Welcome And Setting The Stakes

Shanie 0:04

Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod. I'm your host today, Shiny Reichman, director of IPF Atideed and of Strategic Initiatives here at Israel Policy Forum. We are missing in absence our usual host, Neri Zilber, who is taking a much-needed vacation. And joining me today is Michael Koplau, who I assume everybody knows already. He's our chief policy officer. Uh here at Israel Policy Forum, he is also famously the author of the weekly Koplaw column, which you should be getting. What day of the week is that?

SPEAKER_03 0:32

Thursday.

Shanie 0:32

Thursday.

SPEAKER_03 0:33

You don't know that?

Shanie 0:34

It's a little embarrassing. I should have checked that first. Since Michael and I are both based in America, this will be a little more American-centric than usual. But I know everyone here is really desperate to hear what two Americans think about Israel. So it'll be perfect. And then we'll also talk about what's happening actually in Israel. So don't worry, we'll get to that at the end because I'd be in big trouble with our usual host, Neri, if I didn't also cover that. Michael, how's it going? Should have asked you that. That's the polite thing to do when you host somebody.

Michael 1:01

That is the polite thing to do. But thank you for asking anyway. Uh it's going well. You know, summer, summer is always nice, a little more relaxed, uh, more time to kind of absorb the news in a slower way. So things are good. How are you?

Shanie 1:13

I'm perfect. I'm perfect. Let's

Israeli Elections And Netanyahu Fatigue

Shanie 1:16

talk about something that we talk about basically nonstop between you and me, but I don't think ever on the actual air. Uh Israeli elections are coming up in two-ish months, two and a half months, you know, unless they decide to cancel them. I'm kidding. That won't happen, hopefully. But not to make it all about us. But there are obviously a lot of potential consequences for American Jews, the US-Israel relationship, the Israel diaspora relationship, and how Americans in general view Israel. So let's talk about that. I have far too many opinions on this, so I'm going to let you go first. Let's pretend hypothetical scenario, there's a new Israeli government and it has Ghadi Isenko, Neftali Bennett, all the nice guys, whatever, Yarlapid, Yargolan, I should name them. All these lovely men are now in office. What does it mean for the US as our relationship go?

Michael 2:06

I think that the answer depends, and particularly the farther we zoom out. So in the immediate aftermath, let's assume that they are indeed able to form a government. There will be an immediate improvement just because there's a giant Netanyahu hangover. And I think you see that with pretty much every demographic. You know, it's, I think, common for people to think that the problem with Netanyahu is only among Democrats or only among progressive Democrats or only among liberal Jews. That's not the case. I think there are lots of people in the United States who have kind of had their fill of Netanyahu for different reasons. You know, there are reasons that are specific to the Jewish community. There are certainly reasons specific to Democrats. I think increasingly there are reasons specific to Republicans. And also, with the exception of uh 18-month period in 2021, 2022, he's been prime minister since 2009. So he could be the greatest, most likable, amiable person in the world. There would be Netanyahu fatigue no matter what. So I think just having a new face at the top and new personalities, because again, it's not just Netanyahu. A lot of the characters that he has surrounded himself with also carry their own baggage, in some cases, maybe even more baggage than he does. So I think in the interim, you kind of get a bump. But it definitely matters what that next government does, because I think this is also a common misnomer. It isn't just about Netanyahu, it isn't just about the face at the top, it isn't just about the rhetoric or the language that gets used by Netanyahu and other ministers in the government. Ultimately, much of the problem that Israel is having in the US with Republicans, with Democrats, and with American Jews is about Israeli policies. And so a new government, I think, will shift some of those policies. It will also keep some of those policies in place. And the extent to which there's an actual shift in policies and the extent to which a new government operates differently is going to determine the extent to which we see an improvement in US's relations. It's not just going to be a matter of, you know, new face and that's a clean slate. It really is going to make a difference what they do, particularly in the West Bank and particularly in Gaza.

Shanie 4:36

Before you get into this, and we definitely to talk about what you actually mean about the differences in the West Bank and Gaza, potentially, but I'm 30 years old and I genuinely cannot remember another prime minister other than that 18-month period. That's insane. That's insane. It's this a democratic, liberal democracy, theoretically. And I'll I'll just add that as hard as I try, and I spend so much of my time trying to separate Israel as a concept, the notion, the beautiful notion of Zionism and a Jewish state from the Israeli prime minister, it's impossible to disentangle them. The longer he stays in power, the more like inter interconnected they are. And it just becomes impossible to separate. Even for me, it becomes really hard to separate, right? Um, even for people who are really trying to, it it's it's impossible to do. So just by virtue of, I guess we used to describe it as the Netanyahu hangover, just by virtue of having somebody else. Um, by the way, even if it was someone with policies people liked less, at least they would wreck understand, oh, Israel's a democracy. They do get different political leaders sometimes. Like that's a good look. It's a good look to occasionally have a new head of state, just generally speaking, like people genuinely think that Israel is not a democracy because they just keep seeing the same guy for decades. It's it's jarring, you know?

Michael 5:51

Yeah, absolutely. And and listen, I'm uh I'm 46 and certainly I remember a time before Netanyahu, and I remember governments before Netanyahu. And I think I was probably even like writing about governments uh before Netanyahu. But even for me, it's just difficult to conceive of what it would be like to have somebody different there. You know, of course, we had the Bennett Lapide government, but it was, it was short-lived. And, you know, it's funny what you say about having a different face there, even if it's somebody whose policies you don't agree with. For a long time, and you know, we talked about this in the in the past. My greatest fear was Naptali Bennett as the prime minister of Israel, because when he emerged onto the scene in a real way, he was the person who introduced West Bank annexation into the lexicon. In many ways, he is the, I don't know that he's necessarily the intellectual forefather of it because people were talking about it, but he certainly put it into the public sphere and popularized it in a way that nobody else had. And then he became prime minister. And first of all, the sky didn't fall. He also had a wide-ranging ideological coalition that he had to contend with. But also just having somebody different there was kind of a breath of fresh air for a lot of people, even considering that this was a guy who, up until that point, had been to Netanyahu's right. That was his spot in the Israeli political firmament. So, yeah, I think for, you know, and for someone like you who really has no meaningful memory of a different prime minister, and certainly for people younger than you, it will make a difference. But again, that honeymoon, and there will be a honeymoon, is only going to last so long if a different Israeli government doesn't operate differently.

