Welcome And What’s Ahead

Neri 0:07

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. With the Jewish New Year and high holidays nearly upon us, I thought it would be the perfect week to have back on our two regulars, Israel Policy Forum's very own Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow, and our dear friend and former colleague, Sheera Afron, a senior fellow at the RAN Corporation, and their distinguished Israel Policy Chair. I really wanted to get Michael and Sheera's take on the state of play in the Israeli election campaign with October 27th, rather, now less than 50 days away, which is incredible. And all the parties that are running are now registered and all set as of this past Tuesday. So that's also a very important development that just happened this week that we'll get into. We also discussed the other big news of this week with the announcement by the British government of sanctions on the West Bank settlements and the, well, major response by the Netanyahu government to the British move. What does it all mean? What does it all say about Israel's international standing? We'll get into that as well. Finally, at the end, we took a step back and attempted to answer a big question sent in by one of you, our devoted listeners. So do stay tuned for that at the very end. And in general, we'd love to hear from all of you. So do send in comments and questions to policypod at ipforum.org. That's policypod at ipforum.org. I promise uh we read them, or at least someone reads them. Don't worry, I'll definitely read them. Uh, but hopefully we'll make this a recurring part of the podcast, uh, really answering your questions.

Reporter's Notebook On Demographic Change

Neri 1:59

But first, a few thoughts for me with our new segment called Reporter's Notebook, where I take you behind the scenes and on the ground into the stories that are shaping current events and the big policy moves here in Israel and beyond. So, uh to start with, I have to say journalists uh hate getting things wrong. I know that might come as a shock to some people, but we hate getting things wrong. Uh having a source or interviewee call you up and tell you uh you got something wrong is is bad, trust me. Uh, issuing a correction to something you wrote is even worse. Uh, thankfully, I have to say it's happened very rarely in my own career. Uh, really, it's happened um maybe a handful of times, if that. But one time, a few years back, I spent the better part of a summer uh in the West Bank among the settlers reporting out a story. And my main contact back then for this piece was a uh nice American Ole in his 50s, uh, who lived in the settlement of Bet El, right outside Ramallah. So my contact calls me up uh after the article was published, and I sent it to him, obviously, and he says, uh Neri, I read your piece. Great job, great job. Uh I didn't agree with anything you wrote, but it was accurate. Okay, I thought, so far so good. Uh I've definitely heard worse. Uh, but he added, You got one thing wrong. You wrote that I have seven kids. I actually have nine kids, you only happened to meet seven of them. So, yes, I got that wrong. And, you know, I definitely heard worse than that, but uh nine kids, I only met seven. Um, and these seven kids that I actually did meet ranged in age from uh their early 20s to a seven-month-old baby. Now, uh, why am I relaying uh all of the slightly embarrassing but hopefully instructive information to you at the top of this podcast? Uh, because I'd argue demographics are critical, not just between Israelis and Palestinians, but also, and I'd argue also especially inside both societies. I'm probably dating myself, uh, but that reporting trip to Betel took place way back in the summer of 2012, 14 years ago. Hard to believe. Many of those little kids sitting around the Shabbat dinner table at this family's home in Bethel are probably at or near voting age by now, uh, and also by the way, conscription age to the IDF. Which uh brings us to the current moment. Uh last week, the kids in Israel went back to school the first day of school in the new year. 180,000 students began first grade last week, and the Central Bureau of Statistics here in Israel broke down the entire class's demographic makeup. So 35% of first graders were set to go to secular and what's called here Mamlachti schools. This is basically the normal state-run public schools. 31% of first graders were set to go to ultra-orthodox heredities schools. 14% were going into religious nationalist schools. Uh basically, this is the large, largely pro-settlement demographic, uh, like the family in Betel. But you find them all over the country, not just in the West Bank. That's the religious nationalist stream. And 20% of the first graders last week were set to go to Arab Israeli schools. 20%. So if you're a liberal secular Israeli, this is what you're looking at. 65% of this incoming class of first graders are not of your own stream or tribe, as it's called here. And to be clear, we're speaking now in broad generalities. Each group obviously isn't a monolith, and there are major ideological differences within each group. But bear with me for a second and look at the big picture. If you go to the settlements in the West Bank or Haredi cities like Nabrok, what do you see? Basically, you see massive families, young kids, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven kids, as far as the eye can see. So in another 14 years or so, all those kids who started first grade last week were going to be voters in elections for the Knesset. So the bigger forward-looking question for all those liberal and secular Israelis, I'd argue, is who are you going to align with? Who are you going to align and partner with here in Israel in order to preserve the many beautiful things about this country that you want to preserve? Uh, and also who are you going to align and partner with to stop all the things that don't align here in this country with your own values? And so we're not talking about another 14 years where you have to make the decision, but next month, uh, in the upcoming election, which uh, as you've heard me say many times on this podcast will be uh both fateful and existential for this country's future. So we're basically talking in the future but not so distant future, but demographics could, if nothing actually changes in terms of policy, uh wash over and change a lot of the character of this country from what had been for many decades since the founding of the state in 1948, a clear and solid secular and mammahti majority. So the work needs to begin now, well, next month, uh, in order to put yourself in a position where demographics don't, like I said, wash over you and really change the character of Israel. Some food for thought. Let's get to Michael and Shera.

Registration Day Reshapes The Race

Neri 7:40

Hi, Michael, hi Shera. Welcome back to the pod and uh Khaxamech, upcoming. Hey guys, Chaxameh.

Shira 7:46

Hi, Janatova, it's great to be here. I feel like it's been a long time.

Neri 7:49

Well, it doesn't feel like it's been a long time. It has been a long time since all three of us were on the pod together. Do you remember when the last episode was?

Shira 7:57

We June? We bombed something.

Neri 8:00

We I mean that that could have been any point uh in the past three years. Uh May.

Shira 8:05

May?

Neri 8:06

We recorded. I mean, I had Michael on, I think, with Rachel. I had Shira on with Dan Rotem. So, you know, mixed it up a little bit, but now we're back to uh regular programming. Uh, and we're recording this on Wednesday night Tel Aviv time. It's afternoon in DC where Michael is. Uh, we're just two days before Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. Um, so I thought it'd be the perfect time to have you both back on to uh take stock, introspect, uh, maybe give you an opportunity to ask forgiveness from your favorite podcast host. I'm kidding, kidding, obviously. But I should say uh that there is a lot to get into uh this week on this episode, um, and we're gonna start with Israeli election campaign uh and the fact that we just had the deadline for registration day pass yesterday on Tuesday. Um so all the parties that are now, well, registered are now running, and there are some parties that dropped out, which I'm sure we'll touch on. But the electoral map for the most part is now set, again, for the most part. Uh so Michael, I'll start with you. Uh yesterday, I don't want to say it was like the official beginning of the election campaign, but in many respects, things are a lot clearer. We're now six weeks away or so, just over six weeks away from election day. Uh, so what do you think were the big takeaways from yesterday's registration deadline as we get into this kind of end stage of the campaign?

