Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We have a great episode for you this week. We'll be discussing Israeli politics and the election and a lot more. And for that purpose, I'm delighted to be joined once again by Dan Rotem, a senior policy analyst here at IPF and a longtime expert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as Shira Efron, our former colleague, who is currently a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation and their distinguished Israel policy chair. I wanted Shira and Dan back on this week to help provide a fully Israel-based perspective on how the election campaign is shaping up and how it feels right now in Israel, including the rise of Ghadi Isencott as the main challenger to Bibi Netanyahu. And afterwards, we also touched on the big news regarding a US Saudi nuclear deal and the latest on Gaza. What we didn't talk about this time at least is the ongoing and escalating tensions with Iran. For that, you can check out the deep dive I did with Nasan Rafati in last week's podcast. But needless to say, things uh haven't gotten better since we recorded last week, and things may actually be set to get worse. Um everyone in Israel obviously is watching things warily. Uh, it's obviously in the ether and on people's minds here. Uh but so far Israel hasn't been dragged in or conversely, hasn't been asked by the US to actively and actually get involved. We'll see if uh all those things remain true and actually hold in the coming days. But like I said, this was a terrific episode with Shera and Dan. So uh for now put Iran out of your mind and just sit back and relax wherever you're listening or watching this podcast on the beach by the pool, or uh dare I say, commuting to work and cursing everyone who's already on vacation. Don't worry, you're all very much seen and very much thought of. So, with all that, let's get to Dan and Shera. Hi, Shera, hi Dan. Welcome back to the podcast.

SPEAKER_03 2:22

Hi, Mary, hi Dan.

Neri 2:23

Hey guys, good to be here. Uh, it's my pleasure to have you both back on. Um, Dan, you'll you'll be very familiar with this phrase. You're you're pinch hitting this week for our dear friend and colleague Michael Koplow, who usually comes on with uh with Shera and I, but don't feel too bad about it because Shera missed the last time Michael was on, and we brought in uh our other colleague, Rachel Brandenburg, to pinch hit for Sheera. So I have to I have to make things fair and balanced. Um, you know, you two wouldn't know anything about it, but you know, when you when you have children, podcast children, you have to you have to make it kind of equal. I'm kidding, you both have ch you both have children, obviously. So thank you both for for coming on.

SPEAKER_03 3:10

I mean, I wouldn't know. Michael and Dan, they have the same exact uh hairstyle. And you fooled me.

Neri 3:17

The the Israeli the Israeli Kaplo. We don't uh as a as a general rule, Shira, you know we don't talk about hair on this podcast. Um we talk about Israeli politics and policy. Uh we we steer clear of of uh talk about follicles, but uh your hair is looking one wonderful. Your hair is looking wonderful today, Shira, as always. Um so all kidding aside, what I wanted to do uh this week is to kind of give our audience uh a real perspective uh from here in Israel about the the main issues of the day, primarily relating to uh Israeli politics and the now election campaign. Uh, but we'll definitely get into more of the geopolitics and security issues um in the second half of the episode, trust me. So uh, Shera, let's start here. We're now uh officially in election mode. Uh we have less than 100 days until October 7th, or until October 27th, rather, um, which is election day. Uh yeah, Freudian slip. Um and the big, the big news of recent weeks and recent months is this rise of former IDF chief of staff, Gaudi Eisencott, who we both know well. Um he's now rising in the polls and has become the main challenger to Bibi Netanyahu and the Likud. So I guess, you know, the big question, the first question, what do we think of Eisencott's rise?

SPEAKER_03 4:36

So just just have to say with with the caveat of of having known uh Gaudi Eisencott uh you know through professional circles, but for uh quite a number of years, uh, I'm a huge fan. Um, so you know, this doesn't just put this aside that regardless if he becomes the prime minister or not, we're speaking about, you know, uh a leader, uh person with values, um, and a lot of modesty. And I just gonna give an anecdote here that I think would would maybe you would appreciate. Um, a few years ago, I uh organized a conference and I had him as a guest speaker. It was about sort of like how climate change will affect national security when I was trying to do these things. I yet he was just uh gonna give like an opening remark, really not main professional, uh not he wasn't supposed to give a professional brief on, you know, uh uh climate change forecast for the century. Um, and this is a guy who was the chief of staff, right? Uh was uh Netanyahu's uh military secretary, he's been in wars all his life, and he calls me at around 10 p.m. He's like, Can you talk? And I said, Yeah, of course. And he's like, I'm not sure what to say. God damn, sorry, but he was just like it it showed uh the degree of humility and professionalism that he wanted to deepen and not just come there and uh check a box because he takes things really professionally. And for me, this was uh something that I hold him really high regard because I feel like he's eager uh to learn and he wants to work with uh professionals and he knows exactly what he knows, which is a lot, and I think also what he doesn't know. Um you wrote a great profile uh about Gadi Eisenhock in the Financial Times. So those of you who can crowd go past the paywall, I encourage you to read it, what Neri just wrote.

Neri 6:21

Thank you.

SPEAKER_03 6:22

It's basically he's the anti-BB.

Neri 6:24

Yeah, the anti-Natanyahoo, the anti-politician.

SPEAKER_03 6:26

The anti-Netanyahu. Yeah. And and I think it's it's a really good description in a sense that he looks more modest, he has this aura about him, that when he walks around, people can say, oh, he doesn't have this sort of like American polish to him, if you will, that Netanyahu has so well. And I think some people here say that he's uh he doesn't look like he has the killer instinct, which obviously they don't know him. You don't become the chief of staff of the IDF if you don't have the killer instinct, right? Uh so he's been there. And of course, his pref personal sacrifices, having lost a son uh in the war in Gaza and a nephew. Two nephews, two nephews. Two nephews, right, two nephews and his son, and having sacrificed all his life uh for uh public service, and he's genuine. And I think what you are seeing is that, and we we can talk more about you know, sort of the polling and how things are uh because because in terms of the changes in blocks and who would able to form a government, if it's the Netanyahu bloc or the anti-Netanaeal bloc, the numbers are not shifting so much between the blocks. Uh, but Eisencourt uh is definitely uh gaining at the expense of you know who we we thought a few months ago that could be uh Netanyahu's main rival, Naftali Bennett. It doesn't mean that he will not be prime minister. Um and it seems, at least according to some reporting, that in very traditional Likud towns, you know, Dimona and other places, that Eisencott is popular, more popular. There is this whole, which I'm very saddened to be speaking about in 2026, but this idea of uh what's his heritage, the fact he's Moroccan by descent, uh gives him points in different sectors uh in Israel today, uh, which I think is very unfortunate, but this is the sad reality. And the fact that I think he's very authentic and people believe him, which is something that is so missing today in Israel. So it's it's obviously totally to say uh 90-something days before elections, uh in Israel it's eternity. A lot of things can change here. Yes, but for now he looks like he's he's he he's he's gaining, and and is it's not just his party uh that is I think around whatever Likud is is is polling or a little more, but also in terms of like who's more uh suitable to be prime minister, Imanatanao and he's gaining their also.

