Welcome And What’s Ahead

Neri 0:04

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. We're back this week with our good friend Amos Harel, the defense analyst and correspondent at Haaretz, to discuss the upcoming three-year anniversary of the October 7th attack and everything that has come after and may still be coming in future. Amos is also the author of the recent book 629, Anatomy of a Failure, which came out earlier this summer in Hebrew and quickly became a bestseller. It's an extremely well-done and very important read, especially since, as we all know, a State Commission of Inquiry here in Israel has yet to be formed to look into all the strategic and military failures leading up to the Hamas attack on October 7th and on the day itself. So Amos's book is, well, the next best thing. Still a big if, a new government takes power after next month's election.

The IDF “Video Of Horrors”

Neri 1:23

But before all that, let's do a little reporter's notebook segment where I take you behind the scenes and on the ground into the stories that are shaping current events and the big policy moves here in Israel and beyond. So it's late October 2023, just a few weeks after that terrible, terrible Saturday morning. And by the way, just an aside, just like three years ago, this year too, the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah falls on a Saturday. It'll be this coming Saturday. But three years ago, that's when Hamas decided to launch its invasion of southern Israel at 6.29 in the morning. But a few weeks into the war, back in October 2023, I got a call from the IDF spokesperson's office telling me, can you come in? We want to show you a video. That was it. We want to show you a video. No more details, no nothing. So obviously I said yes. Uh took a cab up to the IDF spokesperson's office and base in North Tel Aviv and Ramatav. Uh and a dozen other foreign journalists were already there, uh, most of the usual suspects and the usual outlets that you can imagine and you'd expect. Uh very little preamble from the IDF officers in attendance. The lights go down, and they show us for the first time literally to anybody, uh, a 44-minute compilation of what Hamas did on that day on October 7th. The video they showed uh really is an unrelenting mix of Hamas GoPro cameras, dashboard cams, CCTV footage from highways and homes, cell phone videos taken by victims or Hamas terrorists, first responders, uh, and more, a lot more material. Uh but basically any and all visual evidence gathered from southern Israel that was then stitched together in chronological order uh throughout that morning and throughout that, again, horrible, horrible day. So uh when the screening ended up in Ramataviv, I remember no one amongst us foreign journalists really said a word. Uh we all kind of shuffled out of uh of the screening room. Uh we were all a bit in shock, uh, to be honest, even if some of us had uh previously seen various clips here and there floating around the internet uh from that day. But the movie came to be known here in Israel internationally as the quote, video of horrors, Serta's vot in Hebrew. Uh in later closed screenings, uh, as word kind of seeped out and got out. I know some foreign journalists here who uh flat out refused to go see it. Um, and even some very seasoned war correspondents uh who did sit through the movie told me later it was uh the worst thing they had ever seen. And these are people who have seen a lot, who have seen a lot up till that point. Uh Israel, for its part, aired uh the movie under very tight supervision, uh, places like the White House, uh in Hollywood, various foreign capitals, uh, and a few other places, but for obvious reasons, mostly having to do with uh the personal privacy and dignity of the victims, uh, the movie was never publicly released and still hasn't been publicly released. So I'll spare you the gory details. Um it was as bad as uh you might be thinking right now, uh, and we're also a family podcast, so I'll spare you all the various details. But I actually ended up watching uh the video of horrors, uh, most of it at least, again for a second time, uh, after I went and wrote uh a profile about the movie's editor. And there was only one editor responsible for putting it all together. Uh his name was Matan Harel Fish, a civilian tech entrepreneur uh who volunteered to go back into the reserves uh in the spokesperson's unit, uh, and he ended up doing this editing work for months, months. Uh not an easy job at all, waking up every morning, as he told me, to uh new videos sent to him from various people and and really units all over the country with literally the worst images you can imagine. That's how he used to wake up uh every morning for weeks uh after October 7th for this project. So

Fauda As A Reality Mirror

Neri 5:53

uh why am I telling you all of this? Because uh the closest thing I've seen to the reality of what was in the actual video of horrors was episodes seven and eight of the new season of Fauda, which is now streaming on Netflix. Uh now, obviously, Fouda is not as severe as what was in the video of horrors. Uh, it couldn't be, but in its overall themes and progression and really a microcosm of the day, uh, it's not too far either. For good reason, I think the guys behind Fouda, primarily Leo Gaz, uh who plays uh Don Kabilo in the show, uh, and Fred of the Pod, Avi Zacharov, made it clear ahead of time that you don't necessarily have to watch episodes seven and eight of this new Fauda season, uh, which is the fifth overall season of the show. And there's a trigger warning ahead of both episodes, telling viewers that you can really skip over them. Uh nothing of this current season's overall plot will be lost, uh, which is which is true. You can skip over it and you won't lose anything. But uh the opposite, uh, I'd argue is also true. For anyone wanting to get a sense of what it was like in the towns and the highways and kibbutzim and music festivals on the Gaza border on October 7th, you could do a lot worse than watching those two episodes. Uh, and again, without needing to watch the entire new season of Fouda. I mean, you should watch the whole season of Fouda, but the point is that you don't have to if you want to get a sense of, you know, a little sense at least of what it was like uh in southern Israel on October 7th. Uh and let me be clear, uh, it wasn't easy by any stretch to watch those two FAUDA episodes uh about October 7th, uh, even if you've seen the real October 7th movie. Um, and I don't think it was easy at all for those guys uh and everyone else involved in the production of Fauda to make those episodes either, uh not by any stretch of the imagination. But uh as a reminder, nearly three years to the day, of just how vicious the Hamas attack really was and how complete the IDF collapse really was, also, uh it's a very, very important document that's now available all over the world on Netflix. So

Amos Harel Joins The Conversation

Neri 8:12

with that, let's get to Amos Harel. Hi, Amos, Chaxamach. Welcome back to the podcast.