Michael 9:31

Well, obviously the most important story is that our friend Benny Gans did not drop out. So I get to still talk about him, which which makes me happy. Um but aside from aside from that, uh actually to me the big story is that the last election, the big thing that happened was that Netanyahu was able to consolidate all of the smaller parties on the right and make sure that no votes were lost. And the opposition miserably failed at doing that, which is how you had merits below the threshold, it's how you had Balad below the threshold. And this time around, it seems like potentially the opposite will happen, where there aren't any big, obvious pools of votes to me in the opposition that may be lost. I mean, you'll you'll have some because it happens. But, you know, aside from many guns there who's who's polling it, you know, 1%. So okay. You know, on the right, you've got this new Ofair Winter Party, which in some polls is at six seats or even seven seats, and in some polls is right at the threshold. And honestly, given that the guy is completely new to politics, I understand the niche he fills, but since he's completely new to politics, I don't think there's any real good way of determining what his real support will be six and a half weeks from now. So he's sitting there dangerously close. You have Batzala Smotrich and Moshe Fakelin, and they merged together because Smotrich was in most polls below the threshold. Now, people might remember from I think it was the first 2019 election, that Moshe Fagelin was literally polling at seven seats in the last poll that was done before election day, and he missed he missed the threshold entirely.

Neri 11:20

Explain a little bit about who Moshe Faglin is.

Michael 11:23

Yeah, Moshe Faglin is a very far right, very far kooky, yes, very far right and very kooky former Likud MK. You know, his two most well-known positions are building the third temple and legalizing marijuana, two things that don't often go together. Or maybe if you've gotten the second, then uh then then the first makes more sense to you. But you know, that's that's much of Faglin. And the notion that because he has now combined with Smotrich that that Hatsio Nutzadit, religious Zionism is now completely safe. Maybe Faglin brings enough votes to put them over, but it's not like this is some super popular politician who lots of people are pining for. So, you know, I think that there's still a chance that Smotrich and Faglin are flirting at the threshold. And then, you know, you have the kind of weird Joaz Hendel and Advilf combination.

Neri 12:25

And Zaliha, the economists. So this is right the right. Yeah, the the reservists and advilf for some reason, who many of our listeners may know, and Yaron Zaliha, who's this, I don't know, far-right pseudo-libertarian economist.

Michael 12:41

Right. So they also are in Hodgepodge, and I think below the threshold in most polls, but I don't even know which block they belong in. Uh I mean, maybe the opposition, maybe BB, who knows? So the point is that BB is, you know, underwater as it is, uh, you know, even if all of those parties make it over the threshold, even with that, his poll numbers still demonstrate that he doesn't have a real path to forming a new government. You know, deadlock is a separate story. But uh it seems that this time Bibi's the one who may have actually failed at this task. He couldn't convince Vinter to run with anybody. He couldn't convince Smoltrich and Ben Veer to put their technical block back together. He didn't use his any of his reserve spots for Smotrich, which I had expected him to do. And then, but he couldn't get anybody to be able to take his reserve spots. I mean, we literally have Yaakov Bardugo, the the ultimate social media troll BB shill running in one of the Leakud reserve spots now because BB couldn't get anybody more attractive to take it. So to me, that's the big takeaway from Tuesday. And as I said, BB was in real trouble anyway, it was underwater as it is. He usually is able to do something towards the end to engineer victory and help himself and uh hit the other side, and he just didn't seem able to do that this time around.

Neri 14:08

So a lot of names uh getting thrown out. Let me just uh kind of make order for our listeners and viewers. Um, so you mentioned Meritz and Balad. So Meritz was um, well, the left-wing Zionist party. They're now part of the Democrats, they've merged with the Labor Party. So back in the 222 election, Meritz didn't make it over the 3.25% electoral threshold for entry into Knesset. Uh, neither did Balad. Balad is the more kind of radical Arab nationalist Arab Israeli party. And so Balad is now running with the two other Arab Israeli parties on the reformed joint Arab list. So both Meritz and Balad are now safe as part of these larger, larger groupings. And then Ofer Vinter, he's um fair to say a controversial retired Israeli brigadier general, uh, known for kind of his own hardline and right-wing views about Gaza and the Palestinians in general. Uh, he formed a new party a few weeks ago, and he's trying to kind of fill fill the niche, I guess, somewhere between Likud and Benvir and Smutrich. Maybe a lot of similarities with Benvir, but a new face. Remains to be seen whether he can actually pass the threshold as well. And then, yeah, Yaakov Bardugo, the less said about him the better. He's a pseudo-journalist, longtime political operator in the Likud, uh, very lavishly, slavishly pro-Netanyahu, essentially a mouthpiece for him on Channel 14 here in Israel. And now he uh he was jettisoned uh or well parachuted into the Likud list. So he's gonna be a member of Knesset, which I think is probably a more natural position for him than as a pseudo-journalist. Uh with that, Shira, what did you think of what happened yesterday?

Shira 15:54

I mean, like Michael, I think that maybe we would have expected Netanyahu to use his political magic both to draw more attractive names than Likud. Um, putting Berdugo aside, actually, he's uh on the board of in my children's school. Uh let's see if this remains. But um there's impact, you know, there are implications for that. But I I think two major uh takeaways is there's so much enthusiasm in Israel, uh, and also among many of my friends with you know Khali Eisencott and primarily with his list, right? He's sort of the new game in town, and obviously the one leading now in the polls. You know, I'll be I'll try to be delicate about this, but but I think his list uh he needs to fill a lot of of seats, uh at least 30, because if he was expected to bring in 25 uh into the knesset or around that, you know, you you there's the Norwegian law, and I'm sure you can expect explain to everyone, but but the idea that he will have to have people in the Knesset, probably high numbers, and I think there are a lot of unfamiliar names there. And my understanding is that despite his enthusiasm, and many people that do want to return to or go volunteer or join the public service in Israel, there are very few that actually want to be Knesset members, including a lot of people that I know that have been were approached uh to join the list and declined, which I think is is telling what uh Israelis that who are even who are eager about the change and see this as the most consequential uh elections of possibly our lifetime, there's still a difference between jumping into the muddy uh Israeli political water. So I guess seeing uh Gadi Eisencott's list uh to me was a bit of um, I wouldn't say it's the most positive surprise. Obviously, good people, the ones I know, but most of them are pretty anonymous. Uh so that's one thing. The second thing, I think, is that we don't know, right? Feiglin, Smotric, Ben Kvier could could could actually perform much better than than he's polling. I mean, we don't know, right? It's too early to talk about where Netanyahu is, but I think the fact is that there's the right to BB or not to BB, and then this Arab thing, right? So there's the BB block, and there's the all the non-BB block, and they're the Arabs. And we spoke about it, I think, last time. I mean, I think this this exclusion of the Arabs. And when you look at the numbers, it's true that maybe BB doesn't have the numbers, but the opposition doesn't have the numbers without the Arabs either.

SPEAKER_04 18:22

Yeah.

Shira 18:22

In O. So it's it's this, you know, deadlock, but uh gridlock and deadlock, and how do you square the circle? And I spoke with some uh people who work with the main contenders, administrative contenders, and they uh admitted that they thought, and definitely hoped, but they also thought they'd be in a better situation by now, that the differences between the blocks wouldn't be uh so close, right? Because there was a poll, I think, earlier this week, con channel 11 people that showed very, very close numbers, and then channel 12, there's higher so, but but anyway, they had hoped that by this time there's been gonna be a very clear gap in what they call the Zionist parties, right? Only Jews essentially, and we're not seeing that. And what does it mean for elections, for a second round, for not uh having a decisive victory, for a decision that after elections that one side you know would have to say, okay, true. We said we would not go with the Arabs, but we will.