Shanie 7:35

On the Natali Bennett point, I'm anxious about making this comparison, but we shouldn't forget that Menachem Beggin was also perceived as very far-right annexationist type and received calls from American politicians begging him, please don't annex the West Bank on your first day. And then, of course, gives back the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt for peace. So, you know, and R. El Sharon, the father of the settlement movements handling the Gaza disengagement. So a long history of hawkish, right-wing, even annexationist pro-settlement Israeli leaders, then making concessions uh for peace agreements, some with more success than others. So just not to, I hope no Israelis who want to who are on the right voting for Bennett hear me say that. But but it is, but it is the the reality, and there's a long history of that. In terms

West Bank Reality Check

Shanie 8:18

of what could happen differently, maybe we'll start with in the West Bank and then we'll move to Gaza. So just in terms of the settlement movement, what would you envision being different with a different government? Recognizing that up, I mean, we don't even know what the parties would look like. We don't know the configuration, but how has this Israeli government been so different from those that came before? And what could be different in a future one? And do you think that's what's top of mind for most Americans?

Michael 8:41

I think something you said there is the key to this, which is how different this Israeli government has been from everybody else. Because we have data from the Benit Lapid government. And frankly, the data under them is not that great. You know, under them, settler violence went up from where it had been under the Netzanyahu government before. Settlement construction went up. Lots of, lots of bad trends went up under them. Of course, when you look at what happened under that government versus what's happened under this government over the last three and a half years, it's night and day. But the Ben Lapide government, and in the time they were in office, didn't reverse the bad trends in the West Bank. Actually, in some ways, they accelerated them. So I think that's important for context. If we have a different government, I there's no doubt to me the first thing that's going to shift is settler violence. It's going to be taken far more seriously. I think it's going to be taken more seriously by the IDF. It's going to be taken more seriously by the Israeli police. And it's something that I'm certain a new government is going to tackle, not only because it's so damaging to Israel in the United States and with other countries far beyond the United States, but because it is a genuinely horrific trend that many Israelis understand is immoral. And it also threatens the rule of law in Israel. Let's remember that this is violence that's taking place, emanating largely from outposts that are illegal under Israeli law. It is being done in a way that challenges the IDF and the police by people who very openly flout the notion that any Israeli government should have authority over them. So first and foremost, it's a giant problem for the Palestinians who are subjected to this now daily and sometimes many times a day, terrorism from Jews in the West Bank. But it's also a problem for just democracy and rule of law in Israel itself. So I think a new government is going to do whatever they can to get a handle on that. And that's going to make a big difference because that's it's a high-profile issue, and it's a high-profile issue in the United States for a good reason.

Shanie 10:57

Because by the way, some of the Palestinians in the West Bank are American citizens who have been attacked too. I think there was an American citizen. Was there an American citizen killed?

Michael 11:04

There have been American citizens killed. And the current administration has taken it seriously when it's really two things that sort of kick them into high gear. One is when it's American citizens, and the other is when it's Christians. And often there's overlap between the two. So for instance, we've seen the embassy in Jerusalem get very upset about attacks in Taiba, a place where you and I have both been in the West Bank. It's a largely Christian Christian Palestinian village.

Shanie 11:31

Great brewery, great brewery.

Michael 11:33

Yes, Taiba Brewery is uh is good beer. I have their t-shirt somewhere upstairs in my room. So, you know, that kind of hits both. But you know, last week there was an incident where the IDF went into a Palestinian village, took over a home, not because there was anything going on in the home itself, but because they wanted to use it basically as a forward operating base. Turns out that the person who lived there was a Palestinian doctor who's an American citizen. And within a few hours, the American embassy went nuts and the IDF had to vacate the house. So that's when you see the administration taking it seriously.

Shanie 12:07

Yeah. And by the way, I historically I've heard Israelis often excuse settler violence and say they were provoked, they were instigated, there's a lot of Palestinian terrorism. Increasingly, I'm seeing Israeli media actually cover this and whatever. There's a whole other podcast episode about the role of Israeli media in shielding Israelis from a lot of the violence that occurs. Um, but I'm now finally seeing their actual coverage, which changes things for Israelis too. Anyhow, back to the American, the America of it all. How much are you hearing this? You're in conversations in Washington circles too. So when we're talking about government-to-government level, it sounds like you you're saying even the Trump administration, which is quite favorable towards Israel in general, doesn't have that much animosity with the Netanyahu government, is very upset about the violence, about the settler violence piece. So you're pretty you seem pretty confident that would be something that would be a tangible difference in another government.

Michael 12:57

Yes. Um by the way, I'm not sure I would say the Trump administration is very upset about the settler violence piece, but you know, they they definitely they definitely raise it uh on on occasion and you know, more than one occasion. But I think most importantly, a new Israeli government is going to be upset about the settler violence piece. And that's what matters. It's not going to require massive US pressure. With that said, I will tell you that over the last two years, in many, many conversations I have with particularly Democratic members of Congress and their offices and their staffs and committees who are invested in this sort of thing. The issue that they raise the most and that they are most upset about is settler violence because it's so visceral, it's so in your face.

Shanie 13:46

And there's no justification of, oh, we're fighting Hamas and these are casualties because we're fighting a terrorist group. No, you're not fighting a terrorist group. These are random civilians being hurt by other random civilians and you're not intervening, or you're intervening on the side of your own of the Israeli civilians, et cetera.

Michael 14:01

Aaron Powell Precisely. There's no excuse for it, and there's really no way to credibly just wave it away.

Shanie 14:08

One more note, because you mentioned that last Neptel and last Benet Lepide government did advance settlements rate. And this is less about violence and more about, let's call it like a gradual, not always so gradual, land grab, um, which overtakes more territory in the West Bank. And of course, the obvious impact of that is that it potentially um gets in the way of a future Palestinian state, which is something we think about a lot, about different obstacles to that. Uh, this Israeli government has advanced has created many, many, many more new settlements compared to the past 30 years. And you can tell me the exact numbers. Do you think that the Eisencott, Lapide, Bended, whatever configuration, government will continue that trend? Like this is the new normal for any centrist, center-right governments, or take us back to the days where it was crazy to hear about a new settlement and very controversial.