Neri 8:50

Yeah, which is key. That's uh a really good summary, Shira, and a great start. And yes, uh, in terms of your anecdote about the conference, um, you know, knowing many uh former senior Israeli uh officers, uh, they're not ones for humility and not ones to actually admit that they don't know well everything about anything. So uh it's uh it's a very nice anecdote. And I, you know, having spent some time with them, not as much time as you have, uh I can attest to the fact that there is um a kind of quiet uh strength, quiet leadership quality to him. Um he's not one to give these kind of rousing speeches, uh rah-rah, but he does connect with people on a one-to-one basis, and obviously his personal background, his personal story. Um and like you said, you don't reach the position he's at well now and in the past by being um, you know, a child or naive, a weakling. So uh it's interesting. Don, let's bring you in. What do you think of uh Eisencourt's rise uh as you know the main challenger now to BB?

Dan 9:54

I think it matters, but I think it doesn't matter all that much to the extent that the only thing that matters is your ability to affect the block uh balance. And as long as this is intra-block dynamics uh mainly. And actually, if you look at the numbers closely, if I'm not mistaken, uh and you had Dahlia here in in past episode, shameless plug, go back to our listeners and and and still pick it up because I think it's still relevant. Um I think what what tilts a little bit or tends to tilt the blocks a bit more is actually which parties cross the threshold in which poll and which parties do not. So that's where the real action that affects uh block calculation is slightly less so his rise in the in the polls. Uh having said that, obviously there are dynamics between him and Bennett and him and Lapide and certainly Gantz factors in in why one or another. But but you know, before that, to the extent that we want to dive in into these calculations, worth noting that historically uh Netanyahu has been haunted by Israel's generals. I think it was Amir Tibon, maybe I'm mistaken, that about a decade or two ago wrote a piece about Netanyahu and the generals, right? His uh almost eternal clash with dating back to Itzik Moddechai and Amnon Lipkin Shachak, right, in tenure in the 90s, and then obviously being defeated by Ehud Barak in the 99 elections, and then going forward, uh facing all kinds of challenges from Amman Mitznah and Ami Ay Alon, even though Mitzna was more against Sharon, it doesn't matter, and also Ami Ay Alon, and a series of generals that that you know came. And Netanyahu has become so efficient and proficient in ultimately beating them, uh, sometimes through coercion uh or just flat out beating them, sometimes bringing them in, like Barak. Um he has his ways. So as exciting as Isencot's both rise and prominence uh is, and you know, a fresh breath, we said he's anti-Natanyao. He's also the anti-Barak in ways, right? He grew up in Eilat, not in the Kibutim, he grew up in Gulani, not in Sayat Matkal, et cetera, et cetera. Or the paratroopers. Yes. Um, he wasn't anointed, right? So as exciting as that is, I wouldn't obviously would not count out Netanyahu and his ability to withstand whatever is coming.

Neri 12:39

That is always a good rule of thumb, and we're going to get to BB in in in just a second. Um, but I I liked your point about uh the generals kind of running against Netanyahu. Uh it's been true, like you said, for for 30 years. And by the way, not just kind of generals from from labor or the left, uh, you also have um like Itzek Modekai from the center, center right. Uh, and it's interesting to me that if you go back and look, every literally every chief of staff going back uh pretty much for 30 years has eventually gone public. The ones that actually entered politics, and a lot of them entered politics, they've gone public and they've actually gone very anti-netanyahu and become very critical of Bibi. And this is literally every almost every chief of staff. Um and you can have Dan Khalutz, uh, who's now a pretty much an activist. Uh, you have Boggy Alon, who's uh the coup's hardline right winger, um, or formerly couped, and now he's the biggest anti-Netanyahu critic. Uh, and even now, most recently, you have Galant, the former defense minister under Bibi, who, you know, was fired by BB uh twice, once successfully, and and is now you know out there again being critical of of Netanyahu. So it is very interesting uh the this dynamic um BB against the generals. And and yeah, Benny Gantz was uh was the more recent one. And it you know, Benny Gantz, it's not that he was defeated by Netanyahu, he just surrendered to Netanyahu on a number of occasions. So that's Benny Gantz's own own journey, uh, as the kids say. But uh Gadias and cut, I think, is is made out of uh kind of different material.

Dan 14:22

And obviously, if you want to expand the scope, you had former heads of Chin Bet coming out against Netanyahu and former heads of Mossad coming out against Netanyahu. Um by now, it's you know, it's a it's a whole you know a full spectrum of security officials high ranking, uh, you know, effectively serving as an opposition to Netanyahu, but with this social political landscape and one that diminishes the importance of expertise and professional gravitas, that carries much less than it had, you know, in past decades, 70s, 80s.

