Introduction

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Peace for our time, maybe. But the US and Iran finally got the deal to end the war, and Dan Shapiro is back on with us to break it all down. Dan was, of course, U.S. Ambassador to Israel for most of the Obama administration, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East in the Biden administration, and in general has held a slew of senior policy positions at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Congress over the past three decades. Dan is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlanta Council in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. This was a great conversation with Dan about why this recent Iran war was very different than last June's war, what's in the actual deal that was just included between the Trump administration and Tehran, and it's called the Memorandum of Understanding, the MOU. And critically, what's not in the deal. We'll also get into that. And finally, what it all means for Israel and US Israel relations more broadly. With all that, let's get to Dan Shapiro. Hi, Dan. Welcome back to the podcast. Thanks, Neri. Always great to be with you. It's always great to have you on, Dan, but uh especially this week. Um, and we are very uh grateful that you spared us some time. I know uh it's very early in the morning where you are in Chicago, uh, but I really couldn't think of anyone better to come on and explain uh what just happened in terms of the US-Iran MOU and then obviously the implications for the US-Israel relationship and and well, Israel itself. Um I wanted to start here

Why This U.S.-Israel War With Iran Was a Strategic Mistake

Neri 2:03

though, uh looking back before we get into uh the big events of of this week and then projecting ahead. Uh you wrote on Tuesday uh in the bulwark that, and I quote, this war was a mistake from day one and needed to end. Uh we'll get to the end part in in just a bit, uh, trust me. But uh, why, to your mind, was it such a mistake to launch this war uh when they did on February 28th, uh, especially as someone who did support uh the last Iran war um back in June of 2025, the 12-day war, uh, as uh I'm sure our listeners remember from um your previous appearances on this podcast. So I guess you know, basic question uh why were you not in favor of this round between the US and Israel and Iran?

Dan 2:46

So that's you know, that's a great important question because you know uh the decision to go to this war really stood out from uh what happened last summer during the what's now called the 12-day war. I mean, the reason I supported that, let's just back up even a little bit further, uh, is because of what Iran was doing with his nuclear program. Uh during the latter part of the Biden administration and the first part of the Trump administration, uh, including post-October 7th, as uh Iran's proxies were being uh uh degraded by uh most Israeli actions. Um, Iran was advancing that program, and I was watching it, you know, with the kind of intelligence you can do so when I was in your government uh during my time at the Pentagon at the last part of the Biden administration. And it was very clear, well, really three things had happened. One was they had uh enriched you know, 10 bombs worth of 60% uh uranium, that's uh uh very close to weapons grade. That was public, that was acknowledged and reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We had a lot of intelligence about uh research that Iran was doing on weaponization, actually building a weapon, a different process from enrichment, um, that had shortened the time it would take them to build a weapon if they ever got the political decision to do so, which they hadn't yet. But if the Aitala ever gave them the order, they were gonna likely be able to do it in much shorter time than they had previously. And of course, Iran had the third thing was Iran had proven in April of 2024, and then again in October of 2024, its willingness to attack Israel directly, uh state to state, with hundreds of ballistic missiles. And, you know, if any one of those was ever tipped with a nuclear weapon, obviously we're in a different world. And so uh it was important, given that they were really too close for comfort to uh a nuclear weapon, to uh, you know, first try to negotiate. I thought actually it would take a few more months until the snapback of sanctions in October, but it happened in June. It really was inevitable and necessary, in my view, to set back that program. But that effort, first Israeli and then American, uh with the midnight hammer strikes uh with the B-2s and the uh and the bombs that could hit the uh deeply buried targets, was limited. It was carefully uh contained in time and in uh objectives, uh, and it achieved those objectives. It significantly uh degraded and set back that program. Uh didn't completely eliminate it, it wasn't like that was the end of the story, but it bought a significant amount of time. Uh, and uh that was uh that was a success in that regard. Didn't mean the Iranian threat was completely gone other ways, too. Uh obviously, when Prime Minister Netanyahu came to uh Mar-a-Lago in December, he spoke to the president about the ballistic missile program and the concern of an up uh an upgrade of production, and then uh Israel could be under fire in numbers that could uh really penetrate its air defenses, had to be dealt with, acceptable. And then, of course, there were the protests in January. And, you know, when you say, as the president did then, calling the people to the street, we've got your back, uh the you know, the people, the regime will pay a price if they crush you, and then they crush the protesters, there's an argument to make the regime pay a price. And so it may be a short, sharp strike under those circumstances against the regime, so they felt some pain. That, you know, that that would have some logic. The point is, I'm not in all circumstances opposed to the use of military power uh uh to deal with Iranian threats. And I think in principle, at the right time and in the right way, but carefully thought through about what you're trying to achieve, you know, it has its place. Certainly the credible threat of that force is essential uh for any successful diplomacy. Uh what happened in this war was totally different. Uh, it was really uh clearly shaped by the president's uh misunderstanding that after the success of removing Maduro from Venezuela in one night, U.S. military power was uh capable of doing anything and basically causing the regime to crumble uh almost immediately. And so he launched uh really a massive war that to achieve its fundamental objectives, even though the objectives were unclear, there was no consistency of what strategic objectives they were trying to achieve. But the only way you could have achieved any of them is through regime change. And uh there we were with a massive force in the region, have to use it or send it home. Uh, and uh we were able to cause damage to many Iranian capabilities, but that's totally divorced from the question of can you achieve your strategic objective? Can you uh essentially cause the regime to capitulate, as the president said at the beginning, total and complete surrender is what he was demanding. Well, right, that wasn't gonna happen. That this regime, and if you know something about Iran and this regime and uh, you know, the way they uh their ideology and the way they're organized, even killing the alloc, even wiping out a few layers, you know, you you still have the same regime in place. And they had a very powerful counter, which was theoretical until this war, which was that they could close the Strait of Hormuz, which they did. In about the week, second week before that had really fully cemented the president had an off-ramp, a chance to claim victory, to say we really blighted their nose, we really hit them hard, we've done some damage to the nuclear program and the missile program and you know the Navy and you know those other capabilities. Um, and we killed the Aetol, of course, but uh and and then declare victory and sort of move on. Uh, and that would have been, I think, uh, you know, a better place to end. Instead, so I think it was a mistake to go in, but if you're gonna go in, you know, you had an early off-ramp that you could have claimed some kind of victory and and and not been hurt. Instead, Iran exercised its uh power and its leverage, uh, which is enhanced from what it was before because of their drone technology and their ability to uh make it just too dangerous for ships to transit. And within, you know, the by the week three or four, we were into this, you know, very significant global energy crisis and economic chaos. And it was being felt at home, it was being felt in Asia, it was being felt in Europe, and it got worse and worse and worse. And so uh it became very clear that uh we had no way to achieve our strategic objectives if we even knew what they were. And Iran was gaining leverage by the day uh because we needed this to stop more than they did. They didn't care about the effect on their people, they didn't, you know, they had already lost us, you know, taken a taken a heavy punch and uh proven they could take it. Uh and uh it meant that we were the party more in need of ending this war than they were, uh, which gives them great bargaining power. I think much greater than I even realized. We'll get to it, because the deal that is emerging to end the war, and I want the war to end, and so I'm not sort of against deals to end the war, but it's much weaker than I expected, suggesting that Iran had even more leverage uh than was commonly understood based on uh them putting us in a position of needing that straight of horn moves open much more than they needed anything uh that we were gonna provide.