The 103 New Settlements Shock

Michael 14:53

I don't think this will be the new normal.

Shanie 14:55

I think wait, say the number.

Michael 14:57

Sure. So you heard me say this last week uh at a uh in a private setting where we both spoke.

Shanie 15:01

So you're I've heard you say it a dozen times, but go on.

Michael 15:04

So you're you're you're teaming me up well here. In 1996, when Prime Minister Nitsanyahu was in his first term, he established Harchomah, which is a settlement between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It was a very controversial settlement at the time because it was uh effectively cutting off Palestinians who were in Bethlehem from East Jerusalem. And historically, these were sister cities. Harchomah went through over the objections of the Clinton administration. Harchomah was 1996. From 1996 until this government took power in December 2022, Israeli governments approved exactly one new settlement in the West Bank. Now, obviously there was lots of construction, lots of settlement units built, new neighborhoods of existing settlements, and also illegal outposts that are illegal under Israeli law. But when we're talking about new settlements that are legal under Israeli law that go through the official planning process, one new settlement from Harchamah in 1996 until December 2022. This government, which took power in December 2022, has approved 103 new settlements in the West Bank and either approved new ones or retroactively legalized previously illegal ones. So we're not talking about illegal outposts. I'll get to that in a second. We're talking about 103 new entities that are under Israeli law legal communities in the West Bank. Now, some of this is accounting tricks, right? Some of it is taking neighborhoods of existing settlements that were illegally built and not only retroactively legalizing them as a neighborhood, but saying this is now a new standalone settlement. So some of it is actually goosing the numbers. But the point is that you have Israeli governments approving one new settlement over a 26-year period. This one has approved 103 in under four years. That's a huge difference, obviously, by any metric, even with some of the fuzzy math and accounting tricks they're using. The other thing that they've done is really preside over an explosion of illegal construction, where, you know, this is harder to track because illegal outposts are illegal largely wild, well, not only illegal, but wildcat settlements that go up overnight with just a handful of people. But when you look at the outposts and when you look at the farms, which are also illegal, under this government, there have been somewhere between 200 and 250 new illegal outposts or illegal farms that have gone up. And when this government took power, again, numbers are hard to come by, but there were probably something around the order of 70. So again, it's an enormous monumental explosion by orders of magnitude. You can't compare what this government has done to any other government. It's literally a revolution on the ground.

Shanie 17:48

And this is the sort of thing that if there was crackdown feels like a strong word for what I would anticipate happens, but if there was some kind of like pulling this back, uh reining it in of settlement construction, especially illegal outposts, it would make a difference to like Washington policymakers, State Department folks, people like in the weeds working on this, which is obviously super important. Okay.

Gaza War Rhetoric Versus Policy

Shanie 18:09

And the general discourse in America centered on Israel thinks a lot about Gaza. And there's a lot of people who would say that this war would have been prosecuted nearly identically under an Eisencott or a Bennett Lepede government, which I think there's some merit to. Um, by the way, I want just when we're since we're talking about the discourse, I actually had an argument this morning about exactly this because a friend posted a Mehdi Hassan, who of course is like someone with a burning, passionate hatred for Israel. But he posed, he wrote an article about how the next government will be all the same and it's all the same, and I still will hate them, even if it's not netanyao, et cetera. And I think he certainly represents like a segment of Americans who will hate Israel no matter what, because it's the notion of Israel and the notion of Jewish statehood that is so threatening and horrifying to them. And it basically doesn't matter what Israel does or says. But I don't think that's most Americans. I think most Americans are like smart and sensitive enough to like some of these issues or can be, have potential to be. And I think that even if this war on the ground looked really similar, if we're going to be graphic about it and say like the bombs being dropped would look the same and hit a lot of the same targets and the casualties would be very similar. There's another layer to this, which is the rhetoric coming out of the government and the personality politics of it all, that I think would be massively different and would matter because not to bring it to this conversation, but the entire genocide claim rests on the rhetoric coming out of the Israeli government, genocidal rhetoric coming out of the Israeli government, um, including ministers, especially ministers. And that's what everything rests on. And so it almost doesn't matter what happens on the ground when you have rhetoric like that. By the way, you could use rhetoric like that, and then the work can look however it looks because you have this rhetoric to lay the claim on. So I think that that's what would have looked really different and would have really mattered. And then potentially on the humanitarian aid front over the course of the war could have transitioned differently. But balls in your court now. Tell me what you think. Would have looked differently, would it have mattered to Americans? And by the way, now, like forgetting what happened, we're where we are today. What about the future?

Michael 20:04

I I don't know that the actual prosecution of the war in Gaza would have looked all that different. I agree with you that the rhetoric certainly would have been different, and that does make a big difference. Uh, you know, the best example of this is Joav Galant, you know, this quote that was used in in the genocide case in The Hague, where he talked about the fact that Israel is not going to let anything into the Gaza Strip. And that wasn't actually the policy. That did not turn out to be the policy. But, you know, he he said it. It was a dumb thing to say, and so people jump on that.

Shanie 20:34

I just want to say it's more than a dumb thing to say. It's a it's it's endorsing collective punishment and it's a really big problem. Conflating, saying that every human being in Gaza is a legitimate target and discounting the fact that there are real civilians, which is a lot of the rhetoric, is a huge problem. It's like it's extremely dehumanizing and it lays the groundwork for war crimes to be committed. So it is a real problem.