Neri 15:00

I'll do you on better, and Shira, I'd love to get your your perspective on this. You see Netanyahu's campaign, um, and really there's essentially only three elements to it, right? Trying to address the rise of Isencard. And look, you look at the polls, yeah. Netanyahu and his kind of block, his current far-right uh ruling coalition with um Bethel Smotrich, Damar Benvair, then the ultra-orthodox, the Herodes, um, definitely down on the polls. They're underwater, they don't have a clear any anywhere near uh 61 seat majority uh according to the polls in the next next Knesset after the next election. So what is Netanyahu saying? He's saying uh number one, you know, like he like he said against every opponent for 30 years, uh Eisencott is left-wing, Isencott is left, Isencot is weak, Isencot uh will go with the Arabs, essentially. Um that's been true now for 30 years, doesn't matter who the opposite you know, opposition candidate is left, weak, Arabs. Uh number two, that Eisencot basically uh would have stopped the war prematurely, according to Netanyahu, and that he's a defeatist, and that he wouldn't have um you know, we wouldn't have done all these remarkable things across the Middle East, you know, killing Nastralla, killing Sinwar, killing Khamenei, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So Eisencot is a defeatist and gets things wrong. He wanted to stop the war, um, and BB wanted obviously to continue. Number three, and this is the most interesting one, it goes back to to Don's point about the generals, BB is running against the IDF. Right. In recent weeks, if you listen carefully to speeches and the interviews that he gives, uh, he's asked what's the biggest change since October 7th? And his answer uh over the past two or three weeks has been uh the biggest change is that we're now uh uh a state with an army and not an army with a state. A state with an army, not an army with a state. And essentially, you know, we the politicians, me, essentially, Bibi, is the one that is uh proactive, takes the initiative, uh goes on the offensive, and the generals, whether current or recent or former, uh are the weaklings. And that's that's fascinating. Uh Shira, what do you what do you make of of this campaign and are people buying it?

SPEAKER_03 17:17

So, I mean, I think it's too early to say what people are buying or not buying. I think it is uh important to note that Matanel made an awful joke in the beginning when he was first asked this question of what changed since October 7, and he said that he lost a little bit of weight.

SPEAKER_04 17:31

Yes.

SPEAKER_03 17:32

Um, which prompted a lot of like families of um um people who were murdered also on October 7, but also killed in the war since then, saying about how their families shed also a lot of lot of weight because of people dying.

Neri 17:45

Or the hostages held in tunnels, yeah, being starved.

SPEAKER_03 17:49

Right. Um, so I mean, just um the lack of sensitivity to what has changed, of course, since then he uh changed to what you say, but like defeatists, right, hesitant leftist will work with the Arabs are basically the same thing. It's basically just just like uh describing what he claims he is not. You know, I I I you need to be a social psychologist to understand what people can are convinced or not, but I think to what Dan Dan said earlier, um, there are two things that I think are important. The first one is that I don't think the blocks are changing so much. If you are a supporter of BB, it doesn't matter what the campaign is. Remember, I think President Trump had the same thing, right? Essentially I can get away with anything, right? People who want to vote for BB will vote for BB. And people who want to vote for some other parties that will definitely form uh a coalition that could resemble what we have today, are not gonna be, I think, convinced either way by a good campaign or not a good campaign. What you have here is a very small, um I it's probably you we're talking about, and and maybe Dan knows the numbers better, and I'm sure Dahlia, who uh who's uh an expert on this, knows the numbers. But we're talking about very few mandates here and there, and depending on who actually goes to goes out to vote, um, that could be uh changed. Um and and and and I'm not convinced that anything that Netanyahu says will help him shift someone who wants to vote for Bennett or for Eisencoat uh to all of a sudden vote for Netanyahu. It could be that he can convince those people who are now not sure, contemplating, have been liquid all their lives, and their grandparents and their parents, right? Like that's what they're born. And they're like, oh, we are gonna now, I'm gonna change finally because the situation is really not good, and the cost of living and you know, everything that Israelis have been gone through. And then Netanyahu says those things and it'll be like, you know what? He's right. I will stay where I am, where I came from. I think this is where, I think this is what Netanyahu is aiming for, those people who are considering ditching the block and moving, he will not be able with this campaign to convince uh anyone else. And another thing that I think is important, because so many of Israeli's decision makers uh have been, you know, have been the generals throughout life, we can we can we can gener we can generalize and talk about uh how Netanyahu treated them. But if you look at pretty much everyone that worked with Netanyahu throughout the years, even civilians, um, many of them have already also become uh staunch opponents of Netanyahu. So he has uh a good way of making people come work with him and then um turning them into his strong opponents, uh having seen it from the inside.

Dan 20:43

That's uh that's also a good point. Dan? Yeah, um a couple of things as we segue into the like, you know, not prediction, not full-on prediction, but like analyzing forward. Um so, first of all, I'm reminding us that Bibi doesn't have to win, all he has to do is not lose. One. Number two, I think more than the campaign themselves, there are contextual issues that will be very dominant here. There are three things um that are still, you know, too early to tell. One is the choice architecture, right? Who runs with who and what is the ultimate party makeup? That what's a choice before the voters? Uh it still hasn't consolidated.

Neri 21:24

No, sorry, I was just gonna interject. You you do hear from people, it's like, you know, who are you voting for? This is the question I ask everybody these days. Um, because it cuts to the chase, right? It's like, I don't care about your opinions. I want if the election was tomorrow, who are you voting for? And that will explain their mindset and where they're coming from. Uh and a lot of people say, I don't know yet. Undecided.

Dan 21:42

So there's there's undecided part of the uh the fact that they're undecided is because yeah, the parties haven't consolidated yet. And usually, you know, it's a center right where these dynamics really come to the fore. Uh and we'll we'll see who runs with who. That's number one. Number two. Two is the mechanics of this. The mechanics feed into, for example, how many people have already left in Israel, have already left Israel, even though they haven't, you know, fully declared so. Are they planning to come back? Will they be able to come back and vote? Et cetera, et cetera. You know, we're talking about a few seats that that are still undecided whether they're able to come and vote and whether the polling right now actually can capture that. But ultimately, I still think there's a lot of events, geopolitical events, external and internal, to happen between other, or that could happen between now and election day. And there will uh and I still believe that it is more about what will happen between now and election day than what has happened until now that will ultimately tilt the balance between the blocks.

Neri 22:52

So everything's still to play for. Yes, even though the polls show, you know, kind of a clear majority for the anti-Nia opposition, they're not quite there in terms of you know a full absolute majority over 61 seats. Um the big difference though now compared to the endless rounds of elections that we had between 2019 and 2022, right? Um is that it's not they're not running neck and neck. So there is an option, even if Eisencott, say, for example, in the bloc, don't get to 61 seats that they can change the government um with just a simple majority. You don't need 61 seats to actually uh form a government or seat a government, you just need an actual majority. Um and this is even before the question of whether they'll actually be willing to to use uh the hands and the votes of the Arab Israeli political parties. Um again, there's still plenty of time to get into that. And then we should never we should never count out Netanyahu. Um but I'm curious, I want to get your sense. Have you you know, obviously the three of us come from a certain milieu, shall we say, here in here in Israel? Um again, I'm not gonna ask you who you're voting for, but I I have a sense who you're not voting for. Uh fair to say we're not we're not huge fans of the current Israeli government. But uh do you spend a lot of time, have you or have you spoken to people who are pro the current government? And how do you how do you understand it for yourselves that the support has still remained constant, even or despite what we've gone through over now three and a half years? Shira, you want to should we uh should we start with you or Dan? Feel free.