Neri 10:08

Right. Um well that's a great uh recap, both uh with regard to last year versus this year, and also what actually happened in the war. And uh for all our listeners and viewers, uh, this isn't uh Monday morning quarterbacking by uh by Ambassador Shapiro. Um you were you actually wrote it on Twitter in the very early stages of the war um that Trump should end this uh quite quickly, um, even bore even before it became uh you know uh even trickier and messier in the later stages of the war. So uh I don't know what the what the Israeli equivalent is for Monday morning quarterbacking. I mean, uh you know, we we can find a soccer football term, but but to your credit, you you put it out there quite early and it might have, I think, shocked a few people in terms of the issue of uh the off-ramp uh and really the the leverage that Iran had with regard to Hormuz, um, as somebody who was a a senior official at the Pentagon, uh, how did especially the American side uh miss it in terms of Iran actually exercising what had been just a theoretical threat beforehand to hold this critical waterway hostage? How do you explain it?

Dan 11:22

Well, it's not as if this was never imagined or planned for. I mean, I think for decades the US military central command has understood that in a all-out war with Iran, this is a likely move they would make. So there have been decades of planning done for it, and so there was a certain degree of preparation. But first of all, the the way they did it uh evolved uh fairly recently. You know, we have seen just in the last really uh 24 months or so uh the whole career has uh dramatically changed uh through the proliferation of you know highly precise and highly destructive drone technology. Uh Ukraine, of course, is the uh test bed for that and and has it has really turned the tide of the war with Russia. Um and Iran uh as its own drone technology. Of course, some of that got into Russia's hands uh for their side of that war. Um but that was a significantly enhanced capability that they had to uh help with the shutting down of the strait. I should have mentioned, of course, they weren't just able to work on the strait using drones and ballistic missiles, they were able to do a lot of damage to U.S. bases on land across the Gulf and uh you know harass uh ships and everything else and hit energy targets of uh of their Gulf neighbors. So they were doing plenty of damage, even as they were sustaining significant damage themselves. But that planning had had sort of been done, but of course, you have to constantly update those plans, especially as capabilities change. I worked very closely with Central Command during uh the war uh of uh October, uh January 24 to January 25, so that last year of the Biden administration is post-October 7th. They are incredibly precise and incredibly professional. And I don't have any doubt whatsoever that they would have presented to the president a realistic picture that said if Iran does exercise its capabilities to shut down uh shipping in the strait, we could open it militarily, but his this is what it would take. This is the cost, this is the capabilities we would uh be required, and this is how long it would take. Uh and the answer to that is weeks, months, major uh ongoing naval deployments, uh, which we've done, of course, and used in some respect to do the counter blockade of the Iranian closure, but we've already significantly extended the uh the deployments of many of these naval vessels. It's gonna pay, we're gonna have a long debt to pay, and the maintenance of that is gonna hurt our readiness for years, not just in the Middle East, but also on the Indian in the Indo-Pacific. Here's what it will take in terms of munitions. Of course, we burned through a significant amount of munitions that also hurts our readiness. Um, here's how here's the time it will take, here's the risk we will bear. Of course, putting U.S. vessels into the uh strait itself when they could be under fire or they could be uh hitting mines, uh, the ability to convince shippers and insurers that escorts or countermeasures that the United States uh could bring. And of course, we didn't have any allies involved in this because you know we went to war without other other than Israel, but certainly no allies in the naval space to help us. This is what it would take to convince the shipping industry to get back into it. And really, at the end of the day, because Iran has ballistic missiles and drones uh along the shore, probably it would require ground troops to seize islands or seize shore uh territory. And, you know, we all know what that looks like. We lost 13 uh service members early in the war to uh uh Iranian strikes, uh hundreds of wounded. But if you're inserting ground troops uh into Iranian territory, uh that's almost certainly going to lead to many more casualties and can suck you into something much greater. It's clear the president didn't want to do that. But I have no doubt that that was presented as an option and perhaps a necessary option if you were actually going to open the strait through military means. So the the real problem was not did the military understand this, did they present it honestly and faithfully uh to the president? The real problem was the president not taking seriously that advice and believing that the power of the US military, demonstrated by those videos he would get showing bombs blow, you know, blowing up buildings, uh demonstrated by uh, you know, the name even of the operation, Epic Fury. You know, it's kind of like you know pounding your chest, sort of a name. And he kept talking about how you know much we were beating up the Iranians, that somehow all that analysis and all of that military advice about what this would take was disconnected from what he thought he was trying to achieve strategically, whenever he was consistent on that point, which really required uh uh paying prices and and taking time and and and bearing risk that uh he was not prepared to do. I'm glad he was not prepared to do it. Uh, but that was the that was the misalignment of of those capabilities and uh and and what he was trying to achieve and what he was prepared to do.