Neri 19:27

Hold that thought. We'll get back to kind of the blocks and the scenarios and the polling in in just a moment. I wanted to kind of dwell on yesterday, because I do think it was it was instructive for what we may see in the coming whatever, six, seven weeks. Number one, BB failed, right? He failed to actually, like you said, work its magic and force a merger amongst the far-right parties, like he had been trying for the past two weeks, applying kind of public pressure on Benvir to take in these um far-right political refugees and oddballs. Uh Benvir refused. Or for Winter refused to take anybody in, to merge, or even to come to the Likud. Noam, this kind of Jewish fundamentalist party, is also running alone, could also cost him votes uh below the threshold. Last time Noam uh ran alongside Benvir and Smortrich. This is uh Avi, Avi Moz is uh very dark party. So Bibi failed. Bibi failed. Uh and on the other side of the aisle, like you said, the opposition, not only did they uh, well, a few weeks ago have a merger of the of three of the four era parties, number one, number two, you had uh essentially the collapse of this third bloc, as they call it here. So uh non-meat, non-dairy, whatever of these kind of moderate right-wing parties that all were below the threshold. Uh so we're talking about the kind of Likud B team. Former ministers Gilader Dan, Yuli Edelstein. Um, they pulled out of the race. Khili Topil jumped ship and he joined with Isencot. That's also worth however many votes. You had, well, Betty Gantz is is still in the race, but uh but Joaz Hendel, I'd say probably for the better, may not make it over the threshold and could cause various problems after the election. We don't need to get into that. So, all in all, the opposition actually got its house in order for maybe the first time ever while BB failed. So I think that was that was, I think, the big the big news and the big kind of uh main takeaway from from yesterday in my book.

Shira 21:29

What did you think of Eisencott's list, Nary?

Neri 21:32

Look, um it could have been better, I suppose, but how many people are really voting based on the number 12 on Gadi Eisencott's Yeshar list? How many people really know the name of his party? I mean, people say you ask him who you're voting for. They'd be like, I'm voting for Eisencott. I'm voting for whatever, Bennett, I'm voting for BB, I'm voting for Smotlich. You know, it may make a difference on the margins, but anyone who's, you know, thinking of not voting for Eisencott and what uh voting for For Ophel Winter because of the list? I don't know.

Shira 22:03

No, no, no. It's between the between the key parties in his book, right?

Neri 22:07

The movement is I think look, I ultimately I think Bennett and Lepide's list is more, for lack of a better word, more professional, right? You have more accomplished people there, you have bigger names. So again, if people are voting according to that, sure. Maybe Bennett Lepide made out better. I don't know. I find it hard to believe. I I think, again, I want to take it to maybe a more positive place. I like how I'm not now the positive one on this podcast. That's a very odd place for me to be. I was thinking the other day, like all four opposition parties. And by the way, I'd also put Ram, uh Mansur Abbas's Rom party, the Arab Islamist Party that I uh I spoke at length about with Dahlia last week, Dalia Scheinlin, who was on the podcast. So Ram alongside Joav Segalovich. So I'd put all five essentially of these opposition parties, all worthy, all worthy parties, all worthy leaders at the top of these parties, whatever is below them, all five of them actually I have no no real issue with. I think all of them have their have their strengths. Obviously they have their weaknesses too, but quite worthwhile. I think, you know, to your bigger point, Shira, why doesn't more of the public actually see that? Why is it as close as it actually is, just given given the polls? Sorry, Michael, I cut you off earlier.

Michael 23:21

I was just gonna say I I'm with you, Neri. I don't think anybody particularly cares who's 13th on Gaudi Isenkot's list versus you know who's 13th on the Biachad list. I think that if I'm Gaudi Isenkot, what I want to do is avoid having people who are gonna embarrass me later, right? I I I don't I don't want a Tsvisukot. I don't want a Tali Gotlib. I don't want somebody who's gonna cause me all sorts of problems once once I'm in the Knesset and and the election is done.

Neri 23:46

Or Trojan horses like what did in Silman.

Michael 23:51

Right, like Ed Edit Silman or or Amichai Shikli, right? You want to avoid that too?

Neri 23:55

Yes, which did in the Bennett Lepide government back in 2021, 2022. Yeah.

Michael 23:59

Right. So maybe maybe better to have some lower profile.

Neri 24:03

Well, I want loyalists. Yes, men.

Michael 24:05

Exactly.

Neri 24:05

And women.

Shira 24:07

And we we don't know with those names if there are loyalists or potential potential civilizations.

Michael 24:12

Let's say fewer overly ambitious show ponies, right? I I'm with you, Neri.

The Arab Parties And Coalition Legitimacy

Michael 24:17

The other thing I was gonna say was listen, uh from my perspective, uh, maybe it's a good thing that the blocks when you don't count the Arab parties are so close, because it means that in order to form a government, Isencode and Bennett, and Lapid, and Golan and Lieberman and company are going to have to rely on Ra'am. And I think all three of us would agree that will be a good thing. It's a good thing to have an Arab party in government. Yes. It's a good thing for this to be normalized. It's a good thing for Arab voters not to think that their votes are just thrown out because their parties are counted as if as if they don't exist, right? I mean, to I think Dahlia made this point with you, Neri, on the podcast last week, right? That we've like normalized this idea that there are two blocks, and then there's this third thing that's like out there in the ether floating in between. I I'm sorry, like whatever, I don't really care what Ghadi Yasinkot and Aftali Benin have to say about sitting with an Arab party. There's no world in which Ra'am, with Joav Sekilovich as the number two, isn't part of that block if they agree to sit with them. So to me, this idea of the Zionist parties only, it's a terrible construct. I I don't criticize people who use it because I understand how we've gotten here. Uh, but it's a it's a terrible construct, and I would love for it to be broken once and for all. And I hope that this breaks it.

Shira 25:38

Sorry, I'm just gonna go this, you know, Dahlia, of course, uh said this, but I said this in May. I the original sin is not the fact that they I and I don't know what they will do or not. The fact that we've legitimized this exclusion of the Arabs is really just awful on so many grounds. First and foremost, right? Like it's racist and uh it's undemocratic. And I mean, take it to any level you want, but also it's gonna backfire deeply with them because they will see it. You know, to say what you just said, Michael, that they would not have a choice but to form a government with the support of Rahm would look like they're violating their campaign promise. And because until today, and if you walk around and you talk to some people on the right that view Bennett as the ultimate traitor because he went with one sure about the previous time, they would be very hesitant to do this. So, I mean, there could there be a scenario, okay? I'm just gonna say how do they spread the circle? And we say, okay, we are gonna have a minority government where we support we have ROM support from the side, and we're gonna do one, two, three, we're gonna reverse some measures of the judicial reform or coup, we will uh uh launch uh a national uh commission of inquiry, right? Like we'll do those two things and we schedule Kharedi Draft Law. Kareflaw, and we're going to another elections in one year from now. Okay? So here's the date for the next elections. So it's like something we we we just want to get BB out. We're doing this, but we're not forming. Will they do it? I just don't know. And we could find ourselves in um if there's no decisive vote without the Arabs, very unfortunately. Um, but I just don't see them having the numbers without it. Uh, we could go to another elections, which would be terrible and and in de facto another Netanyahu victory.

Michael 27:30

Yeah, and a risk. Right. And and if if that's what they decide, and I I agree with you, it's definitely a possibility if that's what they decide, and then they end up with somehow another Netanyahu Khiredi government. Not only will they deserve that, they will all deserve to be hounded out of politics. Uh honestly, it's it's ridiculous. We're not I'm not talking about you know putting putting Balad in the government, right? We're talking about a party that sat in the previous government that now has a an extremely Zionist IDF IDF veteran as the number two on the list. The notion that this is somehow more trafe than sitting with Kharedi parties who talk about how wonderful it is to evade the draft and how they're gonna literally they they will die before they join the army. Like that that's a that's a more legitimate option. I I honestly don't know how we've arrived at this place. And if that's a decision they make, then they will deserve all of the bad things that happen next.

