uh doesn't think about these issues at all. I mean Well, maybe, maybe, maybe the next one will. Yeah. Yeah, that's the hope. Because uh, again, to bring it all back full circle, when someone comes and says uh Israel has never been stronger and for instance Iran has never been weaker, that may be true kind of when you're counting uh weapons platforms and military strength, but strategically Israel cannot afford to lose support, especially among you know America. It's most important, most important partner an ally. And yet uh for years now it doesn't seem like uh this Israeli prime minister really cares about that. And I I do hope that changes, and uh you know, regardless of what's in the MOU.

Rachel 58:38

Yeah, I think what we saw last week was also a reflection of a fundamental misreading of American politics. And um, whether Netanyahu thinks about it or not, um writing a letter in response to a US member of Congress who introduced a bill that is supposed to become US law saying, thanks so much for putting my idea into your policy, is just not a way to gain friends.

Neri 59:05

This is the same Israeli prime minister that went to give a joint address to Congress or an address to Congress to uh push back against uh a US president's foreign policy priority, i.e. the original Iran nuclear deal.

Rachel 59:19

So multiple times.

Neri 59:21

Yeah. So that was the original sin in terms of the Democratic Party. Uh and now, well, things have kind of deteriorated from there. So you're both nodding, but we'll have to leave it there. We're we're out of we're out of time. Uh again, we we were chatting, uh we were chatting earlier. Uh I think you and I were chatting earlier, Rachel, with some of our other colleagues. And basically everyone is just waiting for the Israeli election in the fall to see if something changes.

Rachel 59:47

That's right. A lot of a lot of folks here in Washington are waiting as well.

Michael 59:50

And and if it doesn't, if somehow Netzanyahoo scrapes by, uh I think the turmoil that we've seen in in US Israel issues and in the politics of Israel and DC, it's gonna look like child's play compared to what comes next.

Neri 1:00:05

Yeah. Um, there will be ample time to uh, well, discuss the potential upcoming Israeli election. Uh with that, Rachel, Michael, thank you so much. Thanks, Narry. Thank you. Okay, thanks again to Michael Koplo and Rachel Brandenburg for their generous time and insights. Also, special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, our editor Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum so you can keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please, please subscribe and spread the word. And let's go, NYX.