Neri 16:32

A definite misalignment um in I guess what he what he thought would happen and also what he said publicly uh in terms of the war's goals and objectives at the outset. And and um, I mean we'll get to it in just a second. What he what he's selling now as uh still uh a great US victory. Um also, you know, on this ended in Israel, also being projected as a a great victory as well. Um trust me, we'll we'll get into that as well. Uh the MOU uh concluded Monday between the Trump administration and the Islamic Republic. Uh signing ceremony is set for Friday in Geneva. Uh best I can tell, it has four components. Uh number one, critically, Strait of Hormuz will be reopened

The Details of the Memorandum of Understanding

Neri 17:14

uh by both sides, it has to be said. Number two, uh Iran will get some kind of financial or sanctions relief. Um wasn't a given at the outset of this war, uh, in terms of Trump asking and demanding for unconditional surrender. So this is definitely a quid pro quo uh paying to reopen the strait. Uh three, the ceasefire will be extended for 60 days with an option to extend. Uh, but critically, uh, the end of hostilities need to also apply to Lebanon as well, um, according to the text that uh has been leaked so far. Uh and four, uh during the 60-day negotiation period, um talks will begin about uh the fate of Iran's nuclear program with an emphasis on the stockpile of highly enriched uranium held by Iran. So uh first question to you, maybe the most basic question, Dan. Uh, what did you think of the deal that actually did end the war, at least for now? I mean, you you wrote it's it's a weak deal.

Dan 18:10

It's a weak deal, but it's weaker than I thought when I wrote. Well, I wrote that uh it was necessary to take a deal, even a weak deal. We put ourselves in this position. We needed this war to end, we needed to get uh the global economy stabilized. Uh, we needed to stop our own uh, you know, damage to our long-term military readiness. Um, and so a deal that basically would have opened the strait in both directions, right? Uh was what I expected would be the basic outcome of this. And uh the nuclear issues I figured would be left for later. And that is true within this deal. Uh in the the the the strait will open, it's essentially described as a 60-day extension of the ceasefire, uh, but with the blockade removed, with Iran clearing mines, with uh shipping returning. By the way, it won't be instantaneous. Shippers and insurers will take time to see if it feels durable and uh and safe to to uh safe enough to transit. And you know, then you set up a timeline to discuss the nuclear issues that, by the way, were being discussed in February before the war started. And I think arguably we had a chance to get a much better deal than we're gonna get now on those subjects if we had stuck with that diplomacy then, uh, which we didn't. Um but the two, well, really three main questions uh what will be how will Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium be disposed of, both the highly enriched, the 10 bombs were the 60%, and you know, hundreds more kilograms or thousands more kilograms of uh lower enriched uranium. Well, what some of it's buried, by the way, but from the strikes last June. But what will become of that? Will it be downblended? I mean, made diluted, will it be exported? Uh the president was saying for a while the United States will take it, keeps calling it nuclear dust for some reason. Uh it's not really a term, but uh you know, so that's one question. What's the disposition of that you know, critical material for making nuclear weapons? Second is will there be a uh moratorium on any further Iranian enrichment? They're not enriching now that we know of, but even after the destruction of last June, they're probably capable, if they wanted to, of setting up an enrichment facility, maybe underground somewhere and doing some enrichment, and they could pretty quickly kind of get back to where they were. So a long moratorium on that, five years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, all these numbers have been floated. And then third, the verification mechanisms critically uh that would ensure that they actually kept those commands. That's inspectors, that's cameras, that's anytime, anywhere, you know, intrusive uh uh monitors, those kinds of things. That would all have to be negotiated. And it was said it would be over the 60 days, and Iran's very adept at dragging its feet and raising other issues. And I expected that would take a lot longer than 60 days, if ever, to reach an agreement on those issues. So we get the straight open and that would be good, and we'd maybe get a deal, you know, months from now on the nuclear issues, and it would be you know for shorter term duration, and you know, they'd keep the material in the country, but it would be monitored and it would be weak, but you know, probably would you know by you know some significant time. That was sort of the best case scenario of that weak deal. What I didn't really factor in was the front loading of the sanctions relief that seems to be included in the MOU that's actually been signed and leaked, and we haven't seen the text yet, official text yet, although there are a lot of versions of it out there. Uh that's that was that's been quite shocking. Uh it's and suggestive of how much Iran had leverage over us in this negotiation. Um, so uh in the very front end of this process, well, long before they make any commitments even to sit down. Much less to actually well, if they will commit to sit down, but to certainly agree to anything on the nuclear issues, they will receive it's a little unclear, there's some uh conflicting reports, but it appears tens of billions of dollars of uh Iranian frozen assets held by various countries, not by the United States, but held by others, but that could only be released with the approval of the United States under our sanctions. So they will receive access to that uh uh that those those assets. They will uh receive sanctions, waivers that enable them to sell their oil on the open market. That's been a long-term sanction, though they couldn't sell oil, of course they did in violation of that, mostly to China, but now they will even be able to do it sanctions-free uh for at least some period of time. And so that is, you know, billions of dollars, maybe tens of billions of dollars of revenue flowing into Iran's coffers uh before they've made any significant commitments on the nuclear uh program, other than one, right? Which is in the BMOU, they promise never to have a nuclear weapon. President is making a big deal out of this. This is a great achievement.