Dan 24:31

Uh my friends on you know that side of the aisle, um, most of which are religious Zionists, their biggest uh criticism uh is obviously the internal dynamic has to do with uh ultra-Orthodox conscription. That's the biggest issue right now. That is the main criticism. But when it comes to like the ideolog the big ideological and geopolitical questions of national security in its external manifestation, uh, you know, the hawkish posture, whatever, to them it is clear, right, who they trust to remain hawkish and on the offense and preferring uh military actions to you know diplomacy and and and political processes. And they'll stick with them. When they look at the change block, they see the diversity, right? And alignment with Yahir Ghulan and the Arlapid for them is you know, is a uh trefa. It is something that you don't do when the security of Israel, when the security of Israel is on the line. So, in that regard, as much as they don't trust BB and they, you know, uh and they have all the criticism associated uh with the rifts with the ultra-orthodox and whatnot, uh, on this question, they are clear-cut on that side of the aisle. Shera?

SPEAKER_03 26:00

You know, friends and and acquaintances on the other side who are not necessarily coming from a religious theologist uh perspective, but more from a hawkish perspective. I think there are probably like two types. Uh, one is that those who think BB is sort of a legal of his own, and we can talk about the list of achievements on, you know, who's gonna deal with Trump, who's gonna deal with this, who's gonna do all these great things we are seeing at the moment. Um and they blame Gadi Eisencoot, and Yerry Lapid and others and Lieberman for not joining in with Netanyahu and saying the current coalition is a result of they saying anything but BB. So still it's more like the best thing would be uh a sort of a Zionist uh joint government with Netanyahu and the helm, and it's their fault we got to where we got. Because yeah, we don't necessarily like those crazy, but what can Netanyahu do if you boycott him? And this is still an argument that is happening.

Neri 27:03

Yeah, this is the argument, this is sorry, this is the argument uh we you know, we need to save BB from himself and the and the extremists.

SPEAKER_03 27:10

In their um argument, they're saying, and I think that's what brought uh Gaddy Eisencourt who we started with, and Benny Ga Benigatz is a different story, but you know, when they joined the emergency cabinet after October 7, the idea was like we love the country more than we hate Netanyahu, right? So that's what they're still saying. Okay, you don't like Netanyahu, fine, but do you love your country? To save the country, what we all need to do is come together. So this is still an argument that I'm hearing a lot, um, to forcing their hand to do this because Netanyahu is really the experienced one. We can't have someone now who doesn't have executive experience with all the respect to the others, uh, as they say. Um if and if that's your argument, we will never have a different prime minister, right? Because of course Netanyahu is the most experienced one just by the sheer number of years. And others, I think they buy into this idea that that the list of, you know, there's a lot of like uh protests, you know, the activists, right? If you look at the Democrats, a party we haven't spoken about now, but it's the Yayer Golan uh list. And Yayer Golan is also like an extremely brave fighter. He's he's he's he's um he's perceived as very leftist. I will tell you he's not. And the spoiler also, he came to an IPF event once in the US, and I think the audience was quite shocked when he spoke about an annexation of the Jordan Valley and other things that stand in the way of a traditional two-state solution.

Neri 28:32

You're under you're making news, you're undermining his campaign. But no, you're I mean, you're right.

SPEAKER_03 28:35

He's he's not I'm actually strengthening his campaign.

Neri 28:38

Yeah, well, it depends who you ask, but yes, um depends who the audience is.

SPEAKER_03 28:41

But I will say that but his list, right? You have all these like the leaders of the protest that people say, wait, they they they were part of of the protest, and and and and and how can we have people who refuse to serve because of the legal reform? You remember the judicial coup?

Neri 28:58

Yeah, this is in 2023.

SPEAKER_03 29:00

Right, before October 7th. And obviously, all these people, thank goodness that they exist because they help save the country when this government of, and it's not a political statement, but the fact is that a lot of not prof unprofessional people running it um and working there because a lot of civil servants left, right? These people, this this this the the what you have, the NGO sector, civil society, many of their leaders are now uh trying to get to the to go to the concept, have saved uh the country, really, yeah, and came to the rescue. Um, so so you know, we'll see. I I don't I don't see, but I don't have anyone, and I think when you're saying about the undecided, I have friends who are contemplating between uh Yerik Golan and a Victor Lieberman and Gaudi Eisenhoe, but I don't have anyone who says, like, oh, maybe I'll vote for Smothric or Bent, or maybe BB, or maybe Gaudi. I don't know these people. I know the more within the blocks, uh the shifts.

Neri 29:55

Right. And um we should say we're gonna touch on them in just a second. The Democrats are basically it's the amalgamation of the old Labour Party and the left-wing merits party. Um and Yar Gulan uh thankfully and um well belatedly merged them together, uh, took the top spot, and uh they just had their primaries uh what two days ago? Earlier this week. So uh it it was a strong list by all accounts. Uh they're polling at whatever, 10, 11 seats in the polls, which is um a resurrection, nothing, nothing, nothing less for the Israeli left. Uh and it's you know a combination of kind of existing labor solid kind of um members of Knesset and the activists um and a few kind of old-time uh uh IDF IDF types, left-wing IDF types. Um I'll just uh sum up the the issue of uh people still contemplating voting for Netanyahu, the Likuder, or the government. Um I know I know a lot of them, some of them quite quite closely. And look, I think some of them are just true, true believers, right? And this is maybe difficult for people outside of Israel to to kind of understand, but they blame October 7th and even the protests for nine months before October 7th with regard to the judicial overhaul as solely on the other side. They blame the army for messing up on the morning of October 7th. Uh, they blame the the protest movement for as you alluded to, Sheera, um, you had this phenomenon of uh reservists uh kind of suspending their their reserve duty and protest at Israel going kind of authoritarian authoritarian um due to these judicial judicial reforms, judicial overhaul uh gambit. Um so everything that happens, it's kind of never it's never on Netanyahu. It's never on the government. And there's never any sense of responsibility. Um, you know, the world is angry at this or that action, whether in Gaza or elsewhere. Well, you know, the world is uh anti-Semitic. You know, there's never any real kind of self self-reflection. Um, you know, the Iran War was between a defeat and a fiasco and kind of uh incomplete grade. No, you know, it's it's a it's an absolute good that we were bombing Iran and that we killed Khamenei. Okay. That that's a perspective, that's a prism. So for anyone kind of curious how Netanyahu is still polling as high as he's polling, uh, I think that's the core, the core of his support, um, combined with this massive propaganda pseudo-media machine that really has penetrated uh to a great deal, and this is a fairly recent phenomenon, um, in combination with kind of undermining trust in the traditional mainstream media. Um you see that, you see like the messages being parroted back at you um after every kind of broadcast on Channel 14.