Michael 20:56

Yes. And I also don't want to leave the impression that it's completely about rhetoric because Israel's behavior in Gaza was also problematic in many ways. And I don't know that the war would have been prosecuted completely differently, certainly not in the first few months. I think that any government, when faced with the aftermath of October 7th, probably would have done a lot of what this Israeli government did. Where I think things might have been different, you know, were once you got to spring of 2024, and you know, you had this argument with the Biden administration about the operation in Rafah and what had to be done to lay the groundwork ahead of time. I think that's a potential turning point that that would have possibly been different. But I also think that more important is what happens going forward, because at this point, as we know, the war is not actually over, but it's it's effectively over, right? You still have Israel and Hamas fighting, but don't worry, we'll get there. But the point is that you've now got to transition to the next phase, what whatever that phase looks like. And we're not going To get any of that transition before the election. You know, there's all this talk now about the 15-point roadmap that Hamas accepted and now Israel says that it doesn't. And we can discuss whether Israel's public rejection of that roadmap is actually a rejection versus just politics being played ahead of the election. I think the important point going forward is that the situation in Gaza has to move forward. There has to be a different government. You've got to disarm Hamas. You have to have Israeli withdrawals. You have to actually rebuild Gaza in every way, physically rebuild it and also rebuild the society and allow Palestinians to move forward and create something new there. I think a new government will be more helpful on that, but it's really important to stress. We're going to see changes in the West Bank. Changes in Gaza, I think, are going to be more difficult. And I think they're going to come more slowly. And a lot of that is just because of Israeli public opinion. I mean, you look at where Israelis are just across the political spectrum on the questions of Gaza and Hamas and disarmament and whether Israel should actually withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed. There's not a lot of support for the notion that Israel should take risks in Gaza among Israelis. And that's Israelis who are going to vote for the current coalition and Israelis who are going to vote for the opposition. And that's a limiting factor without question.

Shanie 23:25

I know that this is not contradicting what you said, but I have to say it because I've said it a hundred times and it's true, which is that the job of leaders is not to follow public opinion into a black hole. Job of leaders is to provide actual vision and say, this is the future that we want to build. This is how we're going to get there. I'm still waiting to see some Israeli leaders do that. And I'm hoping that post-election, that's when we'll start to see people actually show up and say, this is the work that needs to be done. And I'm going to take the people along with me, because that's actually their job.

Michael 23:52

Oh, 100%. Leaders should lead. But you

What A Postwar Gaza Transition Needs

Michael 23:55

know, if I'm sitting here with my analyst hat on, what I'll tell you is that a new government, you know, and if it's headed by Gaudi Eisencoat, right? A new government with a prime minister who has really never been a politician. He basically jumped into this in the last few years out of necessity, you know, replacing a very right-wing government and replacing a prime minister who's basically been there forever, a government that if it forms, is going to be constantly attacked from the right for being allegedly weak on Gaza, weak on the West Bank, weak on Iran. Their political imperative is going to be to demonstrate to Israelis that, A, they're not weak on these things, as Netanyahu and what should be the opposition will say, and to demonstrate to Israelis that you don't have to have the most extreme right-wing government possible in power to take security issues seriously. And, you know, it should be obvious that if you've got a government that is headed by a former chief of staff, somebody who, by all accounts, was one of the most creative ones in Israel's history, he shouldn't have to establish his security credentials. Nevertheless, he's going to have to, right? Just like things are here in Israel, oftentimes up is down and black is white. So I think a new government's going to have to demonstrate it's hawkish in a number of places. And I do think that Gaza is probably a spot where we're going to see a more hawkish policy versus a complete shift from what we've seen under the current government.

Shanie 25:26

Okay. So I think we're in alignment that you're still going to have on the American side. It'll make a difference in Washington, which matters a lot. It'll make a big difference in Washington, including in a democratic 2028. Like if there's a demo democratic government in 2028, I'm we can talk about that. But I think it will still make a big difference just to be dealing with someone who's not in Netanyahu and to have different rhetoric coming out of Israel obviously makes a huge, huge difference if we see that, which to your point, needing to be perceived as hawkish is not just about what you do, it's about what you say. So we might end up with Isencott quotes that are making me want to crawl into a hole. Who knows? I mean, I hope not, but it's certainly possible. What Israelis want to and need to hear from their politicians is usually the opposite of what Americans want to hear out of Israel. And that's kind of the core issue. If only there wasn't a Google Translate option on Twitter.

Michael 26:13

Wouldn't it make everybody's lives so much easier?

Shanie 26:15

You know, if only.

SPEAKER_02 26:16

If

Israel Policy Forum Mission And Support

SPEAKER_02 26:17

only Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community. Our mission is to build support for a secure, Jewish, democratic Israel through a viable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advancing pragmatic U.S. policy towards the conflict, U.S. Israel relations, and regional diplomacy among policymakers and community leaders. We promote policy measures endorsed by credible security experts, develop analysis and commentary, and convene programs that engage and educate leaders across the political, denominational, and generational spectrums. Our Young Professionals initiative, IPF AT, works to elevate the discourse among next generation leaders by building community and facilitating engaging programs related to Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To learn more about our work, visit us online at Israelpolicyforum.org and follow us on social media. If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis, please make a tax-deductible gift today at ipf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes.

Shanie 27:16

Okay,

Why U.S. Support Has Fallen

Shanie 27:17

so taking it back to the United States, um there's still this like broader American perception. Obviously, Americans have gone from viewing Israel like pretty favorably to neutrally to pretty badly. And a lot of that is the product we're selling here. It's harder and harder. Obviously, there was a point in October 7th where people were really were rightfully really, really related to Israel and sympathetic. Um, but that goodwill didn't last very long. And some of it had to do with like some of it was inevitable because wars are going to be messy and they were, and that was going to happen regardless. And a lot of it you can tie to what this government specifically did. But in terms of Americans, like as a people, a public, right? Because American politicians need to also be responsive to their public. If they have a public that is like really doesn't like Israel and thinks like, why are we allies with these people? Then they have to also be somewhat receptive to that, some would say. So what do you think it'll take for Americans in general?

Michael 28:10

I think they're different groups that we have to account for. So you already talked about people who are not going to support Israel as a Jewish state, firmly believe in their bones that not only did Israel commit genocide in Gaza, but that's they were saying that October 8th, some of these people, right?

Shanie 28:26

Israel like one day after they were like immediately saying that. By the way, some of them had saying that for like 10 years that Israel's committing genocide somehow.