Neri 23:08

No, I I'll I'll say it because you were about to say it. Uh, in the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by your former boss, President Barack Obama, um, it's front and center at the top of that agreement, that commitment by Iran to never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. And so that that was true back then in the deal that Trump uh Correct.

Dan 23:28

He made that promise many times when they signed the nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear non-proliferation in the JCPOA. They had for years the Ayatollah's FOT law that says they're not allowed to have a nuclear weapon, which of course you know he could change. There's no Ayala as well. Um, so there's really nothing new in that commitment, and that commitment is not to be taken all that seriously or believed. Uh, you have to make sure they don't have the capability to do it if they change their minds or if they decide to do it covertly. So uh it's it's a it's important to have them restate it, but it's not a very meaningful uh accomplishment uh given what we've gone through. So in the end, we'll be providing a lot of sanctions relief up front. That money, by the way, is not going to go to build hospitals and schools for the Iranian people. We see how uh the regime cares about its people uh and suppresses its people and is willing to make them endure tremendous pain, economic pain. That's what kind of led to the protests uh last uh December and January, because you know, water was being cut off, electricity was being cut off, people basically couldn't live. And then when they protested, tens of thousands of them were massacred by the regime. So I don't expect that revenue to produce a better life for the Iranian people. I expect them to plow it into uh their uh terrorist proxy network, Hezbollah, Houthis, uh Hamas where they can, uh other Shia militias, and and get back uh as their counterweight to future uh or deterrent to future conflicts. And uh, you know, those aren't those issues already been mentioned in this MOU. No commitments expected from them on their missiles or drones or proxies, but now a lot of revenue that will help them uh feed much more uh capability into those uh those aspects of their uh of their array. And uh we've given all that, we're giving all that away up front in the MOU before they're making any, before we're really sitting down to have the discussions that hopefully will elicit the serious commitments on the nuclear program.

Neri 25:30

Giving it all away essentially just to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before it says everything about who had the leverage in this negotiations.

Dan 25:39

We needed to get that straight open. I I've been arguing that. Uh that's what I was against the war from the start. That's why I wanted the war to take an early off ramp when, or when the president take an early off ramp when it started. That's why it was clear that we were gonna have to take a weak deal just to get out of this. Uh, but right, that's what we're paying for. We're paying to get back to the status quo ante shipping and the straight of horror moves to try to stabilize the global economy, and we're paying for it with sanctions relief uh up front, and we're getting almost nothing other than the pinky promise on uh no nuclear weapon. Uh, and uh we'll have to negotiate all that other stuff later. We'll be feeding money into their other nefarious activities. By the way, one other thing is it's not even clear we're gonna get back to totally normal shipping in the Strait of Horror moves. Iran claims that the new reality is that they and Oman, which sits across the Gulf from them, across the strait from them, uh, will be the administrators of uh what should be free shipping in an international waterway. And it's not clear what that means. They claim they'll uh charge tolls. Well, the MOU says they can't charge tolls. Well, they say, okay, we won't charge tolls, we'll charge fees uh, you know, for service, for environmental, for, you know, we'll pick your pick your reason. They may, or they think anyway, they will be able to derive revenue also from shipping and what should be uh free navigation international waterway. So between the sanctions relief, those revenues, they could come out of this way ahead. And uh, you know, again, you know, we the other reason I think this is a weak deal is because in order, if we get into phase two negotiations on the restrictions on the enriched geranium and the further enrichment and the verification measures, what's one key factor to any diplomacy with a regime like this that we need to have on the table in order to be effective? It's a credible threat of force. That was always true. President Obama put in place military capabilities, actually, the B-2s and the and the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, those bunker busters were you know kind of uh fine-tuned as a as a uh military option to be available while we were doing JCPOA negotiations. President Trump, you know, had used those in earlier points of his diplomacy and of course, you know, as necessary exercise in last June, which I again supported. But you know, you gotta have Iran worried that if the negotiations fail, they're gonna pay uh a significant price. I don't think that's credible right now. I think we have you know expended so much uh of our own kit and uh kind of exhausted our own people and borne the economic cost for this, that I expect the Iranians will not think it's very credible that if these negotiations drag or they're not making the kinds of concessions we insist on, that the president, certainly not before the U.S. midterms, is going to return to military force, right? He he's not gonna do that. Uh no one believes that. Uh, and so we go into those negotiations much weaker than we should have uh and than we were if we had continued the diplomacy in February. And so we're it whatever nuclear deal emerges from this is likely to be weaker than the JCPOA, likely been weaker than something we could have gotten uh in February, hoping to get back to status quo ante in the strait. And even that might be less than full and free uh shipping the way it once was.