SPEAKER_00 32:55

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Neri 33:52

I'm curious to get a sense, uh the Israeli left, people who we know and love. What do we think of the new and improved the Democrats, this new party, this new list? Done? Is this a new new Israeli left?

Dan 34:08

It's a consolidated Israeli left to a certain extent. Uh empowered by the protest movement of 23, uh, and the you know energy, the momentum, the institutions, pseudo-institutions, formal and informal, that it had um created. It's it's been quite impressive in the polls, polling at you know, low double digits uh for a while now. And um, I think their fate will ultimately, or their electoral fate, right? Not coalition fate, but their electoral fate will ultimately depend on how the rest of the electoral map shapes before the elections and what the choice architecture is for their potential voters. Um I will say that they do resonate beyond their block because statements that they can produce can deter a few people who do, you know, hang between say Eisencott and Bibi. Not many are those, or people that uh hang between Netanyahu and Trupper Hendel. So and Jar Golan's statements tend to uh you know really make waves uh in in the WhatsApp groups of the other side. So they uh when it comes to them, I think the campaign that they will run uh can influence ultimately uh the electoral map.

Neri 35:43

By the way, just for our audience, uh Hendel Truppel, this is this new kind of right-wing party that's now over the electoral threshold, pulling around four seats. Umaz Hendel, former aide to Netanyahu, um Khili Truppel, he's one of the uh self-exiles from Benny Gantz's party. So he broke with Benny Gantz once he realized it was a um sinking ship. So they've joined forces. It's kind of based on reservists, but they're right wing, and they're one of the ones who are calling for a broad coalition government after the next election, a broad Zionist government. Uh where, you know, their their phrase, you know, we're we want to impose this on on both sides. Um, I don't know. It's always a question of who's gonna be number one. And if BB's number one, then why does he have any interest in preserving their broad Zionist coalition for longer than two minutes? But anyway, well, we'll get to that uh before election day, I'm sure. That's uh Hendel and Khili Topel. Um Shira, what do you think of our friends on on the left, the Democrats?

SPEAKER_03 36:48

I mean, I I I agree with with Dan. A lot of uh names we we know. We've been around for a long time. Uh I appreciated, you know, the open primaries. I appreciate the fact that it's uh what do you call a zipper list? Like, right, it's uh men, women, so it's half and half. Um by the way, we're seeing also that Gary Eisenkort and he's joined by many, or not many, but at least as an equal number of women, I think, experts. Very accomplished list, and of Tali Bennett, and of Tali Bennett, I think, even more. Um, so this will be a correction because for those of you who noticed or didn't notice, um, there are very few women in Israeli decision making uh today, uh the political uh rank, but also uh amongst the professionals, no director generals of uh government ministries and in other sectors as well. But they come with a certain clear tag of being, you know, very much on the left, uh, which is not necessarily a bad thing, but there's no hiding, right? This ambiguity as to what they stand for does not exist. Whereas Gaudi Eisencourt can still keep this ambiguity. Uh, I'm not sure uh views-wise, there's such big differences between Gaudi himself and Yerkolan. As I said, Yair Golan is not people think here it's gonna, it's just it's just a perception. You should, you should, you should have heard him speak about, you know, different regions in Lebanon that we should keep forever. I don't think people understand what um he's he's quite hawkish on uh several uh issues, and he's really a military person. And um, you know, he's he's been very like a military through a security lens looking at a variety of things. You have professionals on this list. I don't know what to say about them anymore. I will just say on the Khili Trooper and Joaz Hendel, and now Shiran Haskel, who was the deputy foreign minister, who all of a sudden decided this is this is like a one straw too many, uh, and she has to resign exactly now when we go to elections. And I think she's also launching a new party. I think all these small actors are doing it uh to be uh bought, to be uh acquired, to be merged uh with the big ones, right? Um Killy Trooper himself, I think he left manigans when he said that he's not gonna he's not gonna be part of a party that doesn't uh cross cross the electoral threshold. So if he's polling very near to it, I just don't know that he was. So I think we could, you can know these are small actors that at this moment they could be meaningful, but they could also be completely meaningless uh within days. And we will know more as this um campaign continues.

Neri 39:25

Yeah, um, as always, uh as Don mentioned at the top, I'm gonna I'm gonna steal uh a phrase from Dunn's uh world in baseball. You know, um we can talk all the time and the focus is on the top of the standings, but really where Israeli elections are are decided is the bottom of the standings. It's a smaller parties, um, whether they make it over the electoral threshold, the very fine margins um where where these things come down and and are decided. And Shira, I I I like the fact that you've now undermined not only Yeir Golan's uh campaign, but also Gaudi Eisenkoff's campaign. This is good. Making news uh and making waves.

SPEAKER_03 40:01

Um wait, you said that I strengthened their campaigns. I'm just saying that their um people no in a sense that I said that Gaudi is humble and that he asks uh professionals, that is, and yeah, you're also I'm just gonna say I think it's very compelling. By the way, we spoke about BB, right? Tagging people as leftist, defeatist, and stuff. And I just think there is much more nuance to all of them on different issues, okay, than is convenient for either um their uh competitors um but also for their voters to know. And I think nuance, right? You at IPF, you celebrate nuance, uh, should be appreciated and respect, respected. So I uh hope I strengthen their campaign because I'm explaining they're more complex creatures than being just like leftists.