Shira 28:25

And sorry, Neri, I know you really want to say something, but this is just it's beyond the politicians, the public. You know, when I hear people saying, like, do you really think that after October 7 we can have a government with the Arabs? And I'm gonna go, I'm gonna go back to this. Why? The Arabs that have been kidnapped, murdered, murdered, attacked, operated all hospitals here. We wouldn't have a pharmacy without that serve here, that are in increasing numbers now are serving in the IDF and in the police and in the national service. And we are seeing them as, you know, I don't know, we we probably we're not gonna get into domestic issues, but Israel finally published, the Ministry of Education finally kind of like under the fog of many different outrageous uh news items that came out yesterday. Finally, we got the scores of the Israeli students, right? It's basically 3% of Israeli students, not the Kharia, just only passed like the standardized test in math and English, and you have the Arab share in that is growing. Like, what are we doing? Why how is this legitimate that we are excluding 21% of the population because a terrorist in Gaza launched a massacre? This is just unbelievable. This is the real uh issue here, I think.

Neri 29:37

Yeah, I mean, to answer Michael's question, how do we get here? It's because the contours and narrative of the campaign is being dictated by the Likud and the Israeli right. And the opposition hasn't pushed back on it hard enough, and so they're playing by by their own rules, uh by the rules of the Israeli right. Uh, they're still trying to go after these kind of mythical unicorn soft right-wing voters and keep them or at least draw them to the opposition side and away from BB. Uh and so there's a fear that if they if they take it too far with quote unquote the Arabs, uh, that they'll scare off this voting block. But to go back to what Shera, I think, said earlier, you know, there was a mass hysteria amongst liberal Israelis and the opposition uh late last week and over the weekend when you had these two polls showing either a tie between the opposition and the Netanyahu bloc, or even the Netanyahu block up by up by one seat, I think, in the Channel 11 poll. And then you kind of looked at it, you're like, okay, like there are a few quirks, you know, all the kind of far-right parties made it uh made it into the next access hit. And fine. Even with all of that, BB's block got 52 seats, nowhere near 61 seat majority. And the opposition, including the Arabs, had a commanding 68-seat majority, right? So even uh in the kind of most positive quote unquote poll for for BB's side of it, they're nowhere near a majority, right? But there was, like I said, a lot of kind of hand-wringing and mass hysteria uh amongst amongst the opposition. Later, you know, the polls in in recent days have been uh uh a bit more favorable from Channel 12 and Mahareev, but yeah, uh like I don't know why this is even a question. It's like we're going to form a government no matter what. This government of October 7th, and by the way, the judicial overhaul before it are going home no matter what. And if the Arabs have to go for a cup of coffee when we're holding votes and abstain, fine. Uh, or if they need to actively vote for whatever, a budget, as if Arabs can't vote for a budget in in in Israel, right? They're members of Knesset. I I I think it's preposterous, right? They don't have to sit in the in the security cabinet, fine. But the fact that that the opposition is even playing this game is ridiculous. And I final point the one person I am concerned about is is Lieberman, because he's been the most hard line on not playing ball with the Arabs. Uh, and he also said that he would not give his hand, as he said, for seating a minority government. I know he's obviously kind of playing the game and trying to appeal to those right-wing voters, but he'll he'll need to kind of walk back a lot of that to make this all work. For the other side. My concern is with Lieberman. Uh, I think the others maybe gave themselves a bit of wiggle room. They're at least outwardly and rhetorically still optimistic. Well, we'll we'll get, you know, 62, 63 seats uh by ourselves without the Arabs. The polls have not shown that without at least Rahm's support.

SPEAKER_00 32:34

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The Unity Government Mirage

Neri 33:31

Let's get to the other big topic. Oh, by the way, I mean the final point about the election. Uh, I'm sure you've both heard kind of growing chatter. Let's put it this way. If the opposition does not go with the Arab option, let's call it the Arab option, then there's increasing chatter that there may be, well, you know, they'll go for a unity government with the Likud. Which I I hear this even from people I respect. And I'm like, what in what world are you living in? This has been tried on a number of occasions in the past, and Netanyahu has screwed over every one of his national unity partners. But you hear it more and more. I just have to put it out there. If you're not willing to go with the Arab option and you don't want to run the risk of a um repeat election and successive cycles, um, then you know, you could see people calling for calling for unity. And this time, this time, guys, this time, BB has learned his lesson. He wants to heal the wounds, heal the divisions. Um, I think I think it's preposterous, but we have to kind of put it out there in terms of kind of analytical and intellectual honesty about what what the debate here in Israel is right now.

Michael 34:32

All of the parties, the you know, the new parties that were running on that platform, the Unity platform, right? Kilader Dan and Juli Edelstein and Joaz Hendel, like they had to drop out, right? And Benny Gans, right? Nobody right, they had to drop out except for Benny Gans. Nobody, nobody's buying what they're selling. So given how deeply unpopular that has proven to be, why anybody would think that that is the path forward, I just don't understand. Yeah. But yeah, this is Israeli politics. Anything can happen, right? Who knows who the Prime Minister will be at the end of this?

unknown 35:03

Yeah.

Shira 35:04

The issue is that the Likud is still a strong brand, right? So the moment that Ninthao leaves the Likud, and if this ever happens, right, then you will see a whole attempt to take over the Liquid again. And I think that's that's you know, there's this idea of like, can we have any party with Likud without it? I I don't know. It doesn't look very likely to me. I agree with you, uh, Neri. But let's see. I think we all uh were hoping that you know October 27 at night we will have a, you know, at least we will have a different government in the end. A government, I don't know that we will know.

Neri 35:38

Yeah, and a lot, I mean, to bring it all full circle, a lot will hinge on whether Smortrich and Faglin make it over the threshold, uh, whether Orpher Vinter makes it over the threshold. Even Romm, you know, although Rom always kind of pulls a four or five and gets in, it's fine. You know, if if both those parties kind of drag each other down, then maybe you do have a path for kind of a clear, a clear uh coalition building process. Uh again, remains to be seen. And we should reiterate this. Uh, it shouldn't even be this close. Shouldn't even be this close.

UK Settlement Sanctions And Israel’s Response

Neri 36:09

Let's get to the other big news of this week, uh, an issue near and dear to my heart. Uh, the escalating crisis between his majesty's government in the United Kingdom uh and this Israeli government. Uh so for those of you who aren't aware, the British government announced on Tuesday a new uh import ban on goods coming from West Bank settlements. Uh, they also may institute a wider sanction program against companies and businesses involved in settlement construction uh in the West Bank. Uh and Israel, for its part, retaliated immediately Tuesday afternoon and announced a slew of measures. They're shutting down the British consulate in East Jerusalem, uh, UK officials from post-war Gaza Coordination Center down here in Kirat Gat, southern Israel. Uh, the UK officials are going to be kicked out of Israel. Uh, the British military team in Ramallah that has helped train the Palestinian security forces for nearly 20 years. They're also being expelled. Uh, and also this entry ban into Israel on about a dozen left-wing British parliamentarians, uh, none of whom I think were about to get on a flight and land at Ben Gurion Airport, but so it goes. So this entry ban into Israel. Um, and finally, we had both France and Canada joining up at the last minute to this import ban on settlement goods on Tuesday as well. Uh, Shera, let's start with you this time. I mean, what did you think of this kind of well escalating crisis and both the kind of UK sanctions that were announced and also the Israeli countermeasures? How how serious are they?