Speaker 1 29:22

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Neri 30:01

So you beat me to uh what was going to be my question about the prospects for actually getting to the second phase or the nuclear uh agreement uh during the 60 days after the 60 days. Uh and also, I mean, uh right before we started recording, Donald Trump apparently said at the G7 conference in France that uh, well, uh if the Iranians uh don't come to an agreement or they misbehave, then we're gonna start dropping bombs on them after 60 days. Uh but like you said, I don't know if anybody thinks that's credible, right? Um, that he's gonna start bombing again

Prospects for Getting to the Second Phase of the Agreement

Neri 30:34

in August or September.

Dan 30:35

You know, he's clearly been under huge pressure uh because gas prices are you know four dollars, four dollars and fifty cents a barrel uh a gallon. Um it's it's the oil price has dropped since uh since this deal was cut. You know, that will take time, but that will take time to kind of work its way through the global economy. Uh it it's shipping is not going to get back to normal immediately. There's all this backlog, there's all this ships in the wrong places and things. So the markets won't stabilize immediately. Uh, but the idea that he would do something in August or September, October that could you know produce a big spike again, right before what's likely to be a real you know wipe out for his party in the midterms, I don't buy it. And the Iranians know that. Uh now, could he do something next year if the you know if the uh uh talks drag on that long, and I think they are likely to drag on that long, who knows what the political circumstances will be then. But you know, we we've basically given our best shot, and the Iranians have shown that they were able to withstand the US-Israeli combined assault and uh gain leverage and and use it. And and so, you know, the other thing that's strange about the president, even more so the vice president's presentation of what they hope to achieve in these negotiations is it's not just they think or say they expect to get this uh, you know, these major concessions that Iran is you know going to drag their feet on on the nuclear program, but that there's kind of a bigger grand bargain out there. Uh, that maybe the people now running Iran are, I think in the president's words, uh de-radicalized and very rational. And that actually if they start behaving like a normal country, we can get out of this uh enmity that we've had for the last 47 years and they can uh be reintegrated into the world uh stage and world economy, and you know, things can be just much happier between us. I I don't know kind of what they're smoking. I mean, it's the same regime, it's the same uh ideology, it's different faces, so some of the same faces, but you know, the people running it, Ayatollah, who's the son of the previous Ayatollah, uh, we don't know quite what his status is in terms of his health and everything, but the IRGC leadership, which clearly are even in a stronger position internally than they were uh before uh the war and before the Ayala was killed. Uh they're driven by the same ideology which calls for uh destroying Israel, uh which calls for uh spelling the United States uh military from the region. By the way, that's something else that is at least referenced in the MOU, kind of the pullback of American forces, calls for Iran to dominate uh its uh Arab neighbors and to use its various tools, again, unreferenced in the MOU, uh, which are the Shia militias and other networks. And at the same time that that hasn't changed, none of that has changed about Iran and who they are and the and the sacrifices they're willing to bear to pursue that ideology. I mean, they put their economy into just extraordinary uh chaos and damage for decades and probably a trillion dollars worth of loss to pursue their nuclear program and to endure the sanctions that they've endured for the nuclear program and the missile program and the terrorism. They're the same people, same ideology. And uh while that's true, the vice president is talking about a $300 billion reconstruction uh three reconstruction fund to help them kind of enjoy all the fruits of uh of normal commerce and and rebuild. Uh much broader sanctions relief, actually we've described setting up a schedule for the complete uh elimination of all U.S. sanctions. Some of that requires Congress, of course. It's not something the president can do just by himself, but that that's at least going to be on the table. Um and uh no reference, of course, to how they treat their own people, but this idea that somehow uh they're on the cusp of turning over a new leaf where they won't prioritize Israel's destruction, they won't prioritize all these other uh regional agendas that they have, I don't know where that's coming from. There's no evidence to speak of that that's who these people are or what they're about, but it has already fed a process where other countries in the region, sensing a U.S. pullback, sensing Iran's game leverage, sensing that Iran, not sensing, having experienced Iran uh threatening them and not just threatening them, attacking them and doing real damage to their economies, they're starting to adjust. Uh the call, the Gulf states, the Saudis, the Emiratis, uh, who really hate the Iranians, the Qataris, who are kind of more ambivalent. They've all been attacked, of course, but they are all starting to do their own diplomacy, cut their own deals, try to do déten and de-escalation uh with the Saudis. And now the Europeans are making noises as well. If the United States is gonna uh, you know, uh the United States is going to reduce sanctions. Obviously, Europe will want to match that and get into business uh where they can in the Iranian economy. So there's something really strange about this perception that we are suddenly dealing with a much more rational, much less ideological actor in Iran. And, you know, I don't know what that's based on. One meeting in Pakistan, uh, some text exchange between Steve Whitkoff and the foreign minister. I'm not sure, but that's the I don't see any evidence that that's who we're dealing with.