Michael 28:32

Right. And and some of them are going to be members of Congress come January. So there are the folks who are certain that Israel is a genocidal state no matter what, that Israel's an apartheid state no matter what. And those folks aren't going to be convinced by changes in Israeli policy. But when you look at the drop in favorability for Israel here in the United States over the course of really just two years, and you see that it's dropped more than 20 points, that's connected to policy. It's connected to what the Israeli government is actually doing. I don't discount that there's anti-Semitism at work. I don't discount that all of the stuff that we see on social media that were roiling campuses in the aftermath of October 7th. I don't discount that that stuff plays a role because it has. But such a dramatic shift like that, it isn't just about the media. It isn't just about DSA. It isn't just about anti-Semitism. It's about things that Israel is doing that everybody can see and that people don't like. So you do have to have Israel shift course if you want to see things reversed here. And

Republican Anger And The Iran Factor

Michael 29:37

on this front, by the way, it isn't just about the West Bank and Gaza, because when we look at different groups, we're also talking about Republicans. And what they're largely upset about when it comes to Israel is at the moment the Iran war, which a lot of folks on the right lay at Israel's feet and lay at Netanyahu's feet. There's the sort of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that Trump didn't actually want to go to war and Netanyahu worked his dark magic on him and convinced him to do something he absolutely did not want to do. If you want to hear this version of this, listen to Tucker Carlson. He has basically said this explicitly. People can listen actually to his interview with the New York Times from a couple of months ago, where he said it straight out that he knows for a fact that Trump didn't want to go to war with Iran, but he's, you know, the Israelis made him do it. There's that subset of people, but there's a larger subset of Republicans that don't believe in the conspiracy theory, but of course they know because everybody knows, and it's true, that Israel did indeed want to go to war with Iran, that Netanyahu has spent decades trying to convince American presidents that this would be a good idea. He found a president in Trump who also wanted to do it. It isn't as if Netanyahu, I think, had to pull the wool over his eyes, but he did play a role undoubtedly in convincing Trump that it was a good idea and that it was a good idea to do it now. And you have people who look at this and they say, what interest do we, the United States, have in Iran? It's halfway across the world. Certainly people who you know who look at it know that it's been Iran has been killing American soldiers for decades, particularly in Iraq. But for your ordinary American, you look at this and you say, this isn't our fight. I get why the Israelis don't like the Iranians, but why should that be the US business to such a large extent that we've now launched this war and we're burning through munitions at an alarming rate, and the Strait of Hormuz is now worse off than it was before. And if there's an agreement to reopen it, it's gonna be on terms that leave the United States worse off than it was before. And people look at this and they say, why are we spending all of this time in league with the Israelis? Their fight is not necessarily our fight, and their interest is not necessarily our interest. So for that group, too, there are gonna have to be changes in Israeli policy. And those changes aren't necessarily going to be West Bank and Gaza. They're not necessarily gonna be the changes that Democrats care about the most or that American Jews care about the most. It's gonna be on a completely different plane. Basically, the Israelis are gonna have to present themselves as a country and as a leadership that is always looking to or usually looking to help out the United States rather than seeking help from the United States. I think that's what's gonna make a difference with Republicans. And so there are a lot of different constituencies here, and you know, it's a complex mess, and the Israelis are gonna have to get on top of all of this at once. It's not gonna be easy for any new government to do.

Shanie 32:32

By

Rethinking The Next U.S.-Israel MOU

Shanie 32:33

the way, good time to pitch our report, by which I mean your report. Let's talk about it.

Michael 32:37

On the next US Israel MOU, assuming this is. It is very American-centric. I was gonna say, assuming, assuming that we actually have an MOU at this point.

Shanie 32:47

We will, we will. You just have to will it into existence. That's what Zionism is. Didn't you ever learn that?

Michael 32:51

Sure. In tier two and Zahada. And let's let's let's go with that. Yeah, so we put out this report a few months ago on what we think should be in the next US-Israel MOU. And the animating feature behind it was let's figure out what is actually a core US interest. We take it as a point of departure that Israel is a very valuable strategic partner for the United States. And let's move forward on the assumption that that's true and also the assumption that there are ways in which the two countries can work together more as partners, as opposed to hey Israelis, you know, here's a pile of money every year to buy American weapons.

Shanie 33:31

And by the way, this is the kind of thing that will address the Republicans' concerns. It may like unclear how much, like on the Democratic side, not to say that they're anti, but like this is the kind of thing that I think appeals more to Republicans.

Michael 33:42

Yeah, I think, I think to an extent. And there were interesting comments. I'm not sure I agree with them, but there were interesting comments uh just a few days ago from Ron Dermer, where he uh was speaking somewhere and he said that people are mistaken if they think that the US's relationship is about values, and this is where I don't agree with him at all, that it is about interests and that if Israel wants to improve its status in the US going forward, it just has to focus on interests and basically portray itself and make the argument that the US and Israel have shared interests, Israel is a very valuable partner and ally, and and these are all the ways in which the common interests are advanced.

Shanie 34:22

You can tell this guy never talks to liberals.

Michael 34:25

So that's what I was gonna say. You can tell that that Dermer was very effective with Republicans, and that that's who he largely speaks to, because I think that that is an argument that will work with Republicans, but not all of us are Republicans and um uh give me this guy's number. Republicans are not always going to control the White House and the Senate and the House. And when that situation changes, it isn't just going to be about interests, but that is an important part of it. And certainly it's an important part of it on the right.

Shanie 34:54

Look who said when and not if. All right. You mentioned that some of these people who will obsessively hate Israel no matter what may or may not be in Congress come November. Um, never mind what the White House will look like in two years, uh, two and

DSA Winners And Policing Jewish Identity

Shanie 35:10

a half years. Um, so let's talk about that. There's been some, I think, justified hysteria in the Jewish communal discourse, um, including, you know, from coming from me as well, I will admit. I've contributed to this hysteria. Um, but I think rightful concern um around some of the democratic primaries. I want you to talk about what feels, I don't know, most jarring to you from the outcomes and what you're most concerned about in terms of people who it will not matter who what Israel does and who is in charge of it. It just will make a difference for these people and like how powerful are some of these folks. Um, again, I don't want to be too hyperbolic because I think in general, like everything will be okay. So, you know, temper yourself, but tell me what you think.

Michael 35:52

You know, we have that there are gonna be some new freshman members of the House uh who are very far to the left, completely anti-Zionists, you know, card-carrying DSA. They're certainly gonna matter in terms of the discourse. And I think that they're gonna matter in terms of the civil war that's basically going on within the Democratic Party.