Amos 8:24

Hi, Neri. Thanks for having me.

Neri 8:26

Uh, it's always my pleasure to have you on, Amos. Uh, and I thought you'd be the exact right person to have on specifically this week, uh, as we almost mark three years uh to the October 7th attack. The anniversary is happening next week. Uh, it's also the anniversary of the start of uh, well, three years of regional war, which we'll also touch on. Um, and I start thought we'd start talking about recent events and recent revelations and then kind of zoom out to the bigger picture as we go along. So

The UAE And Egypt Warning Reports

Neri 8:56

I want to start here with you, Amos. In recent weeks, and especially this past weekend, uh, we've gotten several reports, whether in your newspaper, Haritz, uh, and then more recently the New York Times, The Atlantic, a few other places, uh, to the effect that Israel, and specifically Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, uh received warnings way back in September 2023 from top officials in the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, that Hamas was potentially planning something big out of Gaza, uh, and that there may be an earthquake, an explosion, choose your metaphor depending on the source. So these reports have obviously made big waves both here in Israel and also internationally, uh, maybe for different reasons. But uh, let's start here with you. How would you explain these various reports? Um, how should we understand uh what they have in them and also specifically what they don't have in them?

Amos 9:47

Some of this has to do with the fact that there are journalists out there and historians and sources who are all involved in attempting to understand and explain what has happened. Uh, we've mentioned this before. This is the most horrific event in the history of the state of Israel. It's no wonder that so many people people are trying to figure out what exactly happened. Then you have the third anniversary of the October 7th massacre, as you mentioned. And also you have the approaching uh elections. As we speak, we're a month away from the elections, which are uh there's always the cliche, the most crucial uh event or the most crucial elections in the history of Israel. This time it happens to be true. Yes. So everybody's uh naturally focused on that. And I've claimed for a long time that this is the essence of the current campaign. Netanyahu uh may choose to present it otherwise and may choose to discuss things that happened after October 8th. When Netanyahu speaks, it's never clear who in fact was in charge on October 7th. He somehow arrived on the scene a day later and then began correcting the mess that other people, so to speak, uh left behind them. Uh but this is the main issue, I think, for most Israeli voters. On top of the judicial overhaul and on top of corruption, and on top of discussions about Netanyahu the man, to Bibi or not to Bibi, if you'd like, uh there's the question of the massacre. Who on our side was responsible? And I've said that before, there's no Hebrew word for accountability. Uh, and Netanyahu has avoided accountability, uh, some would say perhaps all his political life, but especially uh during the last uh three years. So this is becoming extremely important right now. And then you may have uh people or actors, uh if you'd like, with other uh interests. Let's talk of Muhammad Daklan, for instance, the Palestinian leader who's an outcast by now, uh, who uh lives in the uh um United Emirates, who's close to MBZ, the leader of the Emirates, and is supposedly behind uh one of the warnings um um uh from the UAE, from MBZ to Prime Minister Netanyahu on the eve of the attack. People like the Khalan perhaps have uh a dog or a horse in this race. Perhaps they're not too interested in Netanyahu winning again. So I would be a little bit suspicious about the timeline and about the timing of these specific stories right now. It doesn't mean that they're not true. Some of this is entirely true, some of it maybe may have to do with some exaggerations of uh some of the actors. And yet these are important events, but I wouldn't be naive about the timing and about the motives of some of the people who talk to the press right now.

Neri 12:36

That is a very good uh caveat. Uh by the way, for our listeners, MBZ is Mohammed Ben Zayed, the uh the leader of um, well, United Arab Emirates, uh specifically Abu Dhabi. Uh Mohammed Dahlam is very close to MBZ. Um and just in terms of the substance, Amos, you had a great column about this uh this morning, and we're recording this Sunday afternoon Israel time, uh, basically saying that there were warnings either from Egypt or maybe from the Gulf to, if not Netanyahu, then the Israeli security establishment.

Sinwar’s Pressure Campaign And Deception

Neri 13:09

But it was very much rooted in the context of what was happening in Gaza in August and September of 2023, and even going back before that, in the sense that Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, uh, was looking to pressure, coerce Israel for more concessions, whether economic, financial, more work permits for Gazans. And this is essentially what the Arabs may have been warning Israel about, that you need to kind of give something more to Sinwar or else he's going to do something. Not necessarily there is a massive invasion from Gaza.