Neri 36:00

I think it's the same problem they had when discussing Hamas in Gaza, also to a certain extent what's happening in Lebanon, uh, that they view it through the prism of well, sorry to say American real estate uh developers and businessmen. And that they think that, well, if we think this way, then surely these enemies and adversaries also can think this way. And uh I don't think it's true in any of those other cases. And uh, you know, I think part of it also is the vice president trying to sell this. I mean, he's been on a major media tour trying to sell this publicly amid uh, as you mentioned, very uh fierce criticism from Hawks in uh in DC and uh also uh many people here in Israel, which which we'll get into in a second. Um so he's trying to kind of project a rosier future for uh for the region, one uh without conflict, but I you know it's still gonna be a very hard line regime, no matter if they're willing to maybe sit down and negotiate. Also, I was gonna say um this is similar language, maybe similar expectations that we heard after the 2015 nuclear deal uh signed under the Obama administration, with one major difference, uh that was after you'd already kind of signed on and had a buttoned-down non-proliferation agreement. So you'd already gotten kind of the commitments and verified commitments and inspections and all of that to cap and limit their nuclear program and gave them some sanctions relief. And maybe on the other side, they'll actually make different calculations. Now you're giving them the money ahead of time just to reopen this waterway uh with the hope that maybe they'll make concessions on their nuclear program.

Dan 37:36

That's exactly right, Nary. I mean, that uh that's why I say what could emerge from is a much weaker deal or a non-deal than we had in the JCPOA. By the way, if I'm wrong, and if you know what emerges is a serious non-proliferation agreement with proper verification and you know buys us many years before we have to worry about nuclear program, I'll I'll acknowledge it and I'll say so. Uh, I don't see that's where we're heading. Uh, and you're right, this reverses the order. We don't have those commitments yet. We're already uh providing some of the sanctions, relief, and promising more. I have to say, even at the time of the JCPOA, I was Ambassador of Israel at the time, of course, you know, the JCPA was unpopular in Israel, and I was explaining and you know, uh it's a logic and the time it bought, and also its weaknesses. It had weaknesses, it was not a perfect agreement. But one of the uh one of the elements of the diplomacy of that era that I found hardest to explain or justify, and certainly didn't find myself in agreement with it, was after the deal was signed, Secretary of State Kerry kind of went on a roadshow to try to encourage international investors to come into the Iranian economy. I said, No, we didn't need to do that. We didn't need to deliver that for them. I mean, the same, you know, terrible, ideologically hostile regime, same corruption, uh, same abuse of its own people. They gotta fix their own house before we should become their advocates. I really uh didn't think we should be doing that. Kind of we're doing that now. Uh, it certainly sounds like the vice president is indicating that, again, before we've gotten the nuclear commitments button down or any of the verification. Where we're headed, as I've mentioned, is uh probably something that's uh weaker than we could have had six months ago, weaker than the JCPOA. Uh, and the president looks like he's getting ready to kind of wash his hands of it and just declare victory and shower Iran with various uh benefits. And so I think it creates a real challenge for some of those uh advocates and some of those friends and you know, Republican senators and the like uh who don't want to criticize Trump, but may have to twist themselves into pretzels uh to uh not acknowledge what I just described, that uh what we may have is something much weaker uh than they advocated or than the president said he would achieve.

Neri 39:53

Yeah, you're you're smiling for those of us, uh for those of you listening on on audio only. Uh Dan is smiling because it really is a remarkable uh turn of events where you have these uh Trump supporters, very uh uh effusive Trump supporters, who are now tacitly criticizing the president or maybe the vice president or maybe the negotiation or the deal itself, because uh Iran and and this deal uh are the most important things to them and they're they're criticizing it, I think, on its merits or demerits. Um and then you have those who uh uh I guess are are less um are willing to kind of turn themselves into pretzels uh to back up the president, uh despite the fact that this is kind of a major climb down that everybody can see uh and despite the sales job by this administration. So it's just remarkable to see it in real time happen.

Dan 40:48

It is. And by the way, I I'm completely uninterested in having debates about the merits of the JCPOA. That's an 11-year-old agreement that's been dead for eight years. Uh, I thought the whatever your position was in 2015, I supported it, even though acknowledged some of its weaknesses. I was an ambassador at the time, or in 2018, when President Trump withdrew from it, which I opposed. It had nothing to do with the decisions we had to make in 2025, when, as I said, I supported uh the military strikes against the nuclear program, or in 2026, when we faced the decisions points in February. Uh, and and you know, especially in Washington, there's this kind of cottage industry of people who have made this fight over the JCPOA kind of central to their whole identity and you know, uh trying to trying to win that battle, uh, both a political battle and a and a policy argument uh for years. I I'm completely uninterested in that. I'll acknowledge uh good outcomes if they are achieved by President Trump. I'll acknowledge weaknesses uh of things happened in administrations I've served in. But uh in this moment, right, there are a lot of people facing a real uh a real dilemma about whether they can back the president doing something that is uh much worse than the things they criticize for years and when they called for and thought he would deliver something much better.

Neri 42:09

Yeah, yeah. Um, you know, we can we can take a little private joy uh in in seeing this play out, but uh like you said, it has does really nothing for the actual policy debate that people should be having. Dan, I wanted to get into the US-Israel angle uh of all this. Uh, really important, really interesting, um, especially the Trump Netanyahu uh kind of state of play, very different now than even a few weeks ago. Uh they went from very close partners and allies, and I'm speaking generally about the US and Israel, uh, you know, especially military allies in this historic fight, to now it's gotten to a point where the Trump administration unilaterally decides to end the war, uh, which is, I think, legitimate and appropriate for the superpower to do, the the primary uh partner. But it also now imposing uh a ceasefire on Israel in Lebanon too, which is a front the US isn't directly implicated in. Um, and it didn't even share a text of this kind of MOU

The State of the Trump-Netanyahu Relationship and Upcoming Elections

Neri 43:07

with Jerusalem before it was signed. Uh so quite remarkable on its own, quite remarkable as a fall from grace from even just a few weeks ago. Uh, this kind of downshift, I don't want to call it a break between the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration. But how do you read it as somebody uh with uh a lot of experience in US-Israel relations, especially at the at the highest presidential levels?