Shira 37:40

So, I mean, maybe it's obviously there's there's a crisis, and this crisis has been in the making for um some time now, and it's even before this government. And I think it's interesting that it's not just this British government. This British government, right? If you remember a year ago, almost it's where it's September, so it's coming up on the anniversary of also the British recognition of the state of Palestine as part of um the French Saudi initiative. I mean, this this has been um uh long in the making. It's very, very serious, the big picture. I think that this specific step in Israeli counter is actually not that it's not such a big deal. And I'll explain why. First of all, there's some sort of like it's settlement goods and not services for now. How much does Israel actually uh export uh that is you know, settlements that how much uh of Israel's uh trade uh exports actually come from settlements?

Neri 38:38

A fraction.

Shira 38:39

I don't think it's a lot in terms of goods. Second, they haven't started like looking into, you know, Nary, you and I spoke about this privately yesterday, but there's some where do you incorporate your office inside the green line, outside the green line?

Neri 38:53

They've been doing this for years.

Shira 38:55

For the years. What do you do with companies that are in industrial zones and have 80% of their employees are Palestinians? What about exemptions for religious reasons? For instance, the Jews in the UK they need kosher wine, most of the Israeli kosher wine comes from settlements. I mean, we can we can go in and in what does it mean in practice? So that's one thing. The second thing is I think in the announcement it's very clear that it's not immediate. It's gonna take time to implement. So whether they will actually implement it or not, if there is a change in government, because theoretically they can say, okay, we're freezing this and we're letting the new government uh deal with this. I'll I'll get to in a second why I think where it is risky, but I'll say, in a sense, it could have been worse for an Israel team. And what you said about the companies working in the West Bank, this is where it can get really uh tricky because if it's companies that are involved in construction company, in construction in the settlements, which would be all the major Israeli construction companies, and the banks that finance these companies, then we're in a whole different game. And I just don't see at the moment the UK boycotting Ban Kleumi and Discon and appalling the major Israeli banks. So at the moment we're not we're not there. Can we get there? Yes. The Israeli countermeasures, which like some people take as very big. First of all, closing the consulate in Jerusalem, I think the Brits would be happy to just shut it down and move to Ramallah. That's at least from some people I speak to.

SPEAKER_04 40:24

You really?

Shira 40:25

The CMCC, I mean, there's a general data, I think it's where Israel is actually it's not smart on our part if we're ever serious about finding a substitute for Hamas in Gaza and implementing the 20-point plan. The Brits are essential for that, and I think for the for the um mission that you described, the USC OSC, but this could be reversible. And the the ambassador has not been kicked out, right? It's it's it's it's it's I think what you are saying here is Gidon Tsar, the foreign minister, could have taken this further and even because he doesn't want to escalate, actually. So I think this shows you, and there was a big uh waiting here in Israel, I think, in anticipation of what the US would do, right? Because there are US laws, federal but also state laws, saying, wait, if you uh engage in boycotting Israel, divestment, right? Like we will, but you saw Marco Rubio's um response, and it doesn't look like they're sacrificing their ties with the kingdom for Israel at the moment. So so I don't see it's such a big deal. Where I think it is complicated is that it's not tied specifically to a change in the landscape, right? If you're talking about settlements, what is this? It's like Green Line, is it East Jerusalem? Is it settlement blocks? It's not about like settler violence. Um, it's not connected to E1 even. It's not connected to anything drastic that this government does. And if there's a change in government, right, if comes, let's say, Yayel Lafida is foreign minister of the next government, it sets a very high bar for them in terms of where they start. Is it like we're starting to negotiate? Because if they would say, like, okay, freeze this, please, and see that we are serious about addressing settler violence and we're gonna freeze E1, which is you know the piece of land. I'm sure we spoke about E1 enough on this podcast, then you can say, okay, uh, we will freeze these uh these um measures. These measures. And so I think it could make it more difficult for a future Israeli government that would want to anyway take some steps, but it would it would be better for an Israeli government to take these steps, uh taking the initiative and not looking like they're caving to you to international pressure doing them. Uh one of the criticisms that I heard from people who don't like this government is like they have politics too, right? There's uh there's I guess a party conference next week.

SPEAKER_04 42:45

You're talking about British politics. Yeah, the Andy Burnham government in London. Right.

Shira 42:49

There's there's politics there, there's competition with the Green Party, and so this was a big rush to do this for domestic reasons there. And if you've waited since 1967, they could have waited another 50 days and not give a win to Smutrich and complicate the future Israeli government. But I'm sort of like, it's not such a big deal, depending where this goes.

Neri 43:12

All right. So hold on one second, Michael. There's a lot to clarify and unpack. Um, so E1, uh just for our audience, um, it's this, I guess, new settlement project. I mean, it's been kind of long in the works, but they're moving ahead with it fairly recent, east of Jerusalem, between Jerusalem and the settlement block of Malayadumim. Um, a lot of analysts have cautioned for years. This could kind of bisect the the West Bank and prove that the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state will be will be impossible. So that's E1. Um the CMC CMCC that Shira uh alluded to, another issue near and dear to all of our hearts. That's the civil military coordination center down in Kirat Gat. Essentially the this new it has a different name now.

Shira 43:55

It's called now uh International Gaza Security.

Neri 43:58

International Gaza Security. C MCC anymore, but this is like the center that coordinates post-war Gaza, monitor the ceasefire, brings in aid. And then the USSC, basically, this is the US security also not called the US USSC anymore. Yeah, I'm trying to make this easier for our audience, but the USSC is the old uh US security coordinator mission to Israel, the Palestinian territories. Um, been around for 20 years, has done a lot of great work, both training the PA Palestinian Authority Security Forces and uh facilitating coordination between the IDF and the Palestinian Security Forces. Uh yes, Michael, uh it's now called the Office of the Security Coordinator.

SPEAKER_03 44:34

Yes.

Neri 44:34

Uh and the Brits were were the number two there as well, uh, just like they're the number two down in Kirat Gat at CMCC. Um, all those British military officers and diplomats are now ostensibly getting sent back to London. Michael, what did you think of the UK-Israel spat crisis yesterday? And uh really interesting the US uh the Trump administration role or non-role so far in in this whole crisis.

Michael 44:59

Right. And you know, there's reporting that Burnham had uh spoken to either Trump or Rubio ahead of time and uh and they told him to scale scale back what they were initially contemplating, but they clearly didn't tell him to drop it entirely. And anybody who saw Rubio's response, or Rubio worked worked very hard to uh you know, to not to not slam it or or threaten any countermeasures on the Brits, you know, should should look at that and understand that the Trump administration knew this was coming. They may have they may have asked the Brits to soften it a bit, but they knew it was coming and they seem okay with it, even if they're not going to follow the Brits' lead.

Neri 45:38

And by the way, just an interjection, Michael. Um so obviously that non-comment comment by Rubio made the most headlines. But in the same statement that he gave to the media yesterday, he also criticized Israel for, you know, don't do anything to destabilize the West Bank. It's the last thing we need right now in the Middle East. Could also harm our efforts in Gaza with the 20-point plan and the Board of Peace. That was that was actually explicit. He was like, Yeah, the violence in the West Bank is counterproductive.

Michael 46:07

Right. And they were quick to say that Mike Huckabee's comments about it did not reflect administration policy and were not coordinated with the administration. So it's freelancing. Yeah. Right. No, no question. A lot of freelancing ambassadors out there, whether it's Mike Huckabee or Tom Barrack or whoever else. So I agree with Shera. The the actual impact of this, I think, is not that big. And also it doesn't even go into effect for six to nine months. So we have the Israeli deadline uh kicking kicking the Brits out well before the British measures actually go into effect, which is also interesting. But there are two things here that uh should really be worrisome to Israelis and to Israel's friends.