Neri 40:51

No, 100%. And even in the profile I wrote of Isencott that came out um on Monday, right? He had one statement, he's like, he's giving an interview to Israeli television. He's like, you know, never in my 66 years have I uttered the words Palestinian state. Okay. You know, he was also for most of those years in uniform, so it's not his position to advocate for or against a Palestinian state. Um but then in another interview that same night, he he was asked, and this is to his credit, um, he's against annexation, he's for separation from the Palestinians. And he had a quote that said, you know, the idea of annexing 2.8 million Palestinians, i.e., in the West Bank, um, is a threat to uh the Zionist project, uh is a threat to Israel's uh uh existence as both a Jewish and democratic state. This is this is a classic kind of left-wing, center-left position to take. It also happens to be objectively true. So um the fact that he came out and vocalized that, I'm sure, did not make uh his campaign managers happy. But to your point, Shera, it's actually kind of telling the truth to the Israeli public before an election.

SPEAKER_03 41:58

And this also, this the fact that this is leftist, I mean, it's it's you know, the right is so right that it's left. Because if you think that by preventing a Palestinian state, you're also gonna prevent Israel as a Zionist dream, right? Like they think that they're preventing, you know, a Palestinian state. You're preventing Israel's state as a Jewish state. And that is why this this idea of calling it left and right, it's like what's left and what right? We all want to share uh together, hold hands here, sing kumbaya, which which resources we do we all have uh to uh absorb and uh pay for the rights of you know three million Palestinians in the West Bank, two million Palestinians in Gaza. I mean, do we have more resources of income? And you know, and and you know, I I think that the fact that he's candid and explains that, basically saying that they're not going anywhere and we have to find a way to uh cope with this complex reality is is not a bad thing. But I wouldn't put them as leftists. By the way, I'm hearing that also uh Lieberman doesn't want to control the lives of the Palestinians forever, and he says that. And Lieberman is by no means uh a leftist and he lives in a settlement. And if Tali Bennett, who's definitely not a leftist, right? And he was the head of the Isha Council and the settlements, he also believes in um some sort of like gradual partitions or separation and having uh self-rule for the Palestinians. So yeah, he says autonomy, and I know that autonomy in the legal term is part of a one state, but I think this idea of separation, if we can't even say that today, um we've gone uh we've gone too far in the Israeli discourse.

Neri 43:36

Well, we've definitely gone too far in the Israeli discourse, that's uh to say the least, given given recent years. And um I mean ultimately, like let's let's call it what it is, right? Under Netanyahu's long reign, people, the leadership has not leveled with with the Israeli public. There'll be a lot to talk about, uh, like I said, for the next couple weeks and and months about Israeli politics. Um I wanted to shift with our remaining time to To a few big geopolitical issues. So the big news overnight from our friends at the Wall Street Journal was that the US and Saudi Arabia are set to sign a nuclear agreement where U.S. companies will help Saudi set up its own civilian nuclear program with quote unquote potentially less stringent uh inspection obligations and potentially uh you know uranium enrichment on Saudi soil, uh which would be uh a big a big sea change. Uh Shir, let's start with you. What did you think of this news that broke? Um I mean, I think such a deal between the U.S. and Saudi was talked about for a number of years now as part of this overall package to entice Saudi to actually normalize relations with Israel. And now we're seeing it kind of just being done by the Trump administration for contracts for American nuclear companies.

SPEAKER_03 44:54

Aaron Powell First of all, I just want to say something from a US perspective. And before I go to the criticism of this agreement, what it means from Israel, and I, you know, the bottom line up front is it's a colossal diplomatic failure for Israel. But from a US perspective, I understand why they were doing. Because, you know, we love talking about these other issues, but there is a nuclear uh race, and it's not the nuclear arms race. There's a nuclear renaissance, nuclear power is all the rage, especially to power data centers around the world. And in this race, the Americans have been losing for many years because America's just stopped uh producing nuclear technology. The Russians are in the lead, Chinese are behind them. I've worked a lot on this issue, I'm very passionate about it. And from a perspective of the US uh competition, that it's not just economic. I know it could be tempting to put it all on sort of like what are the Americans making out of this money. Money is part of it, but it's really a geopolitical uh issue, a competition that is goes to the core of uh US uh uh peer competition, rivalry, uh global power comp, whatever you want to call it with the Chinese and the Russians. Um and if we look at the Russian model of how they the the the nuclear power plant, you know, in Turkey, and there's in um Egypt, and there are others. And for the US to want to make sure that they that the Saudis are tied to the US, then they don't go with China, which the Saudis might do because it's a matter of uh energy needs and nuclear and uh and prestige, right? Uh and other issues. So from a US perspective, uh not just the economic stuff, but the other considerations, I very much uh understand why they would want to tie the Saudis with them. Um it's too early to say whether and we don't have time to go into the details, but there's the gold standard agreement, like the UAE signed, um United Emirates, which sort of with the with the with the most guardrails, right? You would have most guardrails and extra protocol. It doesn't look like the Saudis are going for the same type of agreement here. So it's less guardrails, uh no additional protocol, which means less like supervision. And here comes here come come questions about um the dual use nature of nuclear technologies that can be also be converted gradually in the knowledge and the know-how into uh uh a military uh program, which obviously is a whole different issue. There's proliferation uh of uh uh nuclear capabilities, which we don't want. Uh, when we are seeing how vulnerable energy sites are in the Gulf now, you think what's gonna happen if, God forbid, um Iranian right missiles or UAVs uh uh uh hit a nuclear facility, which by the way, there was a strike next to the Emirati one uh already. Um and then there are issues also of saying, you know, regimes can change, right? Saudi is very much in the US orbit now, things can change, and what are we giving? That these are all the considerations. But I think from an Israeli perspective, for years we knew that a primary incentive, not the only one, but a primary incentive for normalizing ties with Israel was this idea that the Saudis get sort of like more uh types of access to more uh capabilities, uh military capabilities than than before, and this uh nuclear agreement. And Biden had negotiated exactly the same the same deal, just with a tiny thing that it comes with Israeli, with normalization uh with Israel. I have to tell you, and here I'm just gonna give you another anecdote, not from an Israeli, about a year and a half ago, or maybe even more, I uh was somewhere in a conference internationally and I met a very senior Saudi person from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their ministry, and they said that they're gonna get it, the nuclear agreement, this time without a normalization. And I was skeptical. So this has been in the making for a long time. Maybe this was um the momentum of appeasing the Saudis at a time where there's some, I don't know if there's strains, but there are issues obviously with the fact that they're they're they've been undermined and attacked by the Iranians with a war that they didn't want. Uh, so I'm not sure about the timing of this, but this has been a long time in the making. And there are reports now in the New York Times, and there have been reports a few months ago that Israel is uh raising its objections about this. But I can tell you, and this I heard also with IPF folks, that on Congress in the last few years, people very close to Netanyahu have told Congress that there's no issues, and Israel would support it because there was always the assumption that it would come with the prize of normalization with the Saudis. And I'll end with this. So Israel is opposing now, but insinuated at least, and I heard in stronger terms that Israel said they have no problem with it, uh, that the Saudi can have it. And not only that Saudis are not normalizing ties with Israel, they already, and everything we're hearing as they told uh Joseph Aound, the president of Lebanon, and Ahmed al-Shara of Syria, not to normalize ties with Israel. So they're also holding back others uh from doing this. Um, and I guess, and if I I don't know, if we want to rate like the diplomatic failures of the last few years, I would top, I would put probably put it in the top five.