Dan 43:33

Well, I read it as a you know, a significant divergence of US interests and Israeli interests that emerged following the beginning of the war. Okay, at the beginning of the war, again, I think misguided, but uh the two leaders determined that this was an opportunity to really set Iran back a significant blow. Again, some murkiness about what the objective was. Was it regime change? Was it just wipe out missiles and nuclear and other capabilities? Um, but uh again, once the Strait of Horror moves became kind of the central issue affecting US interests, the divergence between those two uh uh countries' interests really became very prominent. And the divergence, I guess, between the political interests, you could say, of the two leaders became very prominent. And it's not to take anything away from the you know very successful uh combined military operations that the two militaries did together. Uh I'm really proud of that. I, you know, helped sort of uh work toward those capabilities in government. And and I think it's uh to our interest that we have a partner where we can address common threats and and sort of operate almost as peers. We've got to deconflict at times, we we've got to you know make sure that you know everybody is uh kind of pulling, rowing in the same direction. Um, but we are able to do those types of joint operations because common threats, that's a good thing. And yet once the divergence of interest presents itself, uh, you know, then leaders have to make very hard decisions. It was very clear that the prime minister wanted to continue the war, even when the first ceasefire came in. He wanted to keep trying to weaken the regime, keep trying to uh wipe out certain capabilities. It was obvious that Israel has a different challenge with Hezbollah, which continues to fire weapons into northern Israel, something no Israeli leader can fail to respond to. But because Iran has tried to tie the two theaters together and say there has to be a ceasefire in Lebanon for them to observe the ceasefire uh in the Gulf. By the way, and Trump acquiesced to that Iranian demand. Correct, correct. You so that's so you could really see this divergence uh open up. And yes, when you know the United States has interests and it has to pursue them, it's gonna pursue them. And uh our partner uh will have to make that adjustment and has had to make that adjustment, right? They've not been able to continue the war in Iran. They won't continue that war in Iran uh without President Trump's green light. At some point later in the future, you know, I don't rule out there could be some more independent Israeli operations, but they're not gonna go back to full military operations without uh the president's uh agreement. Uh they have to accept this MOU is uh now going to shape what uh the next phase looks like. Uh and I'm sure uh even though they haven't read it yet, you know, their analysis of its weaknesses will, you know, track with some of the things we've already been discussing. And uh, but you know, so how you manage those differences of interest is important, right? There should be better communication, uh, there should be as much transparency, transparency as possible. You try not to, you don't want to have open uh profane exchanges between leaders. And of course, we've done that, where the president has said on phone calls with the prime minister and then told reporters about those phone calls that you know he told them he was effing crazy and and all of these things. And whether that's true or not, right, that isn't helpful for this partnership to have all of those disagreements uh you know publicly aired when you know we still face common adversaries. Iran is still an adversary, Hezbollah is still an adversary. Um, now how they manage the Lebanon piece of this is is really challenging, right? As I said, no Israeli leader can fail to respond to uh strikes by Hezbollah into Israeli territory. And northern Israel has really never recovered from uh the campaign that Hezbollah started on October 8th. Um, even after Hezbollah was very badly weakened in the fall of 2024, you know, they they they've still maintained uh some capability and and still can do damage. Uh but Israel has seized additional territory in South Lebanon. It's uh destroyed a number of Shia villages in South Lebanon, where by the way, there was a lot of military capability, including in residential homes. It's done strikes in Beirut. The president's been very clear that he doesn't want to see that happening. So I don't know exactly how this is going to play out. I don't think, as I said, any Israeli leader can just, you know, sort of sit back and do nothing if Hezbollah is attacking or even if it's threatening. Uh, but it's pretty clear that there's an expectation that the this conflict in Lebanon will be kept on kind of a slow, a low simmer rather than a hot boil, so that uh the uh nuclear diplomacy uh and the Strait of Hormuz diplomacy uh can unfold the way uh the MOU uh envisions. Uh but what that'll be, I think, a source of ongoing uh tension uh between the two countries.

Neri 48:27

And in terms of ongoing tension, uh the Lebanon front, um it's kind of a collision waiting to happen, but uh also on the actual terms of the MOU and what happens in the coming 60 days, also uh a likely point of contention. You follow this closer than most, closer than anybody, in terms of the politics of what it's possible for an Israeli prime minister to do. Can Netanyahu actually come out publicly uh against Trump, against Trump administration policy? Uh he doesn't have too many friends left in DC, does he?

Dan 48:59

No, I mean, in the past, right, when uh Iran decisions or other decisions taken by President Obama or President Biden that uh Prime Minister Netanyahu didn't like, he had an option, which was to go to Congress, to go to Republicans, to use the counterweight, to give a speech in Congress. Can you imagine the speech he would like to give in Congress about this deal? Uh A, he's not gonna get that invitation, B, he wouldn't do it.

Neri 49:23

You know, how many, how many uh Republican senators would actually uh and Congress people would have the courage to actually show up?