From Targeted Pressure To Wider Isolation

Michael 46:49

One is that to Shera's point, the measures that the Brits are talking about, not just the Brits, the Brits plus 11 other countries, are talking about enacting, they're not in response to a specific thing, right? It's they're not just targeting E1, they're not just targeting settler violence. Right? They're saying we are now going to put sanctions and and uh and bans on all settlement goods. And even if the actual impact isn't that large, rhetorically and and just even kind of psychologically, that's a big deal. And I don't think it's then gonna be hard to at some point down the road extend it from that to anybody that does any business in settlements at all. And before you know it, it's gonna start migrating over to Israelis who don't necessarily touch the settlements directly. So that's the fear. It's gonna keep on moving. And I think that's what should worry Israelis, because for decades, you know, you had these sort of spasms of anger from either the US or European countries about a specific spot, right? Don't do this on the Temple Mount, don't do this in East Jerusalem, don't do this in E1. And now it really is about Israel's presence in the West Bank entirely, because, at least as I would interpret it, things have gotten so out of control under this government that at this point trying to put out a million separate fires is just not gonna work. And so Israel's friends, and certainly countries that are not Israel's friends, are saying, forget it. We're not we're not gonna try to fight all these little fires in different places. We're just gonna declare the entire thing a disaster area. Uh and that actually is a big deal, even if, even if these specific measures themselves ultimately don't have a huge impact on the ground. The other thing that would worry me, I shouldn't say would, that does worry me as as a friend of Israel, is the more that Israel becomes an issue in domestic politics of other countries, the worse off it is. There's just there's no scenario in which Israel being a political issue is going to be good. You know, I'll I'll quote our good friend Dan Shapiro, who said something in a room I was in earlier earlier this year, a few months ago, where he said the best thing for Israel would be if 90% of Americans didn't even know who the Israeli prime minister was. I think that's I think I think that's, you know, it's a it's a it's a it's a good line, but and of course it'll never it'll never happen. But he's right. And the fact that this is happening effectively because Israel is now a huge issue in British domestic politics in a fight within the Labor Party and a fight between Labor and the Greens, we've seen all the ways, just mounting ways, that Israel is an issue politically in the United States, not only among Democrats, but among Republicans as well. For anybody here who reads uh Politico's daily playbook email, just today, today's email, the top item about the Republican midterm convention in Dallas, quoted an unnamed Republican saying that the Republican Party is a mess. All they want to do is fight about Israel. Uh so Israel has become an issue in all sorts of congressional races in primaries, in general elections. And as that has happened, we've seen Israel standing erode even more in the United States. So, you know, this too is a marker of the fact that Israel itself and is and Israeli policies are domestic political issues in the US, in the UK, I'm sure in all sorts of other European countries that I don't follow, that I don't follow closely or at all. And that is just disastrous for Israel over the long term. It's disastrous. So even as she was 100% correct in my opinion, like these specific moves don't amount to much. I think what they signal is is enormous. And Israelis for decades have been dismissing the idea of a diplomatic tsunami coming because Israel kept on pushing the envelope and nothing really happened. Well, guess what? Like tsunamis come without a warning. And that's where we now are. That's a good line.

Shira 51:03

But I I do want to, sorry, it's because I I sort of not dismiss, but I I'm not underplaying this, this, downplaying this specific measure. But I mean, I've worked on it since sorry, I'm reading. So you just need to understand, like when we talk about public opinion, it's not just the UK, right? The unfavorable views towards Israel in countries like Italy, where there's a government that's a right-wing government, is 75% unfavorable. Germany, 73%. In Germany, a few years ago, you couldn't say anything that is even anti-tisraeli government, 73% of the public. And it's exactly when interest in defense cooperation, especially as this like transatlantic rift is happening and the Europeans uh do have security interests with Israel that are even higher than before. The politics just hurts it. And I I will just say that I think it's not just this measure. Sorry, I'm just I'm reading, that's why I'm looking down, but you're looking, the uh Association of University Heads in Israel documented roughly 1,000 120 academic boycott-related incidents against Israel institution over the six month period. This is over a thousand, a hundred and fifty percent increase in campaigns to exclude Israel from the horizon Europe. Horizon Europe is the bread and butter of the Israeli RD and academia. I mean, these things that are not like the official, maybe it's the the silent boycott, I think are more um meaningful than the formal ones, but the formal one will only accelerate what we've been seeing anyway. So it's very, very dangerous. I don't think the action itself will have the impact, but but definitely we are in a tsunami or or uh a sly, what whatever phenomena you want to describe? Sorry.

Will Voters Notice The Diplomatic Costs

Neri 52:44

No, no, don't be sorry. But I guess my question is bringing it back to kind of Israel and especially domestic Israeli politics and especially the current campaign. Do we think A, that the Israeli public now realizes that something is is quite off all around the world in terms of Israel's kind of international standing? Um, and B, will something like what happened yesterday with the Brits and some other countries actually have an impact on the election? The concern was, at least in recent weeks, that it would actually play Tananyao's favor. So what do we think about those two things? Is Israeli public aware and what impact, if at all, will it have on the campaign?

Shira 53:22

I don't know. It's something it's similar in a sense that to me, it just I'm so confused by this. Um, and it's like with the Arabs, but in a different way. Europe is so essential to Israel. The dependence on Europe, the individual, right? There's the bilateral tracks with different countries, but also overall with the European continent in terms of trade, in terms of companies working, in terms of support for RND and academia, which does not come from the US. Israel opens skies the fact that Israelis can go places and they're low-cost companies operating from Israel, of course, when we don't have seven from four all the time. Um, anyway, so Israelis are really dependent on Europe in many ways, yet it is so easy and beneficial even or cost-free for politicians to basically fight with Europe and gain points. And this paradox, um, I I don't think the Israeli public understands it. Maybe it's because Europe has been so uh easy to be sort of a payer but not a player, right? On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this Pavlovian European response of like, oh, we respect and we condemn and human rights and the fact that, or maybe it's this impunity that Michael was referring to, right? That Israel thought you can just go and there will be no implications. But the fact are, but I don't know if the Israelis don't get it. It's something that people are talking about, but you don't see at least I have not seen Gatti Eisencote and and um Nafali Bent and others just jumping and saying, look, our government ruin our ties with with Europe. Maybe they will.

Neri 54:53

No, the only one, the only one that actually addresses this issue like um like a grown-up and levels with the Israeli public is Yar Lapid. He's the only one who actually says, you know, this is a major issue and uh a point of emphasis if and when we form the next government is that we need to repair these ties, even with governments that uh may not agree with us on everything. But he's the only one. I mean, you're I agree with you. Eisenhock would rather talk about the Haredi conscription into the IDF, right?

Shira 55:19

But can you imagine that if like the UAE said something about Israel, everyone would go and I mean it's something about this European-Israeli ties that I don't think the public is fully aware of um how essential they are to Israel.

Neri 55:34

Yeah. And it needs to, like many of these issues, it needs to be explained to the public. Um, and oftentimes the opposite is happening where it's um dismissed, especially by this current government as well. London is beholden to its Muslim population and the woke, as Gideon Sar, the foreign minister here, said yesterday, and uh the wokey, as he said, uh, I think, literally. And uh and that it's all kind of domestic politics playing playing in London uh and in the UK. Michael, what do you think of the internal Israeli dimension to this kind of global problem?