Amos 13:42

By now we know. Um some of these stories were spread in the immediate weeks after the massacre. Smadal Perry from Yadiota Honot, our colleague, was the first journalist to publish the story about the Egyptian warning. Uh and what we see now, as you've mentioned, are versions of those uh same stories from 2023. One is the Egyptian angle, and the other is the Emiratis uh angle. In both cases, uh senior leaders in the region uh warned both the Israeli security apparatus and Netanyahu himself on the period between mid-September and perhaps early October. What we don't know yet is how significant these warnings uh were, how general, and how many details were in fact included uh in them. Because there's a difference between saying, look, Hamas is preparing a massive attack, a division of Hamas terrorists is going to cross the border one morning, sometime late September or early October. And as far as we know, there hasn't been a specific uh warning that was uh phrased in such a manner. Or another version is look, uh things are very, very um uh troubling in Gaza. Sinhua has had enough. He wants uh his prisoners out from Israeli jails. Um he's uh um very frustrated about the fact that not enough working permits are allowed uh for Palestinians to work in Israel. He wants more money from Qatar. And if this isn't done soon, he may explode and there may be an earthquake in the region. What does this exactly mean? Uh Hamas has initiated rocket attacks in the past. There's a difference between launching a hundred rockets at one hour and attempting to invade uh the Gaza envelope uh communities, what he actually did on the October, uh the morning of October 7th. Right. Um so there's a scale here, and it depends how you describe this. As far as I can tell, the warnings were uh slightly more uh general uh than uh it may appear from some of the recent reports. And there's also the question of the background, because what is very, very clear, specifically even more so on the Egyptian uh warning than on the uh Emirati one, is that this was about, as I mentioned, this was about economic relief for Gaza. The message was provide economic steps that would improve the situation in Gaza, and then things won't blow up around uh the border. And let's take the scenario one step uh further. What is this actually about? Because now we know that Sinwal planned this attack for years. So maybe all of this is an act of deceit. It's about um making Israel misunderstand what's going on. Because if you take that explanation, then the Egyptians warned us, the Emiratis warned us, then there was uh a meeting in Doha uh between the senior Israeli officials and senior Qatari officials, and by late September a solution was found. Um Qatar uh promised to provide the money again, and Israel promised that after um Sukkot uh there will be more permits from workers from for workers from Gaza. And then all demonstrations and odd violence on the border immediately stopped. So he may have been misleading Israel intentionally, because between October 1st and October 6th, things were calm on the border, and Israel felt as if this was solved. Now, looking at this, of course, uh we're smarter now, uh you know, three years later. But looking at this from our perspective right now, it seems as if he was purposely uh misleading the Israelis. Look, there's an economic problem, you can solve it. Look, you solved it. No reason to worry anymore. I can tell you one more interesting detail that I think hasn't been uh reported. Immediately after that, the IDF uh Severn Command allowed more soldiers to go on leave during uh the holidays than before because the assumption was that things were calmer and then you couldn't allow uh protection of the border with less troops. And then you got to a point on October 7th where only around 670 uh Israeli soldiers were protecting the whole border from this invasion of about 4,000 to 5,000 uh Hamas fighters.

Neri 18:17

Absolutely true. Uh and that's a good kind of um summary analysis of um what I believe actually did happen. Because, like you said, almost there were these renewed riots on the border um throughout some of September 2023, but they stopped. They stopped uh, like you said, a week before October 7th, uh because a solution ostensibly had been found. And if Sinoir was really uh threatening an explosion or whatever you want to call it due to economic or financial reasons, um A, he got presumably what he wanted. B, uh if you're only after economic relief, you don't you don't launch total war against Israel. Right. And Sid Noir uh knew how to fight a limited war, uh, as we saw in in years past.

Why Conspiracy Theories Don’t Fit

Neri 19:01

Uh related uh topic in question, uh and following up, you wrote the book on the lead up to October 7th, what happened on the day, uh 629, Anatomy of a Failure, uh, that came out in Hebrew early in the summer, uh, with a bestseller here. I'm not gonna ask you about the book, but I did want to ask you about one particular question that keeps coming up, especially in the context of uh, shall we c shall we say uh conspiracy theories, uh, and there are different conspiracy theories, both here in Israel and also uh what you find around the world. Uh around the world, the the theory is that um Bibi, quote unquote, let October 7th happen uh because he really wanted to fight this war against Gaza and go in and invade. This is a theory outside of Israel. And then the second conspiracy theory that you hear, um, you heard it almost immediately from elements of the right wing and pro-Tanyahu base uh right after October 7th, is that it was quote unquote the generals who let October 7th happen in order to undermine Netanyahu, undermine his government. So these are um competing, competing conspiracy theories uh that are obviously at odds with each other, but you you still hear it and you see it on social media all the time. So, as somebody who who has looked into this, who wrote for now the definitive uh analysis of what happened, when people ask you, okay, how did October 7th happen? And we're now almost marking three years to the day, what is your explanation for the disaster?

Amos 20:29

Okay, so allow me uh a moment of self-promotion. The book is uh supposed to be out next year uh in English, in the US and the UK early next year. Uh it's called in English uh Anatomy of Failure. Um, regarding your question, um, Aluf Men, the longtime uh editor-in-chief of Arrets, taught me an important lesson many, many years ago. He said in most cases, the explanation is contingency and not conspiracy in the things we investigate and so on. It doesn't mean that there aren't important stories hiding out there, but usually the explanation has to do with stupidity, with contingency, with mistakes, with the fact that we're human, and not so much with some evil conspiracy that explains everything. That's true for COVID, that's true for 1973, that's true for uh uh Pearl Harbor, the JFK assassination, whatever, I assume. Anyway, going back to uh to our issue, both of these um models of conspiracy that you've mentioned, or uh um theories are nonsense, of course. On one hand, it reminds me a little bit of you remember when uh Rabin was assassinated, there was this whole story um among the extreme right in Israel that this was actually a Shinbet conspiracy.

SPEAKER_01 21:43

Yeah.