Neri 50:08

Very, very interesting. Um, and maybe the Saudis like many other people across the Middle East and not just the Middle East are waiting potentially for a new Israeli government to do business with.

SPEAKER_03 50:19

Sorry, and and I'm sure, by the way, I want to say, I think from Saudis, I it's not normalization, I hope, is a matter of uh when and not if if I don't think this was the only incentive. There are a lot of interests in regional integration and and things can change with the Saudis. But there was, and Dan and I talk about, I'm sure Dan, I don't want to steal your thunder, but I don't think there was a Saudi urgency before. Uh, but there's not going to be a Saudi urgency today now.

Dan 50:46

Yeah, this hurts. This hurts because there was such an opportunity, right? And the more we look at it in retrospective, the more we recognize the opportunities that was there in the late spring and summer and early fall of 23. Everything was integrated and related to each other, right? The Saudis wanting a treaty-level like security relationship that includes uh commitment and capacities and also uh uh you know this nuclear file, but it had ultimately had to come down. Um and to get the Congress, you needed a Democratic president, and you need Netanyahu and Dermer lobbying Republicans to support this thing. And ultimately, to get everything lined up, you needed a Palestinian component and a meaningful Palestinian component. And that was the missing ingredient because many people on the US side and on the Israeli side assumed that all you needed is some something, uh, you know, a statement toward the Palestinians, which was not the case, right? Um just the fact that, you know, some Americans, Shira, once told me, you know, spent three hours with MBS and came back to Washington and never heard about the Palestinian issue during those three hours didn't mean that ultimately that the Saudis won't need something meaningful. And obviously, after October 7th, the window or a window was still there, but the price of that Palestinian component has risen significantly and it will remain high. And by now, Netanyahu himself is probably a persona non-grata in terms of normalization. And if the Saudis can get most of the things that they want without having to pay the cost of normalizing uh with Israel, then why would they? Remains to be seen what happens with the next Israeli government. But I would urge everybody involved not to underestimate Saudi needs on the Palestinian matter or the next opportunity will also be missed.

Neri 52:57

Very much agree with that sentiment. And uh look, um, it's a question of Israeli choices as well. Uh, we've heard people like Betzelas Motrich, senior minister in the current Israeli government say if it's a choice between all of the land and uh Saudi, and he had some very not nice words to say about Saudi, I think, in that particular statement, um, he's choosing he's choosing the West Bank, you know, the land of Israel.

Dan 53:21

That's okay, by the way, that's a leg uh leg I disagree with. It's a legitimate argument to make. The problem is that those, you know, on the hawkish side uh of Israel, there are many of them, right, who are not theologically committed to Greater Israel, et cetera, have the wrong equation in their mind of what it ultimately takes to reach normalization with Saudi Arabia. And the first thing uh for us, you know, think tank, people trying to impact the discourse and the understanding across the board, is to reconfigure and sharpen uh, you know, the needs for such a breakthrough and be very clear. It doesn't need to be a Palestinian state tomorrow or even soon, but it needs to be a meaningful component that projects across the board that Israel is uh serious on progressing with the Palestinian issue. And I believe if that's the case, Israel will also see a Palestinian partner in Ramallah that can work with it on a you know, a process, a roadmap, uh uh focusing initially on improving the stabilizing situation in the West Bank and obviously uh uh stabilizing Gaza and moving it uh along the 20-point plan. Uh, this does not need to be a frog leap uh necessarily toward Palestinian statehood right here and now.

SPEAKER_03 54:50

This is so important because you know we talk about the Saudi needs on this. It happens that those things that are really in the Israeli interest, not that's just the regional component, the regional integration that Israel needs so badly. Uh a competent, right? We spoke about before, right? Like not a uh what do you call revitalized PA, not RPA, uh CPA, a competent Palestinian state. Uh competent, sorry, God forbid, Palestinian Authority, not state, competent Palestinian authority that delivers services for their people, that cooperates with Israel on security and is accountable for the security risks that emerge from the territories that it uh controls, that um obviously does not incite uh uh uh to violence in different ways. Uh this is an Israeli interest, and you know, we speak about the Saudis. I think what was so lost on the Israeli public, and it's gonna be a year to this in September, maybe we can have an episode, Mary. Um, but the Saudi French initiative, which in Israel, all the play was about oh uh gevaled recognition by different European countries of a Palestinian state. But they missed the part that came with it, which was the Saudi French, uh, the New York Declaration with the Saudi and French uh led, but it was written by in consultation with different people, and there's text there that is almost a dream come true to the Israelis, right? Acceptance of Israel, rejection of Hamas, rejection of terrorism. Um, and and so I really think this is not just to give this to the Saudis so we can get something from them. It's the opportunity is there, and I hope it will still be there. But this was was a big uh, right? This was this was a big uh um incentive for the Saudis, and with us assuming that time always works on our side, this is another proof that this is not the not the reality. Yeah.