Shanie 36:10

By the way, we should say the discourse is often being driven by some of the far people. So like some of these public figures are really appealing, well-spoken, articulate, cool. Like they're they're they're really good at what they're doing here and like building out a media ecosystem. So go on.

Michael 36:27

And by the way, they're also they're made for this moment in time, right? There they're concerns about cost of living and you know, the the dominance of elites and the fact that, you know, they're some of them are you know in their in their late 20s, early 30s, and and people like them have no prospects of buying a home and and having a job that that they're gonna be able to that they're gonna be able to retire from at a reasonable age. Like these are these are real concerns, right? Uh, I mean, a hundred percent. You know, it's funny. Like a when I was your age Chandy, I used to think about how lucky my parents were in terms of their economic status, what things were like when they were first starting out and having kids and and buying a home and thinking about what they what they purchased their home for and what cost of living was like. And now I compare my situation to your situation. And you know, you and I are almost exactly 16 years apart. And yeah, now I you know feel completely fortunate when when I was your age, I felt that I was getting screwed. So like they're they're tapping into a real thing.

Shanie 37:27

By the way, most of those people are not gonna be paying yeshiva tuition like you are and I will be. I'm just saying.

Michael 37:32

Correct. Day school tuition, you know, the the sort of tax of living in an orthodox neighborhood and having a kosher home, all of these things, right?

Shanie 37:39

Sorry, that's very that's very hyper-specific to us. But you know, regular Americans have legitimate concerns too. 100%.

Michael 37:45

But the point is, you know, they're there's they're speaking to a real current in this country. And it isn't just about their views on Israel and Zionism. But of course, that that is going to be flowing to the discourse. You know, their actual power in Congress, that um, that I'm not concerned about. I mean, even if we think back to the original squad where people were up at arms about the actual influence on policy uh that Rashid It's Lai, Baril Han Omar, or AOC were gonna have, it it's been it's been very small. So, you know, from that perspective, uh, I think people need to just take a deep breath and understand, you know, what individual freshman members of Congress can or cannot do.

Shanie 38:22

And also AOC, I now see her as like being much more moderate. I don't even know if she's become more moderate or everyone else has gotten crazier. I'm curious. I don't know what you think, but I'm like, oh, she's actually she's very reasonable. And then I'm like, wait, was she always like this? Did she change? Did everybody else change? What happened?

Michael 38:39

I mean, I'll just say, like, personally, from the beginning, I always made a distinction between AOC and the other initial and kind of early squad members. Um both in terms of the way she talks about things. She's also, I just think, very smart and very politically savvy. And uh in a lot of ways, she's she's now become sort of the the poster child and for some folks the the boogeyman of DSA. I think that there are gradations between AOC and other folks, but you know, that's that's probably a different conversation for a different time. What concerns me the most is actually with a lot of these DSA folks who are winning primaries and who are going to be in Congress, the way they talk about Jewish concerns, that actually has me more worried than anything else because they're effectively making a distinction between good Jews and bad Jews. And by the way, very few of them, if any of them, are themselves Jewish. Right. And so there's this idea that, you know, you have you have a good Jew who is going to be a non-Zionist and very concerned with racial and economic justice. And then you have bad Jews who are Zionists and pro-Israel, and that's and that's what they're concerned about. And that is extremely worrisome to me. You know, you see it coming out also in in kind of this um, I don't want to say obsession, but sort of the uh the approach where you know you talk about Jewish safety, right? You know, whatever your rhetoric is and whatever you say about Israel, you promise that you're going to be concerned with with Jewish safety. Everybody here should be safe. Well, that's important. That's that's like nice as a baseline. But for American Jews, for most American Jews, and you know, you can talk about this better than almost anybody else, it's not just about Jewish safety, right? It's it's about identity issues. And for most American Jews, despite the JFNA survey that says 37% of Jews are Zionists, we know that when we think about what it means to be Zionist, it's actually far higher. It's actually the 88% number, right? The problem that people have is with the term Zionist, not with the ideas behind it.

Shanie 40:38

Yes. Just clarifying that 88% are people who support a Jewish and democratic state between among American Jews. So it's a it's a map, real serious majority opinion, regardless of how they feel about the word Zionism, which by the way, part of why they don't like the word Zionism is because of what you're describing, this like toxicity and vilification of the word that's made so many people uncomfortable with it.

Michael 40:58

Right. And what concerns me is that for a lot of the DSA people who are winning elections and who are going to be public officials, they're making this distinction between good Jews and bad Jews that effectively takes away our ability to define our identity as we want it to be defined. And it isn't just that we have concerns, real-world concerns about how American policy is going to impact Israel. Even if you kind of shunt that to the side for a minute, we have concerns about our Jewish identity and how we conceive of ourselves as Jews, all of a sudden being put under a microscope where politicians are going to say, it's okay to be Jewish this way, but it's not okay to be Jewish that way. And so, you know, we'll we'll make sure that you aren't getting beaten up in the street for being Jewish, but we're going to obsessively attack your self-conception of what it means to actually be Jewish. And, you know, when you talk about the discourse, that is without question down the road going to lead to the collapse of this idea that we're going to always protect Jewish safety. Because when people have it in their heads that there's a type of good Jew and a type of bad Jew, you can talk about Jewish safety all you want. People are going to go after the quote-unquote bad Jews. And to have elected officials making these distinctions for American Jews is really concerning and really, really worrisome and really dangerous, which is why when people say, let's work with them on, you know, maybe they can modify their rhetoric a bit, but really what matters is whether they're going to protect Jews and make sure they're safe. I just don't think that's enough. And I think it's a naive view of what's going on. And I think it's a dangerous position for our community to be taking. I think we should insist on more than that. It shouldn't just be about a textbook definition of anti-Semitism. It's got to be about respecting our identity as American Jews.

Shanie 42:54

And as a reminder, 90% of us are the bad Jews. So maybe it's just all the Jews.

unknown 42:58

Yeah. Okay.