Amos 21:43

They wanted to attempt a false uh flagged uh operation in order to um have justification for action against uh right wing extremists, and therefore uh they attempted to uh um pretend that we're somebody's assassinating Rabin, but at the last minute. Somebody switched the bullets of the assassin, and this is how hegal by mistake killed Rabin. This is nonsense, of course. The same is true for what happened here. It's hard for people to explain or to accept that Netanyahu made so many terrible mistakes on the road to October 7th. The whole strategy was wrong, misguided. The fact that he uh ignored warnings from everybody, the security chiefs, and apparently some leaders in neighboring countries and so on, is also hard to fathom. And yet, in the end, this is what happened. Netanyahu made enormous mistakes. So did the security chiefs. This doesn't get them off the hook, uh, their own mistakes, and they paid for them with their careers. Uh, people like Heltia Levion and Baal, the leaders of uh uh the IDF and Shinbet are no longer in office because they were forced to resign because of what has happened, something that Netanyahu has managed uh to avoid. So the whole story about Israel um uh perhaps allowing the Hamas attack in order to create justification for retaliation against Gaza, as far as I can tell, this is absolute nonsense. I saw the shock of the people I talked to um in the days after the attack, this wasn't the case. I think it it may be the other way around. I've long uh suspected that Ich Sinwar thought of this not only of the attack itself, but for him, the violence and the cruelty were not a bug but a feature. It was in order to terrorize the Israelis, and I also suspect that he saw the possible events two or three steps ahead of us. That he assumed that there will be enormous retaliation from the Israeli side, and that would allow him to drag us into the gutter with him. And the fact that Israel acted so brutally um before we started recording, we mentioned the film NASA, that's scandal over the documentary right now. The fact that Israel reacted so aggressively led to a disaster in Israel's um uh relationship with the international community. And perhaps perhaps Sinwal assumed that that would be the case, that he would attack, that uh Hamas would be extremely violent and cruel, that the Israeli reaction would be somewhat uh exaggerated, and that the end result with so many um civilians living uh near the terrorists would mean thousands and tens of thousands of innocent people, which would allow the Palestinians uh to use that uh um on the international arena. And then this isn't exactly what happened. Did he plan it all in advance? I don't know. Maybe contingency and not conspiracy, but this is the way the events uh played out. The other theory you mentioned, the other type, if you'd like, has to do with the so-called uh generals go. Uh somehow a conspiracy of generals, leaders of Shinbet and IDF, who acted behind Netanyahu's back to um hide events from him, conspired against him because they wanted him out, and actually uh allowed this to happen because their main issue at that time was fighting Netanyahu over his attempt for a judicial overhaul. There's a book by Elizabeth Mol, which is the most important document, so to speak, to present that theory. Again, in my view, this is absolute nonsense. I've known these actors for 20, 30 years since they were uh majors in most cases. Uh they're not about that. It was not. This is a terrible mistake. Uh the nation of Israel is paying a terrible price for these guys' uh mistakes, and yet it wasn't a conspiracy. They didn't think in advance that they would hide this uh from the prime minister in order to uh to bring about his uh final uh uh political demise. It wasn't something that they even considered. Their mistake, their sin, so to speak, is the fact that they underestimated the Hamas uh threat, especially in the hours leading to the uh attack. And it's true that they did not uh tell Netanyahu about this, but this was a failure of imagination, a failure of understanding. This wasn't done intentionally in order to hide it from Netanyahu. Of course, it actually serves Netanyahu today because his main argument is you guys didn't wake me up, this is why I'm not to blame. Had you told me about this at 4.30 in the morning, I would have changed everything. This is nonsense as well. We've seen how Netanyahu uh reacts to such uh alarms in the past. He did nothing of this sort in the past. And also, um, once he was notified in 6.29, he was in shock for quite a few hours and almost didn't do anything. He only began his first meeting at the Kiryat, the Tel Aviv headquarters of the military at around 9:55 a.m. So he was missing in action for almost three and a half hours. This is not something that could be uh justified easily. Another um argument that he presents is miscalculation. Ronin Baal, the chief of uh Shinbet, avoided intentionally uh telling him about this because Baal knew that Netanyahu would react with all of Israel's might, and he was afraid that the war would begin because of Netanyahu's reaction. Again, this is nonsense. What Baal said, and this was mentioned when he talked to the internal um investigative team of Shinbet, when they uh uh there was an internal commission committee of uh inquiry in Shinbet that dealt with this, his explanation was something completely different. He did mention miscalculation, but what he feared was that the steps Israel would take, because of those warning uh signs that were mentioned in the hours leading to the attack, there would be a series of misunderstandings between Israel and Hamas. Hamas would think that Israel is about to attack to attack it. There were signs for this in some uh irresponsible statements. Uh I don't know how uh um surprising you will find that by the good ministers in the days leading uh to the escalation. And his fear was that without intention, Hamas and Israel would find themselves swapping massive blows when nobody actually uh wanted this to happen. But this was this is a total mistake, but this was a mistaken theory. It wasn't a conspiracy led by Baal or Hiltialevi or anybody else.

Neri 28:37

It's good that you uh you're putting this to rest because uh, well, you hear it constantly here in Israel. Uh, you know, Netanyahu wasn't woken up. This is on the security establishment. Why, you know, why didn't they wake him up? Uh, you know, sometimes, like you said, Eristad Mori's um, I don't want to call him a journalist, but he's a public commentator, usually on Channel 14, the pro-netanyao.

Amos 29:00

Public populist.

Neri 29:01

Yeah, he's a populist, uh, I mean, call him what you will. Uh, but you hear it again and again, that's a major plank of the Netanyahu campaign. And then also outside of Israel, um, I get asked this all the time. Um, you know, well, why why did BB let it happen? Right. Uh and you even see it on social media, um, especially given the the recent reports of the quote-unquote warnings that were given ahead of time.

Shanie 29:24

Talking

A Quick Break Disputed Territory

Shanie 29:25

about Israel has gotten so hard. People are angry and dug into their positions, and most of the time it feels like the conversation is over before it even begins. But what if we kept talking? I'm Kitty Reichmann from Israel Policy Forum, and this is Disputed Territory, a podcast for real talk about Israel.

SPEAKER_06 29:41

I don't find that shaming people works very well and getting them to listen to you. What I try to do is at least open up a space that people can listen. I also try to ask people questions to like push them to ask themselves to evaluate their own ideologies.

Shanie 29:57

We can believe that there needs to be an is a Jewish state and also work every day to make it better. And I see my work as really digging in there, trying to fix the hardest and most challenging parts of Israel. And it doesn't take away from loving it.

SPEAKER_04 30:11

You can call these things wrong, you can call these things unacceptable, one, two, et cetera, but you could not dehumanize it in church.

Shanie 30:20

We're going to talk about Zionism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jewish identity, the relationship between American Jews and Israel, and the questions that don't always have easy answers. You'll hear from people with different perspectives. Sometimes I'll agree with them and other times I won't. But that's the point.

SPEAKER_01 30:36

When I criticize Antonio and Beginfear and the settlements, and when I speak about a two-state solution, all of this is because of my love for the Jewish people.