Michael 56:07

Yeah, Israelis don't seem to take it as seriously as they should. And if they do, it's it's always anti-Semitism, right? It doesn't matter, it's it's always completely disconnected to anything that Israel has done or will do. It's just always evidence of unfettered anti-Semitism. And sure, there's there's there's definitely anti-Semitism involved in some ways, and there's also no anti-Semitism involved in other ways. And I think you know, Israelis are not unique in this regard. Everybody sees the world as they want to see it and and has their has their frame for how they interpret things, but it's not going well for Israel. And it's it's not solely because of anti-Semitism. On the election issue, this is where I really part ways with with Lapid and others who were running around yesterday saying that this is giving this now the election.

SPEAKER_04 56:58

Yep.

Michael 56:59

For that to happen, this would have to move literally hundreds of thousands of votes. You'd have to have over half a million Israelis decide uh before we were going to vote for the opposition bloc, but now because of this, we're gonna go and vote for Likud or one of the other parties in the government. That just seems incredibly unlikely to me. So I agree that if this helps a side, it helps Nisanyahoo side, but these numbers are baked in. I we've we've been we've been saying this for months, and I'll keep on saying it. These numbers have been baked since last year, maybe even since the year before.

SPEAKER_04 57:32

Yeah.

Michael 57:32

So I don't know that anything at this point can change the fundamental dynamics. The like the blocks are set. They're they're they're set. So there may be maneuvering uh between the parties in each block, but the blocks are what they are, and this is not going to move hundreds of thousands of Israeli voters who yesterday couldn't bring themselves to vote for the government and now are gonna magically vote for BB Nissanyahu because because they need protection from Andy Burnham.

Neri 57:55

Yeah, I I take your your wider point. I think the argument in terms of it uh maybe playing in Netanyahu's favor is the margins are so slim in terms of any kind of clear election outcome that if this swings whatever, 60,000 votes could have an impact. But I'm not even sure it could swing 60,000 votes. I mean, there's a million other things going on right now.

Michael 58:16

Yeah, listen, if we if we b if we believe Shlomo Philbert's polls. Which we don't. Which we don't, but if we did, then yeah, I'd be worried about this, right? If if the coalition was polling at 60 or 61, then yeah, I'd say, uh-oh, this may be the thing that puts them over the top decisively. Given where the numbers are, this is gonna be a drop in the bucket in terms of the election. Right.

Neri 58:35

And like we said, um, it may not actually be implemented for another few months, although I think the the British consulate is uh not long for this world uh in Jerusalem, unfortunately. Um finally, last question, and we're gonna do this in a

Listener Question On Israel’s Future

Neri 58:49

unique way. We're gonna take a question from one of our listeners who emailed in. Uh his name is Saul Podemsky of Toronto, Canada. Really nice email that we got. Uh so thank you. He was very complimentary of the podcast and also Israel Policy Forum, which we always love to hear. So Saul wrote in and he wanted me, and by extension, all of you, to go big picture uh and take a step back. And uh Saul asked, after all the assessments and analyses and prognostications, including over the past, what, 55 minutes, uh, what do all these wars, conflicts, religious divides, elections, anti-Semitism in the diaspora, you know, the impasse on a two-state solution, basically all of these issues that we talk about every week, what does it say about the nation, society, the dream, uh, and the future that that is Israel, right? So if we take a step back and kind of get away from the individual trees on a given week and look at the broader forest, uh, what do we think? Um, and I'll add, you know, we're on the eve almost of a new Jewish year, Rosh Hashanah. Uh, so it's a good time to uh to assess where we might be heading. Obviously, with the caveat that I think we can all agree a lot will depend on what happens on October 27th. So um, Michael, Saul's homework for you. What do you think?

Michael 1:00:05

I agree. Very appropriate question to be talking about uh a few days before Rosh Hashanah. I think that if we were sitting here 10 years ago, 15 years ago, and we've been doing this for a while, but not quite that long. If we've been sitting here 10 or 15 years ago talking on the pod, American Jews and and and Israeli Jews and Israel writ large were just in a in a much less worrisome place. You know, there have been this spate of articles here in the US about the end of the golden age of American Jewry, and we can debate whether there ever really was a golden age, but what whatever whatever there was, there isn't anymore. And just think about the conversation in Israel a decade, decade and a half ago, where it was all, you know, the the second tafada had been had been thoroughly defeated, and there was no really more mass-organized Palestinian terrorism in Israeli cities and towns, and everything was startup nation and Israel's burdening relationships all around the world, and everything was everything was great. And I think it was a lot easier to to be an Israeli Jew, to be an Israeli in general, to be an American Jew back then. And given all that's now happened with everything that's going on with anti-Semitism and the politics of Israel and the United States and everything going on in Israel from October 7th to the things that this government has wrought, we're in for a tough period on both sides of the ocean, your side and my side. And obviously, I don't think anybody would wish that. But in some ways, it actually provides an opportunity because we have to think about our place in the world a lot more and what Israel's future will be like and what the future of American Jewry will be like, and what the future relationship between American Jews and Israel and Zionism will be like. And that can be a very healthy process. Introspection is a good thing, right? We we are about to go into Rosh Hashanah and the Asser de Mechhuva and all the season of Jewish introspection, you know, irrespective of your of your level of observance or belief. And I think it's a it's a healthy process to do it once a year, let alone like once once uh you know once every two or three decades. And I think that that's what the communities on on both sides of the ocean need to do. And I'm optimistic that as there is an Israeli election, and I think we expect a change in government. Um, and as American Jews grapple with what's going on here, and we've got two years left to go of this Trump administration, which has been challenging in all sorts of different ways, there is this opportunity to have this larger conversation and to have it be a conversation that isn't siloed, that one that maybe really actually crosses the border. And that should be a good thing. And it's not something that any of us would have necessarily chosen. But I think that that's when you step back, that to me is the big picture, um, taking into account all that has happened over the last few years.

Neri 1:02:56

Very nicely put. A positive moment for introspection and assessment, regardless, regardless of what the coming months and years uh will bring. Uh healthy process. Shera, what do you think about the the bigger picture?

Shira 1:03:09

Yeah. I mean, it's it's a it's a challenging question. And I maybe I'll just start with. I gave it some thoughts. Um, some someone asked me recently uh in a conference, you know, sort of what are the sort of new conceptias? What are we getting? What are we not getting? What did we improve, you know, what uh how the conceptual, right? Like what is the mindset or what would be the best translation for this in terms of the conceptions or preconceptions. Preconceptions. And you know, they're they're pretty, I think overall, if we take because we we haven't discussed obviously Lebanon and Syria and Ghana.

Neri 1:03:44

On purp on purpose this week.