Shanie 43:00

Well, I appreciate you going down that rabbit hole with me for a bit because I think it was helpful. And I'm always trying to balance being too anxious about what's happening with like being really real about very legitimate fears that I have and that a lot in our community have. But obviously, for those of us who've studied Jewish history and anti-Semitism, we know that the concept of like good Jews and bad Jews and separating Jews based on their politics and their beliefs and their loyalties is a very classical anti-Semitic thing that ultimately has like and Jews buying into that too, right? A lot of Jews in Europe believe that if they were just the good Jew, the less religious, the secular, worldly, urban, intellectual Jew, that they would be fine. And not, I I know I hate to bring up like Holocaust trauma to stress our people out, but this is a like an obvious thing that people have been doing for a very long time to our people. So it's reasonable that we're concerned now that we're seeing it come up again.

Michael 43:50

And by the way, we we do it within our community too. This is not to suggest that that we don't. I don't like it when we do it within our community either, but it's a very different thing, right? It's a very different thing. To have an internal debate. I would never, I'm never comfortable with it about being like, you know, who's actually a Jew and who's not, right? I don't think that your political opinions or your religious practice should in any way, shape, or form determine whether you are actually a Jew or not a Jew. But it's one thing to have debates inside the community of what the proper or or best way is to be a Jew. Very different when you have politicians from outside the Jewish community making their own distinctions and basically using that as part of their public political persona. It's a completely different animal.

Shanie 44:37

While we're on this topic, though, I do need to add, because you're fortunately for you a little bit less on social media than I am, but there is a trend now of picking out people who are non-Zionist Jews, anti-Zionist Jews, or people who are just generally more friendly to the far left and to the DSA, being called capos, being called self-hating Jews. That's obviously despicable and disgusting and should never happen. And I want to ban those phrases from our vocabulary. By the way, I've been called that, and I'm and I'm like a pretty hardcore Zionist and I'm an Israeli and American, you know. So it's pretty insane uh the way that word's being weaponized and brought back. So um just want to name that. Like we're we're not here to be calling out um Jews for their political opinions, even if they're in the 10% who don't believe in a Jewish state. Like that's a conversation we can and should be having within our community.

Michael 45:23

Completely. It's not the opinion I hold, but that doesn't mean that it's not a legitimate opinion for somebody to hold.

unknown 45:29

Yeah.

Shanie 45:29

Um, and and doesn't justify any anti-Semitism that they face or we face. Okay, moving on. I had this dream that this podcast was going to be under an hour, but that's, you know, obviously for the for the imagination, because uh Neri would kill us if we didn't, if we hosted this podcast and didn't talk uh about what on earth is going on uh with this like Trump board of peace, Hamas disarmament, Gaza situation.

Trump’s 15-Point Gaza Roadmap

Shanie 45:51

Trump did that thing he does where he like tries to will into existence some kind of agreement and he's like, you guys, I just told got Hamas and Israel to agree on everything, or I just got Hamas to agree to this insane thing. And they're all kind of like, Did I agree to that? I don't remember. And he's like, Yeah, you agreed over drinks last night. You don't remember? And they're like, oh. And then eventually sometimes they agree. I don't know. It's a fascinating, it's actually one of the most interesting things he does. Anyway, he seems to have done that. Um, and the Israelis, again, pre-elections, it's like a stressful time to agree to basically anything. Um, but Netanyahu was like, nope, we're not agreeing to that. The that that they didn't agree to seems like something they we already talked about like a year ago. So, what is going on? What is this 15-point plan? Is it different from the 20-point plan? It looks the same. I'm very confused.

Michael 46:36

Yeah. So here's another spot where we have a gap between rhetoric and what's actually happening. The 15-point roadmap is different from the 20-point plan, but it builds on it. It's designed to take the 20-point plan and move it from phase one to phase two. And, you know, phase one, we're all familiar with that was the return of the hostages and the Israeli withdrawal to the yellow line, uh, and humanitarian assistance going into Gaza and the actual ceasefire. And now we've got to move things to phase two, which is Hamas disarmament, further Israeli withdrawals, actual reconstruction, the beginning of rebuilding Gaza. So the 15-point roadmap is designed to advance that. And it was basically negotiated between the the Board of Peace, which is effectively the US, Hamas and the mediators, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar. Uh, I'm certain that there was Israeli input and involvement, even if they weren't a party to actual negotiations. But you have this 15-point roadmap, Hamas agreed to it. Israel initially didn't say anything, and then on Sunday, Prime Minister Nisanyao came out and said that Israel does not accept the 15-point roadmap. The situation on the ground, I would say, tells a different story because what we've seen is that Israel has severely curtailed, if not outright ended, its strikes in Gaza. There's supposed to be this 14-day window where specifics are worked out for how some of these things will carry forward. And during that window, Israel was supposed to suspend all strikes. And at the moment, Israel first made it so that any strikes in Gaza have to be approved by the IDF chief of staff. I mean, that's a very high bar. Um, not the head of Southern Command, but literally the head of the entire IDF. And, you know, so far, that seems to be limiting, if not entirely curtailing, what Israel is doing in Gaza. There's also the fact that Israel has been allowing, this is before the 15-point roadmap, allowing reconstruction to happen in what's colloquially known as New Rafah, this Emirati-funded Palestinian city that is in the IDF-controlled zone. So, like things, things have been happening. And the fact that Netanyahu says that he rejects the roadmap, there's a reason that the US isn't freaking out. There's a reason that the Board of Peace isn't freaking out. It's because everybody knows that Israeli elections are coming on October 27th and that Netanyahu cannot agree to any process of withdrawal before the elections. So Netanyahu is going to say that Israel doesn't agree. And I'm not justifying that. I actually think that in many ways, this roadmap is exactly what Israel should be embracing. In a lot of ways, it is the manifestation of this Israeli government's theory, which was that if you use enough overwhelming military force, you will eventually get the other side to cave. And in fact, the other side has basically caved. They've agreed to give up all of their weapons, heavy weapons, light weapons, map of the tunnels. They've agreed to let the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, the NCAG, this alternative government that's sitting in Cairo, come in and run things. Netanyahu's red lines about full Hamas disarmament and no Hamas, no Abbas, those are both this 15-point roadmap. The argument right now is over the sequencing because the roadmap calls for things to happen in phases. So Hamas disarms in a sector, and then the IDF withdraws from that sector, and then Hamas disarms in another sector, and the IDF withdraws from another sector.