SPEAKER_00 30:44

I feel like my responsibility is to be a diaspora Jew and to stay compassionate and to stay nuanced. Why that is so incredibly difficult in this moment, I don't know.

Shanie 30:56

I believe the conversations about Israel don't have to drive us apart. They might actually be the only productive way forward. This is disputed territory, real talk about Israel. Follow along on Apple, YouTube, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Three Years Later Many Fronts Open

Neri 31:19

Everyone is looking forward to that. Um but let's now take a step back uh and zoom out a little bit. Uh as mentioned, we're now uh not just on the three-year anniversary of October 7th, but also three-year anniversary of um this uh regional war. It's a broad question, but I'll start here. As a military analyst, um, how do you assess the current situation uh and status across all the various fronts, uh, whether Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, etc.? I mean, three years in, it seems that it's kind of on a lower flame. And yet, uh, as you've said both on this podcast and in your writings for Haaretz, none of the fronts have been closed.

Amos 31:58

So uh this is an endless war. And um it may have to do with the nature of current wars, because we see what's happening in between uh Russia and Ukraine, for instance. There's no solution there, and the war there has been going on for four and a half years, where, as you mentioned, we're uh close to our third anniversary of the war. Uh but this war uh would take time to end more than anything else because of uh domestic political reasons inside Israel. By now, the Iran event is a different matter, and Israel is by now a side actor, it's not the most important player in that kind of uh regional drama because most of the decisions are made or not made in the in DC and Washington. Uh but if we, as you mentioned, uh on all other fronts, nothing has been decided, nothing has been closed. Netanyahu can claim as much as he wants that he's actually either achieved the final and decisive victory or is very close to reaching that. It's always on the horizon. It's always, if we just turn a corner, things would improve and finally uh sold themselves out. It never materializes. In reality, uh we're close to a ceasefire on many fronts, but it's never really there. Mostly the other side is not feeling any kind of ceasefire. There are many Palestinian deaths in Gaza, many Kizbala deaths in Lebanon, many people uh out of their uh homes, driven out of their homes with the villages destroyed, whether it's uh Southern Lebanon or uh the Gaza Strip. Uh, but Israelis cannot rest uh also. Look at the number of uh reservists uh still serving more than 100 days a year. Look at what's done uh uh to the Israeli economy, look at the government overspending because of these necessities. Uh look at the national trauma regarding October 7th. Nothing has been solved. This is why it's the most important event, uh um election time. Uh so uh what you have is a number of endless wars, and Netanyahu, at the height of his um uh vanity over this about a year ago, talked of seven different frontiers. He sometimes mentioned the home front and alluded to the those uh um uh um you know uh traders from the left who are actually uh stabbing uh the good people of Israel in the back or some kind of nonsense like that. But other than that, he had a political problem in solving these issues. The only reason, and we talked about that in the pod uh in the past, the only reason that the final agreement was made regarding hostages and that all live hostages and bodies of hostages were retrieved last October was that Trump was fed up with this. That Trump was angry at Netanyahu for that failed attack against leaders of Hamas in Qatar on uh uh early September of last year. And within a month he forced Netanyahu to reach a final deal. But even then, Netanyahu avoided moving forward. Of course, Hamas as usual gave him excuses. The fact that Hamas uh refuses to dismantle its weapons and still holds to power in in Gaza means that uh Netanyahu has a perfect excuse. But Netanyahu hasn't moved forward as well because in the eyes of his voters, it would be very, very hard to explain to them why we haven't reached a final uh victory, why there's no decisive end to this war. So it's better to continue with no concessions and uh to pretend that we're very strong and not admit uh a sort of failure regarding uh uh um uh a final victory in Gaza. And in on all fronts, what you see is after the complete failure, which is the IDF's responsibility mostly, on October 7th, we've seen gradual recovery. What we managed to do to our enemies, whether it's Hamas in Gaza, whether it's Hezbollah in Lebanon, whether it's uh uh even Khutis in Yemen or especially uh the Iranian regime, is quite impressive. But in no case was this translated to um any kind of diplomatic solution. There are deals on the table, mostly in Gaza and to an extent in Lebanon, but nothing has been fully implemented, and it all has to do with his domestic problems. And then you have the implications of such an ongoing war and the fact that uh we've um uh you spread so much destruction, mostly uh Gaza and uh and Lebanon. Israel is probably in its worst situation ever in the international arena. Look at what happened to um uh to Israel on on the American uh front. Look at the recent polls on CNN, yeah, how especially young people. But this is Gaza is turning into the divisive issue for a generation, and it's Israel is not doing well. So on all of these issues, there's an impact, and we haven't felt all of it. And I think, in a way, uh the way most of the Israeli media portrays this hides the truth for most of the Israeli voters. We're not fully aware of how bad our situation abroad is, and whenever the main news channels uh report this, they tend to be self-righteous about it. It's always about those anti-Semites who don't understand the issues and so on. Now, of course, there's anti-Semitism, it's quite evident everywhere, and yet our explanations are not very convincing. And if you send uh some of the Likud ministers to explain your position uh abroad, it's no big surprise that people are not buying into uh our excuses.

Neri 37:42

Just on that point, Amos, if you were say the the head editor of you know Channel 12 or uh the head of uh the head editor of Yadio Tachonot, the big newspaper here.

Amos 37:52

There's no chance of any of these uh scenarios.

Neri 37:56

I don't even know if if you would want those jobs, but let's say in a hypothetical hypothetical world, well, maybe the paycheck, but not the job itself. Um what would you want the Israeli public to to see and to understand about the last three years of of warfare?