Dan 49:29

Of course. So that option is not available to him to play those cards and use that leverage in American politics the way uh he did against Democratic presidents. Also in Israel, right? It was helpful to him to be in seen in uh arguments with Democratic presidents who could be portrayed as insufficiently committed to Israel security. Much, much harder to do that with President Trump, who's so popular and has done so much that Israelis care about. Now that might be changing. Uh it sounds like a lot of Israelis, certainly right-wing Israelis and and in in the prime minister's base, and maybe even broader than that, are very unhappy with this emerging deal. And President Trump is taking a lot of criticism. So maybe there's some space opening up for the Prime Minister to show his independence, and I won't take orders from uh an Israeli from an American president, even one who you know we all we used to like. But it it really undercuts his political narrative. He's been you know heading into a very difficult election campaign. And the two things I think he wanted to present to the Israeli public in that election campaign are number one, as always, uh I'm the best steward of uh Israel security, deeply undercut by October 7th and a lot of the uh things that have happened since then, and basically inconclusive campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, but that was what he wanted to present. I'm the uh guarantor and I'm Mr. Iran. That's always been my uh issue. And uh look what we've done. We've achieved these historic uh setbacks to the Iranian threat. Well, that doesn't appear to be a very convincing argument uh now, three or four months before the election. And the second thing I think he wanted to present was I'm Donald Trump's best friend and his running mate and partner as we together reshape the Middle East uh to Israel's benefit. Well, that partnership is on the rocks. Uh the president is publicly swearing at him. Uh the president is now becoming less popular, so kind of making that association is not uh as effective as it would have been. Uh so I think it's really problematic for the prime minister. Who knows how this will play out for three or four months? But it's been interesting that the opposition has uh gone after him uh quite mercilessly as uh having failed on those two exact narratives that were going to be central to his campaign. Number one, uh, you have failed to safeguard Israel's security, you've failed to deal with Iran, you have left uh uncompleted uh work uh in Gaza and Lebanon and now Iran. And number two, you've fumbled uh the US-Israel relationship, where we now have even a friendly president that we all, we Israelis, all see as friendly, uh uh acting without taking our interests into account, and you've lost your ability uh to uh to try to persuade him to do otherwise. That's that's a that's a lot uh for uh a prime minister already facing some stiff headwinds to have to navigate as he goes into this uh this pivotal election.

Neri 52:21

I think uh that's exactly right that on those two issues, the you know, the success or lack of a success on the Iran front and also his ties to Donald Trump, uh both have been heavily damaged over the past uh few weeks, especially over the past week or so after this MOU was was concluded. Um rest assured, uh Dan, EB will try to uh spin his way out of this. Uh they're already talking about the fact that uh, you know, uh they don't they don't remind people that uh he was just his best friend and now not. They're now doing exactly as you said. They're saying, well, you know, you need an experienced Israeli prime minister with wisdom, as Netanyahu said it uh Monday in his press conference, to actually manage the the US-Israel relationship uh well. Uh and so you need you need that kind of prime minister. And the fact that Trump is actually cursing at him and criticizing him is itself a sign of the fact that Netanyahu is doing things that uh that you know are are standing up for Israel's interest. And this is why Trump is is uh saying what he's saying. Um, you know, uh they're nothing if not flexible. What do we say uh about pretzels earlier?

Dan 53:30

Well, there's another there's another culinary expression. For this purpose was the Israeli expression hafuch created, right? You're just doing the reverse of the reverse of what you were used to do and hoping it comes out clean.

Neri 53:44

Yes. Uh and also we should, you know, it goes without saying, but I'll say anyway, uh, during his press conference on Monday, uh Netanyahu gave a a very hard sell as to the success and the achievements uh of this last war. Um again, uh I don't know who you who he's trying to convince. The polls indicate that the Israeli public is uh not pleased with the results of the war, not pleased with the MoU, but uh he's he certainly tried to uh to sell it as a a major degrading and a major weakening of uh Israel's number one adversary. So uh we'll we'll see. He has four months until election day, uh, whenever it happens. So uh I spoke to someone earlier today, and he's like, oh, don't don't count him out. Don't count him out. It's a tough, it's a tough spot for for BB, but but don't count him out.

Dan 54:29

He's a survivor, he's just proven that over many years. Um yeah, but I I mean I think the real the the the election has always probably come down to um a fairly small uh number of potential swing voters, right? The blocks are pretty durable, uh, and there's a lot of movement across those blocks in almost any opinion poll you've seen in in Israel over many uh months. But if there's a small uh cohort of swing voters, they're probably sort of right-wing uh uh voters who have traditionally supported Likud but uh are kind of sick of BB for various reasons, maybe some of the internal issues, some of the corruption issues. Uh, and now maybe asking the question of is he has he lost his fastball? And maybe he's not the one uh to uh safeguard Israel's security. The question is, do they feel that there's somebody else, whether it's Bennett or Eisencott, uh, who they would put their trust in uh to be more effective in that card, that regard? So we'll see, I think probably in the next couple of weeks, if there's any shift in that fairly small, probably two or three Knesset seats worth uh of uh voters uh uh that swing a little bit in across the law across the blocks.

Neri 55:40

Uh absolutely. I mean, we could spend another hour on just on the Israeli opposition, Dan, but I won't I won't do that to you at this early hour uh in Chicago. Um so uh uh we'll have to leave it there. Uh thank you so much for taking the time. Uh this was terrific, especially in this uh very important week uh with everything happening.

Dan 55:57

Thanks, Neri. Thanks for all your comment and analysis as well. And uh happy to come back and do the same time.

Neri 56:03

Uh well, we'll have you on. You know, uh we had you on, I believe, after the Gaza ceasefire last fall. So if there's uh if there's a deal somehow later this summer or later this year, we'll have you back on, Dan. Don't don't worry. Happy to do it. Take care. Okay, thanks again to Dan Shapiro for his generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gielman, our editor, Tracy Levy, and our assistant producer Eden Jesselson, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keeping a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word, and a huge Mazaltof to your new NBA champion, New York Knicks.