Shira 1:03:45

And the West Bank and Iran and all that, that all this is you know happening and happening and happening. And I think if I look at where Israel today, um, I I had hoped, I think many of us that three years after October 7 we would be in a different place uh on a variety of of areas. And I'll start with with I think the the Palestinian issue, which is something that after October 7th, if we know that one of the I mean Israel was was right surprised to say the least with Hamas's uh attack. But whether um, and and we're speaking today, another big news was that there's a report that you know UAE leader warned Netanyahu that His Nwar was planning something that everyone is denying. I don't know if it's true or not, but it does it does not matter what type of warning, concrete warning Israel got in the days before. I mean, it it matters because it could have saved lives, but but the real issue is that Israeli policy on Gaza, right, viewed Hamas as sort of as an asset. This was the direct, the the actual definition, because as long as Hamas controlled Gaza, there was a real pretext to not solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not even addressing it. Uh, this idea that we will keep Hamas weakened and deterred and effective, controlling uh the population. Um, the Palestinian Authority will be on the other side and we can continue. And one thing that I didn't think that we where we would be after October 7 is that we'd be back kind of in the same place. I mean, strip away the rhetoric. Uh Hamas still is the de facto sovereign uh Gaza, yeah, smaller territory. There's a lot more blood and rubble in between, but Israel has not fundamentally allowed for the alternative to emerge. And this is one thing. The second thing that I I I think we we we are we're sort of in a place where we think that what we can solve with force, we will solve with more force. And this goes around, it's not just on the Palestinian uh arena. I think also, and the third one, which is where maybe I'll spin this into something positive in a second, I promise, but this idea that we can't do anything. Most of the Israeli public believes that the Arabs are out to kill us. No one believes we can solve the Palestinian issue. Everyone is against uh a two-state solution. And even if we all share, I think we agree that you can't maybe uh solve the Palestinian issue in the foreseeable future. The fact that Israelis see themselves as helpless and powerless on this and don't understand that we can always improve the situation and start by starting, in a sense, and and not uh asking if the current paralysis solves everything, but whether the current paralysis is good for us. Uh and the answer, of course, is not. So I think this is one of the things that like I hope that we would be in a different place three years after the biggest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. But to Michael's, you know, positive thing, this is this could be a moment of reflection for a future government, for us not to be just reactive, right? Being reactive uh by definition uh means that we are weak uh because we're not designing the reality, you know, we're just we're just responding uh to events, but also thinking that maybe what what what doesn't work with force will work with a little bit less force, that national security is not just you know bombs and buffer zones, it's also relationships and the national story Israel can tell about itself, but also about its relationship with the Jewish communities uh abroad, its alliances and relationships and economic uh strengths and all these. And you know, I I do hope that with the new year and elections, I hope we won't get there, but we could find ourselves in a Netanyahu government, and maybe Netanyahu would even be the one possible of asking you these tough questions. But we're not where we're supposed to be. But I guess when things are so bad, we can only go up from here. I'm sorry, Saul, you'll want something positive. It's difficult to story. I just um Israel is in a in a challenging, in a challenging place.

Neri 1:08:14

And I look, I don't think you should um make up fantasies just for Saul and our audience's benefit. I think this is what you you honestly believe as an Israeli and as an analyst, and I think it's important to to give voice to that. Uh and yes, you you took a kind of the bigger picture conceptia, right? The the primarily the kind of overall national security strategy, which this country is somewhat lacking. Which, by the way, to Isencott's credit, he's been saying this for years. You need a real revamped uh and updated national security strategy, and maybe that'll be one of the things um that will come out of maybe a future Eisencott administration. Um, I'm gonna combine both of your answers into something positive, but it's gonna start not so positive. And this might be a cliche, it might be boring, uh, but it really is about one person, that's Bibi Netanyahu. Um, and I apologize to my father who thinks I I go on and on about about Bibi Netanyahu on the on this podcast and and and off this podcast way way too much. But it I I happen, like I told Shira, I happen to believe it, and I'll explain why. It seems like everything is stuck or getting worse, or this is kind of the natural course of things, and this is what Israelis, this is what the Israeli public believes, and you you can't move the Israeli public to perhaps believe other things, maybe more positive and constructive things. And I would argue that it only seems that way because this one person has dominated political and pretty much all other life here in this country since 2009, which is a long time. 17 years. It's not a short period of time at all. I mean, if you just think I like to play this game, right? So if you go back to say the year 2000 and the Camp David like peace conference, you know, the kind of end of Oslo, if you go back 17 years from 2000, it's 1983. And and the world and Israel was was very different between 1983 and 2000. And we're talking now about 2009 to 2026, with everything that's happened under the rule of one person, and really both kind of the design of Israeli, the Israeli system and in general, like it is the rule of one person. And so everything kind of seems inevitable, right? It's almost inevitable that the peace process is defunct. It's inevitable that the Arabs are now kind of put out of the realm of polite society politically, even though Netanyahu was really the first one to negotiate with Rom, but nobody remembers that because this is the third point. He's built this entire kind of media ecosystem, really a propaganda machine, that is very, very effective. That is very, very effective. It works all the time everywhere here in this country and even beyond. Um that's not it's not inevitable. Um, and then fourth, he's by leaps and bounds, the most kind of skilled and talented politician of his era and maybe any era, right? So he's not only managed to turn the Likud party uh into a cult of personality, he's managed to actually kind of win elections, A, but also B, kind of, you know, exert influence on the entire political system for the better part of 17 years. So why am I saying all this? Is that if you actually remove this one person and his own whatever policies and opinions and systems and mouthpieces and propaganda machine out of Israel, right? Or at least out of the kind of the top of the Israeli political system, then all the things that Saul mentioned in his email, the wars, the conflicts, religious divides, you know, anti-Semitism, impasse and two-state solution, it's not like they're going to be healed overnight. I don't want to give anybody that that impression. And I think we're all we're all grown-ups and don't believe in uh you know fairy tales and unicorns, but you at least have the space and the hope that things could actually begin to shift and to change. And that a different Israeli leader and leadership will actually make a more positive case to the Israeli public, we'll begin instituting more positive policies, and that by extension will have a positive impact on Israel's, on how Israel is viewed in the world. So uh I apologize to my father and all everyone else for kind of making it all about BB, yes, no, but I happen to believe it. I happen to believe that just because this one politician has been in power for 17 years does not mean that he will be in power for the coming four years or forever. Um and that once he goes away, by the way, I think we might have talked about it earlier, um, the licut is finished, right? The licut is gonna crash harder than the labor party crashed. Um, there's gonna be a a realignment in Israeli politics that will also open up uh all kinds of unforeseen possibilities and weird, weird developments. But first, um, well, Netanyahu has to lose an election. Again, that's my that's my pitch for the new year. That's as as good a pitch as any.

Shira 1:12:48

Yeah, no, it's great. I I'm just like, I don't think I think if Netanyahu goes, liquid will go down, but I think it will come back up. I think all these Giladardan and the others, I think someone will rebuild the Liquid. I actually think the Liquid is a stronger brand than all these new parties. So, you know, it the liquid has dipped before and climbed back up.

Michael 1:13:08

Since we're trying to be positive, I'm I'm not even gonna say what I think comes after Netanyahu for for the Israeli right.

Shira 1:13:14

You imagine Israel without Netanyahu?

Neri 1:13:17

I mean Yes. I mean, first of all, you have to you have to imagine it, and then you have to kind of hope that the Israeli voting public votes can imagine it too. Enough.

Shira 1:13:26

Yeah.

Neri 1:13:27

But first you have to kind of imagine it and then imagine the knock-on effect of that actually materializing.

Shira 1:13:32

Next week, uh guided meditation.

Neri 1:13:35

Next week. No, I was gonna say next week, uh, we want more questions from our audience. Uh, so please email policypod at ipforum.org, policypod at ipforum.org, and hopefully we make this a a running segment on the episodes.

New Year Wishes And Sign-Off

Neri 1:13:49

Uh, we've gone way over, but I feel like it was for a worthy cause. Michael, Shira, Khaxamech, Shanatova.

Shira 1:13:56

Shanatova.

Neri 1:13:57

Shanatova, to you both. May it be sweet, sweet and safe and quiet. And I'm not gonna wait another couple of months to have you back on. I I assume we'll have a uh pre-election episode at some point in October.

Michael 1:14:11

And and hopefully, uh hopefully I'll see you both in person at some point before the end of this year.

Neri 1:14:17

Yeah, you're you're overdue for a visit. Yeah. Be well. Take care. Shalatoba. Okay, thanks again to Michael Koplow and Shira Efron for their generous time and insights. Also, special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, and our editor, Tracy Levy, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, so keep being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. And Chakzemech and Chanatova, upcoming for all of you celebrating.