Israel’s Media Bubble And Global Backlash

Amos 38:13

Look, uh to to begin with, I can understand the position in the first year or so. We were traumatized as a nation. We kept digging into our own uh wounds and scars. Every day was October 7th on TV. There were, you know, there are these endless uh news cycles, and the uh night edition or evening edition uh for the most of the uh TV channels is as long as 90 or 120 minutes. And then the last 30 minutes were all about news stories from October 7th. And we were uh grieving, and this was our main focus for a very long time. But this created a sort of an information bubble. And if you'd like, uh Jews are uh from uh Mars and uh Gentiles are from Venus. This was the this was the way uh events were described. We saw only half of the picture, and that was intentional. This was the story our news channels told us uh for a very long time. It was it was never forbidden explicitly, but you couldn't see even destruction, you didn't see destruction in Gaza for a long time, not to mention kids with amputated legs or families buried alive under the rubble from Israeli bombings and so on. It was nobody said it was forbidden, but it was expected from the TV channels not to show that kind of information because people were too emotional about what has happened, and people were still worried sick about uh the danger for their kids who were fighting in Gaza, fighting this war that the the war the world uh has long uh um um ago given up on. They were still fighting there and still dying there. So there was a refusal to discuss that. And then you have the politicians. I have nothing to good to say about politicians, about Israeli politicians uh during this war. And what you have is a very different worldview, much more the the difference is much more emphasized than it was pre-October 7th. Not that at that time BBC was pro-Israel and that the uh um Channel 12 in Israel showed uh Israelis the truth about uh Israeli occupation in the West Bank. It was never the case, but suddenly the gap became uh tremendous. This is what actually happened. I think we need to understand more about what's going on. We need to uh um realize what the world's perspective is about that, and I think we need to leave room for Palestinian voices. I'm not pretending that uh Khalil Khaya, the current leader of Hamas, should be interviewed by phone from Docha on Channel 12 or Channel 13. It's not going to happen, and it shouldn't happen. But again, allow some space for Palestinian voices. I think this could have been actually worthwhile uh from an Israeli from a domestic Israeli perspective. Right now, only Haaretz gives uh some uh space for that kind of uh statement or uh sentiment. Other than that, it's it's it's out of bounds for most of the Israeli media. And then you get stories like the NASA film, and everybody's shocked. How come the world reacts in such a way? Well, the world saw a very, very different picture, somewhat exaggerated, and it did not uh emphasize enough the Israeli side, but this is what happened. It's no surprise that the world sees this very differently than we do.

Neri 41:32

Yeah, um, I mean, you and I have talked about it since I think really early in the war, this uh Israeli information bubble. Um almost kind of a grief and trauma bubble, um, understandable in certain respects, especially um they immediately after Mass up October 7th. Uh, and also the self-censorship by most of the channels here and most of the journalists here. Um that was that was a real thing.

Amos 41:54

Yeah, but it's it's not about Hezbollah. It's not about uh uh PR, or if we just explain ourselves better, uh the world will will agree. It's very simplistic, this the whole debate inside Israel, and many times it's it there are two parts of the debate. One is anti-Semitism, that's the best explanation always, and then there's the Hasbala. We don't do uh PR good enough. It's not a magic, some magic trick that some uh um uh genius uh from political campaigns can solve for us. This is much deeper uh than that. The problem is much bigger than most Israelis assume.

Neri 42:31

Yeah, uh but to your point about the let's say the current crop of Israeli politicians, they're doing husband, it just happens to be all negative. They're causing actual damage as opposed to trying to uh remedy the situation or at least attenuate uh the situation and explain Israel's point of view. Uh, that's a whole other podcast, I think.

The New Force First Security Doctrine

Neri 42:49

Umos, on the issue of kind of Israel after these last three years of war, uh, you had a very interesting uh column this past weekend uh on Israel's current national security doctrine uh with an assist from our from our mutual friend Astaf O'Reillon, uh who's also a friend of this podcast. He's been on many times. But you basically wrote that uh Israel's national security doctrine uh is almost bipolar at this point, uh, that it went from one extreme before October 7th, which is mostly containment of threats, the cautious use of force, to now the other extreme, uh especially under this current Netanyahu government, which is the constant use of force, uh seizing territory, buffer zones, um, like you said earlier, endless war almost. Uh so given what happened on October 7th, uh, and also the national trauma of the public here, um, what do you think the correct approach, the correct doctrine would be moving forward for Israel? Um, you have to fight these wars, you have to fight back against definitely Hamas and his blah and maybe others, but what would be what would be the correct approach? What would have been the correct approach?