Shanie 50:11

Just to clarify, because I think that people who are only following this in Israel don't realize that's how all negotiations are. Like it's always a debate. Who goes first? Who takes the first little step in this peace agreement? Like that's a classical thing. That's not specific to this issue. And yes, the sides don't trust each other. Why? Because they never trust each other in any comparable situation anywhere in the world. That is the whole reason this is created, right? And rightfully so. Like they they perhaps shouldn't. Sorry, as you were.

Michael 50:37

Yeah. And it's also historically how terrorist groups disarm and you know, either disappear or get integrated into an actual political system. They don't hand over all their things in one day. It happens, it happens in phases because they also need confidence-building measures and trust-building measures. And so, like the combination of this is basically everything that Israel is asking for. And the argument now is Israel is saying, okay, well, that's all fine and good, but because we understandably don't trust Hamas at all, until they have given up every single thing they have, we're not going to withdraw from an inch.

Shanie 51:12

Yeah.

Michael 51:13

That's just, in my opinion, not a realistic way to proceed. Nobody is saying that the IDF has to withdraw from all of Gaza until Hamas is disarmed.

Shanie 51:23

By the way, aren't they just asking Israel to withdraw to where they were supposed to be since November anyway? Like they were supposed to stay at the yellow line and then they've been slowly going deeper in. So now they're just going back to what they were supposed to be.

Michael 51:35

And yeah, they want Israel to withdraw to the original yellow line, and then they've agreed to start to disarm in phases. But then as a condition of keeping that going, they want to see Israel then withdraw from territories on the Israeli side of the yellow line. Okay. And again, like to me, I get the Israeli objections. They have all sorts of objections, right? They, again, very justifiably don't trust Hamas. They think Hamas is going to cheat. They don't like the fact that the weapons are going to be not handed over to Israel or shipped out of the country, but they're going to be handed to? So they're going to be stored under the auspices of the NCAG and a new Palestinian force. There have been, and this has been reported in the Israeli press, there have been discussions about, you know, as they're being stored, encasing them in cement or melting them down. But, you know, Israel wants to have them handed over directly to them or shipped out of Gaza. So like there, there are Israeli reservations that you look at them, you say, okay, like that makes sense. It's not an unreasonable request.

SPEAKER_01 52:38

Yeah.

Michael 52:39

The problem is that if Israel sticks to the maximalist demands on every issue, then this will just be a stalemate and a frozen conflict forever, and Hamas will remain where they are and they will continue to gain strength. Israel has the upper hand now, right? You know, this is the this is like the perpetual Israeli thing, right? Where you say, um, if I'm in a weak position, how can I possibly make a can make a concession? And if I'm in a strong position, why should I make a concession? Right now, Israel is in the strong position. And so what they're doing is they're saying, why should we make a concession? And the answer is that this, if it gets carried out as it's supposed to, and again, it's in phases, so it's not like Israel has to do anything irreversible or so enormous without seeing what's happening on the other side, it can genuinely lead to Hamas's end as a military force for a different Palestinian government and power base in Gaza and Hamas eventually being marginalized out of existence. That, yes, is that like a rosy best case scenario? Of course it is. But it's also plausible under this roadmap. And so, what was the point of you know, two years of constant war and continuing pressure, military pressure on Hamas from the October ceasefire up until now, if not to get to something like this, which is so weighted toward Israel in terms of what it envisions? So, to me, like if I were Netanyahu, and clearly I'm not, I would say, amazing, this is the Nizzachon Mukhla. This is the total victory I've been promising. You know, everything that I said about military pressure against total victory. This is it. Hamas agreed to disarm completely. It's going to be internationally verified. We don't have to trust just the cutries. You know, this is under the Board of Peace, which is basically Trump, you know, in Netanyahu's words, the best friend Israel has ever had in the White House, if not anywhere. Like this could be spun and not just spun, like there's an element of truth to it as a dream scenario for Israel. And like I said, the fact that Netanyahu said no doesn't mean they aren't actually moving forward with it, you know, maybe slowly, haltingly underneath the radar. But if this doesn't actually proceed, I don't know when or how Israel is going to get a better outcome. So that's not to wave away the reservations about all sorts of things. But this really is a scenario where you're not saying trust Hamas. You're saying Hamas is going to do these things and we're going to verify it down to the last bullet before we proceed with the next phases. But if you rule out the idea of phases, then I don't know how you're ever going to get anywhere.

Shanie 55:07

Yeah, absolutely. So I do think there's something to be said for Netanyahu potentially actually making progress on this front while pretending publicly that he's not for the sake of his election. But that's still, it actually puts uh the next government in a pretty bad spot because the Israeli public will be tricked into thinking that Netzanyau didn't agree to this and that anyone who does is making a massive concession that Netanyahu never did. Meanwhile, he might have been making the concessions just privately and quietly, as he's been uh pretty good at doing. So I think there's there's a complicated dance to happen here. That said, you know, again, as always, it's good that the American government is invested in this issue and that they're actually working to make progress, I think. And so that that inherently like leads to a could lead to a better situation on the ground.

Michael 55:51

Yeah, for sure. And, you know, this goes back to what I said earlier about um a potential new government not doing what we would necessarily want to see them do in Gaza. Part of it is this, right? That if Netanyahu sets up this public perception that Israel has rejected the 15-point roadmap, very hard for a new government that is gonna, by definition, be more centrist and have actual leftists in it, take power and say, all right, all those things that Netzanyahoo said that Israel wasn't gonna do, well, you know, we're gonna do them now. It'll be a huge problem politically, which is why the West Bank is going to be easier than Gaza will be.

Wrap Up And What’s Next

Shanie 56:26

Yeah. All right. On that note, let's wrap up. Michael, it's been great to have you on Israel Policy Pod to our listeners. Thank you for tuning in. We are taking a short break, a short summer break, but we'll be back in September with Israel Policy Pod. Some other news for the fall is that I'll be launching a separate podcast called Disputed Territory that's going to come uh back around when IPP is back. So you can listen to both of them weekly.

Michael 56:49

And you should.

Shanie 56:51

Bye, Michael. Thanks for coming on.

Michael 56:52

Bye, Shiny. Thanks for having me.