Neri 56:42

And by the way, just for our audience, uh MBS is Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince and de facto ruler of of Saudi Arabia. And uh the 20-point plan um is obviously the Donald Trump uh authored 20-point plan that ended the war in Gaza and the ceasefire and everything that's come on. In the months since. Um, I wanted to get your takes because I'd be remiss if I didn't have two experts on Gaza on this podcast, not ask them what's what's the latest with regard to to Gaza. Um Shira's already shaking her head. Do you do you want to start us off, Shira? Like we heard yesterday that the Board of Peace uh wants to launch this pilot humanitarian and governance zone in in Rafah, in South Gaza. Um what do you what do you think is happening actually on the ground with regard to ceasefire deal, reconstruction, something?

SPEAKER_03 57:34

It's good we're not playing poker now, uh Mary, because I think anyone who sees my face uh can very clearly see that I can't keep my poker face. Um nothing is happening. Okay, I'll just be very blunt about it. Um humanitarian areas, bubbles, zones uh in Rafa is something I've heard of since December 2023. Yeah, 2023. Okay, uh in different shapes or forms. Um the Board of Peace wants to do this. There's no question they want to do this. Uh, what has in fact advanced in the meantime in terms of financial resources, tendering, clearing the space, getting the approvals from Israel, who will control this? Uh is it then a technocratic, um, exiled government waiting in a hotel in Cairo to enter? When and if Hamas says yes, take our arms or not. Uh, none of this uh has happened yet. And I have to tell you, and I think a lot of it depends on this like Hamas disarmament question, which we can have a whole uh episode about. Actually, you did have one, but I think there's there's a question what this means, and I hope there's a different approach for for for this question. But it's very difficult for me to see um that Netanyahu uh with uh Israeli public that is frustrated uh about what's happening with Iran. I mean, it's clearly not not a better situation for Israel at the moment with real risks uh of Iran um that could have emerged stronger from from the campaign. Uh uh Lebanon, uh there's this Israeli fear of Trump uh forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and from Syria in the next few weeks. I don't think it would be a bad thing, but is in Israel it's and now the Saudi uh news. To imagine that Netanyahu's government would be able to give permits to anything that looks like improving the lives of Palestinians in Gaza, I think to me it's uh the Board of Peaces is dreaming whether they can do this and promote some things uh in preparation for after the elections, where whether it's Netanyahu or a different government to promote this, uh maybe, but I don't see anything that is happening positively in Gaza at the moment, except at Israel, the IDF, is taking more uh territory. So effective control of territory in Gaza stands at around probably between 65 and 70 percent of territory. Uh, in the meantime, Hamas control is a shrinking, uh shrinking uh part of Gaza, but virtually all the people.

SPEAKER_04 1:00:10

Yeah.

SPEAKER_03 1:00:12

Um humanitarian crisis that continues, uh, despite aid that is coming in, and we don't have time to get into this, but really humanitarian crisis and humanitarian conditions that are suffering. There are some challenges to Hamas's rule, but they're not as uh as challenging as I think we would have liked uh to see. And you still have the de facto as Hamas uh weekend, but not but definitely not gone. Um and and Israel that is waiting for elections to decide how what we are gonna do about Gaza.

Neri 1:00:45

Decide what it wants to be when it grows up. Dan, uh final thoughts with regard to Gaza?

Dan 1:00:50

I tend to agree. Gaza, uh not tend to agree, I fully agree. Gaza is deadlocked and gridlocked, deadlocked uh on the on the question of uh Hamas disarmament and gridlocked because everything else awaits that issue. So um that's basically where we're stuck. And as the players and Shira alluded to it, I'll be her anger translator. Um the um and so as the key actors involved turn inward to think and plan of what should come after a new Israeli government is in place, I would urge them to not just think that the change in government will in and of itself be the breakthrough that will unleash all the goodies that are awaiting Gaza in the plans and files of the Boards of Peace and others who want to plan the better future for Gaza and Israel, I should say. But there needs to be some real strategic recalibration of what is at play here, how to approach the question of disarming Hamas. This is not just about the mechanics. This is about the basic motivation of that organization and what it perceives to be permissible on both national and religious grounds to do. Uh also the ability to move forward ultimately runs through the participation of the PA, you know, on the ground in small measures, that Shira can can list way better than I can initially, but ultimately also politically, pending reforms and pending the reorganization of internal Palestinian politics and dynamics. All this has to be in play, or Gaza will not move forward.

SPEAKER_03 1:02:49

And if I'm angry, sorry, I didn't mean to be angry, I'm passionate about this because I also think that apropos, you know, opportunities after this horrible, horrendous war, right? There there is an opportunity in Gaza. I we can we can question some some some parts of the 20-point plan that Dan mentioned before, but overall there's there's a good plan. Um maybe maybe the assumptions have to be tested. Uh, but we have to understand this is there's no there's nothing else better that awaits us, right? Um and sort of stalling doesn't again play in our uh favor, and this is why my frustration is there. And you know, when we speak about the changes you want to see in Gaza, obviously um keeping Gaza's population hemmed in. The in the in the in the the living conditions they leave now is not gonna create the the future generation of Zionists.

Neri 1:03:45

No, uh no, it's not. Um Yeah. Uh I mean there's a lot more to be said about Gaza. Maybe maybe we should just do an episode just on that. And maybe as we get closer to the uh three-year mark of October 7th and also the three-year the one-year mark of ceasefire. Um we'll we'll definitely be talking about that. Uh and the Israeli elections as well. Um Shira, Dan. Thank you so much for your time. I will be sure to send this episode to Michael Koplow so he so he sees and hears what he is what he has missed, and uh hopefully he'll come back rejuvenated and uh you know we'll we'll up his game. No, I'm kidding. He's great.

SPEAKER_03 1:04:24

Michael rejuvenated Koplow, definitely.

Neri 1:04:26

But he only has but he only has one one gear though. You know, rejuvenated Koplow, it doesn't it's like an oxymoron. He has one gear, and that's that's I know that's what I'm saying.

SPEAKER_03 1:04:35

It's not exactly his his middle name.

Neri 1:04:37

All right, we'll talk to you guys soon. Okay, thanks again to Shira Efron and Dan Rotem for the journey's time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilden, and our editor, Tracy Levy, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening, and please subscribe and spread the word.