Amos 44:00

So while denying his responsibility to anything that happened pre-October 7th, Netanyahu actually changed track almost completely after that. And he, when he explains himself, including in that speech at the UN a few days ago, he keeps uh bragging about the changes brought and how many leaders of terrorist organizations or nations he's actually managed to assassinate in recent years in retaliation for what has happened on October uh 7th and onwards. If I have to um um try to explain what the new strategy is about, they don't say it in too many words in most cases. Sometimes Israel Katz uh tends his sidekick tends to say the silent part loud. Netanyahu is much more sophisticated than that. But he is, when he talks to domestic audiences, he does brag about the fact that he's taking a proactive stance, that every danger on the horizon gets dealt with immediately using maximum force. And also he sometimes brags about uh those security zones. It's not only security zones or barriers, it's much more than that. He's actually saying or winking or alluding uh to a greater Israel. He's actually telling some of his voters look, for the first time since 67, I've imagined, I've managed to broaden Israeli borders. Suddenly we have 60% of uh uh uh uh of Gaza. Suddenly, uh in the West Bank, what Smotlich is doing and the settlers and so on, we are in much more control of areas than we used to. And of course, Syria and Lebanon. Southern Lebanon, you're aware of the situation there. And Syria, people tend to forget. Yeah, it's the the nation that was forgotten. But actually, since December uh 24, since the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel is holding on to a uh security zone inside uh the Golan Heights, the Syrian side of the border from uh 67, 73, and also Mount Chelmon, the Syrian hilltop of Mount uh Chelmon. And there's no real justification for that. Ashawa is not an enemy of Israel, the current president. There's no real significant danger from Syria towards Israel right now. And yet, why do we do it? Because we can. This is the this is the main event. This is the new Netanyahu approach, the new strategy. Can it survive long term? I'm not so sure. It depends, like most things we've talked about, on one person, which is uh President Trump. It has to do with how much he focuses on that. Does he remember that Israel still deploys uh units inside the Syrian territory from to the east of the 73 uh border? I'm not so sure. Is he focused on that? Will there be a demand at one point or another? It depends. If he needs some kind of an achievement on a foreign uh front on the international armenia, he may force uh Netanyahu, he may coerce Netanyahu into reaching a deal on either Lebanon, Syria, or both. And in the long run, same problems I mentioned. If you deploy so many forces, what do you do with your milwimmunists, with your uh reservists? Can they hold on to 100 days a year? This is unimaginable. This is almost 30% of the year spending far away from your job and from your family. This is uh just just two days ago, uh, two reservists died in an incident and apparently uh an accident inside the Gaza Strip. So the Israeli society is paying a massive price there. And another thing that hardly gets mentioned is that this ongoing war means no solution on any front. You can be surprised every day, there can be escalation every day. People are not feeling safe. Some hard-line liquid voters would tell you, look at how things have improved. Everybody is frightened of us. Is this a good thing necessarily? Can you live uh um relatively uh calmly under these circumstances in the long run? I don't think so. The absolute refusal to reach any kind of deal is problematic. And now I'm not, I don't have any illusions. It would be very, very hard to reach a final deal on the Palestinian conflict. It's almost unheard of. And who speaks up uh uh any longer about the two-state solution? It's not on the horizon at all. But this insistence on fighting long wars all the time and actually pretending to enjoy it is something that I find quite strange. But this is the this is the current reality. This is what he's trying to sell. As usual, he does it in a more sophisticated way than Katz. Katz is just celebrating the fact that he can uh take pictures of himself with uh of himself with uh brave fighters and so on. Um every week he goes somewhere else and uh and and delivers photos from those events. Other than that, he's unimportant. Uh, but it's interesting to see what kind of a corner Netanyahu painted himself into. This is it's quite interesting. His current situation is quite different than uh the way he described things a few years back. Now, in order for him to continue with this trick, it's actually these are illusions in the end. And the way to mislead the public is to keep pretending that we're stronger than anybody else and that we're very, very close to a massive victory. Iran, how many promises did we hear that Iran would end very, very soon from Trump, from Netanyahu, and so on? In reality, we know Trump may decide to go back to war, but it has almost nothing to do with Netanyahu by now. And as we speak, this may change. As we speak, we also see Trump's refusal to back Netanyahu during the elections. It's either because he's angry at him for dragging him into the uh Iranian fiasco, I mean uh for the time being, uh since February, or because he doesn't like losers and he feels that there's a chance that Netanyahu would actually lose this uh in a month's time.

Neri 50:02

So the Trump angle is really interesting. Um it remains to be seen if, regardless of the outcome of next month's election, whether he actually uh does force an Israeli government into some kind of withdrawal, to some kind of compromise on one of the fronts at least. But uh like you said, Amos, uh Netanyahu is running, um, it's hard to believe, but he's running his main pitch is uh vote for me, I'll finish the job. Right? It hasn't I didn't really finish the job over the past three years, even though I promised total victory uh for the past three years. But if you vote for me again, I'll finish the job, and by the way, we'll we'll really topple the Iranian regime uh next year. That's essentially what it is.

Amos 50:42

It's just around the corner.

Neri 50:43

Just around the corner, just like total victory over Hamas was around the corner for for months and months and months. Um but from the sound of it, you don't think that the current national security doctrine, as it developed after October 7th under this government, is sustainable. I mean, in economic costs and and social cost, and you can't just keep it up.

Amos 51:05

I

Reservists Outposts And The Long War

Amos 51:06

I think it's impossible to sustain. I've learned not to make predictions regarding the reservists, because I felt a long time ago that uh there's a danger of collapse there, that people would just say no at one point because this is really uh impossible. And yet we see time after time that a lot of these reservists are still committed to the cause, whether they have right-wing beliefs to begin with, or because they are still under the shock of October 7th and feel themselves morally committed to correcting what went uh wrong and are willing, still willing to sacrifice. So thankfully, we don't see a collapse regarding their uh reservist uh unit. And yet I think this is taking it too far. Four years of this would be much too far. I'm in the process of writing a story about Israel's different uh frontiers. And I went uh to uh the the uh the Lebanon border and inside Lebanon and to the Gaza Strip a couple of times recently, the West Bank, uh Golan Heights, uh Jordan Valley, and so on. And one of the interesting um conversations I had was with a commander on the Lebanese front, and he talked of this paradox between the lessons of October 7th, which meant that he needed to have his men between uh the danger, the threat from Hezbollah, and the Israeli residents on the other side of the border, which was a lesson apparently from October 7th. You could not put the civilian communities along the border and hope that they would be protected uh in any scenario. On the other hand, he was a veteran of Israel's war of uh the the mid-90s and late 90s when we had a security which Out Balak decided to evacuate in uh May 2000. And he said, I've been there, I've done that, I don't want to repeat the same mistakes. Not the logistics, not building uh dozens and dozens of uh outposts, not uh bringing in more and more cement in order to protect the troops. I know I've I've seen this movie, I know how it ends. So this was an interesting uh position he took, uh uh this dilemma between the two poles, if you'd like, of Israeli strategy. On the one hand, the fear of getting yourself entangled in such a mess again, the way it happened in the 90s. On the other hand, the fear of repeating October 7th. Now, when I went to the Gaza Strip and talked to other commanders, they had no such dilemma. For them, it was very, very clear that Israel needed to stay inside. And you know, there are more than 40 new Israeli military outposts in the Gaza Strip, which is uh a very significant change. It's true that many have been dismantled uh when Israel withdrew from some of the territory, and yet the remaining territory, dozens and dozens of outposts, thousands and thousands of soldiers. This is a very new reality. And perhaps this is because Gaza is the main scene of the crime. When this happened and when the memory is so fresh, nobody's willing to take any kind of uh uh chances about that.

Neri 54:23

Yeah, zero chances, zero margin for error. Uh but like you said, um, it's one thing to hold outposts inside Gaza, but for how long? Forever. I mean, maybe some here would would love that. And then you send in a few Israeli civilians, set up a set up a settler outpost. What could go wrong? What could go wrong? I mean, you know, we've we've seen this movie for 50 plus years. Um Amos, final question for you, uh, and it's one I get asked uh constantly, as I'm sure you do, by uh officials, diplomats, and analysts, uh especially outside of Israel, uh, who are all waiting for October 27th almost as much as uh as we are.

If Netanyahu Loses What Changes

Neri 55:03

Uh and the question is this uh let's say the opposition wins next month, uh not a given, but let's play this out. Uh under a new Israeli government, uh, what do you think actually changes and also what doesn't change uh in terms of Israeli foreign policy and Israeli security policy? What do you think?

Amos 55:22

So regarding strategy, I'm not so sure if things would change so rapidly and so massively. Because in the end, there's a difference between a government led by Eisencott and Bennett, for instance, and the Netanyahu government. First of all, you don't have Beng Vilon Smotlic on board, which is a big improvement, in my view, and also in the eyes of the international community. And yet, because the public has moved to the right, and because of the trauma of October 7th, even a centerist government, I wouldn't call it a center-left government because Bennett and Lieberman are right wing, would not be willing to take too many chances, uh unilateral uh withdrawals, uh uh going back to the two-state solution. This is not going to happen. If somebody, for instance, imagines that a government led by Eisencourt would agree to investigations uh um ordered by uh the International Court in Hague over Israeli conduct in the Gaza, if somebody thinks that this would happen, it's not going to happen in a million years. This is not something that an Israeli government uh would uh would uh approve of or would be on board for. On the other hand, there are simple issues that could be dealt with. Uh the best example for that is something that we've hardly mentioned, some arena, an arena we hardly mentioned, which is the West Bank. There has been a massive change in the last four years in the West Bank, and besides Small Twitch is mostly responsible. Uh the settlers uh had uh the full backing of the government, which turned a blind eye to settler violence as well. And in some areas, this went all the way towards something that I would have to uh uh portray as uh ethnic cleansing or an attempt for ethnic cleansing of certain Bedouin mostly, nomad communities uh among Palestinians. And this has been pushed forward intentionally with Netanyahu every now and then saying that this are confused uh youth behind this. Maybe it's uh a hundred uh young boys who who need to be restrained.

Neri 57:29

Initially you said it was uh like 70 uh delinquents, and now uh now it's 150 and counting.

Amos 57:37

Yeah. In reality, uh most of the security services uh people I talk to assume that it's more over a thousand people, and they get the backing of tens of thousands behind them. And mostly they get uh the government and the police allowing this to happen. So, here, for instance, I'm not sure that an Isengard government would dismantle illegal uh uh outposts immediately, but they won't um help build new ones, at least. Uh they would uh go back to arresting people who are uh suspected of attacks against Palestinians. Uh they would tell Shin Bet to start uh behaving like it was its problem, something that the current chief of Shin Bet, David Zini, is uh is avoiding intentionally. So there will be changes there. And also Lebanon and Syria, which we mentioned, there could be some kind of a relief there. Gaza, again, I don't see an Eisencott government withdrawing for completely from Gaza, but perhaps there's no immediate sign of this of pressure on Israel to do so. If Israel makes some positive steps, perhaps Trump can live with that. Perhaps the International Peace Council could live with that as well. Iran, it's not an Israeli decision. It's about Trump and what he what he does. So it's a matter of style, it's a matter of statements. It has to do with the personas. Eisencott is different than Anthaniel. Uh, people like Bennett and Golan, of course, are very, very different from Benville and Smotovich. There could be a change there, but it's not going to be as massive as some people in the West hope. And it's not going to change everything completely at the same time immediately. This is not the way things are done here. But at least there will be some chance of reversing course about these matters. And that's that's that's quite something. If it happens, I'm not sure it happens. If we look at the current polls, for the time being, it seems evident that it's that Netanyahu isn't capable of uh reaching a majority. Right. And yet perhaps reaching another deadlock and preventing the other camp, the other bloc, from uh reaching uh um uh a final victory, that that may be in the cards, and that could be very frustrating because that would mean another uh elections in uh six months and an interim government led by Netanyahu for that period. That could be quite dangerous for Israel.

Neri 1:00:04

Aaron Ross Powell Very dangerous. I mean, hopefully the opposition, even if they don't win outright, they replace the government. Um I mean, hopefully they go farther and and use at least one of the Arab-Israeli parties to to do that. I mean, this is this is a political analysis. That's not why we brought you on, Amos, but uh obviously everyone is is talking about the various scenarios um after October 27th. Um as you said earlier, let's hope for the best and expect the worst, but let's hope for the best to start off with. Thank you very much, Amos Khaxamech. Talk to you soon.

Amos 1:00:37

Thank you, Khaxamech.

Final Thanks And How To Reach Us

Neri 1:00:39

Okay, thanks again to Amos Arell for the generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, Jacob Gilman, and our editor, Tracy Levy, as always, and to all of you who support Israel Policy Forum's work. Just a reminder, you can email us with any feedback or questions, even anonymously, at policypod at ipforum.org. That's policypod at ipforum.org. We always love to hear from you. And do consider making a donation to Israel Policy Forum, certainly being a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast. And most importantly, thank you for listening. Please subscribe and spread the word. And Chakzamach, once again, upcoming to all those celebrating.